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Abstract 
 
In the 40 years since the end of World War II, the most critical strategic problem for the US 
was containment of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, scholars and experts focused on 
building deterrence theories on how to confront communist aggression. In comparison, the 
theory of diplomatic coercion, which tries to use threats or a limited amount of force to 
influence the behaviour of another by making it choose to comply, was popular neither 
among decision-makers nor scholars. Since a favourable international environment for 
applying coercive diplomacy began after the Cold War finished in the 1990s, coercive 
diplomacy and the coercion literature have proved to be less rich and less cumulative than 
that of other political theories.  
 
However, regardless of this weak enthusiasm for it, the concept of coercion was adopted as 
state foreign policy and diplomatic coercion was executed as a strategy. The US 
administrations after the fall of the Soviet Union have implemented coercive diplomacy to 
influence their adversaries. The non-proliferation policy of the US was no exception. 
Regardless of the differences in the doctrines and policies of each administration, Clinton, 
Bush and Obama had a consistent policy on nuclear non-proliferation. Having become the 
hegemonic state of unipolar system with the ability to conduct a war in any place in the 
world, the execution of coercion was the most convenient policy strategy for the US among 
the other alternatives. From a basis of dominant military strength and economic power, the 
Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations attempted to dismantle the nuclear programmes of 
Iran and North Korea by every conceivable means, utilizing hard power, soft power and 
smart power. The coercive, non-coercive and persuasive inducements of coercive diplomacy 
were applied to stop these nuclear programmes.  
 
None of the administrations allowed the full fledge nuclear programmes of Iran and North 
Korea. Instead, they labelled Iran and North Korea rogue states or ‘axis of evil’ during the 
span of the three presidents. Admittedly, the Obama administration showed differences in 
terms of rhetoric, but the ‘strategic patience’ which it applied to Iran and North Korea during 
its first term was not much different from the policy of its predecessors. Moreover, Obama 
applied the most severe economic sanctions, which even prohibited the Iranian oil trade. 
However, the coercive diplomacy of the US administrations did not have tangible success in 
iv 
 
disarming these states of their nuclear programmes; instead, they increased their nuclear 
capabilities. Although a nuclear deal has recently been reached in the Iranian case, it will take 
a process lasting 15 years to complete the settlement. It seems that US coercive diplomacy is 
most likely to be maintained during this period. This study focuses on the non-proliferation 
coercive diplomacy of the US against the ‘axis of evil’ of Iran and North Korea and their 
counterstrategies in order to examine the dispute process as a whole and to provide more 
efficient policy proposals regarding the subject.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
On 15 July 2015, a nuclear negotiation which had lasted 13 years finally reached a 
historic agreement. However, as Hillary Clinton stated in Iowa “… this president and the 
next president have the tools, resources and support to send a clear message to Iran: 
Cheat and you will pay. And when you threaten the region and Israel, you threaten 
America. We will keep confronting you on human rights and terrorism. And make no 
mistakes, we will never allow you to acquire a nuclear weapon. Not just during the term 
of this agreement – never.” 1  The nuclear deal is an ongoing project rather than a 
completed settlement. As is stipulated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, there 
are15 years of bumpy road ahead. Certainly, reaching a nuclear deal is a great start but 
no one knows whether it will turn out to be one small step or one giant leap.  
 
The success of nuclear non-proliferation all depends on will and the knowledge 
accumulated from past failures. One should remember the agreed Geneva framework for 
a 10-year process and how it ended. This chapter therefore focuses on the context of  
research for a general understanding of US non-proliferation policy toward Iran and 
North Korea. Moreover, the chapter explains the purpose and the extent of the research 
to give an understanding of the conceptual framework of the thesis and the model 
employed in the following chapters. 
 
1.1 Background to the Research  
 
Two regions of the world especially giving non-proliferation analysts concern are the 
Middle East and East Asia. In the Middle East, Israel possesses nuclear weapons, Iran is 
seeking to achieve a fuel cycle with the capability of producing a weapon, and Syria 
built a covert nuclear reactor which was later destroyed by Israeli aircraft. In East Asia, 
North Korea already possess dozens of bombs and maintains its nuclear armament 
                                                                
1 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at Wing Ding Dinner in Clear Lake, Iowa”, MSNBC, Aug 14, 2015. 
http://www.msnbc.com/shift/watch/live-dem-hopefuls-attend-wing-ding-dinner-505079363795 
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programme despite increasing pressure from the international community. Setting aside 
the issue of the Israeli nuclear policy of ‘Non-Denial, Non-Confirmation’ and Syrian 
nuclear ambitions, the problem comes down to the nuclear programme of the ‘axis of 
evil’ being the imminent threat to global nuclear non-proliferation. 
The nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea have long histories of sanctions and 
military threats from the international community. However, pressure from the 
international community, which is mostly led by the US, has not shown tangible success 
in dismantling their nuclear programmes nor in halting their development. Although the 
nuclear deal with Iran has been reached, Iran is still proclaiming its rights to operate a 
nuclear reactor and enrich uranium, which carries the potential of transforming into a 
weapons programme. North Korea is a ‘de facto’ nuclear state maintaining a nuclear 
weapons programme. 
Although the two countries, Iran and North Korea, that are causing most concern2 to 
non-proliferation experts are in different regions and it may seem irrational to seek a 
common solution to address the problem, the two countries share many common 
features, such as the environment, the dynamics of international politics and the 
necessity of a nuclear programme for their national interest. Moreover, after the Cold 
War, the nuclear programmes of both countries progressed despite the same US coercive 
non-proliferation strategy and both have obtained a certain degree of success in keeping 
their nuclear programmes by countering US coercion.   
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 signalled the 
unexpected end of the Cold War. New agendas emerged along with the transformation 
of the international environment: the rise and transmogrification of terrorism, 
international disintegration manifested in the Balkans, nuclear proliferation and the 
encroachment of human rights. With the main threat – the Soviet Union – gone, there 
needed to be a change in US identity and foreign policy. Although George Bush Sr. 
announced that a ‘New World Order’ would harmonize with international organizations 
and its force would only be exercised for humanitarian intervention, alternative 
narratives continued to construct US foreign policy as imperialist. The US intended to 
expand its political and economic influence after the Cold War. As the areas the US 
                                                                
2 Mark Fitzpatrick, “Iran and North Korea: The proliferation Nexus”, Survival, Vol. 48, No.1, 2006, pp. 61-80.  
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needed to keep an eye on expanded, threats against US security also became broader and 
more diverse. These included residual threats from Russia, and ones from regional 
aggressors such as Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Syria and Libya, all using the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, other WMD, and support for terrorism. After the end of the Cold War, 
as a unipolar hegemonic state, the US was much more likely to seek solutions to the 
above-mentioned security issues by means of coercive diplomacy. 3  The basic of 
coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic effort to solve disputes without actually engaging in 
war under circumstances of clear asymmetry of power. Therefore, for the US it is much 
more convenient to influence its adversaries by implementing the use of threats, limited 
force or economic sanctions. 4 
 
Admittedly, there were some cases in which the US had implemented coercive 
diplomacy during the Cold War: the Laos Crisis of 1961-1962, dealing with North 
Vietnam in 1965, the 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1963 the Cuban missile crisis. 
However, due to a possible elevation to a global war, coercive diplomacy based on the 
concept of compellence was never the US’s favourite option before the demise of the 
Soviet Union. During the Cold War the core of US foreign policy was more a deterrence 
strategy. However, as the ‘end of history’ had prevailed, the advent of a hyperpower 
changed the global strategic environment. Thus, history witnessed that coercive 
diplomacy was consistently used in US foreign policy after the Cold War.5 This study 
therefore aims to examine the US non-proliferation policy under Clinton, Bush and in 
Obama’s first term against Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes to find the 
implications for resolution not only of these disputes but also ones with potential states 
that might face US coercive diplomacy for acquiring a nuclear capability in the future.    
 
                                                                
3After becoming the hegemonic state in Unipolar system, the Series of US government policy reviews  
such as the Qurrendinial Defense Reviews, Nuclear Posture reviews and National Security strategy clearly 
indicated its use of power to deal with the security threats 
4 John M. Rothgeb Jr, Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System, New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1993, pp. 156-165. 
Richard Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Washington D.C., 1999, p. 3. 
5 Peter Viggo Jakobson, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in Alan Collins(ed.), Contemporary Security Studies, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 235-236, 240-244. 
Art, Robert J. and Cronin, Patrick M., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, Washington D.C., United States 
Institutes of Peace, 2003, pp.10-18. 
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1.2 The Purpose of the Research 
 
It was in the post-Cold War era that coercive diplomacy based on compellence theory 
became frequently used as a tool of the US foreign policy. 6 It therefore started to 
dominate academic debates and expanded to studies of various aspects of strong states’ 
foreign policy.7 The US non-proliferation policy was no exception. 
However, the compellence literature has proved to be less rich and less cumulative than 
that of its strategic counterpart, deterrence, which was well-developed during the Cold 
War. Although scholars generally agree on what is at the core of coercion, the 
compellence literature suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity as each scholar seeks to 
build their own concepts rather than refine the work of others. This is evident from the 
various terms used more or less interchangeably as synonyms for coercion: compellence, 
coercive diplomacy, military coercion, coercive military strategy, and strategic coercion. 
Regardless of its weak theoretical basis, the concept of coercion was adopted as foreign 
policy and diplomatic coercion was executed as a strategy. This study will clarify the 
concept of coercion by examining the work of previous scholars to build a 
comprehensive theoretical framework and a model with which to analyse US non-
proliferation strategy towards Iran and North Korea.  
The majority of the existing research on diplomatic coercion regarding North Korea’s 
and Iran’s nuclear programmes has focused on US foreign policy and its strategies. 
Admittedly, previous research has also utilized coercion theory to establish theoretical 
frameworks. However, it has focused on examining the US strategy of asymmetric 
deterrence and compellence, not the whole process of contention which characterises 
coercive diplomacy. The nuclear policies of Iran and North Korea are easily neglected 
and have generally been simplified as tactics of ‘brinkmanship’ or ‘muddling through.’  
Since US diplomatic coercion does not operate unilaterally, the nuclear strategies of Iran 
and North Korea have to be given the same weight to achieve a clear analysis of US 
nuclear non-proliferation compellence strategy. Although existing research has utilized 
                                                                
6 Byman, Daniel and Waxman, Matthew, The Dynamics of Coercion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 1-3. 
7 Frank Colin Douglas, “Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Regimes”, Ph.D. dissertation, 
 Columbia University, 2006, p. 16. 
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the concept of coercion to emphasize the use of US asymmetric power in its non-
proliferation policy towards Iran and North Korea, it has not been able to suggest policy 
proposals capable of achieving the dismantlement of their nuclear programmes. This is 
well depicted in <Illustration-1> below. 
                             <Illustration-1> What is Coercive Diplomacy? 
 
In the same way that every action has a reaction, when coercive diplomacy is applied by 
the coercer, there is also the coercee’s counter-coercive diplomacy. Therefore, if the 
coercee is not treated as an independent variable in a study, an accurate analysis of 
coercive diplomacy cannot be reached. If the counter-coercion strategies of Iran and 
North Korea are not treated as independent variables, a study cannot accurately evaluate 
the efficiency and validity of US non-proliferation policy towards their nuclear 
programmes.  
Iran and North Korea are not dependent variables in US coercive diplomacy. Both 
countries are agents which have their own objectives against US coercion and take 
action to maximize their interests. Thus, if this mutuality of contention is not included in 
the analysis, an efficient means or objective of US coercive diplomacy that can achieve 
a resolution is highly unlikely to be identified.  
6 
  
Moreover, existing studies of the US non-proliferation strategy towards the nuclear 
programmes of Iran and North Korea fail to include the influence of other state actors as 
independent variables in their analyses of US coercive diplomacy. The strategic 
environment around the non-proliferation policy towards Iran and North Korea is 
intertwined with the different interests of each state that has a relation with the issue. 
That is, if a study on coercive diplomacy does not include the influence of other agents 
such as Israel, China, Russia etc. on non-proliferation by Iran and North Korea, it cannot 
efficiently evaluate coercion or coercive diplomacy towards the two countries. For 
example, if the US tries to execute efficient coercive diplomacy against Iran’s nuclear 
programme, the US must consider the influence of China and Russia, which softly 
balance and support Iran. However, previous research on compellence theory or 
coercive diplomacy has not taken this into account.  
As Geoffrey Blainey argues, excessive military optimism is a vital prelude to war.8 If a 
state which has clear superiority of power calculates that the military option would bring 
an easier victory than the diplomatic alternatives, and stalemate in negotiations is only 
buying time to the benefit of the adversary, a war is highly likely to happen. Although a 
US military strike against the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea seems 
unlikely, their nuclear proliferation under the US coercive diplomacy is always a 
plausible and risky environment for a possible war. Moreover, the US has never 
removed the military option from the table in its dealings with Iran and North Korea. On 
the contrary, it has been utilized as an inducement to achieve the compliance of these 
states.        
Therefore, this research will explain the US non-proliferation policy towards Iran and 
North Korea using a comprehensive theoretical framework and a model based on 
diplomatic compellence theory. It will examine US coercive diplomacy regarding the 
nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea and their counterstrategies against the US 
to explain the causality of how US coercion failed to dismantle the nuclear programmes 
of the two countries during the post-Cold War period, which according to compellence 
theory was an optimal period for US coercive diplomacy to extend its muscles. 
                                                                
8 Geoffrey Blainey, The Cause of War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, p. 35. 
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Moreover, the theoretical framework and the model will offer understanding of policy 
implications for future US non-proliferation strategy.     
 
1.3 The Validity and the Extent of the Research 
 
As James N. Rosenau argues, the five potential influences on a state’s foreign policy are: 
1) the external environment of the international system; 2) the societal environment of 
the state; 3) the governmental structure of its policy-making process; 4) the bureaucratic 
roles occupied by individual policymakers; and 5) the personalities of foreign-policy 
officials and members of the governmental elite. 9  Therefore, research on US non-
proliferation policy after the Cold War could be performed in various way. This 
approach can also be applied to analysing the nuclear strategies of North Korea and Iran, 
which opposed the US non-proliferation coercive diplomacy aiming at the 
dismantlement of their nuclear programmes.  
Since the environment of US domestic politics, the perceptions of each president of 
these nuclear programmes and the international strategic environment regarding nuclear 
issues were all different for the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations, these various 
influences can be examined to analyse the non-proliferation policy of the US towards 
the two countries.   
Factually, Clinton’s basic policy stance of ‘engagement and enlargement’ was 
influenced by the external environment of the international system – the so-called ‘end 
of the Cold War’ – which made the US a unipolar state in the international community. 
In addition, the rapid growth of the US economy was one of the key elements that 
bolstered the ‘engagement and enlargement’ doctrine of the Clinton administration.10 
For the Bush administration, the 9/11 crisis and the domination of hard-line 
policymakers were the driving factors which formed Bush’s foreign policy of war on 
                                                                
9 James N. Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” The Scientific Study of Foreign 
Policy, Nichols Publishing Company, New York, 1980, pp. 128-133. 
10 William Clinton, National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, 1994. 
     ̶̶̶̶  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶̶̶  National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, 1995. 
     ̶̶̶̶  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶̶̶  National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, 1996. 
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terrorism and pre-emptive strikes.11 Obama’s sustained, direct and aggressive diplomacy 
which emphasized a dialogue with rogues 12  was influenced by the personalities of 
foreign policy officials and members of the governmental elite who understood ‘power’ 
as a more stereoscopic concept: ‘smart power.’ Moreover, as John Mearsheimer argues, 
the concept of ‘offshore balancing’ meant that the Obama administration could not 
execute a unilateral foreign policy as its predecessors had done due to the economic 
crisis which occurred in 2008.13 
However, with all these differences and different variables that influenced each US 
administration after the Cold War, as will be examined later in Chapters 4 and 5, the US 
non-proliferation policy towards its ‘Axis of Evil’ amounted to the implementation of 
coercive diplomacy. Since the US had become a unipolar state with the ability to 
execute a conventional war in any place in the world, the implementation of coercion 
was a more plausible policy strategy than other alternatives. On the basis of US 
dominant military strength and economic power, the Clinton, Bush and Obama 
administrations attempted to dismantle the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea 
through every conceivable means utilizing hard power, soft power and smart power. 
Thus, although there were differences among the rhetoric and the doctrines of each 
administration, the policy reviews of the Ministry of Defence, the Department of State 
and the government all reveal the use of coercive inducements such as a military 
presence, economic sanctions and threats of possible military strikes in the attempt to 
achieve complete verifiable irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the Iranian and North 
Korean nuclear programmes.   
This was ostensibly a rational choice for the US, a country that had become a 
hyperpower.14 As will be examined in the following chapters, the majority of scholars 
and politicians in the US argue that although the execution of coercive diplomacy 
against the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea might not be the optimal 
solution, it was ‘less evil’ than all the other options. Moreover, Iran and North Korea 
                                                                
11 George W. Bush, National Security Strategy, The White House, 2002. 
12 Barrack Obama, National Security Strategy, The White House, 2010. 
13 John J. Mearsheimer, “A Return to Offshore Balancing”, Newsweek, Dec 30, 2008, 
http://www.newsweek.com/return-offshore-balancing-82925  
14  Eliot A. Cohen, “History and the Hyperpower”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 4, 2004. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-07-01/history-and-hyperpower [accessed 23 
Jan 2013] 
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had both been classified as ‘rogue states,’ members of the ‘axis of evil’ and ‘state 
sponsors of terrorist groups’ since the Reagan administration. Although each 
administration evaluated the threats from North Korea and Iran at varying levels, the 
nuclear programmes of the two countries were dealt with from this perspective.  
The four major US government policy reviews, the National Security Strategy, the 
Quadrennial Defence Review,15 the Nuclear Posture Review16 and the Ballistic Missile 
Defence Review, display the hard-line stance of the US towards the nuclear programmes 
of Iran and North Korea and this does not seem likely to change dramatically in the near 
future. Fortunately, there was a historical agreement regarding the Iranian nuclear 
programme during the second term of the Obama administration, which is a period that 
this thesis does not cover. However, President Obama stated “like all families, 
sometimes there are going to be disagreements… everybody [should] keep in mind that 
we’re all pro-Israel,”17which clearly indicates that the US coercive diplomacy would 
continue regardless of whether the Iranian nuclear deal was confirmed or not. On the 
other side, although the Ayatollah Khamenei toned down his ‘Great Satan’ rhetoric 
regarding the US, Iran’s top clerical committee, the Assembly of Experts, clarified that 
the US was the main enemy of Iran’s national security. The chairman of the Assembly 
of Experts, Mohammad Yazdi, stated that “the nuclear agreement should not change our 
foreign policy of opposition to America, our number one enemy, whose crimes are 
uncountable.”18 These statements indicate that the environment of coercive and counter-
coercive diplomacy in both countries would continue. Moreover, the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action which constituted the Iran nuclear deal of 2015 is a 15-
year-long phased process which could collapse in any moment.  
                                                                
15 William Cohen, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997. 
Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001. 
    ̶̶̶̶  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶  ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶̶̶      Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
Robert M. Gates,  Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010. 
Chuck Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014. 
16 William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Defense, 1995. pp. 83-92. 
Donald Rumsfeld, Nuclear Posture Review: Excerpt, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 
2002. http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf [accessed 25 Feb 2013]. 
Robert M. Gates, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010. 
17 Tribune wire reports, “Obama expects better U.S.-Israel ties after Iran deal in place”, The Chicago 
Tribune, Aug 28, 2015 [accessed 11 Sep 2015]. 
18 Thomas Erdbrink, “U.S. Remains the 'Great Satan,' Hard-Liners in Iran Say”, New York Times, Sep 1, 
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/world/middleeast/us-remains-the-great-satan-hard-liners-in-
iran-say.html [accessed 13 Sep 2015]. 
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Since the anti-western regimes and sentiments are strongly established in Iran and North 
Korea, there are some experts who view both countries as irrational or non-rational 
actors, and refer to their leaders as ‘Mad Mullah’ and ‘Mad dog.’19 However, like any 
other state, Iran and North Korea also have multi-faceted foreign policies. Thus, many 
studies focus on various different variables such as leadership, international relations 
and domestic politics to understand their foreign policies. 
Admittedly, there are different agents within Iran and North Korea who affect the 
foreign-policy decision-making process. However, as the protection of their nuclear 
programmes and the development of nuclear capabilities are perceived as a critical 
interest and vital to the national security of both countries, their nuclear strategies were 
formed as optimal choices to confront the US coercive diplomacy that aimed at the 
CVID of their nuclear programmes. Thus, even though both Iran and North Korea 
sometimes chose to suspend their nuclear development, it basically happened within the 
framework of their counter-coercive diplomacy and the circumstances of the strategic 
environment that they faced under US coercion. Iran and North Korea never negotiated 
the dismantlement of their nuclear programmes with the US. Moreover, if Iran and 
North Korea sensed that their core interests were violated, both countries stopped their 
nuclear talks or nuclear suspension and executed counter-coercive diplomacy, which 
raised the tension and the deterrence level by developing their missile and nuclear 
capabilities.   
Since there are many variables and agents that influence the decision-making process of 
a state, there are many loopholes in postulating the state as a single agent when 
analysing its foreign policy. Despite the efforts of political scientists and the 
development of methods such as the “system approach,” the “group think model,” the 
“government politics model,” the “organizational process model” etc., one still cannot 
claim to know exactly what happens in the black box of Iran and North Korea’s foreign-
                                                                
19 Amitai Etzioni, “Can a Nuclear-Armed Iran Be Deterred?’, Military Review, 2010.  pp. 117-125; 
Michael Singh, ‘Is the Iranian regime rational?”, Foreign Policy, Feb 23, 2013. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/23/is-the-iranian-regime-rational/ [accessed 23 July 2013];  
Amitai Etzioni, Hot Spots: American Foreign Policy in a Post-Human-Rights World, Transaction 
Publishers, 2012, pp.63-75; William. O. Beeman, The Great Satan Vs. the Mad Mullahs: How the United 
States and Iran Demonize Each Other, University of Chicago Press, 2008. pp. 209-214; Matthew Kroenig, 
‘Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad Option”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, no. 1, Jan/Feb 2012, 
pp. 77-87; Hazel Smith, “Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the Securitization Paradigm Makes for 
Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea,” International Affairs, Vol. 76, No.3, 2000. pp. 593-617.  
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policy decision making. Conventionally, foreign policy is perceived as a ‘state action’ 
which a ‘state’ decides and executes in its relations with other states or the international 
community for the maximization of its interests. Thus, in the majority of papers, foreign 
policy is still easily perceived as a state’s reaction to external affairs or external 
influence based on rational choice theory.   
Due to their unique political systems, there are increasing numbers of researchers that 
emphasize ‘actor-specific theories’ in analysing the foreign policies of Iran and North 
Korea. Some studies even refuse to assume state homogeneity to understand Iran and 
North Korea since Velayat-e faqih and Juche are indigenous systems and ideologies that 
have their own values and are different from the western concepts of states and political 
systems. However, since the national security agenda involving nuclear programmes and 
strategy are issues that have to be dealt with as conventional hard politics of the state, 
there is validity in considering Iran and North Korea as unitary actors in their nuclear 
policies. As will be examined in the case study chapters, Iran and North Korea display 
rationality during the contention of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy over their 
nuclear programmes.  
Moreover, there is another critical problem involved in research on the nuclear strategies 
of Iran and North Korea using actor-specific theories and models. As Graham Allison 
and Philip Zelikow argue, a massive amount of information is needed in order to employ 
an actor-specific approach to analysing the foreign policy of a state.20  Thus, research 
which employs the actor-specific method such as Model II of the “Organizational 
behaviour model” and Model III of the “government politics model” has its limits in 
analysing a state’s foreign policy specifically related to national security issues. For 
instance, due to the confidentiality of the subject, reliable information on the decision-
making process in the nuclear programmes and the nuclear policies of Iran and North 
Korea is almost impossible for a researcher to access. However, Allison’s three models 
give a clear picture of a state’s foreign policy being decided through a process of 
contention among agents, a negotiation game between states, rather than the pursuit of 
static organizational and bureaucratic interests. This intensifies the validity of this 
research.    
                                                                
20 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,2nd ed. 
Longman, 1999, pp.385-388. 
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Arguably, the contention between the nuclear strategies of Iran and North Korea and the 
non-proliferation policy of the US proceeded within a theoretical framework of coercive 
and counter-coercive diplomacy, resulting in state foreign policy action. There was not 
much room for other agents but the state in the contention process. Although there were 
some differences in each US administration, all three US presidents shared the same 
goal of not accepting a nuclear weapon capability of Iran and North Korea, including a 
fully fledged nuclear programme which is permissible within the NPT. Similarly, Iran 
and North Korea also displayed continuity in their nuclear policies of securing their 
nuclear programmes against US coercion despite changes of leadership in their domestic 
politics.  
There is a high level of explanatory adequacy in analysing the US non-proliferation 
policy towards Iran and North Korea from the perspective of compellence and coercive 
diplomacy. This is because coercive diplomacy theory sees resolution being achieved 
through forceful persuasion, but not war, in a situation where there is clear asymmetry 
of power between the agents.  
However, apart from the question of “for or against’ coercive diplomacy, previous 
research which has examined the US non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and North 
Korea from the perspective of compellence theory falls short in a vital point. 21 An 
accurate evaluation of coercive diplomacy is arrived at when the contention between the 
coercer and coercee is comprehensively fed into the analysis. This is because, regardless 
of the power discrepancy between the two, coercive diplomacy is not just a coercer’s 
game. The coercee also employs its counter-coercive diplomacy to achieve its 
diplomatic objectives against the coercion. Thus, if the contention between the coercer 
and the coercee and how it affects the coercion process and its result are neglected, one 
                                                                
21 Robert S. Litwak, “Living with Ambiguity: Nuclear Deals with Iran and North Korea”, Survival, Vol. 
50, No.1, 2008, pp. 91-118.  
Bruce Klingner, “Time to Get North Korean Sanctions Right”, Backgrounder, No. 2850, 2013. pp. 1-10. 
Aftab Alam, “Sanctioning Iran Limits of Coercive Diplomacy”, India Quarterly, Vol.67, No.1, pp. 37–52. 
Zachary Keck, How to Make Coercion Work, The Diplomat, December 17, 2013. 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/how-to-make-coercion-work/ [Accessed 23 Jan 2014] 
Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, “Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran”, FAS Issue Brief, 
Jun2012. http://fas.org/pubs/_docs/IssueBrief-Sanctions.pdf [Accessed 15 July 2014] 
Bruce Jentleson, “Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World”, Policy Analysis 
Breif, The Stanley Foundation, Dec 2006.  
Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, Brookings 
Institution Press: Washington D.C., 2003, pp. 24-36, pp. 61-97. 
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cannot fully understand or explains the causality of the outcome of US non-proliferation 
policy towards Iran and North Korea. 
Moreover, if the US does not understand the dynamics of how the counter-coercive 
diplomacy of Iran and North Korea is formed within the theoretical framework of 
compellence and its strategic environment, it cannot execute efficient coercive 
diplomacy to achieve the compliance of Iran and North Korea.  
Indeed, the international community has a common interest and grounds to deal with the 
nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, with the aim of prohibiting their 
acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. However, despite the consensus on the 
generalities of non-proliferation, the countries neighbouring Iran and North Korea which 
have to balance US hegemony in the region also easily become a means of their counter-
coercive diplomacy against US compellence. The non-proliferation agenda which is 
supported by China and Russia cannot be identical to that of the US.  
All these subjects had to be considered within US coercive diplomacy in order to make 
the right inducements to maximize possible behavioural changes by Iran and North 
Korea. However, previous research based on coercive diplomacy has only focused on 
examining the coercers and their policy while overlooking the above-mentioned 
variables. Since successful coercive diplomacy achieves behaviour change through a 
‘stick and carrot’ approach, these other variables need to be considered within the model. 
Previous research has insufficiently unravelled the complex dynamic nature of 
compellence. Research on US non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and North Korea 
has been no exception.   
Therefore, this study aims to build a comprehensive contention model – a contention 
model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy. It will use the model to examine the 
coercive diplomacy of the US and the counter-coercive diplomacy of Iran and North 
Korea in a global strategic environment where the influence of other agents contributes 
to the group dynamics of the contention progress. Moreover, by using the results from 
the model the study aims to measure the validity of the US non-proliferation strategy in 
international conflict where there is a clear asymmetry of power between states. 
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2. Assessing the Post-Cold War US Security Strategy and Nuclear Non-
Proliferation  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
When the Bipolar system of the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, many scholars 
expected the rise of a multilateral system. Structural realists considered that US 
unilateralism would be a transitory system which would soon be replaced through a 
process of ‘balance of power.’22 Since the Soviet Union had collapsed due to its imperial 
overreach, there was an overflowing of scepticism about the US unilateral system.23 The 
depression of the US economy at the time was also a critical point which bolstered the 
argument. Moreover, there seemed to be a possible advent of a Japanese era, which 
could be compared with the rise of China in recent years.24 As Charles A. Kupchan 
shows, some scholars predicted that the US unipolar system, which had come about 
through the unexpected demise of the Soviet Union, would be tempered by a decrease in 
US will to intervene in international affairs. Therefore, they predicted that a multilateral 
system would be formed through Europe balancing the power of the US and Asia filling 
any power vacuum.25    
 
However, while Francis Fukuyama declared that it was ‘the end of history’ after the fall 
of its mighty foe,26 the US demonstrated its presence as a unipolar hegemonic state.27  
The decades of the post-Cold War period were managed behind a US lead. With the 
booming of its economy, the US had become not only the unilateral military hegemon 
but a unipolar state with the capability of extending both its soft and hard power across 
                                                                
22 Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise, International Security, 
Vol. 17, No. 4, 1993, pp. 5-51; and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, 
International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1993, pp. 44-79. 
23  Paul M. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000, Knoph Publishing Group, 1989. 
24 Samuel P. Huntington, Why International Primacy Matters, International Security 17, No. 4, 1993, 
pp.68-83; Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
1985; Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No, New York: Harper and Row, 1991 
25 Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st 
Century, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2002. 
26 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, HarperCollins Publishers, 1993. 
27 Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, 1990, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 25-33. 
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the international community.28  
 
The US aimed to build a ‘new world order’ that could guarantee its unipolar hegemony 
in the transition of the global security environment at the advent of a new century. The 
policy reviews and papers of three US administrations after the Cold War, those of 
Clinton, Bush and Obama, clearly displayed its intention to keep its unilateral 
hegemonic status. This intention was shown in Clinton’s engagement and enlargement, 
Bush’s policy of ending tyranny and spreading democracy and Obama’s renewal of 
global leadership in a ‘new era of engagement.’29  
 
Admittedly, with the 2008 global economic crisis, the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq 
and hesitation over Libyan intervention, it seemed the US unilateral hegemonic status was 
on the wane during the first term of Obama. Although the Obama administration had its 
own foreign policy initiatives, which could be described as a progressive pragmatism, they 
were evaluated as mere damage control but lacking grand strategy.30 However, with the 
Obama administration’s aim of “building at home, shaping abroad,”31 set out in its 2010 
National Security Strategy, the US clearly showed its strategy of “offshore balancing” by 
maximizing its geopolitical strength to keep its unilateral hegemonic status.32  
 
As the US economy recovered from its financial deficit, unemployment and energy 
dependency through the shale revolution,33 the Obama administration released its 2015 
National Security Strategy, which stated its intention of more US engagement with the 
international community to secure US unilateral hegemonic power: “Today, the United 
States is stronger and better positioned to seize the opportunities of a still new century 
and safeguard our interests against the risks of an insecure world.”34 
 
                                                                
28 William F. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security 24, No.1, 1999, pp. 5-
41. 
29 Barack Obama, Renewing American Leadership, Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, No.4, 2007, pp. 2-16.  
30 Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Bending History: Barack Obama’s 
Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, 2012. 
31 Barrack Obama, National Security Strategy, The White House, 2010. 
32 Christopher Layne, “Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”, 
International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997, pp. 86-126. 
33  Edward Crooks, “The US Shale Revolution”, Financial Times, Apr 24, 2015. 
https://www.ft.com/content/2ded7416-e930-11e4-a71a-00144feab7de [assessed on 25 May 2015] 
34 Barrack Obama, National Security Strategy, The White House, 2015. 
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Since the US lost a certain amount of its credibility among the international community 
with its 2003 Iraq invasion35 and the rise of China, there were analyses that the US 
unilateral hegemonic status would be degraded.36 However, there is still no ‘constraint 
structure’ which could damage US unilateralism. Moreover, in the global security 
environment of the 21st century where there is no player capable of substituting US 
hegemony, the strong will of the US to sustain its superiority and unilateralism cannot 
be ignored even if US power has actually decreased. In particular, in a situation in which 
there are many analyses viewing China’s potential to become a partner in a new G2 
being hindered by it facing the middle income trap, 37  the hyper-power or hyper-
puissance of the US will continue for a considerable period of time.38  
 
Therefore, this chapter will study US security strategy and its non-proliferation policy in 
more detail. It will bring better understanding of why it is important to contemplate US 
non-proliferation policy through the conceptual lens of coercive diplomacy within a US 
unipolar system. Moreover, the chapter will examine the validity of applying the 
framework of coercive diplomacy to Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes and 
why these two cases should be dealt with together. 
 
2.2 The Post-Cold War US Security Strategy  
 
2.2.1 The Pursuit of US Hegemony as a Unipolar Power 
 
After the demise of the Soviet Union, the US has become the unrivalled state in 
international politics. Despite the expectation of scholars that the post-Cold War system 
would be multilateral rather than unilateral, the splendid economic growth during the 
                                                                
35 Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack Iraq,” The Wall Street Journal, Aug 15, 2002. http://ebird.dtic.mil/ 
Aug2002/e20020815dont.htm. 
36 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “U.S. Military Hegemony in the Arabian/Persian Gulf: How Long Can It Last?”, 
International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2003, pp.186-190 ; Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the 
American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2002. 
37 Wing Thye Woo, “China meets the middle-income trap: the large potholes in the road to catching-up”, 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, Vol. 10, No.4, pp. 313-336; Linxiu Zhang, Hongmei 
Yi, Renfu Luo, Changfang Liu and Scott Rozelle, “The human capital roots of the middle income trap: the 
case of China”, Agricultural Economics, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 151-162. 
38  Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the 
Challenge of American Primacy, Princeton University Press, 2008, pp. 13-15; G. John Ikenberry, ed., America 
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Clinton administration39 made the US a hyper-power state.40 The accumulated wealth 
made the Bush administration able to implement a two-war strategy as a unipolar 
hegemonic state.  Although the 2008 financial crisis hit the US hard and made its 
unipolar hegemony falter, the resilience of the US economy and the growth slump in 
China, the only potential rising state that could challenge US unipolar hegemony, made 
its eclipse seem highly unlikely in the next few decades.  
 
Various indices show that US unipolar hegemony should be sustained for a considerable 
period of time. From 2001 to 2015, the US created approximately a quarter of world 
total GDP and it produced a national GDP of 17.9 trillion dollars in 2015.41 Its national 
defence budget in 2015 was $598.5 billion dollars, which is equivalent to the total for 
the next top 11 military powers.42 Among them, seven countries – Saudi Arabia, the 
United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, South Korea and Australia – have signed 
collective defence arrangements with the US and created military alliances. These 
indices clearly testify to the firm unipolar hegemonic status of the US.  
 
However, although the bipolar system of the Cold War collapsed decades ago, world 
politics has not yet settled into being a unipolar system. The current world political system 
seems “transitional and amorphous.” 43 Nevertheless, despite uncertainty about complete 
settlement of the US unipolar system, US power among the international community is 
extensive and comprehensive. Moreover, there is no alliance in the making or state that 
could challenge US unipolar hegemony. Even China, which is perceived to be the front 
runner to compete with US hegemony, would seem to need decades to become the real G2 
in the international system due to its economic slump.44 While it may not be plausible to 
consider the post-Cold War international system as a US unipolar structure, no one can deny 
US unilateral hegemony and its influence on the international community.  
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With its nemesis gone, from George H. W. Bush to Obama the US sought to build a 
‘new world order’ that could establish US hegemony in a unipolar system.  The H. W. 
Bush administration stated that it was “ensuring that no hostile power is able to 
dominate or control a region critical to our interests; and, working to avoid conflict by 
reducing sources of regional instability and violence, limiting the proliferation of 
advanced military technology and weapons of mass destruction, and strengthening civil-
military institutions,” and the US started to utilize its military, diplomatic and economic 
assets not only to deter possible elements of security threats but also to coerce them to 
comply with US interests. The US is no longer shackled by its containment and 
deterrence strategy against the Soviet Union and now can stretch its influence without 
worrying about World War III.   
 
2.2.2 The Compellence Strategy Era 
 
The end of the Cold War bipolar system brought an abrupt change in US foreign 
policy’s grand strategy: deterrence of the Soviet Union. However, the US had to face a 
rapid transformation of the international security environment and with it new threats 
which it had not needed to consider under the bipolar system. 
 
The top priority in US security strategy was no longer containment or deterrence of the 
Soviet Union. It had to determine an appropriate strategy and force structure for the new 
era and to continue to properly manage the post-Cold War reduction of its armed forces 
without sacrificing its readiness for those forces to respond to threats in an increasingly 
complex world.45  
 
As the Warsaw Treaty Organization dissolved, the US had to amend its deterrence 
strategy accordingly. A withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons and a redeployment of 
US forces all around the world were inevitable. Therefore, tension rose among the 
regional hegemons such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom etc. over how to 
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achieve a balance of power in the vacuum created. Moreover, the absence of the Soviet 
Union led to ethnic strife and refugee problems in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union’s 
nuclear warheads that were left in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan and consequent 
possible nuclear proliferation became new challenges for US national security too. The 
terrorism which grew in this newly created environment also became an important US 
security issue. However, none of these problems were considered serious security threats 
to the US and were not dealt with in the same way as the security agenda during the 
Cold War period.    
 
With the arrival of the new international security environment and the ensuing problems, 
the US decided to actively intervene to eradicate potential security treats by coercing 
behavioural change in the agents involved. The Clinton administration took the initiative 
to reformulate policies for the use or threat of use of military power in the US military 
and security strategy. 46 In order to achieve its aim, the US redeployed its military forces 
and elaborated an implementation plan.  
 
The US was aware that strengthening its compellence strategy in this unipolar 
environment would lead to criticism that it was acting imperially. Therefore, it tried to 
achieve agreements with international organizations such as the NPT to make 
intervention a more legitimate and delicate tool. However, as witnessed in Panama and 
with the 2003 Iraq invasion, the US clearly sought to secure its unipolar hegemony and 
implemented the foreign policy which utilized its military strength to compel the 
adversaries.  
  
Apart from its military interventions, the US employed various means to execute its 
compellence strategy. Although there were differences of degree in how hard the US would 
implement its measures, all the US administrations after the Cold War commonly emphasized 
the spread of democracy, the promotion of economic ties and the enlargement of international 
institutions. As the unipolar hegemonic state, the US started to employ more than a deterrence 
strategy. In order to achieve the necessary coercion, it set out four major action plans.   
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2.2.2.1 The Spread of Democracy 
 
The spread of democracy is the most notable example of the US compellence strategy 
and is based on democratic peace theory.  As Jack S. Levi argues, “The absence of war 
between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in 
international relations.”47 Thus, the US policymakers believed the spread of democracy 
would reduce international conflict and provocation.   
 
Democratic peace theory has been criticized by scholars critical of liberal 
internationalism who doubt the existence of a possible quantitative methodology to 
prove the theory.48 However, despite this criticism the US set the spread of democracy 
as a core value in its foreign security policy and executed coercive diplomacy by 
implementing economic sanctions and military intervention.  
 
With an increase in the number of studies not treating democratic peace theory as an 
‘iron law’ and quantitative studies on how democracy affects state conflict, 49  US 
coercive policy to ‘spread democracy’ started to secure its theoretical ground.   
 
Democratic peace theory, which interprets democratic peace phenomena, can be divided 
into two categories: “structural/institutional” and “cultural/normative.” 50  The 
“structural/institutional” interpretation sees the democratic system and its institutions as 
key.  This logic is well-explained by Robert Putnam, who states “Any key player at the 
international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, and 
conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks 
being evicted from his seat.”51 Thus, the leaders of democratic states have to play a two-
level game that simultaneously maximizes the national interest by negotiating with other 
state leaders at the international level and persuades domestic interest groups to accept 
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the result. Since democracy has checks and balances on authority and power through 
elections and public opinion, structural/institutional democratic peace theory holds that 
peace is naturally achieved through the democratic decision-making process. That is, 
since the citizen is a rational actor who does not wish to pay the price of war, rational 
decision makers who have to win their representativeness via the citizen’s vote have a 
tendency to avoid war.  
 
The cultural/normative interpretation considers that peaceful conflict resolution between 
states is more likely to happen among democratic countries that share the same values 
and norms of democratic culture. Decision makers in democratic states have a tendency 
to utilize diplomatic means and dialogue rather than violence and force to resolve 
conflicts.  
 
However, there are scholars who criticize these distinctions. James L. Ray argues that 
this analytical categorization of democratic peace theory is neither clear nor important.52 
However, Maoz and Russett point out that the analytical separation between the 
“structural/institutional” and “cultural/normative” schools is based on different 
approaches and methodology, providing more variety to the understanding of democratic 
peace theory.  They argue that the “structural/institutional” interpretation is based on 
economic ‘rational choice theory’ whereas the “cultural/normative” interpretation 
utilizes sociological methodology to focus on sociocultural variables.53 
 
In-depth studies of democratic peace theory inspired the US with confidence to 
implement the ‘spread of democracy’ as it action plan for securing US unilateral 
hegemony. The US believes its core values are economic liberalism and democracy, and 
the ‘spread of democracy’ assumes that political leaders and people are rational. The 
assumption that their pursuit of self-interest combined with the normative value of 
democracy will reduce security threats is therefore indispensable for the US.54 
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After the Cold War, the US consistently emphasized the strategic importance of the 
“spread of democracy”. The Bush administration in particular argued that the promotion 
of democracy is the most efficient long-term plan to bring peace among strong states 
and eradicate fundamental terrorism. 55 Although the US’s spread of democracy was 
faced with unexpected difficulties and side effects in Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine 
etc., it has remained in place as US foreign policy.    
 
The US consistently expanded the alliance of democracy,56 which is based on the normative 
assumption that states which share the value of democracy will enjoy close cooperation.57 
Since it seems that a network of alliances can be built more strongly among democratic 
states, the US attempted to intensify its alliances by spreading the democratic system to deal 
with security problems. As a result of efforts by US administrations, the eastern European 
countries that were once members of the Warsaw Pact became member states of NATO: 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia. 
 
2.2.2.2 The Enlargement of Economic Relations  
 
Along with the ‘spread of democracy,’ the US utilized trade and investment as tools in 
its coercive foreign policy.58 It tried to sign free trade agreements with its allies and 
security alliance partners to expand the common ground of economic interest. This was 
based on the expectation that with greater economic interdependency the incentives for 
diplomatic and security cooperation would also increase.59 The US believed it would 
thus strengthen its unipolar hegemony in the international system.  
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Although there are controversies over the Washington consensus, it could be an example 
of a US structural attempt to enlarge its economic relations.60 However, Moises Naim 
states, “It is also worth remembering that the belief that a less developed country could 
not really benefit from freer international trade and investment was, and to a certain 
extent continues to be, widely held in these countries. Therefore, the prescription of the 
Washington Consensus that government-imposed barriers to imports and exports, to 
foreign investment, and to foreign currency transactions had to be lifted was sharply at 
odds with the long-held conviction that developing countries had to protect their 
economies from an unfair and exploitative international system rigged against them.”61 
The Washington consensus thus has some elements of the US utilizing FTAs and trade 
as foreign policy. Moreover, with enlarged economic blocs, economic sanctions and 
conditional economic incentives were used as inducements to coerce behavioural change 
in US adversary states.  Iran and North Korea were typical examples.  
 
The US also made the best use of enlargement of economic relations as a solution to 
global terrorism. In order to minimize the social economic unrest caused by poverty, 
which is believed to reinforce terrorism, the US argued that economic development 
assistance to the third world would reduce global economic inequality, and therefore 
terrorism. 
 
2.2.2.3 The Enlargement of International Institutions and Regimes 
 
 
The importance of international institutions and regimes has progressively intensified in 
international relations and politics. The US has taken advantage of this and utilized it as 
a means of its foreign policy.62 In order to expand free trade and enhance the efficient 
management of the global economy, the US has supported and strengthened the 
establishment of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the 
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World Bank, the International Monetary Fund etc.  
 
The nuclear non-proliferation issue is a case in point. The international non-proliferation 
treaty and regime were established to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
However, since the NPT regime allows the peaceful use of nuclear energy, there are grey 
areas and weak points in the complete prevention of state nuclear armament. Thus, the 
US actively reinforces the NPT regime and complements the NPT measures to counter 
nuclear proliferation. The implementation of 93 + 2 additional protocols is a typical 
example. After witnessing Iraq’s shocking development of a nuclear capability during 
the first Gulf War, the NPT allowed member state intelligence information to be used as 
a source for the accurate inspection and surveillance of nuclear facilities and 
programmes.63 This gave the US more room to implement its foreign policy because of 
the information asymmetry created by the superiority of the US intelligence agencies.  
 
Moreover, the US initiated a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to control the spread 
of nuclear-related materials. The PSI is not a free-standing initiative but builds on wider 
efforts by the international community through existing treaties and regimes. It was 
launched in 2003 and is now endorsed by 103 countries including Russia.64 It is not a 
legally binding agreement or treaty, but the US purpose of making it a global standard 
measure for non-proliferation is clear. 65  In addition, the US has also utilized the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime and 
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to strengthen its compellence 
strategy.  
 
The US made use of international institutions to secure its objective, the unipolar 
hegemony. To maximize its national interests, it wanted to strengthen the international 
regime through building close cooperation systems among the democratic states. The 
establishment of the Community of Democracies in 2000 and the 2004 establishment of 
the Democracy Caucus in the UN are examples of how the US planned to combine the 
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‘spread of democracy’ through enlarged international institutions.  
 
2.2.2.4 Securing US Military Superiority and Escalation Dominance 
 
 
The US compellence strategy is clearly revealed in its military doctrine and policy. The 
US believes it must sustain the absolute superiority of its military strength to confront 
the rise of potential adversaries and security threats. In order to stabilize the world order 
under US unipolar hegemony, it retains the possibility of pre-emptive strikes, the 
unilateral use of military means and even pre-emptive war. Moreover, countries that are 
labelled part of the ‘axis of evil’ and ‘rogue states’ are not given any negative assurance 
by the US. That is, the US would use its nuclear arms to attack countries such as Iran 
and North Korea.   
 
 After the Cold War, the US transformed its military forces to effectively respond to the new 
international security environment. It redeployed the US forces stationed abroad and 
reorganized its forces into lighter, faster and effective military operation systems.66  The 
vision was to maximize US capability of prompt intervention against any potential security 
threat.67 In order to achieve this goal, it enhanced its capabilities of airlift transportation, 
long-range precision strikes and naval-based power projection. Moreover, it tried to 
establish an “Afghanistan model” that could facilitate prompt and easy intervention in 
regional conflicts and against threats.68 
 
In addition to its development of conventional military power and operation systems, the 
US enhanced its asymmetric warfare capabilities. Strategic bombers, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles – the “nuclear triad” – were 
retained even under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia. In the post-
Cold War era, the US realized its traditional nuclear strategy posture based on the 
‘usability paradox’ and a ‘balance of terror’ would not work to deal with its future security 
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threats.  Thus, the new nuclear triad system was developed to sustain US escalation 
dominance and secure its unipolar hegemony to implement its compellence strategy. The 
new nuclear triad system was a combined strategy of nuclear and conventional weapons, a 
comprehensive defence system with MD and infrastructure to effectively intervene against 
new security threats. 69 This system also included drone technology and the “military 
technical revolution” of advanced precision weapons to strengthen US military 
capabilities.70   
 
The four major US action plans were still valid under the Obama administration and are 
highly likely to be continued in the new administration. They can be summarised in 
Hillary Clinton’s remark as Secretary of State when she emphasized the “three Ds” – 
defence, diplomacy and development – as the keys to US foreign policy.71 
 
On the basis of its assessment of each different security threat the US combines above 
mentioned four action plans to form an efficient compellence strategy. Balancing among 
these four action plans to create a more efficient coercive policy has become an 
important element in US foreign policy.72 
  
There are, however, opinions that the US should implement its compellence strategy 
with more prudence after the ‘spread of democracy’ and the incorporation of Georgia 
into NATO led to an unexpected disaster and escalated a regional conflict.73 The failure 
of ‘Iraqi Freedom’ also made the US administration hesitate to employ direct coercion in 
the form of limited warfare. However, the fundamental structures of the US compellence 
strategy are still up and running. Although the Obama administration emphasized 
dialogue, it did not abandon its compellence strategy74 despite the following statement 
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by the President: “tougher sanctions and aggressive, principled and direct high-level 
diplomacy, without preconditions… By going the extra diplomatic mile, while keeping 
all options on the table, we make it more likely the rest of the world will stand with us to 
increase pressure on Iran, if diplomacy is failing.”  
 
Obama instead elaborated Bush’s compellence strategy by implementing other forms of 
inducement.  Persuasive inducements such as offering a dialogue and punitive inducements 
such as consolidating international agreement over more efficient sanctions were 
implemented.75 Moreover, the US military superiority, which secures escalation dominance, 
was always sustained in all the US administrations after the Cold War, i.e. the framework of 
the US compellence strategy was retained regardless of the rhetorical differences between 
the administrations in the post-Cold War period.  
 
  
2.3 The US Non-Proliferation Policy 
 
2.3.1 Background 
 
The ‘Manhattan Project,’ which was initiated in 1942, succeeded in building a nuclear 
bomb, with the first detonation of a US nuclear weapon in New Mexico on 16 July 1945. 
The two nuclear bombs which were dropped on Japan in August 1945 then kicked off 
the nuclear arms race among the international community. As a result, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, France and China became nuclear weapon states and through the 
bipolar system of the Cold War strategic nuclear weapons were spread under the nuclear 
umbrellas of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was clear that the massive destructive 
power and the asymmetric nature of nuclear weapons had soon occupied the primary 
place on the agenda of international politics.76 
 
The US nuclear strategy was first established in the 1950s under the Eisenhower 
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administration. The first US nuclear strategy, the “New Look,” was based on US nuclear 
weapon superiority to offset any threats that the Soviet Union possessed by means of a 
‘massive retaliation’ capability.77 
 
However, the ‘massive retaliation’ strategy was only sustainable when the quantitative 
expansion of nuclear weapons could maintain US military superiority. Thus, when the 
Soviet Union initiated its nuclear arms race against the US in the 1960s, the strategy lost 
its validity. The Kennedy administration therefore shifted to a new nuclear strategy 
based on ‘flexible response.’ This was that the US would implement its policy measures 
according to the level of the various security challenges from the Soviet Union. 78 
However, the ‘flexible response’ strategy to limit and control possible security threats 
from outside was not the only nuclear strategy that the Kennedy administration adopted. 
It also implemented the ‘mutual assured destruction’ strategy to deter possible nuclear 
provocation by the Soviet Union: although the Soviet Union had the ability to make a 
first nuclear strike on the US, the strengthened US second-strike capability would deter 
the Soviet Union from doing so.79 
 
‘Mutual assured destruction’ was counterevidence that the ‘balance of terror’ was not 
created by the existence of nuclear weapons themselves. As the Soviet Union had 
advanced its nuclear capability to compete with the US in the 1960s, neither the US 
nor the Soviet Union had the absolute ability to demolish the counter strike capability 
of their opponent with a first nuclear strike. Thus, despite the differences in the 
political systems of the two superpowers, the nuclear strategy of both bipolar states 
became deterrence based on ‘mutual assured destruction.’80 As the nuclear capabilities 
of the US and the Soviet Union remained parallel after the Kennedy administration, 
the US nuclear strategy for the rest of the Cold War became a ‘deterrence strategy.’  
 
 The long sustained deterrence strategy started to show signs of change in the 1980s as 
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third-world countries enhanced their conventional arms and displayed ambitions to 
acquire nuclear weapons. The US had to establish a new nuclear strategy to confront the 
rising threat. As a result, it mapped out a ‘discriminate deterrence’ strategy, which 
proposed preparation for ‘mid-intensity conflicts' against regional hegemons that had 
acquired the rudiments of a nuclear, chemical and missile capability.81  
 
The ‘discriminate deterrence’ strategy aimed to reduce the possibility of a nuclear 
weapon being used in the escalation of a conflict. It meant that US non-proliferation 
policy would go beyond the long-lasting deterrence to become a compellence strategy. 
The US planned to utilize its overwhelming military strength to coerce a behaviour 
change in third world countries that intended to acquire nuclear armaments.   
  
However, although the leading concept in the US nuclear strategy started to shift to a 
compellence strategy, the US did not only implement coercive measures. From 1970, the 
US and the Soviet Union initiated a dialogue about their bilateral nuclear arms race in 
the arena of international politics. As both countries realized that the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons to third-world countries would harm their national interests, common 
ground between them was created. In order to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons to 
third-world countries, they attempted to prevent nuclear proliferation through 
international politics and bilateral strategic arms reduction talks. As a result, the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, SALT I & II, took place from 1969 to 1972 and 1969 
to 1979 respectively, and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, INF, was 
negotiated from 1981 to 1987 and finalized a reduction of nuclear weapons. Moreover, 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START I, II, III and New START were agreed 
between the two powers to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to 1,550 on each 
side. 82  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime was also established to 
prevent nuclear proliferation in 1968.  The three depositary states were the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.  
 
Nevertheless, the US peaceful approach to solving nuclear proliferation did not mean 
abandonment of its compellence nuclear strategy.  The US effort to reduce nuclear arms 
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was due to an assessment that a massive quantity of nuclear arms was no longer efficient 
in the changed environment of international politics. Moreover, control and surveillance 
of peaceful uses of nuclear power through the international NPT regime was already 
included as a tool in the US compellence strategy.  
 
The use of nuclear weapons was never removed from US military security measures and 
remained a tool in the US compellence strategy after the demise of the Soviet Union.  
The Clinton administration introduced a ‘nuclear triad’ system to maintain US military 
dominance and coerce behavioural change in its adversaries.  Moreover, it did not 
confirm any negative assurance to states that were categorized as ‘rogue.’ The Bush 
administration was much tougher in every respect. It declared the possibility of a pre-
emptive nuclear strike against an enemy and the ‘nuclear triad’ system of the Clinton 
administration was intensified in a ‘new nuclear triad’ system. Moreover, the non-
proliferation policy was changed to a more aggressive counter-proliferation policy.  
 
As was well-known before his inauguration, Obama wanted to tone down the rhetoric 
and change the policies of his predecessor. Thus, the counter-proliferation strategy was 
changed back to a non-proliferation strategy and other diplomatic measures such as 
direct dialogue, providing economic incentives, and multilateral engagement based on 
common security and humanity were emphasized. However, the Obama administration 
did not abandon the compellence strategy. The ‘new nuclear triad’ system was sustained 
and no negative assurance was guaranteed to adversary states such as Iran and North 
Korea. Moreover, the PSI and the GICNT, which were initiated by the Bush 
administration, were enhanced during the term of the Obama administration.   
 
2.3.2 The US Non-Proliferation Strategy after the Cold War 
 
The US non-proliferation policy in the post-Cold War period was based on compellence, 
which aimed to secure US unipolar hegemony. Thus, as mentioned above, the US 
combined four major action plans to coerce behavioural change in any state that 
attempted to develop a nuclear weapon capability.  
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 2.3.2.1   Compellence through the NPT and the UN Security Council 
 
As a nuclear arms race became inevitable in the 1950s, the US started to plan measures 
to efficiently curb global nuclear proliferation. Since it could not blindly coerce 
sovereign states into non-proliferation, it undertook a policy of transfer of nuclear 
technology and nuclear material for the peaceful use of atomic energy if sovereign states 
signed a safeguard agreement not to use transferred nuclear technology or material for 
military purposes. This was a similar approach to that employed by Rome in the Third 
Punic War, in which it demanded that Carthage should surrender over 200,000 suits of 
armour and 2,000 siege weapons in exchange for a peace treaty. 
 
The US control of nuclear proliferation through the ‘peaceful use of atomic energy’ 
seemed very effective to prevent the appropriation of nuclear material and technology 
for military purposes. However, as the safeguard agreement in the bilateral negotiations 
approved US nuclear inspection of sovereign states and limited their decisions on their 
nuclear development, it seemed that the US had violated the Treaty of Westphalia, 
which guarantees the rights of nation states. Therefore, in 1953 the US president 
Eisenhower proposed to the UN general assembly the establishment of an International 
Atomic Energy Agency to conduct nuclear inspections83 and thus avoid the issues of 
breach of state sovereignty.  
 
Following Eisenhower’s proposal, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was 
established in 1957. However, since the US and the Soviet Union had to deploy their 
strategic nuclear arsenals to provide nuclear umbrellas for the member states of NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact, the process of building a non-proliferation regime through the 
IAEA became lengthy. In 1964, the slow progress in forming the international non-
proliferation regime reached a turning point when China succeeded in developing a 
nuclear weapon. On witnessing the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon 
technology to a communist country, the US took the initiative with the establishment of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Thus, on 17 August 1965, it submitted the first 
draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the eighteen-nation Committee on 
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Disarmament.84 As a result, the IAEA opened the NPT treaty for signature in 1968 and 
it finally entered into force in 1970. However, within the Cold War bipolar system of 
economic and military competition it was difficult for the international community to 
consolidate  strong binding forces for the NPT regime, and in 1974 India carried out a 
nuclear test, demonstrating that nuclear proliferation was continuing.   
 
However, the situation changed when the US become a unipolar state after the end of 
the Soviet Union in 1989. Ostensibly, the US argues that its nuclear policy which 
utilizes the NPT regime is in the common interest of the international community in 
preventing nuclear proliferation. It therefore claims that its nuclear policy contributes to 
global prosperity and peace. However, whether intentionally or not, it utilizes the NPT 
regime as a tool to coerce sovereign states to abandon their nuclear development. In this 
way US nuclear superiority cannot be challenged by any other state within the NPT 
system.  
 
The hidden side of the NPT regime is the US ambition to secure its unipolar hegemony. 
This became clearer as the US completed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and 
established a Missile Defense system, MD. The ABM treaty was signed between the US 
and the Soviet Union in 1972 to limit quantities of anti-ballistic missiles to one hundred 
each.85 However, once the US became the unipolar state, it found the ABM treaty to be 
an obstacle to its aim of building a MD system to sustain its unipolar hegemony. It 
therefore unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty in 2001 and abolished it in 2002.   
 
In the early 1980s as a prelude to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US undertook a 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. The SDI was a system with which it sought 
to sustain its military superiority beyond any potential security challenges. It eventually 
developed into the Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system and then 
into the National Missile Defense system, now well-known as the MD system. 
Moreover, the US attempted to develop a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrating Weapon 
system that could destroy covert nuclear and military facilities hidden underground or 
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inside mountains. Although the project was cancelled because of the budget deficit in 
2006, it clearly showed the US intention of intensifying its compellence strategy 
measures. 86 
 
The US abrogation of the ABM treaty and its establishment of the MD system were seen 
as degrading the non-proliferation regime. 87  Since these steps contradicted signed 
agreements and ongoing negotiations on arms reduction treaties such as SALT, INF and 
START, the irony of US nuclear policy is one of the proofs that it is implementing a 
compellance strategy: on the one hand it promotes nuclear non-proliferation through an 
international non-proliferation regime and on the other hand it established the MD 
system to strengthen its first nuclear strike capability. 
 
It is true, however, that the MD system was based on the concept of ‘deterrence by 
denial.’ This means that the MD system is a countervailing strategy to limit possible 
damage from adversaries with non-nuclear weapon systems. This seems ethically 
superior to the US nuclear strategy in the Cold War based on ‘mutual assured 
destruction.’ However, despite the ethical aspect of the MD system, it cannot be denied 
that it made the US nuclear weapon system untouchable.88   
 
The US also takes advantage of other international institutions such as the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) as tools in its nuclear compellence strategy. The UNSC operates as a 
means of multilateral collective security to resolve international conflicts and crises. It 
releases presidential statements, press releases and resolutions as declarations of intent.  
While the press releases and presidential statements are exhortative measures that have 
no binding power, UNSC resolutions are voted agreements that have more legal force, 
equivalent to soft law. In this way, UNSC resolutions become the basis for all the UN 
agencies to exert their authority in their fields of interest.89  
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The authority of the UNSC is projected on the basis of the UN charter. According to 
Chapter VI of this charter, the UNSC implements non-military diplomatic measures 
such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement 
to resolve crises and conflicts. Chapter VII approves more aggressive measures being 
implemented by the UNSC, with articles 39, 41 and 42 indicating possible 
implementation of economic sanctions, limited warfare or total war.90 
 
The US takes advantage of the UNSC being able to execute multilateral military, diplomatic 
or economic interventions to coerce states that try to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. 
Thus, along with its unilateral measures the US attempts to achieve UNSC resolutions 
which intensify its compellence strategy. The cases of Iran, Libya and North Korea are 
typical examples. Under the authority of UNSC resolutions, they have all faced international 
economic sanctions and the pressure of possible ‘peace enforcing’ military interventions.  
 
2.3.2.2   Compellence through Economic Incentives and Sanctions 
 
Along with diplomatic and economic sanctions through UNSC resolutions and the NPT 
regime, the US executes unilateral economic sanctions and incentives in its compellence 
strategy. A typical example is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 
(CTR). When the Soviet Union collapsed, one of the top US concerns was diffusion of 
the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear weapons that had been deployed to the member 
states of the Warsaw Pact.  Therefore, US senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar 
submitted a joint bill which was later enacted as the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction 
Act of 1991, creating the CTR. Three US ministries, the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, spend approximately a billion 
dollars a year to operate the CTR programme.91  
Initially, the CTR programme dismantled nuclear and chemical weapons, nuclear and 
chemical materials and WMD-related facilities in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and 
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Kazakhstan. In the 15 years of the CTR programme, it succeeded in eliminating 6,600 
Soviet nuclear warheads, 470 ICBM launch pads, numerous nuclear submarines, 
strategic bombers and stockpiles of weapons-grade enriched uranium, and 50,000 
nuclear scientists were redeployed.92 
  
The CTR has much similarity to the US compellence strategy. First, its priority objectives are 
comprehensive. Its goal is to dismantle not only nuclear and chemical weapons but all the 
elements of WMD programmes. Thus, nuclear and chemical materials for weapons 
programmes, nuclear weapon technology, human resources for WMD programmes and 
WMD facilities are all included for irreversible dismantlement. Second, the CTR is not based 
on a principle of reciprocity. It coerces other states to abandon their WMD programmes 
without the US losing its WMD capability, i.e. the US does not reduce its nuclear weapon 
numbers or programmes while it conducts CTR to reduce those of other states. The 
programme can therefore be considered a US compellence measure to maintain US unipolar 
hegemony.93 
 
Besides coercion through economic incentives, the US has also utilized punitive 
inducement. The economic sanctions which were imposed on India, Pakistan, Iran and 
North Korea are typical examples. After nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, the 
US imposed economic sanctions on both states, using its ‘Arms Export Control Act’ and 
the ‘Export-Import Bank Act’ to try to force them to renounce nuclear weapons.94 In the 
case of Iran, it imposed the first economic sanctions after the seizure of the US embassy 
in Teheran during the 1979 Islamic revolution. Since then, US presidents have issued 
executive orders and imposed economic sanctions under the ‘Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
proliferation Act,’ the ‘Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,’ the ‘Iran, North Korea and Syria 
Non-proliferation Act’ and the ‘Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and 
Divestment Act’ trying to coerce Iran into behavioural change.95   
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Policy towards North Korea is no different. After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the 
US imposed its first sanctions using the ‘Export-Import Bank Act’ of 1945. Since then, US 
economic sanctions have been imposed under the ‘Trading with the Enemy Act,’ the ‘National 
Emergencies Act,’ the ‘Export Administration Act,’ the ‘Arms Export Control Act,’ the ‘Iran, 
North Korea and Syria Non-proliferation Act’ and the ‘Patriot Act.’ Moreover, many executive 
orders have been issued by US presidents with the aim of forcing the irreversible nuclear 
disarmament of North Korea.96   
 
2.3.2.3 Compellence through Dominant Military Superiority 
 
Beyond the previously-mentioned MD system, the US effort to sustain its military 
superiority is massive. The US defence budget alone surpasses the total of the next top 
11 countries’ defence budgets.97 With its peerless scale of military expenditure, the US 
maintains absolute escalation dominance regarding any sort of threat and security 
challenge. In addition, it does not conceal its intention to do this. The Quadrennial 
Defence Review, which encompasses all US military policy reviews such as the 
National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the National Military 
Strategy, clearly indicates that its military means will be employed to resolve security 
threats and stabilize US unipolar hegemony.  
 
After the Cold War, there was a growth of criticism that a lack of consensus in US 
administrations and an absence of consistency in its military strategy could not counter 
the new security threats of the post-Cold War period. 98  Occasionally, the US 
Department of Defense released policy reviews. However, there were rising concerns 
among defence experts that the US as the unipolar state needed periodic policy 
assessments to deal with the new security environment. Therefore, the H.W Bush 
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administration first released a ‘Base Force Assessment’ report compiled by Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to revisit US military strategy as a whole.99 In the 
Clinton administration, Defense Secretary Les Aspin released a ‘Bottom-up Review,’ 
which later became the background for the ‘Military Structure Review Act’ of 1996, the 
so-called ‘Lieberman Amendment.’ 100   On the basis of this act, guidelines for 
Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) were established and the first one was released in 
1997 under the leadership of Defense Secretary William James Perry. Subsequently, a 
QDR report has been issued every four years. Therefore, the Bush and Obama 
administrations released two QDR reports each during their tenures.    
 
Although there are differences of degree in the administrations’ QDR reports, the QDRs 
clarified three objectives of US military strategy: 1) to establish a favourable 
international security environment for the US; 2) to enhance US military capability 
against new security threats; and 3) to maintain US military superiority through 
technological, tactical and military innovation. 
 
First, the US maintains an approximate average of 150,000 active duty military personnel 
around the world and manages naval operations to enhance its readiness to intervene against 
potential security threats.101 The US naval force headquarters of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh 
Fleets are stationed in Bahrain, Napoli and Japan respectively for efficient projection of US 
force. Moreover, the US maintains its nuclear superiority to intensify its escalation 
dominance. Although the US showed a will to reduce its strategic nuclear weapons by 
signing nuclear arms reduction treaties such as START I and II and New START, it 
announced development of its MD programme and other military projects which would 
strengthen its nuclear superiority. Thus, the US military strategy was to sustain or intensify 
its military superiority to maintain a favourable security environment.   
 
Second, in order to establish a quick reaction capability to confront the rise of new 
security threats, the US tried to achieve a balance between end strength, readiness and 
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modernization. Furthermore, it declared a ‘win-win strategy’ in the ‘major theatres of 
war.’ That is, if security threats simultaneously occur in different regions of US interest, 
it would carry out two different interventions or even two total wars to achieve victory. 
The 2001 QDR, which was released after 9/11, clearly states that the US would ‘swiftly 
defeat’ two adversaries and ‘win decisively,’ which might involve a regime change 
rather than simply defeating the enemy's military. 
 
To support the new US force-planning structure, a 1-4-2-1 model was created: defend (1) 
the United States; deter forward in 4 critical regions (Europe, northeast Asia, the Middle 
East and southeast Asia); swiftly defeat 2 adversaries nearly simultaneously; and win 1 
war decisively, including potential regime change.102 
 
The US military strategy that was generally stated in the QDRs was to build US forces 
that are multi-mission capable. It aimed to create a military that could easily transform 
and deploy to various levels of conflict from full-scale war to ‘low-intensity conflict.’103  
Thus, in order to separately confront adversary states and non-state adversaries, the US 
allocated the military operation of regular and unconventional warfare to the general 
military unit and the operation of counter terrorism and counter proliferation to Special 
Forces. Accordingly, the US increased the numbers of its special operation troops by 30% 
and established the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) to 
engage 2,600 more marines. Moreover, it reorganized its military system to project its 
special warfare unit more efficiently.104    
 
The US also reinforced its triad weapon system of ICBMs, SLBMs and ALCMs to make 
it more prompt and efficient – the ‘new nuclear triad.’ Thus, the Mobile Consolidated 
Command Centre of the US STRATCOM was abolished and the reporting system was 
simplified for an efficient use of the triad weapons.105 
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Lastly, the US military strategy aimed at military technological innovation to prevent 
future security threats. Since it evaluated that its clear-cut victory in the first Gulf War 
was due to technical development of weapons in the 1970s and 1980s, it believed that 
technological innovation should be continued and even applied to ‘military 
transformation’ in order to sustain US unipolar hegemony in the 21st century. For 
example, it employed new information technology that utilizes computers, satellites, 
drones etc. to establish a new military command and control system. The asymmetry of 
information created by this innovation leads to US information dominance, which is 
believed to be a key element in modern warfare. Through ongoing military 
transformation using new technology, the US plans to sustain its unipolar hegemony.  
 
A common argument of all the QDRs is that US military force will contribute to 
bringing a ‘spread of democracy,’ promoting cooperation between states, providing 
regional security and removing security threats to the US and its allies. This clearly 
displays support for the four major action plans in US military strategy. Moreover, by 
applying the concept of preventive defence, the QDRs seek to establish more than the 
conventional ‘deter-defend strategy.’ Thus, the QDRs demonstrate the US compellence 
strategy involves intervening militarily if it is necessary to prevent the advent of a 
security threat.      
 
However, due to the global economic crisis the US had to enact a Budget Control Act in 
2011. Under this act, a sequester programme started to cut its military expenditure in the 
2012 fiscal year and for the next 10 years. Since a total of 487 billion dollars has to be saved 
in this period,106 many QDR plans had to be delayed or scaled down. The ‘win-win’ 
strategy’ in two major war theatres was toned down to a ‘1+ win strategy.’ That is, while 
waging a total war in one region the US would implement ‘deter and denial’ in another war 
theatre until the end of the first war. However, despite the budget cut, the US distinctly 
stated that it will sustain military power projection to secure ‘full-spectrum operation’ 
capability and US unilateral hegemony. Moreover, it clearly revealed that it will use military 
power not only to deter security threats but also to compel adversaries to bring peace.107  
                                                                
106 Anthony H. Cordesman, Tracking the Defence Budget: US Defence Budget Cuts, Sequestration, the 
FY2014 Budget, and the FY2014-FY2022 Forecast, CSIS, 2013. 
 http://csis.org/files/publication/130715_trackingthedefensebudget_ppt.pdf.  [Accessed 23 Aug 2014]. 
107 Charles T. Hagel, Quadrennial Defence Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014. 
40 
  
2.3.3 US Non-Proliferation Policy Against the ‘axis of evil’ 
 
Fundamentally, the US is against nuclear proliferation in all countries, whether they be 
allies or adversaries. Since nuclear weapons can shift the power balance in a region and 
degrade US unipolar hegemony, it employs economic and diplomatic sanctions backed 
by military pressure to coerce behavioural change in states that seek nuclear weapon 
capability. However, as witnessed in several nuclear tests – Israel in 1966, India in 1974 
and the simultaneous nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 – it selectively allows 
nuclear proliferation on the basis of its grand foreign policy strategy. 
 
Certainly, the US became stricter and more determined about nuclear proliferation after 
becoming the unipolar hegemonic state after the Cold War. Thus, India and Pakistan had to 
face US economic sanctions based on the Arms Export Control Act and the Export-Import 
Bank Act after their nuclear tests in 1998. However, when the US needed the support of 
both counties after 9/11, it eased the sanctions and approved their nuclear weapons. For the 
US, India was a crucial regional player to check and balance Chinese expansion. Moreover, 
in order to enlarge its influence in southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the 
US needs India to stand by its side. Pakistan was also critical for the US to win the ‘war on 
terrorism’ after 9/11. To stabilize US power projection to Afghanistan and the Middle East, 
Pakistan’s support was inevitable.  
 
Despite these exceptional cases, the US implemented its coercion and compellence strategy 
to limit nuclear proliferation. In particular, the nuclear programmes of countries labelled as 
‘rogue’ and part of the ‘axis of evil’ face more severe coercion. Therefore, the WMD of Iran, 
North Korea, Iraq, Syria and Libya were dealt with using more intense compellence than the 
cases of South Africa, Ukraine, India and Pakistan. 
  
In the post-Cold War period, the US perceived the nuclear threat from ‘rogues’ and the 
‘axis of evil’ to be more imminent than that from Russia or China. Since the non-
proliferation strategy in the previous bipolar system – deterrence – can no longer contain 
the nuclear ambition of individual states, the US decided to employ a compellence 
strategy based on its military strength and its escalation dominance. Thus, it started to 
handle the threat of nuclear proliferation through a ‘capability-based approach’ rather 
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than a ‘threat-based approach.’ Since unspecified asymmetric threats from unspecified 
agents had increased after the Cold War, the passive deterrence strategy from the bipolar 
system was not sufficient to confront new security threats with WMD.108 Therefore, the 
US decided to focus on its ability to confront potential threats and execute preventive 
measures based on its capability, not on assessment of the size of the threat.109    
 
The US clearly indicated that it would reinforce its conventional weapons to prevent 
adversaries from acquiring WMD. Moreover, it threatened a possible use of nuclear 
weapons if adversaries do not comply with its demands for their nuclear disarmament.110 
Therefore, along with Russia and China, the ‘axis of evil’ – Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and 
North Korea – was excluded from any US negative nuclear assurance. 
 
Since the Middle East and northeast Asia were designated as critical regions in US 
security strategy after 9/11, the two regions have become major US war theatres. The 
regional states of the two regions that were labelled ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ in the 
1980s were categorized as ‘rogue states’ and later turned into the ‘axis of evil,’ a target 
of the US compellence strategy.  
 
As Libya abandoned its WMD in 2003, Iraq’s Saddam regime was replaced with pro-US 
Shiites, and Syria’s nuclear facility was destroyed by an Israel airstrike in 2008,  Iran 
and North Korea are the only members of the axis of evil left trying to acquire their own 
nuclear programmes and confronting US coercion.  
 
2.3.4 Geopolitics and the US Non-Proliferation Coercive Policy  
 
After the Cold War, the US saw the Middle East and northeast Asia as critical regions for its 
global security strategy.111 As the US indicated the regions as ‘two major theatres of war’ and 
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the ‘win-win’ or ‘1+ win’ strategies as its security policy objectives, it planned to enhance its 
military capability by rebalancing and transforming its military force to secure its unipolar 
hegemony.112 While the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact used their ‘Iron Curtain’ to secure 
their expansion toward the sea, the US clearly identified the Middle East and northeast Asia as 
important geopolitical regions to contain Russia and China to sustain its unipolar hegemony. 
 
2.3.4.1 The Geopolitical Importance of the Middle East 
 
1)  Israel 
 
The conventional US policy objectives in the Middle East were containment of the 
Soviet Union, the oil security of the Gulf States and the security of Israel. Since the US 
abruptly filled the power vacuum in the Middle East after World War II, its policy in the 
region had been highly influenced by the bipolar Cold War system. Therefore, it 
established the Baghdad Pact and utilized the strong states in the region, Iran and Turkey, 
to confront the Soviet Union. In the early period of US Middle East strategy, Israel was 
not a strategic partner of the US.113 However, as the spread of ‘pan Arabism’ and the 
non-aligned movement weakened the Bagdad pact and the Soviet Union succeeded in 
establishing diplomatic ties with the socialist countries of Syria, Egypt and Iraq, the US 
perceived Israel as its last bastion in the Levant area. As a result, US national interest in 
the Middle East became equated with the security of Israel and it started to rely on Israel 
to project its Middle East policy.114  
   
From 1949 to 1973, when the US focused on containment of the Soviet Union through 
the Bagdad Pact, its economic aid to Israel was an average of $120 million a year, which 
was a relatively small amount compared to its assistance to other states.115 However, 
after witnessing the Israeli military capability in its victories in three Middle East wars, 
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the US started to appreciate Israel as a strategic partner in the region.  As Henry 
Kissinger states, “When confronted with the realities of power in the Middle East – after 
much anguish and circuitous manoeuvres – Nixon recognized that he must pursue, in the 
national interest, the same strategy which others supported for reasons of ethnic politics: 
to reduce Soviet influence, weaken the position of the Arab radicals, encourage Arab 
moderates, and assure Israel’s Security.” 116  Therefore, US economic aid to Israel 
quintupled after 1971 and increased again to 2.6 billion dollars in 1974. Since then, it 
provided Israel with an average of 3 billion dollars a year in economic aid until 2015.117 
Currently, Israel is an indispensable strategic partner of the US in the Middle East and 
possesses 200 nuclear weapons.  
 
2) Oil security 
 
47.3% of world oil reserves are buried in the Middle East and 32.4% of total world oil 
production takes place in the Middle East Gulf states.118 Since petroleum became an 
important source of energy for various industry sectors after World War I, the Middle 
East has been a core strategic region for energy security. In particular, the Strait of 
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf is a vital transport channel for international energy markets. 
In 2014, 63% of the world’s oil production, 56.5 million barrels per day, was transported 
on maritime routes, and 57% of all the seaborne oil trade passed through the Strait of 
Hormuz. If this critical transit point were blocked, it would cause a global energy 
crisis.119 
 
Recently, with its ‘shale revolution’ and a diversification of oil import channels, the US 
has created its own leverage and succeeded in building threat control on Middle East 
oil.120 Thus, it is highly unlikely that the US would face a similar situation to that of the 
1973 oil shock even in a worst-case scenario such as the Strait of Hormuz being closed. 
However, the East Asian countries, which import an average of 75% of their oil supply 
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from Gulf oil states, are different. 85 % of the crude oil supplies that leave through the 
Persian Gulf are headed towards Asian countries.121 Therefore, if the energy security of 
the Middle East were damaged it would lead to US unipolar hegemony. In particular, the 
US, which has declared a ‘pivot to Asia’ would face Chinese expansion if Middle 
Eastern energy security became destabilized. It would provide China with a reason for 
maritime expansion. In fact, it has recently changed its foreign policy doctrine from 韜
光養晦 (keep a low profile) to 主動作爲 (take initiative) under the leadership of Xi 
Jinping.122 
 
Even though energy dependency on oil has started to decrease with technological 
innovation and renewable energy, the importance of oil in the energy sector is highly 
likely to continue for the next few decades.123 The US military aid and massive arms 
sales to the Gulf oil monarchs shows that the Middle East is an essential region for 
global energy security.124 
 
The geopolitics of the Middle East, the security of Israel and global energy security are core 
US foreign policy interests. Therefore, any abrupt change in the balance of power or 
escalation of conflict in the region is considered a serious threat to the US unipolar world 
order. Moreover, since the Middle East lacks a collective security system such as NATO, the 
US cannot overlook any changes in the Middle East.  
 
2.3.4.2 The Geopolitical Importance of East Asia    
 
East Asia is another critical region for US foreign and security policy. Without referring 
to the controversial argument of Samuel Huntington after the Cold War, 125 the US 
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doctrine of a ‘pivot to Asia,’ or a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, indicate 
checking and balancing China as the most critical need to sustain US unipolar 
hegemony.126  
 
1) The Rise of China 
 
The economic and military rise of China, the decline of US hegemony and power 
transition are not new arguments in international politics. In the late 1980s there was a 
similar argument that Japan and Germany would rise and compete with the US for 
global hegemony.127 However, the past discourse on the rise of Japan and Germany was 
disproved by Joseph Nye’s prediction that the US would sustain its hegemonic status 
through soft power. 128 However, due to its size and influence, the rise of China is 
perceived as a more serious and substantial threat to US unipolar hegemony.  
 
US concern was clearly revealed in its policy reviews in the post-Cold War era. In 1995, 
the Clinton administration released its US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific 
Region, the EASR report. This stated that US East Asian policy would focus on the 
stabilization of peace between Japan and China, and prevent any threat which could 
bring a shift in the power balance in the region such as the North Korean nuclear 
programme.129  Therefore, the US announced it would maintain 100,000 troops in East 
Asia and consolidate multilateral systems such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.  
 
The US East Asia policy aim in the 1998 EASR report was more lucid than the previous 
one. It stated that the US would help build an equilibrium of the power balance in East 
Asia, and clearly stated that it would prevent any attempt at WMD proliferation. By 
strengthening collective security with allies in the region, the US planned to prevent any 
type of arms race and threats to its hegemony.   
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The Bush administration took a firmer stance in its East Asia policy. During the whole 
presidential election campaign, Bush referred to China as a ‘strategic competitor,’ not a 
‘strategic partner,’ and declared the US would build a ‘theatre ballistic missile defence’ 
in East Asia to contain Chinese expansion. 130  Particularly after 9/11, the Bush 
administration realized the importance of collective security for the US, Japan and South 
Korea for counter terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and sustaining its unipolar 
hegemony against Chinese expansion. In 2005 the Bush administration released a report 
entitled ‘The Military Power of the People's Republic of China,’ which portrayed 
Chinese military force as a threat to the whole of eastern and southern Asia and the 
Pacific Ocean.   
 
To accompany the US strategy in Asia, Japan released new ‘National Defense Program 
Guidelines’ in 2004, which created an ‘Air Defense Identification Zone’ conflict with 
China. 131 Moreover, under its ‘National Defense Program Guidelines,’ Japan elevated 
its Defense Agency to the status of Ministry of Defense in 2007 to execute more 
efficient collective security against China.   
 
The geopolitical importance of Asia in US foreign and security policy continued in the 
Obama administration. Although it took some time to release its Asian strategy due to the 
policy priority of the US military withdrawal from Iraq, the Obama administration 
announced that the axis of US policy strategy had moved to Asia. According to ‘Sustaining 
U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’ the Obama administration’s 
security strategy for the next 10 years would focus on the enhancement of US military 
strength to prepare for total war with the rising adversary – China.132 This was a shift from 
the 9/11 paradigm of US security strategy focusing on enhancing US counter terrorism and 
unconventional warfare capability. Following this, a ‘Joint Operation Access Concept’ 
(JOAC) report was released by the US Defense Department to implement a detailed action 
plan. Here, the concept of ‘AirSea Battle’ was created to offset China’s Anti-Access/Area 
Denial (A2/AD) military strategy to deter US intervention.133  
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The JOAC was a clear statement that the US would achieve military superiority over the 
Chinese deterrence capability in order to sustain its unipolar hegemony. It emphasized 
an enhancement of the US ability to offset Chinese military power through flexible 
integration of space and cyberspace operations into the traditional air-sea-land battle 
space. Thus, US military strategy was set to intensify capabilities such as long-range 
missiles, the direct intervention of special operations forces and cyber warfare to destroy 
the deterrence system of an adversary. Therefore, despite the budget sequestration 
reducing the military budget by 259 billion dollars from 2012 to 2017,134 the Obama 
administration announced it would maintain stealth strike bombers, its long-range 
missile capability, hunter-killer nuclear submarines, and its Integrated Reception System 
in Asia.  
 
To sum up, the Middle East and East Asia are geopolitically critical regions for US 
foreign and security policy. Especially after the Cold War, the two regions became 
objects of more detailed US military strategy to maintain the new world order and US 
unipolar hegemony. The Middle East is important for the US in terms of global energy 
security and the pro-US countries that contain the expansion of Russia and 
fundamentalist terrorism. East Asia is a region that is becoming more important than the 
Middle East because it is now becoming a theatre in which the US aims to contain China, 
which has risen as its new nemesis. Therefore, after the Cold War US administrations 
clearly revealed their intention in various policy reviews such as NSS, NPR, QDR, NDS, 
NMA etc. to employ a compellence strategy in the region to maintain US unilateral 
hegemony.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The US security strategy in the post-Cold War era is to maintain the unipolar hegemony 
which it achieved after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although pessimism about US 
unipolar hegemony has continued since 1990, the US still has unchallenged military and 
economic superiority. There is no country that could globally project its power and 
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execute total war like the US. 
     
The US is well aware of its unipolar hegemony and has set its grand security strategy to 
sustain its global leadership. It is actively engaged in solving new security threats that 
have arisen in the new global environment after the Cold War. Therefore, its 
conventional containment and deterrence strategy started to shift to a strategy of 
compellence, using ‘engagement and enlargement’ and the ‘spread of democracy.’ In 
order to keep its unipolar hegemony, the US has pursued the aim of behavioural change 
by its adversaries to comply with its demands.    
 
For an efficient compellence strategy, the US has set the spread of democracy, the 
enlargement of economic relations, the enlargement of international institutions and regimes, 
and the securing of US military superiority and escalation dominance as its four major 
action plans. The US non-proliferation policy is part of this, and so the US compellence 
strategy and its four major action plans have been applied to achieving a nuclear-free world.  
 
Since its conventional nuclear strategy based on ‘mutual assured destruction’ could not 
contain the new nuclear threats of the 21st century, the US decided to enhance its military 
superiority and escalation dominance to solve the problem of nuclear proliferation. 
Furthermore, the US even admitted the possibility of nuclear strikes in its non-proliferation 
policy. As the chances of asymmetric threats from unspecified agents increased, the US 
realized the need for a more aggressive strategy than conventional nuclear deterrence. 
Therefore, its non-proliferation policy became more rooted to its compellence strategy. For 
instance, the ‘nuclear triad’ system – ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers – was elaborated 
into a ‘new nuclear’ triad system, which involves a combination of an offensive strike system 
with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and revitalizes the defence system by including MD to 
provide a new capability to overcome any emerging threat. Moreover, the US has clearly 
stated that it will not provide negative nuclear assurances to the countries that it labels as 
‘rogue states’ or members of the ‘axis of evil’ to secure its escalation dominance. Thus, North 
Korea, Iran, and Syria are among the five states that could be struck by US nuclear weapons.     
 
Enlargement of international institutions and the international regime have also been utilized 
as tools for US coercion on nuclear non-proliferation. PSI and GINCT were set up by the 
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US to operate voluntarily, but have become a regime that implements binding measures 
against any state that breaches non-proliferation. The IAEA and NPT have also strengthened 
their surveillance and inspection capabilities to detect and punish any state misbehaviour in 
nuclear development. Since the enlarged international institutional regime is interconnected, 
it can trigger international institutions such as the UNSC to promptly engage and impose 
measures to bring about behavioural change by states that attempt to achieve nuclear 
weapon capability.135 The enlarged international regime also provides justification for US 
coercion on nuclear non-proliferation.   
 
Needless to say, economic inducements are the classic coercive measure in US non-
proliferation policy. In addition to economic inducements through Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction, unilateral US economic sanctions have always been 
imposed on counties that attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. After the Cold 
War, South Africa, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, India, Iran and 
North Korea were all coerced by means of US economic inducements to abandon their 
nuclear programmes. Moreover, the US consolidates its economic sanctions by utilizing 
UNSC resolutions to maximize the effect of economic embargos.  
 
Although the US employed its compellence strategy in all the nuclear proliferation disputes 
after the Cold War, the degree of US coercion varies according to the strategic environment 
and background of each conflict. Due to abrupt changes in the security environment and the 
strengthening of their democratic regimes, the nuclear programmes of South Africa and 
Ukraine were easily dismantled with a low degree of US coercion, whereas Iran, Iraq and 
North Korea, which are labelled ‘axis of evil’ members, have to face severe US 
compellence. India and Pakistan, which share common interests with the US as essential 
strategic regional partners, successfully acquired nuclear weapons with US acquiescence.   
 
Currently, the two countries that are left to cause concern about nuclear proliferation are 
Iran and North Korea. These two countries are located in the Middle East and East Asia, 
regions where the core policy interest of the US is to sustain its unipolar hegemony. 
Their nuclear weapon programmes could change the balance of power and damage US 
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unipolar hegemony. Therefore, they have become policy priorities for the US. Non-
proliferation by Iran and North Korea is not just an agenda for a ‘nuclear-free world,’ 
but a core objective of US security and foreign policy.    
 
However, the two-decade-long US compellence strategy against the nuclear programmes of 
North Korea and Iran has not achieved its objective, the dismantlement of their fully fledged 
nuclear programmes. Although there was a historical agreement on a Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action between Iran and the US in 2015, it will take a 15-year process to finalize the 
agreement. It is therefore too early to evaluate the JCOPA of 2015 as a case of successful 
non-proliferation. Until the phased steps in the Iran-US agreement are completed, the US 
has clearly stated that it will maintain its compellence strategy towards Iran.   
 
This chapter, has dealt with non-proliferation policy within the broader picture of US 
security and foreign policy and has shown that the concept of compellence has become 
the core of US diplomatic strategy since the Cold War. Moreover, the implications of 
nuclear threats in two strategic regions critical for the US – the Middle East and East 
Asia – have been examined. In these regions, US non-proliferation policy has gone 
beyond a deterrence strategy to compellence to secure US unipolar hegemony.  
 
The following chapter will examine coercive diplomacy, which is the actual implementation 
of the US's compellence and forceful persuasion. Moreover, the chapter will present the 
structural framework and theory which will be applied in this research.   
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3. US Compellence Strategy and Coercive Diplomacy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Since the US became the unilateral hegemonic power after the demise of the Soviet 
Union, there is high validity in analysing its post-Cold War foreign and security policy 
through the concept of the compellance. Compellence and coercive diplomacy is a 
strategy of a strong state to derive the compliance of the weak where there is a clear 
asymmetry of power. If the power difference between states is marginal, a compellence 
strategy is a risky political choice which might end up in total war, as in the case of the 
Cuban missile crisis.  
 
With its absolute superiority and the escalation dominance, the US utilizes various 
inducements such as economic aid, sanctions, the restoration of diplomatic relations, 
surgical strikes and limited warfare to achieve behavioural change by any agents that 
pose security threats or display potential elements of being security threats. The new 
global security problems of nuclear proliferation, intensified ethnic conflicts, human 
rights violations and global terrorism have all been dealt with through compellence 
rather than through the conventional strategy of containment and deterrence.  As the 
hegemonic state in a unipolar system in the post-Cold War era, the US has extended its 
soft, hard and smart power to engage with global security issues to stabilize peace and to 
sustain its unipolar hegemony.  
 
After the Cold War, most US decision makers and foreign policy experts perceived that 
a strategy of compellence was the optimal choice to deal with security issues.136 At least, 
they believed it was lesser evil than other alternatives. This was revealed in a series of 
policy reviews and reports by the US government that were released after the Cold War: 
QDR, NSS, NDS, NMS etc. According to its policy reviews, the US has implemented its 
compellence action plan to achieve compliance by agents to abandon their 
misbehaviour. However, despite the absolute power superiority of the US, due to its 
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democratic system it has difficulty in implementing a total war to coerce behavioural 
change in an adversary.137 Therefore, the US started to implement coercive diplomacy as 
the core of its compllence strategy. This involves forceful persuasion utilizing every 
kind of inducement except total war. As a result, scholars of international relations and 
politics started to examine the policies of strong states that attempt to solve international 
conflict and security threats by means of compellence. This has led academic research to 
take on the study of coercive diplomacy.138    
 
It is an admitted fact that coercive diplomacy is practised in relation to many global 
security issues. The statement by Jeff Rathke, Acting Deputy Spokesperson, that 
“Sanctions will be suspended in a phased manner upon verification that Iran has met 
specific commitments under a finalized joint comprehensive plan of action”139 shows 
that the recently agreed Iran nuclear deal is also within the framework of coercive 
diplomacy. The JCPOA is a phased process of providing inducements to achieve 
compliance by Iran.  If Iran’s behavioural change – dismantlement of its nuclear weapon 
capability – stops, economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure and possible military 
intervention will be triggered to compel it to proceed with this dismantlement.140 
  
As has been witnessed in the cases of various security issues such as ethnic cleansing in the 
Bosnian war, the nuclear programmes of North Korea, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Libya, the US 
uses coercive diplomacy to achieve compliance with its demands. However, previous studies on 
US coercive diplomacy have only focused on US coercive inducements and their effectiveness 
without evaluating the coercees’ counter-strategies against US coercion.  Implementation of 
counter-measures by adversaries to offset the coercer’s coercion makes it difficult to achieve the 
objective of coercive diplomacy.  
 
If the counter-strategy of the coercee is not treated as an independent variable in 
research on US security policy and strategy, the validity and utility of US coercive 
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diplomacy on particular issues cannot be understood or evaluated. Since the utility of 
coercive diplomacy is relative, the coercer’s coercive diplomacy cannot achieve its 
objective – behavioural change by the coercee – if it fails to evaluate the aims of the 
coercee’s counter-coercive strategy and the strength of its resistance to the inducements 
of coercive diplomacy. Moreover, in the case of US coercive diplomacy, countries that 
attempt to check and balance US unipolar hegemony such as China, Russia and regional 
hegemons degrade and limit the US coercion. Thus, the US has to consider how this 
strategic environment influences the process before implementing its coercive 
diplomacy.   
 
As previous studies on US coercive diplomacy have failed to examine the mutual 
contention between the coercer and coerce in the complex dynamics of the strategic 
environment, this chapter will revisit the concept and theory of coercive diplomacy to 
build a theoretical framework and model for further research on strategy towards nuclear 
non-proliferation.   
 
3. 2 Literature Review: Coercive Diplomacy Theory 
 
Despite decades of research on coercive diplomacy, there are many areas which are 
unexplored and in need of consensus, in particular the mutuality of coercive diplomacy 
and the linkage between deterrence and compellence. These are the two major issues 
that need to be examined for a clear understanding of coercive diplomacy.  
 
In most security conflicts, reciprocal bargaining takes pace to achieve the desired 
outcome for each participant. Thus, during the bargaining or negotiation process, the 
participants skilfully utilize exploitation of potential force to achieve their objectives. 
Scholars understand that this process of strength and power is used as a diplomatic tool 
to compel adversaries.141 However, the heavy focus and reliance on deterrence during 
the Cold War prevented any comparative analysis linking deterrence to compellence. 
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Naturally, reciprocal bargaining and the mutuality of coercive diplomacy was also 
overlooked in research.   
 
The end of the Cold War led to a second wave of studies on compellence strategies and 
coercive diplomacy. Alexander George, Peter Vigo Jakobson, Lawrence Freedman, 
Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman and Robert J. Art investigated the concept and the 
detailed logic of coercive diplomacy, including the mutual aspect of coercion. This 
chapter will focus on research by previous scholars to clarify the theory and model of 
mutual coercive diplomacy which will be employed as the theoretical framework in the 
present study.  
 
3. 2. 1 The Concept of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
In order to understand coercive diplomacy, it is crucial to differentiate between the 
concepts of compellence and deterrence, which are both sub-concepts of coercion. They 
may seem very similar at first glance, since both of these concepts contain the use of 
force or the threat of using force against an opponent to achieve the results desired by 
the coercer. According to John Rothgeb, the crucial difference between the two lies in 
the time order of who initiates the action – the coercer or the coercee. If one tries to 
coerce or compel an opponent, it means an attempt at aggression or a threat has been 
made by the opponent or is in the process of being made. Therefore, in general, the 
coercer takes the initiative in executing the next move. In deterrence, on the contrary, 
the coercer is satisfied with the behaviour of the opponent and wants to maintain the 
status quo by preventing any aggression or change in its behaviour. Thus, it is the 
opponent or future coercee that has the ball in its court, so to speak, and thus is the one 
that has the initiative to reply.142 
 
An attempt to find the difference between compellence and deterrence is also seen in 
Thomas Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict. He sees it as the “difference between inducing 
inaction and making someone perform,” classifying the former as deterrence and latter 
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as compellence.143 Unlike deterrence, compellence is a concept that contains the active 
use of violence. In other words, compellence is the use of threats or force to make an 
opponent stop an action that has already been started, or to perform an action that the 
coercer wants.  
 
Schelling’s classification of deterrence and compellence can also be found in his other 
book, Arms and Influence. Here, he defines deterrence as a “threat intended to keep an 
adversary from doing something.” This is a passive concept: a certain party or state 
makes a threat of action in order to deter an opponent from performing a certain act. In 
contrast, compellence is a more active concept: the coercer takes the initiative, forcing 
the opponent to change or stop its behaviour against its will.144 
 
The success of deterrence can be measured by a certain behaviour not being performed 
by the opponent, and the success of compellence can be measured by how quickly and 
accurately the opponent changes its behaviour to conform with the coercer’s wishes.145 
 
<Figure 3-1> Comparison between deterrence and compellence 
 
Robert J. Art “The four foundations of force”, p. 135 
 
 
Figure 3-1 shows Robert J. Art’s diagrammatic illustration of Schelling’s concept. In 
deterrence, A is not showing any aggression that is unacceptable to B. Being satisfied 
with the situation and wanting to maintain the status quo, B threatens or warns A that it 
will retaliate if there is a shift or attempt by A bringing any aggression to this status quo. 
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As a result, A does not change its behaviour and stays the same. 
 
In contrast, in compellence, A is performing or has already performed a certain 
behaviour that is not tolerable for B. Thus, B takes action to threaten A to stop or change 
its behaviour. As a result, A stops the threat or aggression that had been intolerable to B 
and B also stops coercing A.  
 
Schelling defines coercion as including concepts of both deterrence and compellence.146 
Coercive diplomacy, while sharing some similarities with the concept of compellence, is 
not without its differences. Compellence does not distinguish between the offensive and 
defensive uses of coercion. Moreover, it relies on the offensive use of coercion. In 
contrast, coercive diplomacy is the defensive use of strategy to persuade the opponent to 
comply. It emphasizes flexible diplomacy by executing reasonable persuasion, 
inducements and coercive threats.147  
 
The concept and theory of coercive diplomacy are based on the works of Alexander L. 
George. The logic is that “The diplomacy will be successful if demands on an adversary 
are backed with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be considered 
credible and potent enough to encourage compliance.” In other words, coercive 
diplomacy can be defined as “the use of forceful persuasion, military threats or limited 
reinforcement of military power to cause the adversary to expect sufficient costs and 
risks to cause him to stop what he is doing.”148 
 
<Table 3-1> Coercion and Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Coercion 
Compellence 
Deterrence 
Blackmail Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Alexander L. George elaborated on compellence and built the concept of coercive 
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diplomacy as is categorized in Table 3-1. He defined coercive diplomacy as a strategy of 
defensive use of force in persuading the adversary. George criticizes Schelling’s concept 
of compellence in that it includes coercive diplomacy, blackmail and sometimes the 
concept of deterrence. For this reason, George uses the term ‘coercive diplomacy’ 
instead of compellence. According to George, the concept of coercive diplomacy 
distinguishes between the uses of defensive and offensive coercion. With this distinction, 
George asserts that in contrast to compellence, which mainly depends on offensive 
coercion, coercive diplomacy includes not only coercive threats but also the possibility 
of flexible diplomacy with reasonable persuasion and reconciliation.149 
 
Coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy, a non-military measure for the defender 
when facing aggression from an adversary that encroaches upon its interests. 150 As 
Table 3-2 shows, George classified coercive diplomacy in 3 types: type A – persuading 
the opponent to stop short of the goal; type B – persuading the opponent to undo the 
action; and type C – persuading the opponent to make changes in its government or 
regime.151  
 
 
<Table 3-2> Three Types of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Deterrence 
Coercive Diplomacy 
Type A Type B Type C 
Persuade opponent 
not to initiate an action 
Persuade opponent 
to stop short of goal 
Persuade opponent 
to undo action 
Persuade opponent to 
make changes in 
government 
Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, p 9. 
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coercive diplomacy. 
151 Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” The Limits of Coercive 
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Peter Viggo Jakobson gives credit to George for bringing the concept of the ‘carrot’ to 
the conceptual framework of coercive diplomacy.152 Jakobson explains that there is a 
higher possibility of achieving coercive diplomacy when the carrot and stick go side by 
side, thus the concept of coercive diplomacy becomes more elaborate. In 1996, when 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed inducement, which came from the concept 
of the carrot, to solve humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era,153 it led to further 
discussion on the use of force and developed into the concept of coercive inducement. 
Coercive inducement is utilized to harmonize various diplomatic, economic and political 
means to achieve persuasion, unlike physical or military strikes.154 
 
As Table 3-3 shows, further studies classified inducement into three categories: coercive, 
persuasive and compensative inducement. Coercive inducement consists of violent 
coercion, which applies the use of limited force or the threat of using limited force and 
non-violent coercion, such as economic sanctions. Compensative inducement literally 
promises a reward as an inducement. Some examples of this could be providing a light 
water reactor to North Korea or offering enriched uranium to Iran. Lastly, persuasive 
inducement involves giving information or exchanging information to induce the 
adversary.155  
 
<Table 3-3> The Inducements in Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Coercive Diplomacy 
Coercive  
Inducement 
Compensative 
Inducement 
Persuasive 
Inducement 
Violent coercion, 
Use of limited force, 
Air strikes 
Non-violent coercion, 
Economic sanctions, 
Non-violent threats 
Economic, political 
compensation 
Providing new 
information, 
discussion 
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154 Donald D. F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Qudratt, Coercive Inducement and the 
Containment of International Crises, Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, p.22. 
155 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, 2nd ed., Boston: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publisher, p. 100-105.  
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The concepts of compellence, coercive diplomacy and coercive inducement involve the 
use of threats or force and include non-military means to make an opponent stop an 
action it has already started, or to take an action it is not willing to take. If deterrence is 
to prevent things which an actor does not want from the opponent, compellence, 
coercive diplomacy and coercive inducement are to focus on the object that the coercer 
wants from the coercee.156 
 
3.2.2 Variants of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Alexander George created a framework of four variant models that policymakers could 
employ in using coercive diplomacy: 
 
1) Try-and-See approach. This represents the first component of the ultimatum variant, 
“a demand on the opponent.” There is no set time limit, no sense of urgency conveyed. 
Instead, the coercer makes a single threat or takes a single action “to persuade the 
opponent before threatening or taking another step.”  
 
2) Gradual turning of the screw. This is similar to the try-and-See method in that it 
makes a threat but “relies on the threat of a gradual, incremental increase of coercive 
pressure rather than threatening large-scale escalation to strong, decisive military action 
if the opponent does not comply.”157 
 
3) The Tacit Ultimatum. This is similar to an ultimatum except that it does not set out an 
explicit time limit or punishment. However, the actor or actors and the opponent both 
believe that the situation is escalating into a crisis. Thus, tension increases.  
 
4) The Ultimatum. “A demand on the opponent, a time limit or sense of urgency for 
compliance with the demand and a threat of punishment for noncompliance” are applied 
to the matter and substantial coercion is under operation.158 
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The coercer can change its approach during the process depending on whether the crisis 
escalates or settles down. It can begin with the try-and-see approach and move 
immediately to the ultimatum, or move from the try-and-see approach to a gradual 
turning of the screw to the ultimatum.  Coercive diplomacy is a form of persuasion and 
bargaining in a crisis. Therefore, one cannot say that a strong hardcore variant 
contributes more to solving problems.159 
 
The use of military force is only limited for the purpose of threats or setting an example. 
Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic and political effort to solve a crisis; the role of 
military action is to build credibility and to show the coercer’s intention to mobilize a 
bigger force if necessary. The use of total force or of force that will escalate into war 
means that coercive diplomacy has failed. Moreover, the use of military force is not 
always required in coercive diplomacy. Peter Viggo Jakobson considers that Western 
powers will only resort to using military force and military threats when their interests 
are challenged by a serious menace or if there is a greater possibility of success and few 
casualties are expected.160  
 
The nuclear strategies and programmes of Iran and North Korea also developed through 
stages such as these with changes in the US coercive diplomacy. This thesis will 
examine how the two countries responded and proceeded under US coercive diplomacy. 
It will follow the strategies of three US administrations and reveal how each is different 
from the other. 
  
 
3.2.3 Contextual Variables of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Alexander L. George states that as “coercive diplomacy is highly context-dependent, 
many different variables can affect the variant of the strategy the policymaker selects, its 
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implementation, and its outcome.”161 To apply coercive diplomacy to a particular crisis, 
five contextual variables need to be considered: 
 
1) The global strategic environment. A particular regional crisis might be affected 
significantly or occasionally; another crisis or conflict may be accorded a higher priority.  
 
2) Type of Provocation. A clear attempt at violation and flagrant disregard of 
international law by the opponent gives the coercer legitimacy. This is extremely helpful 
in obtaining international and domestic support. Moreover, it helps to cut off the 
opponent’s international backing or protection from its allies. 
 
3) Images of war. The more horrible the images of war the crisis triggers, the more 
likely it will be that one or both sides avoid war and cooperate. 
 
4) Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is likely to be more 
difficult to carry out when it is employed by a coalition of states than by a single 
government. 
 
5) Isolation of the Adversary. The success of coercive diplomacy is more complex and 
more difficult when the adversary is not an isolated state but is diplomatically and 
militarily supported by allies.  
 
As the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea were managed under US coercive 
diplomacy, the above-mentioned contextual variables affected both cases and the 
processes of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy. Since three US administrations 
attempted to apply coercive diplomacy to the nuclear proliferation of Iran and North 
Korea, understanding how these three administrations dealt with the above-mentioned 
contextual variables will shed light on why they achieved the outcomes that they did.  
  
3.2.4 Conditions which Favour the Success of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
In his book Arms and Influence, Tomas Schelling sets out five necessary conditions for 
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the success of coercion: 1) the threat of coercion has to be forbidding enough to make 
the opponent believe the cost of non-compliance will be great; 2) the threat to the 
opponent has to be reliable; 3) the opponent needs time to comply and execute the 
coercer’s request; 4) the coercer has to guarantee that surrender will not lead to more 
requests to the opponent; and 5) the crisis or the circumstance of conflict will not be 
recognized as zero-sum. Both coercer and adversary must be persuaded that negotiating 
will bring more benefits than each pursuing their own interest through force.162 
 
Alexander L. George elaborates on Schelling’s work. Schelling’s five conditions were formed 
through deductive reasoning, but George apples inductive methods to case studies and 
identifies eight conditions for coercive diplomacy: 
 
1) Clarity of objective  – clarity about what is to be accomplished through coercive diplomacy. 
This helps the policymaker decide among various options. Moreover, clarity of what is 
demanded helps persuade the adversary. 
 
2) Strength of motivation. The coercing power must be sufficiently motivated, and the 
motivation must be strong enough to lead the crisis. 
 
3) Asymmetry of motivation. It is essential to recognize that motivation is a two-sided matter. 
It is more likely to be successful if the side employing coercion is more highly motivated than 
its opponent by what is at stake in the crisis. 
 
4) Sense of urgency. It is the opponent’s perception of the situation that is critical. If the 
coercer has a great sense of urgency to achieve its object, it is more likely to generate a sense 
of urgency that the opponent commplies. 
 
5) Strong leadership. – Decisions on coercive diplomacy and its implementation and results 
depend to some extent on strong and effective top-level political leadership. The Cuban 
missile is a good example. 
 
6) Adequate domestic and international support. Since most strong states are democratic states, 
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a certain level of political support at home is needed to execute coercive diplomacy. 
International support is also an important factor. As NGOs and global organizations such as 
the UN have established, international support is a crucial factor for the success of coercive 
diplomacy. 
 
7) Unacceptability of threatened escalation. The impact of coercive diplomacy is greater if the 
initial action and threat against the adversary arouse fear of an escalation to circumstances less 
acceptable than those promised if the adversary complies with the demands of the coercer. 
 
8) Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis. Clarity of objectives and 
demands may not suffice. In some cases, it may also be necessary for the coercer to formulate 
specific terms regarding the termination of the crisis that both sides can agree on.163 
 
Alexander L. George emphasizes asymmetry of motivation, sense of urgency and 
unacceptability of threatened escalation as particularly significant conditions among the 
eight: “coercive diplomacy is facilitated if the coercee believes that an asymmetry of 
motivation operates in favour of the coercing power, that it is really time-urgent to 
respond to the coercing power’s demands and that the coercing power will engage in 
escalation that would impose unacceptable costs.”164 Therefore, the goal of coercive 
diplomacy is to make the adversary come to the conclusion that the loss caused by non-
compliance exceeds the interest incurred through confrontation. 
  
On the basis of Schelling and George’s work, Victor Viggo Jakobson comes to four 
ideal conditions for performing successful coercive diplomacy: 1) the coercer has 
sufficient military force to take on the adversary in a short period of time with low costs; 
2) the coercer should set a time limit for the adversary to comply or else the adversary 
will not trust its military threats; 3) a conviction that there will be no further demands 
after compliance – if the adversary thinks that there will be another request or demand 
after complying, the motivation to comply will be reduced; and 4) the adversary should 
be rewarded for compliance, thereby providing it with a carrot. 
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However, it is not sufficient to claim that these conditions will lead to a success of 
coercive diplomacy. Since coercer and the adversary, or coercee, are not static actors, 
both change their strategies to maximize their interests through a contest of coercive and 
counter-coercive diplomacy. Given this dynamic nature of coercion, coercive threats 
should not be taken as single discreet events with a linear logic. Moreover, a coercive 
contest should be considered a series of actions and counter-actions, which are not only 
based on and anticipate each other but also other changes in the security environment.165 
 
 
3.2.5 Coercive and Counter-Coercive Diplomacy 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, for successful coercive diplomacy one should 
consider the mutuality of coercion. No unilateral coercive diplomacy operates in the real 
world. Regardless of the asymmetry of power, most coercees have resource to executing 
counter-coercion. Therefore, the coercee also executes its counter-coercive diplomacy to 
implement measures to change the coercer’s behaviour and coercion during contention 
over a crisis. Thus, the contention of the coercer and coercee are reciprocally formed. 
This mutual dynamic of coercion has been studied and identified in Lawrence 
Freedman’s Strategic Coercion and the co-work by Daniel Byman and Matthew 
Waxman: The dynamics of Coercion.  
 
3.2.5.1 Strategic Coercion 
 
Strategic coercion is a term that Lawrence Freedman employed to distinguish his theory 
from those of other scholars. According to Freedman, strategic coercion is a fundamental 
concept underlying any strategy that uses threats or coercion as a means to influence 
another’s decision. He defines strategic coercion as the deliberate and purposive use of overt 
threats to influence another’s strategic choices. 166  The key to strategic coercion is an 
awareness of the fact that the coercee that has to face the strategic coercion also has strategic 
alternatives: the coercee in strategic coercion is not a guinea pig in a science lab whose 
behaviour depends on the coercion of the coercer.  
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According to Freedman, the coercee can either agree with the demands of the coercer or 
deny them. Moreover, the coercee may also ask or counter-coerce the coercer to amend its 
demand. ‘Strategic coercion’ thus clarifies the bidirectional nature of coercion when it 
comes to the actual implementation of state policy. This reinforces the value of examining 
the contention process of coercion for an accurate analysis since coercer and coercee that 
initiate and receive the coercion are simultaneously playing both roles. 167  The coercer 
imposes a cost for resistance and non-compliance on the coercee but the coercer also has to 
pay the enforcement costs of the coercion. Moreover, the coercee can execute counter-
coercion to increase the enforcement costs to the coercer and also reduce its own non-
compliance costs, thus attempting to achieve the compliance of the coercer with its 
objectives or manipulate the coercion of the coercer.  
 
In a conflict or crisis, even if the coercer’s coercion has been well-planned to harmonize 
with all the conditions favourable for successful coercive diplomacy and the coercee is fully 
aware of this situation, coercion is not the only variable in strategic coercion. It is just one of 
the factors or variables that will be considered by the coercee to decide on compliance or 
refusal to comply with the demands of the coercer. Other than the coercer’s coercion, the 
coercee also considers other important variables, such as its national interest in the particular 
issue, domestic support, international relations and the dynamics of the issue etc. Thus, the 
best standpoint for analysing the consequences of strategic coercion is to examine the 
contention or the crisis with a balanced perspective on the two sides. One factor is the 
‘asymmetry of motivation’ between the coercee and coercer who are dealing with the 
specific issues that have triggered the crisis and the contention. Another factor is the agents’ 
capability and their positions within the international balance of power.168 Thus, the most 
efficient way to strengthen their positions is for the coercer and coercee to either initiate 
coercion or counter-coercion. Both need to obtain the support of other international agents 
support for their side. This is similar to Alexander George’s ‘adequate international support’ 
condition. 
 
As in the previous work by Schelling and George, Freedman also sees deterrence and 
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compellence as sub-concepts of coercion. Unlike the coercive diplomacy of Alexander 
George, Freedman includes the concept of deterrence in strategic coercion. However, 
although George clearly distinguishes between compellence and deterrence, he does not 
rule out the use of deterrence within coercive diplomacy. Deterrence in strategic 
coercion has some resemblance to the ‘try-and-see’ approach of George’s coercive 
diplomacy, where the coercer waits to see how the coercee responds or behaves when a 
crisis is initiated as a result of the coercee’s breach of the status quo. Compellence in the 
concept of strategic coercion is a continuous threat or coercion by the coercer to achieve 
the compliance of the coercee.169   
 
The design of the threat and the demands made is assumed to support the will of agents 
to reflect a broader political relationship between the coercer and the coercee, and 
cannot be expected to serve as the only influence on this relationship. While Schelling 
and George clearly point out an important feature by linking coercion with diplomacy 
and away from the supposed concerns of traditional military strategy, the distinction 
between an apolitical use of ‘brute’ force and a highly political use of threatened 
‘exemplary’ force is troublesome. 
 
Freedman’s concept of strategic coercion is made much clearer as it distinguishes 
between ‘control’ and ‘coercion.’ The concept of control does not acknowledge choice 
by the coercee. That is, it puts the coercer in an overriding position that cannot be 
challenged through any choice of the coercee. However, in strategic coercion the 
coercee also has options. Coercion works and influences interactively through the agents’ 
choices. As Table 3-4 shows, Freedman uses the concept of strategic coercion to stress 
this mutuality and distinguish his theory from the concepts of coercion, compellence and 
coercive diplomacy.  
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<Table 3-4> Concepts which use threats as tools 
 
Strategic Coercion Control 
Compellence 
Deterrence 
 
Coercer in 
an 
overriding 
position 
Blackmail 
Coercive Diplomacy 
Coercive 
Inducement 
Compensative 
Inducement 
Persuasive 
Inducement 
Violent 
coercion, 
use of 
limited 
force, 
air 
strikes 
Non-
violent 
coercion, 
economic 
sanctions, 
non-
violent 
threats 
Economic, 
political 
compensation 
Provide 
new 
options, 
exchange 
opinions 
 
 
3.2.5.2 Pressure Points and Escalation Dominance 
 
Matthew Waxman and Daniel Byman introduce the concept of pressure points and 
escalation dominance, which are crucial in the analysis of the contention between 
coercion and counter-coercion.170 Coercion may be successful when the coercer finds a 
pressure point of the coercee and efficiently threatens that point. For instance, if the 
target regime or government is founded around a certain tribe, political party or specific 
elite group, it will be pressure points. When a threat to a pressure point continues, such 
as one against the interests and lives of the elite group – e.g. continual air strikes – the 
opponent might comply with the coercer’s demand so as to not lose control of its power. 
However, the opponent can also use the same concept. Occasionally, the characteristics 
of US coercive diplomacy are used by opponents as pressure points. Byman and 
Waxman point out five characteristics of US coercive diplomacy that erode the 
credibility of coercion and limit US capability: 1) a preference for multilateralism; 2) 
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sensitivity to casualties; 3) an aversion of domestic public opinion to suffering by target-
state citizens; 4) dependence on advanced technology to reduce American casualties; 
and 5) observance of international regulations. Many case studies on the crisis 
management of US coercive diplomacy show that its opponents are already aware of 
these characteristics and use them in their counter-coercion as pressure points.171 
 
The ‘escalation of dominance’ can be easily explained as an absolute superiority of the 
coercer. It means the coercer has to be more capable than the coercee under any 
circumstance during escalation of the contention. This means that any form of escalation 
which the coercee could achieve through counter-coercion will not affect the coercer. 
The success of coercion or coercive diplomacy can be achieved when the coercer 
maintains superiority in escalation dominance. The most successful results will be 
reached if the coercer simultaneously increases its threat against the opponent and 
offsets the opponent’s ability to counter-coerce and threaten. International isolation, 
economic sanctions, support for rebel groups, air strikes and invasion can be used as 
means of coercion. 
 
The theoretical framework for the present research includes the coercion theories of 
Schelling, George, Jakobson, Freedman, Byman and Waxman in their entirety. Thus, the 
use of diplomatic coercion theory in this research does not refer to the work of any 
particular scholar. Using this comprehensive theoretical framework based on the work 
of previous scholars, a contention model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy 
will be applied to the case studies in the thesis to examine US coercive diplomacy.     
 
3.3 Methodology and Modelling of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
3.3.1 Methodology  
 
Related concepts and propositions are systematically assembled to form a theory to 
explain certain behaviour in a given environment. A proposition is a construct of several 
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concepts and theory is an assembly of several such propositions. Therefore, since a theory 
represents a composition of many propositions and concepts in a system, theory is more 
comprehensive and complex than hypotheses and propositions. 172 Those who are not 
familiar with scientific research perceive theory as mere ‘speculation.’ However, theory is 
essential to substantiate happenings in reality. Well-defined theories are established 
through positivist examination and experiment to prove their value in reality. 173 Kurt 
Lewin emphasizes the importance of bridging theory and reality by stating “no theory 
could exist without reality and no reality could be constructed without theory.” Theory 
therefore has a critical role in social and political science research.174 However, no theory 
is absolute all proven theories need to be developed to achieve higher validity in 
explaining their subject matters. 
  
Coercive diplomacy theory is based on the realism of international politics. Realism 
assumes the state is the single most important actor that has clear sovereignty. Thus, the 
agent in a coercive diplomacy model is the state and the analysis has to take a state-
centric view. Since realism presumes the state is a rational actor that seeks maximization 
of profit, the coercive diplomacy model also assumes that state behaviour is utility 
maximization. Moreover, since realism presumes a state of anarchy in international 
relations, coercive diplomacy theory embraces anarchy as the basic ‘strategic 
environment’ in which the coercer and coercee are considered when implementing their 
coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy.  
 
Coercive diplomacy is a theory that the coercer, which has asymmetrically more power, 
uses diplomatic coercion in order to induce the adversary to change behaviour to comply 
with its demands without engaging in a war. The coercer forcefully persuades the 
coercee that complying with the coercer’s demands is more profitable than taking a risk 
and paying the cost of non-compliance with the coercer’s coercion. Since coercive 
diplomacy theory assumes the coercee is also a rational actor that seeks utility 
maximization, the coercee would not make any choice that is unprofitable.  
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This research proceeds by means of a comprehensive coercive diplomacy model which 
is based on the theories of coercion, coercive diplomacy and mutual coercion. There 
have been a number of studies and articles which try to explain international conflict 
using the concepts of coercion and coercive diplomacy. However, few previous scholars 
have developed coercive diplomacy theory. Thomas C. Schelling, Alexander L. George, 
Lawrence Freedman, Peter V. Jakobsen, Daniel L. Byman, and Matthew C. Waxman are 
among the few who have developed the concept of coercion into more of a theory. 
Schelling separates coercion and deterrence to emphasize the differences between 
containment and compellence. Alexander L. George and Peter V. Jakobsen contribute by 
adding the concept of inducement. Finally, Lawrence Freedman, Daniel L. Byman and 
Matthew C. Waxman bring understanding of mutuality in coercion. In a crisis 
environment, the coercion never works in one way. Although the mutuality of coercion 
is not completely neglected in academia, most studies of coercive diplomacy tend to 
focus on strong states and the coercer’s policy to investigate what can be done to 
achieve the compliance of the coercee. This thesis has the aim of analysing diplomatic 
disputes over proliferation by the ‘axis of evil’ by inputting both the coercer and the 
coercee into a ‘contention model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy’ in order 
to gain clearer understanding of state coercion.  
 
The scope of this study is limited to the 20 years of contention using coercive and 
counter-coercive diplomacy between the US and North Korea and between the US and 
Iran after the end of the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the US 
rise as a unipolar state produced a clear asymmetry of power, it was a rational choice for 
the US to project its power on issues that could affect its national interests. As coercive 
diplomacy theory focuses on diplomatic efforts by strong states to solve disputes 
without actually engaging in war under circumstances of a clear asymmetry of power, 
the cases of Iranian and North Korean nuclear development naturally fit into the model.  
 
Since there is a clear asymmetry of power in the contention over the nuclear 
programmes of North Korea and Iran, the US generally takes the initiative on the issue. 
Moreover, it is the US that wanted to stop the nuclear programmes of Iran and North 
Korea and initiated the coercion on both countries to suspend or dismantle their nuclear 
programmes. Thus, in the coercive diplomacy model of the contention between the US 
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and Iran and North Korea, it is US demands that determine the contention.      
 
A change in the coercer’s demand means a change of phase in the contention. For 
instance, at the beginning of the second nuclear crisis with North Korea, the US focused 
on the North Korean highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme and demanded North 
Korean CVID. The result of the contention was the withdrawal of North Korea from the 
NPT and an end to its nuclear suspension. Therefore, the US changed stance and 
demanded that North Korea take part in six-party multilateral talks. North Korea resisted 
by demanding the bilateral talks. This phase of contention ended with North Korea 
accepting the six-party talks. Of course, persuasive and compensative inducement also 
helped achieve the compliance of North Korea.  
 
When the coercer makes a demand and coerces the coercee to change, the contention 
begins. Phase one of the contention ends when the demand of the coercer results in 
either 1) compliance by the coercee; 2) compromise with an alternative; or 3) non-
compliance by the coercee. If the coercer begins offering different inducements – more 
severe sanctions, a compensative economic package, or both, or even a small change in 
the demand – it is the beginning of a new phase of contention. By dividing the 
contention into phases in this way, one can evaluate and analyse whether the coercive 
diplomacy is a failure or success and what can be changed to achieve better 
implementation of state policy.    
 
The analysis in this research looks at the administrations of Clinton, Bush and Obama. 
Even though the study examines the detailed phases of the contention process using its 
coercive diplomacy model and not the strategy of each administration as a whole, 
changes of personality of foreign policy officials and governmental elites is surely an 
important factor that influences a state’s foreign policy. Thus, this division based on 
leadership change in the coercer can clearly reveal consistency in US non-proliferation 
policy and coercive diplomacy and the validity of using the coercive diplomacy model 
in the methodology of the thesis.  It has been particularly widely used in international 
politics. For instance, state behaviour is commonly analysed in terms of ‘doctrine’ on the 
basis of official statements, government policy reviews, media interviews etc. Therefore, 
while using the coercive diplomacy model as its main methodology, the thesis uses 
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content analysis to build a model of the coercive diplomacy in each phase of contention.   
 
To carry out this analysis using the coercive diplomacy model, this study mainly collects 
and references US official government statements, reports and official policy reviews, 
North Korean and Iranian official government statements and statements by state-owned 
news agencies in these countries, and official statements and reports by the IAEA and 
the UN. As ancillary reference data, various US think tank and newspaper/broadcast 
media reports will be utilized.  
 
3.3.1.1 Data collection 
 
Content analysis is defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their context”.175 Content analysis particularly has been widely 
used in international politics. For instance, the state behaviour is commonly analysed 
with the ‘Doctrine’ based on the official statement, policy reviews of government, 
interview with media and etc. Thus, while using the coercive diplomacy model as a 
main methodology of the dissertation, it uses content analysis to build the coercive 
diplomacy model in each phased of contention.   
 
To carry out such analysis with the coercive diplomacy model, this research mainly 
collects and references the US government’s official statements, reports, official policy 
reviews, the North Korean and Iranian government’s official statements, statements of 
state owned news agencies of those countries and the official statements and reports of 
IAEA and UN. Also, as an ancillary data, various data from US think tanks and 
newspaper/ broadcast media of states that could help analyse conditions of Iran and 
North Korea will be utilized as reference data.  
 
3.3.1.2 Research Question and Hypothesis  
 
A lack of understanding of the decision-making process in compellence and coercive 
diplomacy is caused by discrepancies between the theory and actual implementation of 
                                                                
175 K. Krippendorff, The holidaymakers: Understanding the Impact of Leisure and Trave’l, Heinemann, 
1989, p. 403.  
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state coercive policy. Thus, under the hypothesis that misunderstanding of compellence 
and coercive diplomacy theory causes failure of US strategy against nuclear 
proliferation in Iran and North Korea, the thesis will examine the following questions. 
How did the US coercive diplomacy after the Cold War influence the nuclear strategies 
of Iran and North Korea? How did the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea 
progress despite US coercive diplomacy?’ And what caused the failure of the US 
coercive diplomacy against nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea?   
 
 
3.3.2 The Contention Model of Coercive and Counter-Coercive Diplomacy 
 
A theoretical model is a structure or a system based on a specific theory to examine 
behaviour or happenings in reality. If the purpose of theory is to explain phenomena in 
the real world, a social scientific model makes a representation of these phenomena 
based on the related theory. The theoretical model examines the variables that are 
related to certain actions and analyses how they influence agents to produce a certain 
result or phenomenon. For instance, a marketing manager uses a theoretical model to 
evaluate how spending from an annual budget influenced sales profit and growth in the 
market in a designated period. Another example is weather forecasting, where the 
direction and intensity of wind, temperatures, levels of humidity and barometric air 
pressure are put into a theoretical model to predict future weather patterns. 
 
A theoretical model is highly efficient to understand the subjects of social and political 
science. Therefore, various theoretical models such as path models, network models, 
mathematical models etc. have been created to analyse the actions of agents in realty. 
All theoretical models have descriptive, predictive and normative forms to clarify the 
related theory. That is, a theoretical model captures the variables in a theory and relates 
them to show how they lead to a certain action or phenomenon.  
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<Figure 3-2> The Process of Building a Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
As described in Figure 3-2, the development of a theoretical model includes inductive 
and deductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning begins an observation, which leads to a 
question of “why this has happened?” In order to derive an answer to the question, a 
hypothesis is needed to draw a provisional conclusion. The theory and the theoretical 
model test the hypothesis reach a scientifically verified conclusion through deductive 
reasoning based on logic and the evidence. Therefore, this chapter will construct a 
theoretical model of coercive diplomacy to examine US non-proliferation policy 
towards Iran and North Korea in the following chapters.  
 
 3.3.2.1 Coercive Strategy of the Coercer 
 
In order to perform a precise analysis of a state’s foreign policy by applying coercive 
diplomacy theory, it is necessary to consider the coercive diplomacy of the coercer, the 
counter-coercive diplomacy of the coercee, the neighbouring states, and any important 
agent that has influence on the subject matter as independent variables. The dependent 
variables are the consequences of the contention resulting from the independent 
valuables. Resolution, the status quo and escalation of a crisis are the possible results 
which can be expected. Thus, the coercive diplomacy model which will be applied to 
analyse the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea will be built on comprehensive 
knowledge and concepts from previous studies of coercive diplomacy.  
 
Following Alexander George’s coercive diplomacy concept, a coercer first has to decide 
which type of coercive diplomacy it will implement towards the coercee: type A – 
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persuading the opponent to stop short of its goal; type B – persuading the opponent to 
undo an action; or type C – persuading the opponent to make changes in its government 
or regime. The type of coercive diplomacy can change as the coercive diplomacy 
proceeds. This is because coercive diplomacy is kinetic and changes according to the 
consequences of the contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy.  
 
Alexander George’s eight conditions favourable for the success of coercive diplomacy 
will also be included in the coercive diplomacy model in order to explain how they 
influence the contention process and its results. It is certain that the eight conditions are 
influential on the implementation of the coercive diplomacy towards Iran and North 
Korea and a lack of certain favourable conditions would be fatal for the success of US 
coercive diplomacy. However, since not all the conditions need to be considered in each 
phase of the contention process, they will only be included when necessary.   
 
Five contextual variables that have an impact on the contention between coercive and 
counter-coercive diplomacy are also included in the model: the global strategic 
environment; the type of provocation; images of war; unilateral or coalitional coercive 
diplomacy; and isolation of the adversary. As Alexander L. George states, coercive 
diplomacy is highly context-dependent. These five variables can affect the policymakers 
of the coercer and coercee in selecting and implementing policy. To take the example of 
global strategic environment, when the Bush administration gave the Saddam regime in 
Iraq an ultimatum and there was military intervention in 2003, the global strategic 
environment was not supportive of Iran and North Korea. The cost of resistance or 
counter-coercive diplomacy could lead to military intervention. Therefore, North Korea 
and Iran had to maintain low profiles and remain compliant with the US. However, 
when in 2008 there was a financial crisis that shook the US, the Bush administration 
could not afford new expenditure on engaging in another international affair, or even 
maintaining its policy. Therefore, the global strategic environment was more favourable 
for Iran and North Korea to implement their counter-coercive diplomacy. The Bush 
administration had no option but to tone down its so-called ‘pure coercion’ coercive 
diplomacy and initiated the six-party talks with North Korea which had been put on hold 
since the administration had set the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programme 
as a precondition for any dialogue. The coercer’s coercive diplomacy can be described 
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as in Figure 3-3 below. 
<Figure 3-3> The Coercive Diplomacy of a Coercer 
 
 
When coercive diplomacy is implemented, the coercer considers the contextual variables 
and conditions that favour the success of its coercive diplomacy and then selects the 
type of coercive diplomacy and inducements to coerce the coercee. During the process 
of coercion, the coercer examines and deploys four variants of coercive diplomacy to 
implement more effective coercion: try and see; gradual turning of the screw; tacit 
ultimatum; and ultimatum.   
 
 
3.3.2.2 Counter-Coercive Strategy of the Coercee 
 
The objective of the coercer in implementing coercive diplomacy is to maximize the 
cost of non-compliance to the coercee. Therefore, the coercer uses both a carrot and a 
stick, compensative and punitive inducements, to convince the coercee that compliance 
with the coercer is much more beneficial and rational. By showing the clear asymmetry 
between the cost of non-compliance and the consequence of compliance, coercive 
diplomacy induces the coercee to comply.  
 
In contrast, the goal of the coercee and of counter-coercive diplomacy is to maximize 
the enforcement cost to the coercer, which will hinder the execution of coercive 
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diplomacy. Moreover, the coercee tries to minimize the cost of non-compliance which 
will be imposed on it during the coercion.  
 
The strategy of counter-coercive diplomacy is to defend or expand the coercee’s main 
objective during the contention of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy. Just as the 
coercer sets the objectives of its coercive diplomacy, the coercee also sets the aims of its 
counter-coercive diplomacy and accordingly plans how it will be implemented. If the 
coercee evaluates the demands of the coercer as unacceptable, it also implements carrots 
and sticks, compensative and punitive inducements, to counter-coerce the coercer. The 
inducements of counter-coercive diplomacy aim to maximize enforcement costs and 
minimize non-compliance costs. 
 
For example, when the US demanded the complete verifiable irreversible dismantlement 
(CVID) of the North Korean nuclear programme, North Korea counter-coerced the US 
coercion by utilizing its carrot and stick. By freezing its nuclear programme and 
allowing an IAEA inspection, it reduced the possible cost of non-compliace with the US 
coercion. Since North Korea made a favourable gesture, it became difficult for the US to 
raise the level of the coercion, which meant lowering the non-compliance cost to North 
Korea. On the other hand, North Korea also revealed its missile and nuclear capabilities 
and added in conventional weapon provocation to raise the enforcement cost of the US 
coercive diplomacy. If the deterrence level of North Korea escalated, it meant the 
enforcement cost which the US had to pay for its coercion rose. Although it was North 
Korea that was forced to comply, it also had its own coercive and compensative 
inducements in its counter-coercive diplomacy.  
 
The coercee uses two implementation strategies to maximize the enforcement cost to the 
coercer and minimize the non-compliance cost to itself. There are two typical methods 
for maximizing the enforcement cost of the coercer. First, it has to show a strong ‘sense 
of urgency’ in its counter coercion. Coercive diplomacy includes military threats and a 
limited use of military force. Therefore, if the coercee is not willing to resist military 
action or the coercer’s threats, a counter-coercive diplomacy cannot exist. The latter is 
effective when the coercee shows its willingness to make total war or to cause a high 
level of military conflict that the coercer is not willing to afford. If the coercee sustains 
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the credibility of its implementation of a high enforcement cost on the coercer by 
showing willingness to take military action which the coercer cannot manage, it displays 
‘strength of motivation’ not to comply with the coercive diplomacy. If this happens, the 
coercee has leverage on the escalation dominance of the coercer, which is a crucial 
element for the success of coercive diplomacy. 
 
The second method is to raise the enforcement cost. When contention between coercive 
and counter-coercive diplomacy occurs, the coercee can reveal or develop its ability to 
raise the cost of implementing coercive diplomacy. Missile development and the 
revelation of the nuclear enrichment programmes of Iran and North Korea are good 
examples. As the ability of the coercee increases, the enforcement cost to the coercer of 
implementing and sustaining the coercive diplomacy increases as well. 
 
A second implementation strategy of counter-coercive diplomacy is to minimize the 
non-compliance cost to the coercee. By minimizing the pressure of coercive diplomacy, 
the coercee can manipulate the coercer’s coercion. There are also two methods of doing 
this. First, the coercee can decrease the legitimacy of the coercer’s coercive diplomacy. 
The coercer’s demand is the key element justifying its coercive diplomacy. If the 
coercive diplomacy has the right cause and objectives, it is highly likely to lead to the 
compliancy of the coercee. Therefore, the coercee provokes an argument over the 
legitimacy of the coercive diplomacy and reduce the justification for it in order to 
dampen the momentum and the power of the coercer’s inducement. When the coercee 
succeeds in showing that the coercive diplomacy lacks legitimacy, the coercee can 
portray the demand of the coercer as unilateral unbalanced oppression and request a 
compromise to sabotage the coercive diplomacy. The second method is to weaken the 
solidarity of the multilateral group involved in the coercive diplomacy. The coercee’s 
counter-coercive diplomacy can be described as in Figure 3-4 below. 
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<Figure 3-4> The Counter Coercive Diplomacy of a Coercee 
 
 
‘Adequate international support’ is one of Alexander George’s eight crucial conditions 
that favour the success of coercive diplomacy. In a globalized world, no coercive 
diplomacy operates without multilateral participants. Therefore, the coercee utilizes its 
own diplomatic asset – international relations and mutual interests – to lead the 
contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy as it wishes. In the cases 
of North Korea and Iran, a multilateral structure – P5+1 and the six-party talks – was 
also established and it became the theatre of contention for the coercive and counter-
coercive diplomacy. Even before this structure or system was established, there were 
three-party talks on the first North Korea nuclear crisis and an EU3 dealing with the 
Iranian nuclear programme.    
 
As mentioned above, coercive diplomacy cannot simply be described as a stick and a 
carrot. For an accurate assessment of coercive diplomacy, the participants, the strategic 
environment and various variants have to be considered. The contention between the 
coercive diplomacy of the coercer and the counter-coercive diplomacy of the coercee 
can then be analysed on the basis of these considerations. If the objective of the coercive 
diplomacy is not achieved as a result of the contention, or the contention escalates to all-
out war, it is a failure on the part of the coercive diplomacy. The contention between the 
coercer and coercee can be modelled as in Figure 3-5 below.     
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<Figure 3-5> The Contention Model of Coercive and Counter-coercive Diplomacy 
 
 
      
 
3.3.2.3 Non-Proliferation and Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Ever since a nuclear weapon was first used in World War II, its massive power of 
destruction and the swift way it brought the war to an end, in addition to fears of being 
attacked with nuclear weapons, enticed many countries to acquire nuclear armaments. 
These weapons were considered an optimal option by countries whose national security 
was exposed to great threats, regimes that feared subversion and countries that wanted to 
increase their status and political influence. 
 
The motivation for a state’s nuclear armament has been analysed using three models: 1) the 
security model – a state builds nuclear arms to raise its capability of preventing any external 
threats, including a nuclear attack; 2) the domestic politics model – a state utilizes nuclear 
weapons as a political tool for domestic and bureaucratic reasons; 3) the norm model – a 
state wants to achieve modernity and identity through nuclear armament.176 Many countries 
                                                                
176 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb”, 
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3. (Winter, 1996-1997), p. 54-86. 
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such as South Africa, Libya, Ukraine, Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea attempted to 
obtain nuclear armaments or ability following these three models of motivation. 
 
The US Government executed coercion and inducement in all these cases to prevent 
nuclear proliferation. However, it is difficult to analyse every case mentioned above in 
terms of coercive diplomacy due to differences in the backgrounds for each country. 
Moreover, the fact that the US used coercion and inducement as a diplomatic tool, and 
the amount of pressure and willpower being different for each country make it even 
harder to apply coercive diplomacy to each case. US coercive diplomacy was relatively 
weak in the cases of South Africa, Ukraine, Pakistan and India compared to Iran, North 
Korea, Libya and Iraq. Iran and North Korea are the only two countries left that are 
being subjected to ‘relatively intensive’ US coercive diplomacy. 
 
In July 1985, President Reagan asserted that “The American people are not going to tolerate 
intimidation, terror, and outright acts of war against this nation and its people. And we’re 
especially not going to tolerate these attacks from outlaw states run by the strangest collection of 
misfits, loony tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich.”177 However, it 
was the Clinton administration that elaborated on this concept. In 1994, National Security 
Advisor Anthony Lake labelled five regimes as ‘rogue states’: North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Iran and 
Libya. In theory, at least, to be classified as a rogue a state had to commit four transgressions: 
pursue weapons of mass destruction, support terrorism, severely abuse its own citizens, and 
stridently criticize the United States. Even though the concept of rogue states was abolished in 
the last six months of the Clinton administration, economic sanctions and coercive diplomacy 
towards the nuclear development of Iran and North Korea were maintained through the two 
terms of his regime.  
 
Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, and his administration were much more hard-liners. The 
concept of ‘rogue states’ was replaced with the “axis of evil,’ a label that befell three states: Iraq, 
Iran, and North Korea. After the 9/11 Crisis, the US non-proliferation strategy, which was based 
on the concept of ‘contradiction of usage’, was that nuclear weapons could be developed and 
possessed but not used and the ‘balance of terror’ was changed to a counter-proliferation 
strategy. The Bush administration exercised more aggressive coercive diplomacy against Iran 
                                                                
177 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, July 8, 1985. 
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and North Korea. 
When he was a democratic candidate in the presidential election, Obama proposed to 
negotiate with Iran using “big sticks and big carrots” to persuade the country’s leaders not to 
develop nuclear weapons.178 However, after the inauguration, the Obama administration took 
the stance of using dialogue without military threats to solve issues. The administration 
attempted to change and tone down the policies of the Bush administration. Even though it 
was relatively weak compared to the previous one, the coercive diplomacy of Obama was 
operational. Iran and North Korea are still subject to economic sanctions and they are getting 
tougher. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, announced that it would exclude Iran 
and North Korea from any ‘negative security assurance’ and it would not remove the threat of 
using US nuclear weaponry on these two countries.179 The Obama administration maintained 
a framework of coercive diplomacy which is still coercing both countries.  
 
The goal of coercive diplomacy is to achieve a state’s objective by diplomatic means without 
necessitating war. This means the objective of US coercive diplomacy on non-proliferation is 
to prevent Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons without going to war. 
However, the above-mentioned theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy introduced 
violent coercive inducements and the limited use of force or threats to use force as important 
means of coercion. Although Alexander L. George and Lawrence Freeman state that it is 
possible to use coercion without the use of military force, if the US could make a credible 
threat to use military force, which would impose an escalation of costs and a threat to Iran and 
North Korea, US coercive diplomacy against the nuclear development of these two countries 
would be much more effective.    
 
North Korea’s long-lasting efforts to possess nuclear weapons and frequent requests for 
a non-aggression pact with the US reveal its fear of US military action against its regime. 
In addition, the routine denouncement, threats and provocation by North Korea against 
joint South Korean-US military exercises such as the Ulchi-Freedom Guardian and Key 
Resolve Force also show North Korea’s fears of the US military capability.180  
                                                                
178 Matti Friedman, “Obama Favors “Big Sticks and Big Carrots” for Iran”, The Suns, New York, July 23, 2008 
http://www.nysun.com/foreign/obama-jerusalem-to-remain-israels-capital/82479/ [accessed 13 April 2012]. 
179 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010.   
180 Kim Min-seok, “North strongly protests new Key Resolve joint exercises”, Joong-ang daily, Seoul, 9 
March 2010.  http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2917570 [accessed 
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Distinguishing itself from North Korea, Iran is claiming to observe the NPT and to be 
exercising its right to a peaceful use of nuclear technology. In spite of the differences, 
Iran is not free from US military threats similar to those against North Korea. Iran has 
witnessed US invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, a strong alliance between the US and 
Pakistan and is also well aware of the close proximity of the US forces stationed in 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain, as well as the naval fleets in the Straits of 
Hurmuz. Whether Iran wants nuclear weapons or nuclear power is not clear. The Iranian 
authorities deny that they are seeking nuclear weapons for deterrence or retaliation since 
Iran’s level of technological progress cannot match that of existing nuclear weapon 
states. However, the fact that Iran wants to implement the Japanese nuclear programme 
model reveals its fear of a threat from the US military. Even without weaponization, 
pursing the Japanese model shows its ambition to use its nuclear capability as a strategic 
deterrent. Iran is unlikely to agree to a zero-enrichment policy because in doing so it 
would give up the most valuable bargaining chip it can bring to the table. 
 
The non-proliferation of WMD and the management of international conflict are the two 
main concerns in America’s security strategy in the post-Cold War era. In terms of 
effectiveness, coercive diplomacy is the essence of crisis management after the rise of the 
US as the head state in the unipolar system. Coercive diplomacy supports a strategy of 
engagement, strategic coercion and any types of inducement that counter the proliferation 
of WMD. 
 
The theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy is of much value to analyse the 
nuclear development of Iran and North Korea. An analysing the application of US 
coercive diplomacy to these two countries helps highlight the problems and provides 
some parameters for potentially more effective policies. 
 
3.4 US Diplomatic Strategy and Coercive Diplomacy  
 
In order to achieve an accurate analysis of US diplomacy toward the nuclear 
development of Iran and North Korea under the theoretical framework of coercive 
diplomacy, it is crucial to clarify the validity of coercive diplomacy in US diplomatic 
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strategy. For instance, if the US used an appeasement strategy to deal with the issue, it 
would make contradiction for applying coercive diplomacy as the theoretical framework 
as it would have no validity.  
 
The US diplomatic strategy after the Cold War can be divided into four main types: 
appeasement, engagement, containment and isolation. Appeasement is a strategy used as 
a method of positive sanction. It is a strategy that applies the state’s territorial or 
geopolitical influence to the opponent in order to change its behaviour. Appeasement 
needs no consistent relationship or cooperation, and if it is executed one single time it 
can be called an appeasement strategy. The Munich Agreement in 1938 is a typical 
example.  
 
Compared to appeasement, engagement is a gradual strategy and it brings change in the 
balance of politics, diplomacy, economics and the military. The state that exerts 
engagement is aware of this change and with this prospect implements its policy. 
Engagement emphasizes cultural, social and economic factors more than military ones. 
Through consistent relations and cooperation, engagement seeks change or maintains the 
opponent’s behaviour.  
 
Containment is an aggressive strategy that prevents the geopolitical expansion and 
hinders the influence of the target state. Since a state can exchange and continue 
relationships in various fields with the target state while pursuing a containment strategy, 
containment is compatible with engagement. However, containment and an appeasement 
strategy cannot be concurrent with each other since they are contrasting concepts. 
 
Isolation is the opposite to engagement. It involves cutting all relations with the target 
states to marginalize it. An appeasement strategy can be used with isolation due to its 
one-off use characteristic. This means that even if a state wants to isolate a target state, it 
can use an appeasement strategy to achieve its objective since appeasement is not a 
gradual or continuous strategy.  
 
Thus, if the US sets its diplomatic strategy as containment or isolation, it is appropriate 
to analyse the US diplomacy within the theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy. 
85 
  
The problem is when the US uses appeasement or engagement. Since engagement and 
containment or isolation and appeasement can be used at the same time, it seems there is 
still room for coercive diplomacy. However, without strictly clarifying the relationship 
between these diplomatic strategies and coercive diplomacy, there will be many 
weaknesses in using coercive diplomacy as a theoretical framework for the study. 
 
In the context of non-proliferation and the US diplomacy toward the nuclear programmes of 
Iran and North Korea, appeasement cannot be used as a strategy. Thus, it is important to 
clarify the relationship between engagement and the use of coercive diplomacy. 
‘Engagement’ is one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon. It may vary in meaning 
depending on the issues, circumstances, and the context of relations between the states.181  
 
Many scholars have different views on how to define engagement. Randal Schweller 
states that engagement encompasses “any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into 
acceptance of established order…it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the 
threat of punishment to influence the target’s behaviour.”182 This is similar to Gordon A. 
Craig and Alexander L. George’s view in which engagement is seen as a policy of 
appeasement.183 Victor D. Cha sees engagement as a strong state using non-coercive and 
non-punitive inducements on the weak state to obtain its objectives.184 If a weak state 
uses non-coercive and non-punitive inducements on a strong states to change its 
behaviour as the weak state wishes, he sees it as appeasement. Richard Haass and 
Meghan L. O’Sullivan view engagement as the use of a positive incentive to achieve a 
goal, which does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments 
such as sanctions or military force: “Engagement implies a willingness to use positive 
incentives as a means of rewarding good behaviour and, to a certain degree, linking 
these incentives to other areas of behaviour.”185 Robert Litwak differentiates negative 
sanctions such as containment, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, limited and total war 
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from positive sanctions, defining the use of the latter as engagement.  
While the concept of engagement differs for each scholar, there is a common element. 
The strategy is to make the target state change its behaviour to that preferred by the state 
that performs the engagement. Chester A. Crocker defines engagement as “a process 
which involves exerting pressure, by raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and 
by probing the other country’s assumptions and thinking.” 186 In this comprehensive 
perspective, engagement needs coercive diplomacy as a sub-policy.  
 
There are views that do not accept the coercive inducements of coercive diplomacy as 
means of engagement. However, as mentioned above, coercive diplomacy also includes 
non-violent and positive incentives such as persuasive and compensative inducement. 
Moreover, in the field of non-proliferation, the US administration will not tolerate any 
attempts by rogue states to pursue nuclear armament or capabilities. This is clearly stated in 
the series of US Nuclear Posture Reviews and Quadrennial Defence Reviews that were 
released after the Cold War. Therefore, whether it is the engagement and enlargement of the 
Clinton administration, the hawk engagement of the Bush administration or the cooperative 
engagement of the Obama administration, whether the dove or the have the initiative in the 
US administration, coercive diplomacy has a valid place in analysing US diplomacy when 
dealing with the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
After the demise of the bipolar system, a favourable international environment for 
applying coercive diplomacy began in the 1990s. Although the compellece literature has 
proven to be less rich and less cumulative than the ‘other side of the coin,’ deterrence, 
US administrations have implemented coercive diplomacy to induce their adversaries 
and to solve security threats to the US.  
 
 According to Robert Putnam, the leaders of states have to play a two-level game that 
simultaneously maximizes the national interest by negotiating with other state leaders at 
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the international level while persuading domestic interest groups to accept the result.  
 
“Any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome  
may upset the game board, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his  
fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat.”187 
 
The two-level game was also played in the US coercive diplomacy on the nuclear 
programmes of Iran and North Korea. For instance, the Clinton administration had the 
opportunity to implement a great process to solve the North Korean nuclear program. 
However, due to opposition from domestic groups, it could not execute its policy. The Clinton 
administration failed to persuade the Republican statesmen who controlled the US congress, 
the media and even some groups within its administration. The enfeeblement of the support 
base for North Korean diplomacy led to questioning of the reliability of Clinton’s North 
Korean policy. It therefore resulted in a brinkmanship strategy by North Korea rather than 
compliance with the coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration.  
 
The Bush administration also faced the same problem. Bush’s coercive diplomacy 
toward the North Korean nuclear programme was much more hardline than the strategy 
of the Clinton administration. However, after massive losses in the election for Bush’s 
second term, the administration had to tone down its coercive diplomacy as it was 
judged to only increase the nuclear ability of North Korea.  
 
The Obama administration also implemented coercive diplomacy to deal with nuclear 
proliferation. Since it learned from the failures of previous administrations, Obama 
waited to pressure North Korea using strategic patience. However, when provocation by 
North Korea and disclosure of its nuclear ability brought about domestic pressure for 
more US engagement on the issue, the Obama administration had to change its policy.  
 
Since the US domestic politics is important in forming foreign diplomacy, there are 
scholars who emphasize the domestic factor when analysing the nuclear programmes of 
Iran and North Korea. However, as shown in this chapter, the US administrations 
consistently sustained coercive diplomacy toward the nuclear proliferation of North 
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Korea and Iran. Moreover, the theoretical model of coercive diplomacy brings room to 
examine the mutuality of coercion. The US domestic politic environments can be 
considered and analysed as strategic environments for the counter-coercive diplomacy 
of Iran and North Korea.  
 
Although the level of coercive diplomacy changed according to domestic politics and the 
environment, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations executed coercive diplomacy 
and North Korea and Iran counter-coerced the U.S. to achieve their goals. Through the 
contention of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy, the nuclear programmes of Iran 
and North Korea progressed. Therefore, this thesis focuses on analysing the nuclear 
strategies of Iran and North Korea under the US coercive diplomacy.  
 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on diplomatic compellence to establish a 
theoretical framework and a model of coercive diplomacy which will be used in this 
study. It has also explained the validity of using coercive diplomacy in analysing the US 
policy toward the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Moreover, by 
discussing the possible strategic stances of US foreign policy, it has demonstrated the 
existence of coercive diplomacy as the core US non-proliferation strategy after the Cold 
War. Chapters Four and Five will examine how US coercive diplomacy affected the 
nuclear programmes and nuclear strategies of Iran and North Korea and how the US 
policy failed in the mutual contention process of coercive and counter-coercive 
diplomacy.   
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4. An Analysis of Diplomatic Contention between the US and Iran on 
Nuclear Nonproliferation after the Cold War 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Even without referring to the ‘Three Models’ of Scott D. Sago, it is not difficult to infer how 
nuclear weapons and its capabilities of the state are perceived as a symbol of prestige and 
power in international politics of anarchy. The nuclear yield of ‘Little Boy’ and ‘Fat Man,’ 
which ended World War II, later created a balance of power so-called ‘balance of terror’ and 
it becomes the concept of nuclear deterrence. Ironically, the redoubtable destructive power 
of nuclear weapon had restrained the war and waged the peace in severe political contention 
of the Cold War. 
 
Admittedly, there are some scholars who question ‘nuclear deterrence’. John Mueller argued 
that the long sustained peace after the 1945 was due to the elevated ‘rational mind’ of the 
states that had experienced the catastrophic destruction through the previous two world 
wars. He asserted it was not the terror and destructive power of nuclear weapons that 
brought peace but the strong aversion from the international community that the war was 
used as a political tool.188 However, a majority of scholars reason that the existence of 
nuclear weapons was the major factor which prevented another world level military dispute 
during the fierce contention of the Cold War. Thus, this perception and the understanding of 
history still affect the analysis of the nuclear strategy of the states that are facing a security 
threat from the outside. Iran’s nuclear programme was not an exception.  
 
Despite Iran’s proclamation of achieving the peaceful nuclear energy, the scholars and 
experts analysed and understood the purpose of Iran’s nuclear programme as the 
acquirement of nuclear deterrence against outside threats which does not necessarily means 
the nuclear armament like as Japan model.189 Nevertheless Iran officially announced its 
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denial of nuclear armament and observed the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement, which 
was clearly different from that of North Korea’s, this perception became the reason or at 
least a justification of why Iran had been imposed to economic sanctions of the international 
community.  
 
Even when diplomatic relations was intimate with the West during Shah’s era, the concept of 
nuclear deterrence and Iran’s cognition on nuclear armament was publicly announced and 
disclosed by Shah himself as having, “No intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small 
states began building them, Iran might have to reconsider its policy.” In a declassified 1974 CIA 
report, the US, who was the biggest patron of Iran at the time, was also convinced if India was 
successful in nuclear armament, Shah would definitely be as well.190 
 
In the early stages of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini was against nuclear armament 
and any type of WMD since he interpreted it as un-Islamic. Thus, although Iran had suffered 
because of Saddam’s chemical attack and encountered the threat of national security in the Iran-
Iraq War, Iran never utilized WMD against the Iraqi army. However, the Supreme Leader 
himself acknowledged the power of nuclear weapons as a nuclear deterrence. 191 This perception 
was in line with the announcement of then Prime Minister, Mir-Hussein Mousavi, that Iran 
would restrain the use of its chemical weapons and other WMD, but there was also the 
possibility of using it in compelling situations.192  
 
The intention of current Supreme Leader Khamenei on the nuclear programme is still 
controversial among experts. It is uncertain whether Khamenei is willing to build nuclear 
weapons or just to generate nuclear energy. That is, when viewed in an historic light, even if 
Iran’s nuclear programme might aim to achieve nuclear weapon capability, Iran perceives the 
development of a nuclear programme as a symbolic and practical deterrence power against 
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outside threats, not the actual use against the adversary. 193 
 
Nevertheless substantial threats from the outside generated Iran’s ‘siege mentality’ and 
necessity of nuclear deterrence, any nuclear programme beyond the nonproliferation 
regime, NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement, could not be approved by the international 
community. However, the problem lies in the nuclear technology itself since there is no 
difference between the peaceful use of atomic energy and the nuclear weapon process. 
That is, there are no boundaries between a full-fledged nuclear programme for the 
peaceful use of atomic energy and the nuclear weapon programme. Although the IAEA 
put a cap of uranium enrichment to 20 present, the technology of producing a 20 percent 
enrichment of uranium and the over 90 percent of enriched fissile material are exactly 
the same. Therefore, restriction and the coercion of the US on Iran’s nuclear programme 
rely on its credibility and degree of its confidence on the Iranian government, not the 
level of Iran’s observance to the IAEA safeguard agreement.  
 
Since Iran is currently a member state of NPT and observes its duty, such as allowing 
IAEA inspections and a six month pre-notice before the activation of nuclear facilities, 
the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme by accusing Iran as the 
proliferator of nuclear weapons has less legitimacy. As Mark Fitzpatrick stated, 
“Possessing an enrichment capability is not the same as having the Bomb. If enrichment 
alone conferred weapons status, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands and Brazil would be 
considered nuclear-weapons capable.” 194 As such, the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s 
nuclear programme has had its limit from the beginning.    
 
Prior to the 1979 revolution, the primary motive of Iran’s nuclear programme was to 
achieve its modernity and identity through nuclear development, the ‘norm model’. That 
is, through the progress of the nuclear programme, Iran wanted to strengthen its status as 
a technologically advanced regional hegemon. It was inline and fit harmoniously with 
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the ‘twin pillar’ policy of the US, who wanted to develop its Middle Eastern policy 
through Iran and Saudi Arabia as the central axis. However, it faced a dramatic change 
after the Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the theocratic state, Vila at-e Faqih. 
The elevated tension between the anti-western Khomeini regime and the US, followed 
by the Iran-Iraq War brought change in the perception of Iran’s nuclear programme. The 
changed environment pushed Iran’s nuclear programme to slant more towards a 
‘security model’, which was to consider the nuclear programme of Iran as a nuclear 
deterrence. Moreover, the cutting of diplomatic ties and commercial trade with western 
countries, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War threatened Iran’s energy security by 
damaging self-sufficiency in its energy sector. Thus, the nuclear programme agenda 
became not only a security matter but an issue of domestic politics. With its various 
dynamics intertwined, Iran’s nuclear programme became a more difficult issue to be 
resolved.  
 
There are three approaches to dealing with Iran's nuclear programme as such: 1) military 
action, including pre-emptive strikes, 2) the behavioural change of Iran through 
sanctions paired with containment and deterrence, which was the coercive diplomacy, 
and lastly, 3) learn to live with a nuclear capable Iran, with a full cycle nuclear 
programme or even nuclear weapons.195  
 
The most hard-line policy proposal among the three groups is to solve Iran’s nuclear 
programme through military action, including pre-emptive strikes. According to 
Matthew Koenig, the level of Iranian nuclear capability is very high and if Iran succeeds 
in nuclear armament, it would degrade the US’ influence in the region and its Middle 
East policy, which would create turmoil on regional security. Moreover, he argues that 
nuclear Iran would ignite the nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Thus, since the cost 
of dealing with nuclear Iran is much more expensive, he claims it would be better to 
execute military operations to stop them, although it might cause collateral damage. 196  
Max Boot asserts ‘toothless diplomacy’ turned Iran closer to a nuclear state. He claims 
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air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities are the only option left for the US. Although he 
admits military intervention is hardly an ideal solution, a physical strike on Iran’s 
nuclear facility would guarantee years of setback on Iran’s nuclear programme, which 
diplomacy would not accomplish.   
 
Norman Podhoretz assumed zero enrichment is the only condition for the P5+1 that 
would make Iran’s nuclear programme acceptable. However, since the possibility of Iran 
accepting zero enrichment is low, he claims the only viable means of stopping Iran’s 
nuclear programme is military action on Iranian nuclear facilities.197   
 
Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisnstadt argued for the necessity of a military strike in 
ceasing Iran’s nuclear programme. Although it was hard to gauge the aftermath of 
military action on Iran, both asserted the US had to consider it seriously since a nuclear 
Iran would be a much more difficult opponent to manage. Moreover, they urged for a 
more severe economic sanction and pressure from the international community, since 
they insisted it would escalate the possibility of Iran’s nuclear dismantlement.198  
 
However, for the decision maker, the execution of military operations to resolve Iran’s nuclear 
programme is not an easy task, since it is impossible to predict the results and the aftermath. 
Moreover, even if the military operation was successful as planned, it would not guarantee the 
complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme. Contrary to expectations, there is the 
possibility of strengthening Iran’s consolidation of its nuclear programme, which would make it 
more difficult to resolve the case. In addition, since Iran has been protectively developing its nuclear 
programme after the 1986 air strike on the Bushehr nuclear power reactor during the Iran-Iraq War, 
many experts are sceptical that a military strike would result in success, like as the Operation Opera 
and Operation Orchard of 1981 and 2007. Even worse, military action could bring a breakdown of 
global solidarity against Iran’s nuclear programme. This might lead to an unfavourable environment 
and conditions for the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. 199 
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The other far sided group of experts suggest that the approval of Iran’s nuclear programme 
would be much more efficient in managing and resolving Iran’s nuclear programme. 
According to Kenneth N. Waltz, Israel’s nuclear monopoly in the region is no longer 
sustainable in the long term. He argues Israel’s nuclear arsenal is the main contributor of 
nuclear proliferation, not Iran’s desire to possess a nuclear programme or its weapon 
capability. He asserted that accepting nuclear weapons or a weapons capable Iran would 
bring much more stability in the region rather than prohibiting Iran’s nuclear 
programme.200   
 
Barry R. Posen bolsters the argument of Kenneth N. Waltz by questioning the fears of the 
Middle East arms race, which might be initiated by Iran’s nuclear weaponization. He argues 
US military presence and capability in the Middle East is already sufficient to forestall a 
nuclear Iran. 201 Paul Pillar also strengthened Waltz’s view on Iran’s nuclear programme by 
giving an example of a well-contained nuclear China under Mao’s rule.202   
 
Robert D. Kaplan argued in his interview with Henry Kissinger that nuclear negotiation 
was a tactic of buying time rather than a symptom of reduced tension. For ‘revolutionary 
powers’ like Iran and North Korea, he understands the negotiation and treaty talks are a 
‘concessionary phase in continuing struggle.’ In his interview, Kissinger stated, “Iran, 
merely by pursuing nuclear weapons, has given itself a role in the region out of 
proportion to its actual power, and it gains further by the psychological impact of its 
being able to successfully defy the United Nations Security Council.” Although 
Kissinger mentioned that he would try his best to stop nuclear Iran if he were in the 
position to be against the “ideologically and militarily challenges the Middle East 
order,” he did not believe nuclear Iran to be of the same threat as that of a nuclear Soviet 
Union during the Cold War.  
 
Moreover, Kissinger furthered his argument that Iran’s strategic interest should run 
parallel with the US, such as by limiting Russian influence in the Caucasus and Central 
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Asia, limiting the Taliban’s influence in Afghanistan, and establishing the stability of Iraq 
and Iran as a peaceful balancing power in the Sunni Arab world. With Kissinger’s 
interview, Kaplan asserted that strengthening the Shiite role in the Middle East would 
balance Sunni hostility, which degraded the US’ interest in the region. Moreover, since all 
options to stop nuclear Iran was at a high cost and the chance for success was poor, 
Kaplan argued the containment of nuclear Iran was the most sensible policy for the US.203     
 
However, nuclear Iran directly contradicts the nuclear policy of past US’ administrations 
and it is also remote from the Prague Doctrine of the US, which desired to accomplish a 
nuclear free world through the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement. The idea by 
Kenneth Waltz of admitting a nuclear Iran seemed plausible under the concept of the 
balance of power, which prevailed widely in international politics. However, as Senator 
John McCain had said, “There is only one thing worse than military action against Iran, 
and that is a nuclear-armed Iran,” and the acceptance of a full-fledged Iranian nuclear 
programme meant the nuclear weapons capability was highly unlikely to happen in US 
foreign policy. 
 
The last group is the happy medium of the two extremes mentioned above. They argue that 
a behaviour change by Iran through sanctions paired with containment, deterrence, and a 
coercive diplomacy will solve Iran’s nuclear programme. The majority of scholars and 
experts are in this group. Although while they admit coercive diplomacy is not the best 
choice, they argue it is the lesser evil among the other options the US could implement. 
Those are as followed:  
 
Kenneth Pollack offers the triple track strategy as the most efficient way of dealing with 
Iran’s nuclear programme. He asserts the necessity of 1) keeping the door open for grand 
bargaining, 2) sustaining the Stick-and Carrot approach to induce Iran, and 3) preparing 
a well-schemed containment policy as a fall-back option.204 Although he addresses his 
policy proposal in a sophisticated way, the triple track strategy could simply be defined 
as a coercive diplomacy. As he stated, while none of the possible US options for Iran’s 
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nuclear programme are good in the absolute sense of the word, he concluded that 
utilizing a ‘Stick and Carrot’ coercive diplomacy is ‘unquestionably’ the best choice 
among all the other bad options.205    
 
Richard N. Haass argues for the necessity of immediate US engagement on Iran’s 
nuclear programme. Although he emphasizes talk and diplomacy to be the heart of the 
US’ policy on Iran, he asserts limited military action and deterrence would be the 
buttress for the diplomatic success of ceasing Iran’s nuclear programme. 206 
 
Alon Ben-Mei asserted the necessity of a new US negotiation strategy in solving Iran’s 
nuclear programme. He argues that the US should end threats to Iran for a regime change, and 
initiate secret talks along with implementing punitive measures in case the negotiation fails.207   
 
David Albright and Jacqueline Shire suggest a solution for Iran’s nuclear programme by 
increasing sanctions with an incentive package deal. Although their solutions oppose military 
action, they stated that, “To ensure aggressive Iranian action in the region is discouraged, the 
US must maintain a robust array of military forces in the Gulf region for years to come.”208 
The coercive diplomacy utilizes compensative inducements and escalation dominance. 
 
The co-authors of the book of the Brookings Institution, ‘Which Path to Persia?’, also 
emphasized the importance of coercive diplomacy in solving Iran’s nuclear programme. Since 
the concept of persuasion can be integrated with many other options such as military threats, 
economic sanctions and compensative inducement, etc., they argue in order to induce Iranian 
compliance, the persuasion strategy will bring much more flexibility in facilitating reaching a 
‘deal’ with Iran.209 
 
                                                                
205 Kenneth Pollack, “Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy”, Simon & Schuster, New 
York, pp. 393-396.  
206 Richard N. Haass, “Regime Change and Its Limits”, Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 2005,  
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60823/richard-n-haass/regime-change-and-its-limits 
207 Alon Ben-Meir, “Nuclear Iran is Not an Option: A new negotiating strategy to prevent Iran from 
developing nuclear weapons”, Digest of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 2009, pp 74-89. 
208  David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, “Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable”, Institute for Science and 
International Security, Jan 21, 2009. 
 http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Nuclear_Iran_21Jan2009.pdf 
209  Kenneth Pollack, Daniel Byman, Martin Indyk, Suzanne Maloney, Michael O’Hanlon and Bruce 
Riedel, “Which Path To Persia?: Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran”, Brookings 
Institution Press, 2009, pp.203-207. 
97 
  
As many of the experts have analysed and suggested, the US administrations after the 
Cold War executed its will of Iran’s behavioural change on the nuclear programme. 
Although there were differences in rhetoric and inducement, the ‘dual containment’ of 
the Clinton administration, the ‘counter-proliferation’ of the Bush administration, and 
the ‘Prague Doctrine’ of the Obama administration, they all share the flat-footed denial 
of the full-fledged Iranian nuclear programme.  The series of Nuclear Posture Reviews 
released by each administration in 1994, 2002 and 2010 detailed with accuracy the firm 
rejection on the full-fledged Iranian nuclear programme. The PSI, which was 
implemented by the Bush administration, was succeeded by the Obama administration, 
and Obama further clarified his policy on Iran’s nuclear programme would be more 
systematized with Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, or GICNT. Moreover, 
the three administrations consistently sustained its ‘escalation dominance’ against Iran 
through the US military based in Kuwait, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan with the fifth Fleet of the US Navy in the straits of Hormuz.  
 
The three US administrations have set out economic sanctions, possible air strikes, 
limited military operations and kept full military operations as a last resort to maintain 
its escalation dominance for any contingency to derive Iran’s compliance. However, Iran 
did not give up its nuclear programme and even succeeded in the advancement of its 
nuclear capability by counter-coercing the US pressure. Thus, this chapter will examine 
the contention of the US and Iran through the contention model of coercive diplomacy 
after the Cold War and how it lead to the failure during the Clinton administration to the 
first term of the Obama administration.  
 
4.2 Analysis of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear 
Programme 
 
4.2.1 The US Coercive Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Programme 
 
The objective of the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme is the 
Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement, or CVID, of Iran’s nuclear weapon 
capability. However, it directly contradicts Iran’s objective of the nuclear programme, 
98 
  
which aims to achieve a full-fledged nuclear programme, including uranium enrichment 
and nuclear fuel reprocessing technology.  
 
Since there are no distinct boundaries regarding these technologies as to what constitutes 
the peaceful use of atomic energy and what constitutes nuclear armament, the concerns 
of the US and their coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme is lack in reason. 
Moreover, since the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement also approves a certain level of 
nuclear enrichment and spent fuel reprocess technology as the sovereign rights of a 
state, unless Iran breaches the regulation, such as by conducting a fissile material test, 
withdraws from NPT or implements any unreported nuclear activities, US intervention 
on Iran’s nuclear programme has no justifications. Thus, unlike the case with North 
Korea, the US coercive diplomacy has had its limits and difficulties from the beginning. 
 
The types of coercive diplomacy during the process of contention are type A: persuading 
the opponent to stop short of the goal, type B: persuading the opponent to undo the 
action, and type C: persuading the opponent to make changes in the government or 
regime. Thus, if the US decided to coerce the compliance of Iran and change its 
behaviour, the aims of the US coercive diplomacy could be categorized with these three 
types. Forcefully persuade Iran to temporarily stop or cease its nuclear programme, 
force a complete dismantlement, or force a regime change for the dismantlement of the 
nuclear programme. 
 
Each goal differs from the other. In the case of Iran’s nuclear programme, type A is to 
seize or freeze Iran’s nuclear programme. That is, the objective of type A’s coercive 
diplomacy is to seize Iran’s nuclear programme and its development of nuclear weapon 
capability. Type B is the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapon capability, 
which means more than a seizing or freezing of the current nuclear programme. It 
includes the dismantlement of their ‘past nuclear capability,’ which aims for the 
complete dismantlement of Iran’s entire accumulated nuclear capability, such as 
accumulated enriched uranium. The goal of type C, the complete dismantlement of the 
Iranian nuclear weapon capability through a regime change, goes even further to achieve 
the assurance of the ‘future Iranian nuclear programme’ by eliminating the Iranian 
regime, which is hostile to the US.  
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There is much evidence that the US coercive diplomacy aims for the complete 
dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapon capabilities. In 2003, when Iran offered full 
transparency over its nuclear programme, including additional protocols, Bush 
dismissed Iran’s offer in order to coerce Iran to abandon its nuclear programme. Up until 
now, the US has not changed its ultimate objective of its coercive diplomacy. Even if it 
limits the sovereign right of Iran’s peaceful use of atomic energy, the US is against a 
full-fledged Iranian nuclear programme.   
 
4.2.1.1 Favourable Conditions for the US Coercive Diplomacy on the Nuclear 
Programme of Iran 
 
As witnessed by the long, fruitless years of contention between the US and Iran on the 
nuclear programme, it is a difficult task for an agent to derive successful results from the 
coercive diplomacy. The coercive diplomacy is highly context-dependent and easily 
influenced by many different variables. Thus, it is important to identify conditions which 
favour the success of the coercive diplomacy. Through a number of case studies by the 
preceding researchers, eight conditions are identified that favours success: Clarity of 
Objective, Strength of Motivation, Asymmetry of Motivation, Sense of Urgency, Strong 
Leadership, Adequate Domestic and International Support, Unacceptability of Threatened 
Escalation, and Clarity Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis. 
 
The objective of the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme is clear. It is 
the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear weapon capability that might degrade 
Iran’s sovereign right to a full-fledged nuclear programme, including uranium 
enrichment. However, methods of achieving dismantlement varies: 1) Freeze Iran’s 
nuclear programme → Dismantlement, 2) Freeze Iran’s nuclear programme → Decrease 
Iran’s nuclear capability → Dismantlement; it is similar to the step-by-step proposal 
offered by Russia in 2011, 3) the Dismantlement, which could be referred to as a one-
shot resolution with grand bargaining, 4) Dismantlement through a regime change or 
military intervention. Since the choice of which method to implement is determined by 
the contention between the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy, there is room for 
‘Clarity of Objective’ to be damaged. For example, suppose the US changes the type of 
coercive diplomacy from type A to type C during the contention of the coercive and 
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counter coercive diplomacy. The discrepancies of the objective, the freezing of Iran’s 
nuclear programme and the regime change of Iran degrades the ‘Clarity of Objective.’ 
Moreover, if the US coercive diplomacy fails to send a clear signal of what they are 
demanding from Iran, it could be referred to as an absence of ‘Clarity of Objective.’ 
Thus, ‘Strong Leadership,’ which secures the consistency of the US coercive diplomacy, 
is important for success.  
 
‘Strength of Motivation’ indicates the willingness of how much and how far the US 
would go to accept the enforcement cost of the coercive diplomacy of Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Series of the US’ policy reviews and official statements indicate its strong 
motivation for not accepting any nuclear weapon capability of Iran. Moreover, a major 
factor for the impasse of Iranian nuclear negotiation is due to the 20 percent LEU 
programme, which is admissible to the NPT, and the IAEA could be referred to as one of 
the indicators of the strength of US motivation. 
 
‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ is the discrepancy and the gap between ‘Strength of 
Motivation’ of the US, whose goal is the dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear 
programme, and Iran, who wants to secure a full-fledged nuclear programme. It is likely 
that the more Asymmetry of Motivation is created, the more there is of a negotiation to 
be settled. Thus, the US utilizes many types of inducements to dampen Iran’s motivation 
for achieving its nuclear programme. On the contrary, Iran implements counter measures 
to neutralize US inducements and strengthen Iran’s motivation to achieve a full-fledged 
nuclear programme. 
 
The ‘Sense of Urgency’ is about how the US or Iran perceives Iran’s nuclear programme as 
their policy priority. Whoever has a greater Sense of Urgency will generate a more favourable 
environment for its policy aim. Thus, it is somewhat related to ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ 
since how the US or Iran perceives the nuclear issue as their policy priority is the main factor 
that causes the ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’. When the Bush administration initiated operation 
‘Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003, the US policy priority of removing WMD was high and Iran 
frequently appeared in the media and Washington as the next target. Since the US’ ‘Sense of 
Urgency’ on WMD rose, it influenced the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of the US, which created 
the ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’. Thus, it drove Iran to propose negotiations with the US in 
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April 2003210 which contains ‘full transparency over Iran’s nuclear programme, including the 
Additional Protocol’, ‘Cooperation against terrorist organizations, particularly the Mujahedin-
e Khalq and al-Qaeda’ and ‘Iran’s acceptance of the Arab League’s 2002 “land for peace” 
declaration on Israel-Palestine.’ 
 
Due to the geopolitical environment of Iran, the international support is crucial for the 
success of US coercive diplomacy: the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapon capability. 
The US has to combine the solidarity and assets of Iran’s neighbouring states and 
international nuclear power. Thus, the establishment of multilateral negotiation, P5+1, was 
set to maximize the incompliant cost of Iran. However, although it all shares the necessity 
of stopping Iranian nuclear weapon capability, each state has a different agenda and 
interest in dealing with Iranian nuclear negotiation. For example, in February 2005, the 
United Kingdom, France and Germany’s so-called E3 compelled the Bush administration 
to declare that it would not use force against Iran. Moreover, Russia and China, who tried 
to soft balance the US in the region, provided civilian nuclear technology to Iran. Thus, in 
order to overcome this entangled diplomatic dynamics, the ‘Strong Leadership’ of the US 
was critical for the success of its coercive diplomacy.  
 
The ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ could be easily explained with the 
concept of the red line. If the US coercive diplomacy succeeds in drawing a clear red 
line on Iran’s nuclear programme, the possibility of Iran changing its behaviour to the 
US coercive diplomacy would be maximized. However, drawing a red line on the 
Iranian nuclear programme that has not clearly breached the NPT and IAEA regime is 
not an easy task. Moreover, Iran is fully aware of this and cleverly deals with their 
nuclear programme to degrade the solidarity of US alliance in nuclear negotiation, 
which is to maximize the enforcement costs of the US coercive diplomacy.  
 
The last condition that favours coercive diplomacy is the ‘Clarity Concerning the 
Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis.’ When an agreement or compromise of Iran’s 
nuclear programme is made as a result of contention between the coercive and counter 
coercive diplomacy, terms and agreements have to be clarified for the best results. If not, 
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the North Korean nuclear negotiation and the collapse of the Geneva Agreed Framework 
would be the perfect example of what may happen.  
 
The implementation of the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme begins 
by stating clear objectives and demands for Iran. After they have been set, the measures 
and inducements of the US coercive diplomacy are chosen. When the objectives and 
means of the coercive diplomacy are settled upon, the US manages its coercive 
diplomacy within the strategic environment by considering favourable conditions. 
<Figure 4-1> shows how the US coercive diplomacy is set and implemented to Iran. 
 
<Figure 4-1> The Model of the US Coercive Diplomacy on Iran 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Iranian Counter Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy has been applied to preserve its full-fledged nuclear 
programme and guaranteed access to advanced nuclear technology against US non-
proliferation policy. Moreover, through its counter coercive diplomacy, Iran has had the 
objective of removing economic sanctions and re-joining the international community.  
In implementing its counter coercive measures, Iran was at an advantage to degrade US 
coercive diplomacy since its nuclear activities and development has not yet violated the 
NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement. Thus, Iran limits itself within the IAEA and NPT 
regime such as by limiting their uranium enrichment to 20 percent and providing six 
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months’ notice before nuclear material is introduced at its nuclear facilities. Within the 
non-proliferation regime boundaries, Iran maximizes its counter coercive diplomacy by 
travelling between the red lines. 
 
Although Jacqueline Shire and David Albright argue Iran had breached six NPT 
safeguard agreements: 1) Uranium Imports, 2) Uranium conversion, 3) Uranium 
enrichment, 4) Hidden Sites, 5) Laser Isotope Enrichment Experiments, 6) Plutonium 
Experiments,211 it was never confirmed by the IAEA. Even in the IAEA censure report, 
Iran was never accused of violating the NPT safeguard agreement. “Inconsistent with 
its obligations” and “lack of full cooperation reduces the level of confidence” are 
the descriptions in the IAEA document on Iran’s nuclear programme. However, 
these statements did not constitute a formal finding of Iranian noncompliance.212  
 
The will of preserving its nuclear capability and programme, the ‘Strength of 
Motivation’ of the Iranian counter coercive diplomacy could be witnessed in a long 
enduring economic sanction, which is due to its persistence in acquiring a nuclear 
programme. Iran has always refused to abandon its sovereign rights for the peaceful use 
of atomic energy and development of nuclear technology. Not just claiming its right, 
Iran goes even further to demand international support for its nuclear development. 
Thus, if Iran believes the negotiation process is leading to a complete dismantlement of 
its nuclear programme, it counter coerced the US by delaying negotiations or increasing 
their nuclear capability, combining it with missile development. 
 
The best case scenario for Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy is to remove economic 
sanctions, join the international community, and preserve its full-fledged nuclear 
programme. Thus, in order to confront the US nonproliferation policy, Iran implements its 
measures to maximize the enforcement costs of the US coercive diplomacy and minimize 
the incompliant cost, which will be imposed for sustaining its nuclear programme. 
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The agreement of the Paris Accord in 2004 is an example of Iranian counter measures 
against the US coercive diplomacy. Through the Paris Accord, Iran claimed its sovereign 
right on the peaceful use of the nuclear programme by agreeing to a temporary freeze of 
uranium enrichment and an IAEA inspector to monitor the cessation. Similar to North 
Korea, Iran utilizes the suspension of its nuclear capability to degrade the “Adequate 
Domestic and International Support” of the US coercive diplomacy. Although it was used 
as a bargaining chip in later negotiations, whether they would sustain additional protocols 
or not, Iran also signed the Additional Protocol for good measure and for the Safeguards 
Agreement of NPT, which guaranteed greater authorities of the IAEA to verify Iran’s 
nuclear programme. The Iranian counter coercive diplomacy paid off in 2005 when E3, 
the United Kingdom, France and Germany, compelled the US not to use military action on 
Iran. By expressing its will to negotiate and compromise, Iran degraded the alliance of the 
US coercive diplomacy, its inducements and justifications of the coercion.   
 
Iran also intensified its diplomatic ties with countries hostile to the US, such as Russia 
and China, to degrade and counter coerce the US coercive diplomacy. As the founding 
supreme leader of Velayat-e Faqih, Ayatollah Khomeini, stated, “Our youth must know 
that China and Russia, like the US and Britain, feed on the blood of our people.”213 
China and Russia were not considered friendly allies of Iran. However, the strategic 
necessity of each state rapidly brought them together. Through strengthened relations, 
Iran did not just restrain them from participating in US coercion, but also obtained their 
support on nuclear development and its counter coercive diplomacy.  
 
During the Cold War, a theocratic Iranian regime viewed communist Soviet Union as no 
different to other imperialistic western countries. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
made Iran become more firm in its perceptions. Thus, despite serious conflicts with the 
US, Iran set its foreign policy as being “neither East nor West.” However, when facing 
the massive deployment of US forces in the Persian Gulf after the demise of the Soviet 
Union, ties between Iran and Russia began to strengthen with growing mutual interest in 
foreign diplomacy, military and the economy. 
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Nevertheless Russia voted in favour of the series of UNSC resolutions on Iran; 2006, 2007, 
2008 and 2010, it rejected further punitive action even when the IAEA officially condemned 
Iran’s lack of cooperation in September 2008. Russia also refused to participate in a P5+1 
meeting in 2008 to discuss levelling additional sanctions against Iran. Moreover, ever since 
Iran and Russia reached an agreement in 1995 to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant, 
Russia has been supplying the materials and expertise for Iranian nuclear development. 
According to its 1995 contract term, the VVER-1000 water cooled reactor was planned to be 
built in Bushehr, which could annually produce 180kg of plutonium from its spent fuel. 
Moreover, it also agreed to provide a 50MW light water research reactor, a provision of 2,000 
tonnes of natural uranium and annually train 15 Iranian nuclear scientists. 214 However, as it 
was agreed that the spent fuel had to be managed and sent back to Russia215, Iran carefully 
executed its nuclear development under the IAEA safeguards.   
 
China, like Russia, had agreed to a series of UNSC resolutions on Iran. However, as foreign 
Ministry Spokesman of China, Liu Jianchao, stated in July 2008, he, “believes that 
sanctions, especially unilateral sanctions, are of no help,” and that China had no intention to 
fully support the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. This was once again 
witnessed in 2009, when Obama presided over a UN Security Council meeting, the first US 
president to do so. Although China voted in favour of the Resolution of 1887, Chinese 
Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman, Jiang Lee, reiterated China’s position that sanctions were 
not an appropriate method in dealing with Iran’s nuclear enrichment.216 Moreover, China 
and Iran enjoyed the extensive economic and diplomatic relationship despite UN Security 
Council sanctions. When the US and other western countries imposed sanctions against Iran 
due to concerns over its nuclear programme, Chinese oil companies were able to win bids 
for developing large oil fields in Iran. That is, the efficiency of coercive diplomacy is not  
determined by the coercive diplomacy of coercer but the result of the contention between 
the policy of coercer and coercee.  
 
Since 2007, China has replaced the European Union as Iran’s largest trading partner. As 
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reported by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trade between Tehran and Beijing 
totalled more than $36 billion in 2012. In April 2010, as unilateral US sanctions against 
Iranian gasoline imports appeared imminent, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum 
Corporation, CNPC exported 600,000 barrels of gasoline worth $110 million dollars to 
Iran. Similarly, that month, Iran’s Press TV reported that Sinopec’s trading company, 
Unipec, agreed to ship some 250,000 barrels to the country via a third party in 
Singapore. Iran’s Economy Minister, Shamseddin Hosseini, stated in 2010, “Iran is 
perfectly capable of meeting its needs and, as in the past, the sanctions policy will not be 
effective.” Iran actively built diplomatic assets to devaluate US coercion. The counter 
coercive diplomacy of Iran could be described as <Figure 4-2> below.   
 
<Figure 4-2> The Counter Coercive Diplomacy Model of Iran 
 
 
 
The success of the US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme did not merely result 
from how well its plans and inducements were schemed, or by maximizing the incompliant 
costs of Iran and favourable conditions for the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme. It is 
rather a contention process of deriving results by competing the Iran’s counter coercive 
diplomacy with efficient coercion. The following <Figure 4-3> shows a clear picture of how the 
contention is made between the US coercive diplomacy and counter coercive diplomacy of Iran.  
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<Figure 4-3> The Coercive and Counter-Coercive Contention Model 
of US and Iran 
 
 
 
 
4.3 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Clinton Administration and the 
Counter Coercive Diplomacy of Iran 
 
4.3.1 Background 
 
The conflict and negotiation of Iran’s nuclear programme ignited in earnest in 2002 
when the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which included the People’s 
Mujahedin of Iran and the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK, impugned the nuclear 
armament programme that led to an IAEA inspection on Iran’s nuclear site.  However, 
the history of Iran’s nuclear programme goes back to 1950 when Pahlavi dynasty ruled 
Iran.   
 
The origin of Iran’s nuclear programme was the civil nuclear co-operation agreement 
with the US, as a part of the Atoms for Peace programme in 1957. 217  On the basis of 
this agreement, the Central Treaty Organization’s (CENTO: consisting of Iran, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Iraq, the United Kingdom and the US) nuclear science institute was moved from 
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Baghdad and established in Tehran. In 1959, the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, or 
TNRC, was planned for the nuclear science institute of CENTO, and negotiations for 
providing the 5MW research reactor was discussed between the US and Iran. At that 
time, the US was more than favourable towards the development of Iran’s nuclear 
programme. In 1961, although it was turned down by the Kennedy administration, the 
US Joint Staff Office suggested stockpiling its tactical nuclear weapons in Iran. 218 
 
The TNRC started its construction in 1961 and was finally established in 1967. Soon 
after its establishment, the US provided the 5MW research reactor and the development 
of Iran’s nuclear programme has taken off ever since. It is known that the US 
administration had provided 112kg of plutonium, 104kg of which was fissile isotope. 
They also provided 5.54kg of 93 percent enriched uranium, which was also a fissile 
uranium isotope, and both could be used as nuclear weapons. In 1969, the US and Iran 
agreed to a ten years extension of the cooperation for ‘Atoms for Peace programme. 
With the environment of the Middle East at that period, the withdrawal of UK and the 
following new ‘twin pillars’ policy of the US, the Nixon and Ford administration, who 
needed friendly relations with and the support of Iran, continued to cooperate in 
developing Iran’s nuclear programme.219 
 
On March 1974, Iran officially announced its ‘full-fledged nuclear power industry’ plan that 
would produce 23,000MW of electricity by building 23 nuclear power plants before 1994. 
For the success of the ‘twenty-year vision plan’ which included uranium enrichment, 
fabrication of fuel and the reprocess of spent nuclear fuel, Iran established the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran and appointed Dr. Akbar Etemad as the director of the 
organization. By 1976, the budget of the AEOI reached 1.3 billion US dollars and became 
the biggest public economic institution other than the Iran nation oil company. 220 
 
Although Iran swiftly signed the safeguard agreement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 
1 July 1969, the annual production plan of 23,000MW electricity by the indigenous 
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nuclear programme was not something to be overlooked by the US. If Iran succeeded in 
building its nuclear programme as planned, it meant that Iran could annually produce 
fissile plutonium for 600 to 700 nuclear warheads.221 Thus, when India succeeded in its 
nuclear armament in 1974, the US requested extra means to control the fabrication and 
reprocess of spent nuclear fuel of Iran’s nuclear programme apart from the NPT 
safeguard agreement. However, under Cold War, the US Pentagon was also worried 
about damaging the relationship with Iran. Moreover, since US allies, Germany and 
France, were already cooperating with the Iranian nuclear development, curbing Iran’s 
nuclear programme became a more complicated matter. Thus, the US decided to keep 
Iran close and support its nuclear programme. 
 
According to Mustafa Kibaroglu, Iran could achieve its nuclear development since 
solidarity in the nonproliferation policy of the West was rather weak in the 70s. Thus, he 
argued the sensitive nuclear technology would easily spread to countries like Iran, Libya 
and South Africa. 222  However, nuclear development of Iran was possible since the US 
had acquiesced Iran from acquiring it. In a declassified US National Security Council 
document in late the 90s, it was clearly stated that the objectives of the US foreign 
policy in the 70s was not the nonproliferation of Iran but to provide for the nuclear fuel 
reprocessing facilities and settle Iran’s nuclear programme to prevent regional nuclear 
proliferation, especially in Pakistan. 223 In October 1978, the US Department of Energy 
shipped four laser devices to Iran for uranium to enrichment. 
 
As was revealed in the past, before the demise of the pro- US Shah Regime in 1979, the 
US was the biggest patron of Iran’s nuclear programme. Under its support, Iran achieved 
its nuclear capability. Although Akbar Etemad, the first director of the AEOI denied his 
interview soon after the release of the article, it is believed that the Shah had plans to 
make nuclear bombs. 224 However, in a recent interview with BBC, Etemad admitted 
Shah would have gone for nuclear armament by stating, “The Shah had the idea at the 
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time that he’s strong enough in the region and he can defend our interest … but he told 
me that if this changes ‘we have to go for nuclear’…my mission was to go for all the 
technologies imaginable in the field of nuclear technology”.225  Some of the scholars 
had even furthurer argued that the Shah could appoint the scientists for its nuclear 
armament under the US support. 226  
 
Iran’s nuclear programme which had progressed under the Shah had stopped after the 
1979 Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini who succeeded in the establishment of the 
theocratic state believed the nuclear programme as the ‘Shah’s expensive toy’ and the 
West’ ‘imperialistic project.’ Moreover, on religious grounds, he objected to nuclear 
weapons as un-Islamic. 227 As the leadership of Iran had changed, the western countries 
that had been helping Iran’s nuclear programme decided to suspend its project. Thus, 
Iran’s nuclear programme came to a half-willing, half-coerced halt. 
 
The nullified nuclear programme resumed a new phase when the outbreak of the Iran-
Iraq War happened in 1980. The war, which devastated Iran, started to reinforce the 
discourse and agenda of acquiring its nuclear technology, not only for the deterrence 
power and national security but for its energy supply and efficiency to reconstruct Iran 
and its economy.  
 
In early stages of the Iran-Iraq War, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti claimed Iran should acquire 
nuclear armament to secure an endangered Iran. 228 In April 1984, then president Ayatollah 
Khamenei argued that nuclear weapons would serve as a ‘deterrence of God’s soldiers’. 229 In 
February 1993, Akbar Torkan, former Iranian defence minister, also made a similar statement, 
saying, “Can our Air Force take on the Americans, or our Navy take on the American Navy? If 
we put all our country’s budget into such a war, we would have just burned our money. The way 
to go about dealing with such a threat requires a different solution entirely.” 230  
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As it was shown in various statements of the Iranian officials, Iran had built a new discourse 
on its nuclear programme. Although it is controversial whether the statements were actually 
intended to nuclear armament, the fact remained that its nuclear programme, once labelled 
as ‘Westoxification,’ had been reinitiated during the Iran-Iraq War period. In 1983, Iran sent 
an official memorandum to Hans Blix, the director general of the IAEA, to request its 
cooperation for Iranian nuclear development. Iran also strongly claimed the rights to the 
peaceful use of atomic energy at the Non-Aligned Movement Conference in 1984. Some of 
the western countries took it as a declaration of Iranian nuclear armament.231  
 
In 1987, Iran acquired critical components, including the blueprint of Zippe-type P-1 
centrifuges and an enrichment plant with gas centrifuges, from AQ Khan Network. As a 
result, Iran could skip many steps of difficult research. 232 In May 5, 1987, Iran signed three 
agreements with Investigaciones Aplicadas, INVAP of Argentina, for the advancement of its 
nuclear programme: 1) a $5.5 million agreement was signed for the replacement of the 
reactor core at the TRNC. The new core operated on 20 percent of enriched uranium rather 
than the 93 percent enriched fuel required by the US supplied core,233 2) the provision of a 
component for building pilot plants for uranium conversion in to uranium dioxide, and 3) 
the provision of a component for nuclear fuel fabrication. However, since the Iran –Iraq war, 
the progress of the Iran nuclear programme had its limits. 
 
The Iranian nuclear programme was initiated when Rafsanjani was inaugurated in 1989. 
The Rafsanjani administration set out to reconstruct war-devastated Iran, making it their 
top priority. In order to counter-balance the electric shortage caused by the rapid 
population growth and the war, Rafsanjani decided to succeed Shah’s nuclear 
programme and spur its development.  
 
4.3.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy between 
Clinton and Rafsanjani   
  
 
The year Rafsanjani was elected president was a pivotal year in Iran’s history. The war 
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that consolidated the systemically weak theocratic Iran due to its abrupt revolution had 
just ended a year before and the charismatic figure who led this unity, Ayatollah 
Khomeini, passed away on 3 June, 1989. The factionalism and power struggle in Iran’s 
domestic politics started to bloom accordingly. 234 
 
In this political environment, Rafsanjani, who was considered the leader of the 
pragmatic faction, became the president of Iran with a landslide victory of 94 percent of 
the votes. The Rafsanjani administration set its objectives as the reconstruction of the 
economy of war-devastated Iran by building an efficient bureaucracy system, and 
centralizing the government power, rather than staying in religious teaching. Rafsanjani 
put his aim into practice by forming his cabinet members with technocrats who had 
received ‘modern training’. 235 Through his two terms of presidency, Rafsanjani only 
appointed four cabinet members from clerics and few with military backgrounds, which 
was an innovative and pragmatic decision for an administration that had just finished 
eight years of religion-related war. 236  
 
However, Rafsanjani’s policy moderation was not the fundamental change of Iran from 
Khomeini’s era. The objective of Rafsanjani’s foreign policy was not to reconcile with 
the US but to enhance Iran’s status in the region. As witnessed prior to becoming the 
president, Rafsanjani, who was known as a pragmatist, revealed his stance of protecting 
the theocratic states of Khomeini. Rafsanjani worked together with Ayatollah Khomeini 
and Khamenei to expel Montazeri from becoming the next supreme leader, legalized the 
Expedience Council and removed the position of prime minister to centralize authority. 
Rafsanjani’s pragmatism was within theocratic rules but meant to centralize the 
governing power for the efficient reconstruction of a devastated Iranian economy and its 
infrastructure. The nuclear programme of Iran also proceeded with this prospect.  
 
After witnessing the victory of the first Gulf War and the demise of their long-time foe, 
the Soviet Union, the Clinton administration evaluated the US as the only dominant 
power in the Middle East that could unilaterally flex its muscle to influence the regional 
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rogue states. The US no longer viewed the Middle East through a competitive prism. 
However, the absence of bipolar competition and its vacuum could also bring a 
decrement of control over the regional powers by giving them more freedom in making 
their policies. Moreover, as revealed through the first Gulf War, the increased military 
capabilities of Iraq, including the nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles, was 
considered that any provocation or conflict in the region could bring enormous impact 
and turmoil, which could no longer be contained in the region as was the case during the 
Iran-Iraq War. 
 
The Clinton administration wanted to create a virtuous circle by containing the threats of 
Iran and Iraq, which would promote the peace process between Israel and the Arab 
countries. The US believed the more the peace process between Israel and Arabs was 
settled, the higher the possibility of dismantling the threat created by Iran and Iraq. 
Therefore, the well-known policy of ‘dual containment’ was implemented to cease the 
proliferation of WMD, and to spread democracy and the settlement of peace in the 
region. The dual containment of Iran and Iraq meant the change of US policy, which was 
to build up one to balance the other as the post Iranian revolution balance of power 
structure in the Middle East. After the US became a hyper power, the Clinton 
administration decided not to rely on Iran or Iraq to bring balance to the region.237 
 
4.3.2.1 Clinton’s Limited ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’ and the Resistance of 
Rafsanjani  
 
1) The Timely and Well-Structured but Limited ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’ 
 
The Clinton administration decided to use economic sanctions as the key tool for its 
‘dual containment’ and coercive diplomacy to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme. With 
its ‘engagement and enlargement’ doctrine and the ‘dual containment’ policy, the 
Clinton administration began its implementation of a more severe economic sanction. 
The main point of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, which was enacted by the 
Bush Sr. administration, was to ban the provision of any dual use of technology and 
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devices to Iran and Iraq. However, there was a loophole. With the approved license from 
the US government, any firm could export prohibited items and technology to Iran and 
Iraq. Thus, the Clinton administration extended the Export administration Act, which 
expired in 1994 through Executive order 12924 on 19 August 1994 and edited in a 
clause of ‘presumption of denial’ to easily cancel the licenses issued to the companies. 
Moreover, the Clinton administration strengthened the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation 
Act by adding ‘secondary sanction’ to any foreign countries who exported the prohibited 
item to Iran and Iraq.  
 
The tightened and amended economic sanction of the Clinton administration made its 
coercive diplomacy more efficient. Since the Arms Export Control Act and the Export 
administration Act was automatically lifted when the US took Iran off the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism, the strengthened Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of the Clinton 
administration made it possible to sustain its coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear 
programme in any changing political circumstances. Vice versa, the strengthened Arms 
Export Control Act and the Export administration Act made the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act more efficient and convenient in being implied against Iran’s nuclear 
programme.  
 
Despite the well-schemed economic sanction structures of the Clinton administration, there 
was a problem in clarity with the terms used in the sanction act, one of the most important 
conditions for the success of the coercive diplomacy. This was the ‘Clarity Concerning the 
Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis.’ Since the terms used in the sanction act, such as 
‘advanced conventional weapons,’ ‘destabilizing number and type of weapons’ and ‘dual 
use devices’ were somewhat vague, it was difficult to implement actual enforcement. The 
advancement in missile capabilities of Iran by importing the C 801 and C 802 missiles from 
China is one good example. 238   Moreover, when Russia provided the equipment and 
devices to build the Bushehr nuclear reactor, since Iran and Russia argued it to be for the 
peaceful use of Atomic energy, it was not an easy task for the US to put a curb on its 
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transaction.     
The Clinton administration also intensified the US trade and investment ban on Iran. 
The primary authority regulation of the Iranian sanction on the commercial sector is the 
International Emergency Economic Power Act, which was enacted in 1977. It authorized 
the US president to block transactions and freeze assets to deal with the declared 
existence of the ‘unusual and extraordinary threat to national security, foreign policy, or 
the economy of the United States’. Moreover, in the event of an actual attack on the US, 
the president could also confiscate property connected with a country, group, or person 
that aided in the attack. 
 
On the basis of the International Emergency Economic Power Act, the Clinton 
administration issued the executive orders to gradually turn the screw to elevate its 
coercive diplomacy on Iran. Through executive order 12957 on 15 March 1995, the US 
prohibited the investment of American firms or individual on Iran’s energy sector. Two 
months later, on 6 May 1995, the Clinton administration issued executive order 12959 to 
ban all commercial trade and investment with Iran, a ban that a majority of experts say 
was the most effective economic sanction made by the US.  
 
However, the executive orders also had a problem with clarity in terms of coercing Iran. 
The country of origin for all oil products was labelled as the location where it had been 
refined and not the actual location where the oil had been extracted. Thus, if Iran’s crude 
oil was mixed with other crude oil in the refining process or refined outside of Iran, it 
was impossible to completely ban the Iranian oil trade. Moreover, as the US prohibited 
aid, trade and investment, Iran initiated eleven ‘buy back’ projects in its energy sector to 
naturalize the US economic sanction.  
 
The Clinton administration acknowledged this situation that with its trade invest ban, the 
US could not prevent Iran from developing the energy industry that would degrade the 
US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. Thus, with the support of the 
congress, the Iran-Libya Sanction Acts bill was sponsored by Senator Alfonso D’Amato 
and passed at the 104th congress session on 5 August 1995. According to the Iran-Libya 
Sanction Acts, which was later changed to the Iran sanction Acts in 2006, the US could 
prohibit any firm that invested 20 million dollars or more on Iranian energy resources. 
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Although the US coercive measures were swift and implemented in a timely manner, there 
was scepticism on the effectiveness of the coercion. According to Daniel Altman, since the 
private sector of Iran’s industries were weak and the government controlled almost 80 
percent of the economy, no strong business class was formed to wield its leverage on the 
Iranian regime. Thus, he argued that even if the US economic sanctions had been 
successfully implemented, it would not create enough pressure to coerce a behavioural 
change in the Iranian government.239 Inversely, this meant the Iranian economic structure 
was more favourable to the Iranian government in counterploting against the US coercive 
diplomacy and mobilizes the Iranian public into opposing the US.  
 
Anthony H. Cordesman argued that since Iran’s net trade of other industries excluding 
the oil export were insignificant in the total GDP, the US economic sanction had little 
chance to derive Iran’s compliance. Moreover, by emphasizing the fact that Iran’s 
trading partners were already well-diversified, he asserted the implementation of the US 
economic sanction and the result of it would not be as effective as planned. 240  
 
Whether efficient or not, the Clinton administration attempted to derive Iran’s 
compliance on dismantlement of its nuclear programme through omnidirectional 
economic sanctions in the military, commercial and energy sector. However, Rafsanjani 
decided to counter coerce the US by utilizing Iran’s asset to precede its nuclear 
programme rather than to comply with the coercive diplomacy of the Clinton 
administration.  
 
2) The Sustained Nuclear Programme with Secured Justification 
 
Despite the changed environment and actual US coercion on Iran’s nuclear programme, 
the director of the AEOI, Reza Amollahi, strongly announced its plan by stating, 
“Through any means possible,” to complete the construction of the Bushehr nuclear 
reactor at the 35th IAEA general session in 1991. However, due to pressure from the 
                                                                
239 Daniel Altman, “Quandary over Iran Sanctions”, International Herald Tribune, Jan 24, 2006. 
240 Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real and 
Potential Threat, the CSIS press, significant issues series vol. 23 no.3, 2006. pp.307-309 
117 
  
Clinton administration in 1993, the three cooperation contracts made with Argentina in 
1987 was canceled after only fulfilling one among the three contracts: namely, the 
provision of 19.73 percent enriched uranium fuel for the research reactor. 
 
Rafsanjani sustained his will to achieve the nuclear programme and tried to procure the 
devices and components for its reactor. In 1993, Iran tried to acquire eight steam 
condensers built by the Italian firm Ansaldo under the German Kraftwerk Union 
contract of the past Shah regime. However, the Clinton administration seized its attempt 
by pressuring the Italian government. Moreover, the negotiations with Czech firm Skoda 
supplying the reactor components were cancelled again due to US pressure in 1994. For 
the same reason, Iran also failed to buy nuclear power reactor components from an 
unfinished reactor in Poland. When the nuclear cooperation with foreign countries 
become more difficult to achieve due to US coercion, Rafsanjani concentrated building 
nuclear cooperation with China and Russia, who could countervail the sabotage. 241 
 
On 16 February 1993, Rafsanjani met Jiang Xinxiong, the president of the China 
National Nuclear Industrial General Corporation, and agreed to the provision of 
technology and equipment for the construction of a 300MW nuclear power station in 
Ahvaz. 242  After the agreement, Rafsanjani made a statement that the nuclear 
cooperation would only be for the peaceful use of atomic energy to contain the 
justification of US coercive diplomacy.  
 
On 13 April 1993, the Iranian parliament ratified their nuclear cooperation agreement, 
which approved the purchase of two VVER-440s and 440MW reactors from Russia and 
two 300MW pressurized water reactors from China. 243  On 18 June 1993, with the 
partnership of Amir Kabir Technological University and the AEOI, Iran produced its 
first X-ray tube using cobalt-57, designed to detect uranium. 
As the denouncement of Israel and the US mounted with the progress of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, Reza Amrollahi, then director of the AEOI, announced Iran’s nuclear 
programme was for peaceful use only and emphasized that Iran was the first state to 
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proclaim a nuclear free zone in the Middle East at the IAEA General conference on 27 
September 1993. Moreover, Iran suggested an inspection visit by the IAEA. On 15-21 
November 1993, a group of International Atomic Energy Agency officials, led by IAEA 
Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Bruno Pellaud, visited Iranian nuclear facilities 
in Tehran, Isfahan, and Karaj. Since the IAEA announced that they had, “Found no 
evidence which was inconsistent with Iran’s declaration,” Iran degraded the justification 
of the US economic sanction and its coercive diplomacy on the Iran nuclear programme.  
 
When Russia initiated the construction of a 1000 MW nuclear reactor plant in Bushehr 
on 21 March 1994, Iran again invited Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, on 18 
April 1994, to discuss the nuclear development and a nuclear free Middle East to 
dampen the build-up efforts of the US concerning its coercive diplomacy. Despite the 
information provided by IAEA inspectors and Iranian commitment to the IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement, the US accused Iran of attempting nuclear weapon development.  
On 13 August 1994, John D. Holum, the director of the US Arms Control Agency, 
claimed Iran was continuously attempting to acquire a nuclear weapons programme and 
criticized the IAEA of not knowing of Iran’s wrongdoing. 244 
 
As US denouncement and pressure on Iran’s nuclear programme continued, Iran 
revealed the possibility of withdrawing from the NPT. On 12-16 September 1994, at the 
third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension 
Conference in Geneva, the Iranian delegation claimed that Iran was not being granted 
access to technology designed for the peaceful use of nuclear energy as stipulated by 
Article IV of the NPT and disclosed its consideration for a withdrawal. 245  On 20 
September 1994, Iranian delegates to the IAEA General Conference in Vienna stated 
that Iran would postpone its decision of the withdrawal from the NPT until closure of 
the final Preparatory Committee meeting for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension 
Conference. 246 It was more of an aggressive Iranian counter coercive diplomacy to 
derive support on its development of the nuclear programme and neutralize US coercion.   
                                                                
244 “Tehran Pursuing Nuclear Programs,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 13, 1994, p. A4 
245 Mark Hibbs, “Iran May Withdraw From NPT Over Western Trade Barriers,” Nucleonics Week, 
September 22, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; 
246 Mark Hibbs, “Western Group Battles Iran At Third NPT Prepcom Session” Nucleonics Week, 
September 22, 1994, pp. 9-10 
119 
  
 
On 7 January 1995, Iran and Russia signed an 800 million dollar contract in Tehran to 
finish the first reactor unit based on the Russian VVER-1000 reactor design.247  After 
the agreement was signed, the Clinton administration opposed its contract by raising the 
possibility of the plutonium from the VVER-1000 reactor to be used as a nuclear 
weapon. However, as Thomas Stauffer stated, “The reactor at Bushehr is the wrong kind 
of nuclear reactor for producing weapon grade fissile materials. It will produce the 
wrong kind of plutonium,” and many nuclear experts doubted the possibility of creating 
a plutonium bomb with the Bushehr reactor. 248 Moreover, since the agreement specified 
that all the nuclear spent fuel would be returned to Russia and the development would be 
preceded under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the US’ argument was too weak to 
prohibit the deal.  
 
On 9 January 1995, officials from the US Department of Energy, or DOE, claimed they 
had “almost no doubt” that Iran had succeeded in obtaining nuclear materials and “if 
Iranians maintain this intensive effort to get everything they need, they could have all 
their components in two years.” 249   The very next day, on 10 January 1995, CIA 
Director James Woolsey, stated at the Senate intelligence committee that Iran is most 
likely to continue developing nuclear weapons through indigenous resources, in which 
case it might have a nuclear weapon within five years. 250  
 
However, the U.S, allegation was immediately damaged by Russian Atomic Energy 
Minister, Viktor Mikhailov, when he stated, “the Russia-Iranian cooperation in nuclear 
power engineering has peaceful goals….nuclear reactor to be finalized by Russian 
specialists in Iran cannot be used for war purposes since war plutonium is made by 
reactors of another type.” 251 The IAEA bolstered the Russian assertion that there was no 
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evidence of Iran constructing nuclear weapons. 252 However, the most harm came from 
the inside. On 26 January 1995, Thomas Graham, a senior official at the US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency declared the nonexistence of the Iranian nuclear 
weapon programme and denounced US allegations as being a stretch and a conjecture of 
Iran’s future intention. Moreover, he admitted that Iran was in full compliance with all 
of its NPT obligations. 253  
 
On 15 March 1995, the Clinton administration enacted executive order 12957, banning 
commercial investment with Iranian oil resources. On 16 March 1995, a day after 
executive order 12957 had been enacted, Kenneth R. Timmerman, the Director of the 
Middle East Data Project, testified before the US Senate that US firms had exported 
dual-use technologies to Iran without proper Department of Commerce, or DOC, 
licensing or inspection. However, his allegation was again criticized by the official from 
the DOC as “inaccurate and without foundation.” 254 
 
The Clinton administration continuously denounced Iran’s nuclear programme and 
alleged its possession of a secret nuclear weapon programme in the media to damage 
Iran’s justification of nuclear development.  On 6 May 1995, the Clinton administration 
enacted executive order 12959 prohibiting all the US investment in Iran to intensify 
coercion.  
 
On 11 May 1995, at a joint press conference with US President Bill Clinton, Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia would not sell gas centrifuge to Iran and 
would eliminate all “military” aspects of Russia’s nuclear deal with Iran. Iran 
immediately denounced the joint statement. Reza Amrollahi, head of the AEOI, argued 
that the provision of centrifuge never was in the agreement. He criticized America’s 
accusation as “childish hostility.” However, although the provision of centrifuge was not 
in the final agreement, Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Federation Security 
Council’s Inter departmental Commission for Ecological Safety, reported the fact that 
the additional protocol to the Iran-Russia nuclear contract on January 1995 indicated 
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both sides had discussed the provision of a centrifuge for uranium enrichment. This did 
partially contradict Amrollahi’s statement that Iran “had never sought” centrifuges 
technology through the agreement. However, with the IAEA’s consent on Amrollahi’s 
statement about the no centrifuge deal in the agreement, the Clinton administration’s 
diplomatic efforts were again unsuccessful in gaining justification of its coercive 
diplomacy. 255 
 
Despite US coercion and sabotage, Iran slowly made progress in its nuclear programme. 
On 22 June 1995, Rafsanjani announced the completion of the first phase of a nuclear 
research centre in Bonab. The facility was planned to perform a research radiating 
agricultural products. 256 Moreover, after the press conference of the IAEA Director 
General Hans Blix, where it was announced that the IAEA inspections had not detected 
any evidence of Iranian nuclear military programs on 3 July 1995, Iran signed a series of 
nuclear cooperation contracts: an additional two VVER 440 light water reactors at 
Bushehr and 10 years provision of nuclear fuel from Russia257  
 
As Iran’s nuclear programme progressed, the Clinton administration implemented 
further measures to coerce Iran. Not only with the economic sanctions and diplomatic 
intervention, the Clinton administration also intensified military appearance as well. On 
1 July 1995, the fifth fleet of the US Navy, which had been dismissed in 1947, was 
reactivated to secure its ‘escalation dominance’ in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, the 
Clinton administration continued to raise questions on Iran’s nuclear programme and 
wanted to consolidate the solidarity of the international community to participate its 
coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. However, it once again failed to do so 
as IAEA experts Vlado Valkovich and Frank Watt declared their inspection on Iran’s 
nuclear programme, “entirely for peaceful purposes” on 6 November 1995.258 
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Although Clinton’s coercive diplomacy failed to bring upon a behavioural change of 
Iran, the US coercive diplomacy was not just a series of failures. On 9 January 1996, 
Chen Chi Chan, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, said that the agreement 
between China and Iran for a nuclear power plant had been frozen. On 15 January 1996, 
Slovak economic minister, Jan Ducky, stated that the Slovak Republic would not 
participate in the construction of a new power station in Iran. The Clinton administration 
had succeeded in slowing the pace of Iranian nuclear programme development.  
 
However, Rafsanjani’s Iran did not back down and contended with US pressure to 
continue the progress. On 6 February 1996, Reza Amrollahi, head of the AEOI, declared 
Iran had successfully developed laser technology and produced zero-power and 
miniature reactors. On March 1996, Spain and Iran negotiated a comprehensive 
economic deal worth $1.5 billion which included nuclear cooperation at the Bushehr 
nuclear facility. 259  Iran also consistently disclosed its will on nonproliferation to 
strengthen its justification of the nuclear development. On 25 September 1996, Iran 
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to disclose its integrity on total disarmament 
of nuclear weapons.  
 
On 2 June 1997, Iran announced the first phase of its $33 million electron accelerator 
had initiated operation. It was a device able to produce 239 Pu or 233 U of nuclear 
material. The figure <Figure 4-4> explains how the contention leads to the initiation of 
electron accelerator. It was an achievement of the Rafsanjani administration that had 
preceded its nuclear programme development under the US coercive diplomacy.  
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<Figure 4-4> The Contention which leads to electron accelerator of Iran 
 
 
 
 
Even before the inauguration, the Clinton administration set the dismantlement of Iran’s 
nuclear programme as the objective of its foreign policy. During the first term of his 
presidency, the Clinton administration decided to utilize economic sanctions as the tool to 
coerce Iran to abandon its nuclear programme. Moreover, the Clinton administration 
aggressively intervened in the nuclear cooperation of Iran and foreign countries to 
sabotage the deal and extend its economic sanction to any international firms or 
individuals who invested and had transactions with Iran. However, since Rafsanjani’s Iran 
observed the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement to claim its sovereign right to 
peaceful atomic energy and peaceful nuclear cooperation, which was guaranteed by NPT 
Article 4, the US could not elevate its inducements of coercive diplomacy more than the 
economic sanction. This was also disclosed during an interview with Rafsanjani by Asahi 
Sinbun, that his priority for Iran’s nuclear programme was to win the credibility of its 
justification from the international community against false accusations by the US. 260 
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Since repeated IAEA inspections evaluated Iran’s nuclear programme as ‘peaceful use of 
nuclear energy’ during the Rafsanjani presidency, the Clinton administration could not 
implement more aggressive coercive inducement such as air strikes and the limited use of 
military force on Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
Nevertheless the Clinton administration could not implement military options as a 
measure, the war readiness and ‘escalation of dominance’ was strengthened by 
redeployment of the US naval force. Prior to the first Gulf War in 1990, the Commander 
Middle Eastern Force, COMIDEASTFOR of the US Force was responsible for the 
military operations in the region. However, as its combat ability was revealed as 
improper during the Gulf War, the Seventh Fleet which was in charge of the Western 
Pacific and Indian Ocean was given the temporary task of overseeing the region. In 
1995, the Clinton administration decided to reactivate the Fifth Fleet to replace 
COMIDEASTFOR to implement efficient military operations in the Middle East.   
 
The coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration on Iran’s nuclear programme was 
type B, which is to persuade the opponent to undo the action. That is, the US’ objective was 
to coerce Iran into abandoning its nuclear programme. However, without the justification for 
the coercion, it was difficult to acquire ‘Adequate International Support,’ which was an 
important condition for the success of the coercive diplomacy. Moreover, since Iran 
observed the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the US could not set its 
‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation.’ If the US could not set a clear limit leading to 
the unacceptable costs of Iran, the US could not enforce Iran to think that the Iranian loss of 
incompliance exceeded its interest of confrontation. In that case, there was no need for Iran 
to accept US coercion.  Thus, rather to accept US demands, Rafsanjani observed the NPT 
and IAEA Safeguards Agreement to intensify its justification of nuclear programme 
development. Moreover, by counterploting the weakly justified US coercive diplomacy, Iran 
intensified the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of Iran’s nuclear programme. Overall, the coercive 
diplomacy of the Clinton administration had little success in delaying Iran’s nuclear 
programme by sabotaging the deal. However, it failed to achieve the dismantlement of Iran’s 
nuclear programme or a behaviour change in Iran.  
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4.3.2.2 Iranian Missile Development: Advent of the New Tool for Counter Coercive 
Diplomacy 
 
“You don’t have a weapon until you put it in something that can deliver a weapon.”261 
Colin Powell, press interview on 17 November 2004 
 
The collective capability on nuclear fissile materials, explosive devices and delivery 
system is called the ‘nuclear force’ of a state. Some regard the production of nuclear 
materials, explosive devices and the development of the delivery system as the three 
components of a state’s nuclear deterrence.262 That is, prohibiting the delivery system 
itself is considered as crucial as controlling the nuclear materials and the explosive 
device in nuclear nonproliferation. Thus, the dangerous task of transporting nuclear 
explosives, along with the missile technology including ICBM, is perceived to be of 
similar importance and threat as that of a nuclear bomb. Iran, who acknowledged the 
importance of missile technology in the Iran-Iraq War, decided to continue its 
development progress during the Rafsanjani period. Whether it was intended or not, the 
improvement of the missile technology meant an increased deterrence of power since its 
advancement of missile capability raised the enforcement cost of the US coercive 
diplomacy on Iran. The Iranian objective of the missile development was clearly 
revealed when the Commander of the Aerospace Division of the IRGC, BG Amir Ali 
Hajizadeh, stated, “Iran possesses the ICBM technology but has no intention of 
producing missiles with ranges greater than 2,000 kilometres… Iran’s interest is only in 
the ability to target US and Israeli bases in the region.” 263 
 
To restrain the missile development of Iran, the US utilized the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, MTCR, which was established in 1987. The MTCR was initially 
created to prevent unmanned delivery systems for nuclear weapons, specifically delivery 
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systems that could carry a minimum payload of 500kg at a minimum of 300km. 
However, at the 1992 annual meeting in Oslo, the MTCR expanded its scope to 
unmanned aerial vehicles for all weapons of mass destruction. It was the groundwork of 
the US to build international solidarity to curb Iran’s missile development.  
 
However, against the coercive diplomacy of the US, the Iran succeeded to acquire 
efficient tool for its counter strategy.  Against the US coercion, Iran continued its missile 
development through non-members of the MTCR, especially North Korea and China. In 
March 1993, a group of 21 Iranian officials travelled to Pyongyang, North Korea, to 
discuss the cooperation on ballistic missile programs. The Iranian group was led by 
Brigadier General Hossein Mantequei, director of the Defence Industries Organization, 
DIO. The DIO was responsible for Iran’s ballistic missile development and 
production. 264 On 12 April 1993, US intelligence sources confirmed that China had sold 
key missile components to Iran. 265  
 
On 14 July 1993, more specific information was captured by the Yonhap News Agency. 
It was disclosed that the Iranian delegation who had visited North Korea on April 1993 
was to sign a contract for the purchase of 150 Rodong 1 missiles. According to its 
report, Iranian delegation requested the increase of the missile’s maximum range from 
1,000 km to 1,300km, which could reach Israel. 266  
 
The Iranian attempt of acquiring missile capability for a possible strike on Israel 
revealed a glimpse of the Iranian counter coercive diplomacy against US coercion. Since 
the security of Israel was perceived as crucial to the national interest of the US, the 
increase in Iran’s ability to strike Israel meant an increased deterrence power of Iran and 
the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy.  
 
Not only purchasing the missiles, Iran increased its missile operation capability to 
upgrade the deterrence power by executing missile exercises. Since 60 percent of the 
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world’s marine transport of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 1993, 267 it was a 
great threat to the US, whose stable flow of oil was one of its crucial national interests in the 
region. From 23rd-30th October 1993, Iran conducted a week-long “Missile War Game” 
dubbed Sa’eqeh 3, Lightening 3 in a 1000km area around the Straits of Hormuz. The 
exercise aimed to “establish command, control, communication, and intelligence 
distribution between Tehran and its main strategic headquarters, including the activation of 
missiles on orders from Tehran.” The Khatam ol-Anbia 1 strategic headquarters was 
activated to coordinate Iran’s surface-to-surface ballistic missile units. The communication 
system successfully reacted to a simulated missile launch. Shore-to-sea missile units from 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC, and the Navy participated in the 
exercises on Abu Musa, Kishm and other islands off Hormuzgan Province. This was the 
first of a regular set of IRGC exercises involving the regular military. Offensive and 
defensive chemical weapons units were also employed in the exercise.268  
 
On 14 June 1994, Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Pelletreau, stated at the US House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, “North Korea has in the past delivered Scud B and Scud C, 
primarily to Iran and Syria. We’re concerned about press reports and other intelligence 
that they might, at some point, sell the Rodong missile with a much longer range than the 
Scud B and Scud C.” 269  If the revealed information was true, it was a serious threat to the 
US administration, since acquiring the Rodong missile, which surpassed the maximum 
range of Scud C, 805-1126km, meant Iran’s advanced capability of a strike on Israel.  
 
On 23 November to 1 December 1995, Iran executed Saeqa 4 missile exercises for the 
missile manoeuvres in the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman. The firing was 
reportedly the first operational test of “advanced missile systems” built by the Iranian 
Navy. As senior US Navy officials reported, Iran had increased its integrated naval 
capabilities, anti-ship missiles, and anti-aircraft capabilities and by doing so, upgraded 
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its means to oppose possible coercion from the US. 270  
 
On 13 May 1996, Iran tested a new land-based anti-ship missile called the Tondar, 
which Brig. General Ahmad Dadbin, commander of Iran’s land forces, claimed to have 
produced indigenously. Tondor was known to western experts as a ballistic missile with 
a reported range of approximately 700km, which was modified from the Chinese C-801 
Sardine anti-ship missile. Once again, Iran displayed its improved missile technology to 
cease the strait of Hormuz and its deterrence power for its counter coercive diplomacy 
against US pressure. 271 
 
On 9 December 1996, for the first time ever, Iran successfully fired a Chinese-made 
HY-2 Silkworm missile from a Houdong patrol boat during a 10-day military exercise. 
On 6 June 1997, Iran conducted a live-fire test in the Persian Gulf. The C-802 was fired 
from an F-4 aircraft. US Secretary of Defence William Cohen reported that Iran’s C-802 
missile tests were the first known launching by Iran of the air-launched variant of the 
Chinese-made C-802. It was the last increment of Iran’s missile capability in the 
Rafsanjani period.  
 
Throughout Rafsanjani’s rule, Iran denied its missile development by cooperating with 
North Korea, China and Russia. It is still unclear how much help and technological 
support was exchanged. However, Iran surely succeeded in building its missile 
capability and deterrence power against US coercion. As the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies reported, Iran achieved indirect deterrence with its development that 
could hit cities in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf States.272 Moreover, since the 
advancement of missile capability during the Rafsanjani period led to a Shahab-3 
missile of Khatami, which made it possible to strike Israel, the advent of efficient tool 
foe counter coercive diplomacy was a quiet of success for in Iran. 273  Iran surly 
succeeded created ‘something that can deliver a weapon’. 
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4.3.3 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy between 
Clinton and Khatami            
 
 
The US coercive diplomacy without compensative and persuasive inducement was at a 
crossroad after the 1997 Iranian presidential election. The factionalism that had 
blossomed after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini was actively developed through the 
Rafsanjani period and it caused a change in domestic politics in Iran.     
 
During the Rafsanjani presidency, the reformist faction became disgruntled since 
Rafsanjani put more emphasis on protecting the theocratic state of Iran and could not 
meet expectations in terms of reformation due to pacifying the conservatives. Moreover, 
after being marginalized by the centralized government and the theocratic regime, the 
radical parliamentarians who were once loyal to the Iranian revolution, became much 
more moderated by abandoning its statist economic system and toned down anti-
Americanism to draw more support from the public. Interlinked with theses factions, a 
group of students, scholars, clerics and politicians were formed to demand a reformation 
on authoritative theocratic Iran. It soon had become a reformist movement and coalition 
for change. That is, the rigidity of theocratic Iran awakened the majority of Iranian 
nationals who felt themselves too marginalized to create a stream of reformist 
movement.  
 
In an overwhelming trend, the leader of the reformist faction, Khatami, was elected as 
the president of Iran in 1997. Khatami received 69.5 percent of the votes and achieved a 
landslide victory. As an unexpected reformist who seemed more open and less hostile to 
the US had been elected president, the Clinton administration revealed in the possibility 
of a policy change. The real mood change came when Khatami sent a letter to Yasser 
Arafat, in which was disclosed the shift of its stance on the Arab-Israel peace process, 
saying that, “He acknowledged Israel’s legitimacy, and would discuss the possibility of a 
region-wide peace if the Palestinians were allowed to establish a state on the West Bank 
and Gaza.” the US began to reappraise its policy change from ‘dual containment’ by 
providing persuasive and compensative inducement to Iran. 274  
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However, as Madeleine Albright stated “These hopes must be balanced against reality… 
its efforts to develop long range missile and to acquire nuclear weapons continue. The 
United states opposes and will continue to oppose”, 275 the moderation of the US policy 
did not mean the approval of Iran’s nuclear programme or a fundamental change of its 
coercive diplomacy. Moreover, As Suzanne Maloney had evaluated “The reformist trend 
has not prevailed over some of the most powerful instruments of the state power in Iran, 
including the military, the state television and radio, vast semi-governmental economic 
conglomerates, and the religious councils that must approve any parliamentary 
legislation.” 276, the reformist character and the approach of Khatami was encouraging 
but his ‘2nd of Khordad Movement’ shown its limit for the US to change its coercive 
diplomacy on Iran. 
 
It was clearly revealed on 27 August 1997,  about two months after his inauguration, 
Khatami replaced the vice minister of Iran and director of AEOI, Reza Amrollahu, to 
Gholam reza Aghazadeh, who was then Minister of Iran’s oil ministry. The swift 
replacement of a western trained nuclear scientist with decades of experience to 
someone who had no background on nuclear technology was a shock not only to the 
insiders of AEOI but also to all the other western experts dealing with the Iranian 
nuclear issue. None of the experts knew what caused the sudden leadership change in 
the AEOI.277 It was later revealed by David Patrikarakos that, according to his interview 
with Khazaneh, the replacement was the ‘ultimate political appointment’ by the supreme 
leader Ayatollah Khamenei. 278    
 
Khamenei wanted to propel the nuclear programme. As he believed Reza Amrollahi was 
too weak to overcome western pressure, especially from the US, to fulfil the speedy 
development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Thus, Khamenei ordered Khatami to dismiss 
Reza Amrollahi. Since Gholam reza Aghazadeh developed and managed the Iranian oil 
industry under difficult situations such as wars and sanctions, Khamenei evaluated him 
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as the right person to accomplish the Iranian nuclear programme as scheduled.   
 
Admittedly, the Clinton administration had implemented other inducements such as 
possible diplomatic normalization and ease of sanction to derive a behavioural change in 
Iran on its nuclear programme. However, as Madeleine Albright stated “We could have 
achieved a breakthrough only by abandoning our principals and interest in 
nonproliferation, terrorism and the Middle East, far too high a price”, 279 the Clinton 
administration could not implement any fundamental changes of its policy. With its 
environment of domestic and international politics, Khatami had limits in wielding 
leverage on Iran’s nuclear programme. Thus, the contention of coercive and counter 
coercive diplomacy between Iran and the US continued.   
 
4.3.3.1 The Continued Clinton’s Limited ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’ and the 
Upgraded Resistance of Khatami 
                
On 22 July 1997, on the eve of Khatami’s inauguration, IAEA director Hans Blix 
announced an official statement after an inspection of Iran’s nuclear site, declaring that 
Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes and Iran had always allowed the 
inspection of its nuclear facilities with little advance notice.280 It meant the Khatami 
administration had initiated its term with an advantageous position against the US 
coercive diplomacy by achieving its legitimacy on the development of the nuclear 
programme. This became more obvious when the US Department of Energy conducted 
its first subcritical nuclear test on 3 July 1997. Although the subcritical nuclear test was 
not subject to the provisions of the CTBT, as it is not accompanied by a nuclear 
explosion, many experts and even some countries argue that subcritical tests could be 
used beyond their stated purpose and could be used in developing new nuclear 
weapons.281  
 
This contradiction was later criticized and utilized by Iran to bolster its counter coercive 
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diplomacy. On 20 September 1997, Mahmud Mohammadi, spokesman for the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry stated, “At a time when the United States finds fault without 
supervised peaceful nuclear activities, it engages in destructive atomic tests,” and 
criticized the US coercive diplomacy on Iran as ‘discriminatory’.282 With this ironic 
environment, the reformist Khatami who was considered more favourable leader to 
bringing change in Iran nuclear negotiation could not do much differently from that of 
Rafsanjani’s period.   
 
In the beginning of Khatami’s presidency, Israel and the US questioned Iran’s nuclear 
programme and claimed that Iran had a covert nuclear weapon programme.  On 26 August 
1997, Benjamin Netanyahu, then Israel’s prime minister, asked the world’s major powers 
to come together to prevent Iran and Iraq from developing nuclear weapons by stating, 
“they’re arming themselves feverishly and this is a problem for the international 
community.”283 On September 1997, former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher 
argued Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear 
weapons. 284  Accordingly, similar to Rafsanjani, Khatami opposed the accusation and 
continued with the nuclear programme. On 3 September 1997, Iran announced the 
appointment of Gholam Reza Aqazadeh to replace Reza Amrollahi as the head of the 
AEOI. As mentioned, this was a display of Iran’s will to continue its nuclear 
programme.285  
 
In response, the Clinton administration announced a possible economic sanction on 
Russia, who was supporting the nuclear programme in the Bushehr nuclear reactor. On 23 
September 1997, during a high-level talk visit in Moscow, US vice President Al Gore 
stated the US would execute economic sanctions on Russia if assistance in Iran’s nuclear 
programme continued. 286   However, US pressure could not create any resonance on 
Russia since Valeriy Nesterushkin, Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, denied the 
accusation and announced its commitment to complete the construction of the Bushehr 
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nuclear power plant.  
 
To strengthen its counter coercive diplomacy, Iran disclosed its will of observing the 
IAEA Safeguards Agreement and inversely intensified the legitimacy of its nuclear 
programme. On 2 October 1997, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the AEOI, assured 
Mohamed ElBaradei, the new coming Secretary General of the IAEA, that Iran would 
follow all the regulations dictated under the purview of the IAEA in an effort to obtain 
information necessary to use nuclear technologies. In reciprocation, Hans Blix, then 
Secretary General of the IAEA, assured Gholam Reza Aqazadeh that cooperation 
between the Agency and Iran would continue.287 The close ties with IAEA indicated the  
observance of NPT by Iran which directly contradicted and degraded the US coercive 
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
Since it appeared that putting pressure on Russia was not productive, the Clinton 
administration turned to China. On 14 October 1997, the US State Department 
spokesman James Rubin stated China should give “clear and unequivocal assurances” 
that it would not convey nuclear weapons technology to Iran. 288 On 16 October 1997, 
the US intensified its request that China halt all nuclear cooperation with Iran, even what 
was allowed under NPT, for further nuclear technology assistance from the US.289   
 
Despite Iran requested definitive proof of US’ allegations on Iran’s nuclear 
programme.290 On 29 October 1997, Chinese officials provided “authoritative, written 
communications” that China would not engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran 
after completing two projects which they had already undergone: a zero-power research 
reactor and the production of zirconium tubes. 291 It could be considered a small success 
of the US coercive diplomacy. However, in the long run, as Madeleine Albright later 
confessed, “It left us isolated,” and banning all the legitimate cooperation that been 
approved in international treaties degraded the US coercive diplomacy by damaging the 
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“consolidation of International support”. 
 
On 7 January 1998, even during a historical interview with CNN, Khatami denied 
allegations that Iran was seeking to develop nuclear weapons and claimed the 
programme to be ‘seeking peaceful nuclear energy.’ This displayed Iran’s clear 
limitations on how far it could stretch its appeasement policy with the US. Thus, despite 
a favourable approach from Khatami, the Clinton administration continued to coerce 
Iran’s nuclear programme. On 9 February 1998, James Foley, a spokesman for the US 
State Department, stated the US would cut economic aids to Ukraine unless it stopped 
cooperation with Iran’s nuclear programme. The Clinton administration had already 
ceased the US firm Westinghouse Electric Corporation’s two nuclear power plants deal 
with Ukraine.292 The coercion on Ukraine was efficient to curb the nuclear programme 
of Iran since the Ukraine firm, Turboatom, had made a contract with Russian firm, 
Zarubezhatomenergostroy, to provide the turbine for a 1000MW reactor at Bushehr. 
 
As the progress of the nuclear programme fell behind schedule due to the US coercive 
diplomacy, Iran converted many of the Iranian subcontractors to Russian on a “turnkey” 
basis293  and decided to conclude a “contract for completing the first unit” of its nuclear 
power plant at Bushehr.294 Instead of surrendering to the US coercive diplomacy, Iran 
attempted to accomplish its nuclear development by all means nessasry. 
  
On 7 March 1998, the US coercive diplomacy had a small success as it established a 
new 30-year nuclear cooperation accord with Ukraine. This accord confirmed the two 
states’ commitment to controlling the export of nuclear technology by allowing Ukraine 
to purchase US fuel for its nuclear reactors. With its closed deal, Ukraine cancelled the 
provision of turbine for the Bushehr nuclear reactor. 295  Although Russia and Iran 
gathered for a meeting to build turbines that needed for the nuclear power plant’s 
generators, Iran’s nuclear programme had to fell behind schedule.  
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However, the legitimacy of the US coercive diplomacy soon took a hit. On 16 March 1998, 
IAEA spokesman David Kyd announced Iran had not violated the NPT or any other laws 
governing non-proliferation. The IAEA had inspected the research centre at Isfahan and the 
experimental reactor at the University of Tehran four times in the past year. The two reactors 
under construction at Bushehr were not inspected because no form of nuclear fuel had been 
transferred there yet.296 Without the IAEA’s clear accusations on Iran’s nuclear programme, 
the Clinton administration could not increase coercion by utilizing its capable inducements. 
Thus, as it had done in Rafsanjani’s period, the Clinton administration could only implement 
an independent economic sanction and diplomatic sabotage on international aid and the 
cooperation of Iran’s nuclear programme. 297  
 
In contrast to the slowed pace of the nuclear programme, the development of Iran’s missile 
capability was remarkable. On 23 July 1998, Iran tested a medium-range missile, Shahab-3, 
which had a range of approximately 800 miles and was capable of hitting Israel and Saudi 
Arabia. Although some sources claimed it was a failure since it exploded 100 seconds after 
the take-off,298 the fact that Iran had built Shahab-3 which had the potential to alter the 
political and military balance of power in the Middle East was a big progress for Iran’s 
counter coercive diplomacy. On 25 July 1998, Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani 
announced that Iran had successfully tested a 1,300km-range surface-to-surface missile.299  
 
On 30 July 1998, soon after the missile test, the Clinton administration immediately 
imposed sanctions on seven Russian companies accused of selling weapons technology 
to Iran. 300  Moreover, after witnessing Iran’s missile capability, the US extended its 
coercion to the IAEA by threating the possible cut of US allocation to the agency. On 3 
August 1998, in protest of Iran’s nuclear programme and its capability, the US House of 
Representatives voted to cut funding for the IAEA by the exact amount that the IAEA 
was assisting Iran with the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. 301 
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However, as David Kydd, an IAEA spokesman stated, “This action cannot influence this 
agency’s general policies”, US coercion on the IAEA could not lead to the 
dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme. On 11 October 1998, despite elevated US 
sanctions, the Economic Council of Iran allocated 418,000 million rials, equivalent to 
140 million US dollars, for the completion of the Bushehr power plant. 302 Moreover, as 
it was denounced as a ‘double standard’ by Russia, the US unilateral accusation on Iran 
nuclear armament and economic sanction harmed international solidarity on Iran’s 
nuclear programme, which adversely affected the US coercive diplomacy.303 As the US 
failed to consolidate the “adequate International support”, Iran’s nuclear programme 
continued its progress. On 9 January 1999, Yevgeniy Adamov, the Russian Minister of 
Atomic Energy, stated the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant would be 
finished by 2000 or 2001.304 
  
The Clinton administration again intensified its sanctions to curb the nuclear cooperation 
between Iran and Russia. On 12 January 1999, US National Security Advisor Samuel 
Berger announced US sanctions against three Russian entities, D. Mendeleyev 
University of Chemical Technology, the Scientific Research and Design Institute of 
Power Technology, and the Moscow Aviation Institute, for aiding Iran’s nuclear weapons 
and ballistic missile programs. 305 
 
As the US coercive diplomacy continued, on 16 March 1999, Kamal Kharazi, the 
Minister of foreign affairs, met with Mohammed Al-Baradi, the director of the IAEA, 
and Wolfgang Hoffman, the executive secretary of the CTBT, to reiterate the peaceful 
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and show appreciation to the IAEA for its support 
for Iran’s nuclear programme against US coercion. Iran strengthened its justification of 
the nuclear programme by emphasizing its observance of the IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement and the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, Iran succeeded in the 
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enhancement of missile deterrence for its counter coercive diplomacy against US 
coercion. On 29 April 1999, Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani stated that Iran, 
“has a considerable number” of deployed Shahab-3 missiles that could be launched at 
any time to strike Israel.306 
 
On 20 July 1999, with no inducements left to coerce Iran, the US passed a bill that 
degrades its coercive diplomacy; freeze the allocated funds for the IAEA. The US House 
of Representatives passed a measure that the Secretary of the State could control the 
release of the IAEA funds to facilitate coercion on Iran’s nuclear programme. On 14 
March 2000, President Clinton signed the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 to take 
punitive measures against any individual or organization that provided any material aid 
to Iran’s nuclear or any other WMD programme. 307 The legislation also cut considerable 
funding from the US-Russia space station project unless Russia demonstrated a 
commitment against the Iranian nuclear weapons programme. However, pressuring the 
IAEA based on weak accusation on its support to possible Iran nuclear weapon 
programme was placing US into a corner. 
 
During the second term of the presidency, the Clinton administration not only put 
pressure on Iran, China, Russia, but also Ukraine, Czech and IAEA, to dismantle Iran’s 
nuclear programme. The coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration show a 
partial success since it restrained the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, such as 
the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor and turned down the international 
nuclear cooperation of China, Ukraine, Czech, South Africa, Spain, Argentine, etc. to 
Iran. However, the US neither succeeded to dismantle the Iran nuclear programme nor 
built its justification for coercive diplomacy. As US sustained the adamant stance of 
prohibiting the peaceful use of atomic energy of Iran, it create the room for Iran to 
implement its counter coercive diplomacy to take the advantage in developing its 
nuclear programme. Moreover, since the Iran nuclear capability had increased with is 
advancement of missile technology by counter coercing US coercion, it could be 
considered that the coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration was more of a 
failure.  
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On the contrary, the contention process of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy was 
partial success for Iran. Although there were many failures of nuclear cooperation by the 
coercive diplomacy of Clinton administration, Iran successfully sustained a close 
relation with Russia and secured its legitimacy of the nuclear programme by observing 
the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Moreover, as Iranian ambassador to Russia, Mehdi 
Safar, stated, the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was nearly 40 percent 
finished on 22 May 2000. 308 Iran did make some progress on its nuclear programme. 
However, the most crucial factor in evaluating Iran’s success was its advancement of 
nuclear deterrence by acquiring the ability to strike Israel and other close US allies, as 
well as the US military bases in the region. The advancement of Iran’s missile 
deterrence means the increment of enforcement cost for the US coercive diplomacy.    
 
The damaged justification of the US coercion could also be counted as the success of the 
Iran counter coercive diplomacy. Since Iran kept its nuclear programme under the NPT 
and IAEA Safeguards Agreement, all the US coercive inducements that had been 
implemented to Iran’s nuclear programme defamed the US coercive diplomacy by 
influencing favourable conditions of its success, the ‘Adequate Domestic and 
International Support’. The < Figure 4-5> shows how the contention was set and 
resulted. 
 
<Figure 4-5> The Contention Model of the US and Iran during the Khatami Period 
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4.4 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Bush Administration and the 
Counter Coercive Diplomacy of Iran 
 
4.4.1 Background 
 
During the US presidential campaign in 2000, presidential candidate George W. Bush 
declared his foreign policy would be based on ‘realistic internationalism’ that focused on 
the establishment of peace through its strength, the US military force. 
 
Robert B. Zoellick, the US Trade Representative during the first term of the Bush 
administration, disclosed the principles of Bush’s foreign policy: 1) pursue US national 
interest based on US power, 2) build and sustain coalitions and alliances, 3) recognize 
international agreements and institutions as a means of an objective, not a form of 
‘political therapy’, 4) accept the revolutionary change of the environment in global 
politics and security, and 5)  realize the evils that hate and confront the US. He argued 
the Bush administration would lead the US to a diplomatic success reminiscent of the 
Reagan administration if the five principles were well-projected in the US foreign 
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policy. 309  
 
Accordingly, Condoleezza Rice, then foreign policy adviser to Bush’s presidential 
campaign, also argued for ‘selective intervention’ based on geopolitical priority rather 
than Clinton’s humanitarian intervention with multilateral, liberal internationalism. In 
comparison to the Clinton administration, Bush’s foreign policy was the US 
Internationalism, which put a higher value on military strength and alliance to intensify 
the US centric world order. 310  
 
Bush’s policy stance of emphasizing US power and the US centric alliance was also 
reflected in its perception on International Organization. As George W. Bush stated “I 
will never place US troops under U.N. command…America will pay its dues but only if 
the U.N.’s bureaucracy is reformed… Our goal is a fellowship of strong, not weak, 
nations. And this requires both more American consultation and more American 
leadership”,311 Bush’s priority was cooperation with its democratic alliances rather than 
International Organizations which included the UN.   
 
Bush openly criticized the multilateralism of the Clinton administration by accusing it of 
having weakened the ties of their allies and losing the credibility of US leadership. The 
criticism also influenced the US Middle East policy of ‘dual containment’. The Bush 
administration did not believe in the virtuous circle of ‘dual containment’ or that the 
containment of Iran and Iraq would bring a better environment for the Israel-Palestine 
peace process or that the reciprocal interaction between the two would eventually solve 
the regional problem. By judging Clinton’s proactive mediator role in the Israel-
Palestine peace process as non-beneficial to its national interest, Bush denied engaging 
in the Israel-Palestine peace process as an active mediator despite the requests of Yasser 
Arafat and Hosni Mubarak. 
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By comparison, Bush’s policy on the regional ‘rogues’, Iran and Iraq, was more 
determined and specified. The Bush administration sustained a hard-line policy on 
Saddam’s Iraq and even declared a possible military intervention. Admittedly, there was 
a moderate decision making group in the Bush administration that counterbalanced the 
aggressive US’s Iran and Iraq policy, such as Colin Powell, the Secretary of the state, 
and Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of 
State. However, after 9/11, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, who 
were backed by hardliners in the Pentagon, took the initiative in the decision-making 
process of the US foreign policy.  
 
4.4.1.1 The Bush Administration after the 9/11 Crisis 
 
The 9/11 crisis, which was a direct strike on the mainland of the hyper power, was a 
staggering blow. As explained as the ‘Paradox of American power’ by Joseph Nye, the 
9/11 crisis led a fundamental change in the US’ foreign policy.312 The hard-line foreign 
policy of the Bush administration shifted to a more extreme stance, the so-called 
‘offensive realism’ or ‘Neo-conservative.’ 
 
As George W. Bush stated on the very day of 9/11, “This will be a monumental struggle 
between good and evil. But goodwill prevails”, 313  Bush dealt the 9/11 crisis in a 
dichotomy manner. This soon became the stance of the US foreign policy: ‘War on 
Terrorism’; “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are 
with us, or you are with the terrorists”. 314 If a nation defined war as one of the tools in 
diplomatic process, it could be stopped when the adversary complied with the request of 
enforcer and abandoned its will to resist. However, if the war became a battle of good 
versus evil, there is no room for negotiation and compromise.  The Bush administration 
even implemented a law that could violate human rights and freedom to detain POWs 
from Afghanistan and Iraq by using extraterritorial jurisdictions at Guantanamo Bay. 315  
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The US even declared the ‘pre-emptive strike’ against the security threat. John Lewis 
Gaddis bolstered the idea by arguing that the previous presidents such as Quincy Adams, 
Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson had never abandoned US rights on pre-
emptive measures. 316 However, as Jacques Derrida criticized the US justification of a 
pre-emptive strike and its war against ‘rogues’ as a homologous discourse and structure, 
which lacks in logic with many contradictions,317 in a long term, it degraded the US 
foreign policy. The weakly justified and controversial doctrine of the Bush 
administration had soon revealed its limits. The US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s 
nuclear programme was not an exception. The Bush doctrine and the discourse of “axis 
of evil” created a more favourable environment for Iran to resist the US coercion.   
 
After 9/11, the Bush administration evaluated that the International Arms Control regime 
based on ‘Idealism’ such as NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological 
Weapon Convention, was not enough to solve the nonproliferation problem. Thus, the 
US decided to bring peace and security through its military dominance and economic 
power. On January 2002, the Bush administration released its Nuclear Posture Review. 
Through the NPR, the Bush administration announced a ‘New Triad System’ in which 
nuclear weapons could be utilized as a means of pre-emptive strikes on non-nuclear 
weapon states such as Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.  
 
According to a series of the Bush administration’s policy reviews, the US’ nuclear 
strategy clarified three key axes: 1) counter proliferation against the actual use of WMD, 
2) the nonproliferation of the WMD, and 3) consequence management as damage 
control of the US being attacked by the WMD. The counter proliferation covered the 
interdiction of nuclear weapon technology and fissile material transfer. It also included 
active and passive intensification of the nuclear deterrence, such as a pre-emptive strike 
and missile defence.  The nonproliferation of WMD was to implement the active 
nonproliferation diplomacy, strengthen the multilateral regime, increase threat reduction 
cooperation, such as the Nunn-Lugar programme, and the utilization of various 
sanctions. The WMD consequence management was basically the crisis management of 
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the US government after being attacked by WMD. As displayed in the policy reviews, 
after 9/11, the Bush administration displayed its will of active prevention on nuclear 
proliferation.  
 
The nuclear programme of Iran was a good target to test the strengthened US 
nonproliferation policy. Thus, on 14 August 2002, when the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, 
or the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK, claimed Iran had a covert nuclear weapon 
programme, although one of the Bush administration’s reasons for the attack on Iraq in 
2003 was Iraq’s sheltering of the MEK, the US took the MEK allegation to justify the 
US coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. On 13 December 2002, after CNN 
aired a coverage based on the ISIS report about the suspicious covert Iranian nuclear 
facility, the Bush administration used it as leverage to implement a more hard-line 
coercive diplomacy on Iran. Rather than using a stick and carrot to derive Iran’s 
compliance, the Bush administration set the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme 
as a pre-condition for any further negotiation. It was the Bush administration’s ‘pure 
coercion’ coercive diplomacy. As it was revealed in CONPLAN 8022, the Bush 
administration decided to execute bilateral and multilateral sanctions backed by its 
military dominance to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
 
4.4.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy between 
Bush and Khatami 
       
 
 
The hard-line policy of the Bush administration gathered momentum after MEK’s 
allegation on Iran’s covert nuclear programme318 and the related CNN report later that 
year on the nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Natanz and Arak. However, MEK’s allegation 
on Iran’s covert nuclear programme was patchy. The Uranium Conversion Facility in 
Isfahan was operating under the supervision of the IAEA from the beginning and the 
construction of heavy water reactor in Arak was under no duty to report to the IAEA 
according to the Safeguards Agreement.  
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The problem was the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, which was also found to be 
under construction and unreported to the IAEA but claimed to be tested the centrifuge 
by simulation. Iran had not informed the IAEA about the simulation test of the Natanz 
enrichment facility. Moreover, the Chinese imported components that had been used in 
the facility were also not reported to the IAEA. Thus, it increased the suspicion and 
concern of the western countries on Iran’s nuclear programme and of its purpose. 
However, the construction of the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility and simulation test 
without injecting the nuclear fuel could not be considered as problems by international 
law since the IAEA Safeguards agreement that Iran had signed only required them to 
report to the IAEA six months prior to the actual introduction of nuclear fuel into the 
facility. At the time, Iran did not sign the 93+2 additional protocol.  
 
In the IAEA additional protocol standards, Iran’s unreported construction of the enrichment 
facility at Natanz was a breach of IAEA regulations. However, this was not the case since 
Iran had not signed one. Iran had not agreed to the ‘subsidiary arrangement’ at the time. The 
‘subsidiary arrangement,’ the so-called Code 3.1 was the regulation that the members of the 
NPT must report the construction of a nuclear facility when a decision is made to build one.  
However, without confirmation of these specific details, the Bush administration 
amplified their suspicions and concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and 
attempted to build a ‘Sense of Urgency’, ‘Strong Leadership’ and ‘Adequate Domestic 
and International Support’ for its coercive diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme. It 
was clearly revealed on 16 March 2005, when President Bush said Iran’s hidden nuclear 
programme had been discovered “because a dissident group pointed it out to the world.” 
Later that day, White House acknowledged that the dissident group which was cited by 
the president was the National Council of Resistance of Iran, or NCRI, the organization 
which largely consisted of MEK members. 319 
 
4.4.2.1 The Absence of Negotiation and the ‘Pure Coercion’ of the Bush 
Administration: Nuclear Talks between IAEA, EU3 and Iran 
                                  
After 9/11, the decision making process of the Bush’s first term was dominated by the 
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technocrats, the so-called neocons: Vice President Dick Cheney, Chief of Staff to the Vice 
President Lewis Libby, National Security Council Senior Director for Near East and North 
African Affairs Eliott Abrams, Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counter proliferation 
and Homeland Defence Robert Joseph, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy 
Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith, 
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John R. Bolton. 
 
Since the neocons evaluated the international treaty and multilateral agreement as non-beneficial 
and sometimes severely degrading US sovereignty and its foreign policy, the Bush 
administration preferred the implementation of unilateral measures excluding cooperation with 
multilateral organizations such as UN and NATO.320 This was also directly reflected during the 
first term of Bush’s nonproliferation policy on Iran’s nuclear programme.  When the Iraq war 
ended with Bush’s declaration of victory at the USS Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003, there 
was the increasing sense in Washington that Iran would be the next target.321  
 
The Bush administration aimed the CVID of the Iran nuclear programme and went even 
further by not accepting Iran’s peaceful use of atomic energy, which was totally 
legitimate under the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Similar to the North Korean 
nuclear case, the Bush administration set the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear 
programme as a precondition for any negotiation. That is, instead of inducing Iran to 
abandon its nuclear programme through the stick and carrot method, the US attempted 
to implement ‘pure coercion’; possible pre-emptive strikes, economic sanctions, UNSC 
resolutions and omnidirectional pressure to coerce the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear 
programme. The persuasive and compensative inducements such as diplomatic and 
economic normalization, easing the sanction, the de-listing of Iran from ‘state sponsors 
of terrorism’, and the investment on Iran’s energy sector, the support were not given as a 
means of coercive diplomacy.  It was not the archetypal coercive diplomacy that derived 
the compliance of coercee by simultaneously providing the ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’. Rather, it 
was the maximization of the stick, the coercive inducement and pressure to make Iran 
abandon its nuclear programme.  
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The ‘pure coercion’ coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration was become clearer 
when the Washington Post disclosed on May 2005 that the Concept of Operation Plan 
8022, the so-called ‘Global Strike,’ had been completed in November 2003. 322 The 
‘Global Strike’ was the substantial military implementation of Bush’s upgraded 
nonproliferation policy, and the ‘New Triad system,’ which was announced in the US 
Nuclear Posture Review in 2002. 323  
 
Admittedly, compared to Operational Plan, CONPLAN is not yet a detailed military 
plan which only includes a small scale military operation. However, while OPLAN was 
rather a defensive form of military operation to response to actual or potential threat for 
which military operations may be required, the CONPLAN 8022 was more of an 
offensive concept of military operation by allowing a pre-emptive strike, which included 
nuclear strikes when the nuclear activities of North Korea and Iran were detected.    
 1) The Iranian Nuclear Crisis and the First IAEA Resolution of September 2003 
 
Irrespective of MEK’s allegation on Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme, Iran 
continued its development of the nuclear programme. On 21 August 2002, Alexander 
Rumyuantsev, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, stated that Russia had signed all the 
necessary agreements to import the radioactive fuel waste from the Iranian Bushehr 
plant.324 It means Iran had succeeded to sustain its cooperation with Russia.  
 
In order to impose high enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy, Iran continued to 
secure its justification of nuclear programme through IAEA. On 16 September 2002, 
Gholamreza Aghazadehh, Director of the AEOI, addressed to the 46th general 
conference of the IAEA that Iran had been the vanguard of the advocates of the nuclear-
free zones and had played an active role in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in the Middle East since 1974. 325  
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Despite Iran’s denial of the nuclear armament, its will to observe the NPT regime and the 
assurance of the Russia, the US did not hold back its suspicion on Iran’s nuclear 
programme. On 12 December 2002, after CNN aired satellite pictures of two additional 
nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, which was alleged by ISIS as the secret nuclear fuel 
cycle facilities, the US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated that, “Iran is 
actively working to develop nuclear weapons capability,” and declared, in a CNN interview 
on December 13, that Iran’s energy needs do not justify these nuclear facilities.  
 
Admittedly, Iran flares more natural gas annually than the equivalent energy its future 
reactor could produce. Thus, the alleged power-generation applications of the $800 
million dollar Bushehr nuclear plant and the two follow-up nuclear reactors seem neither 
economically justified nor truthful to the US. However, whether nuclear programme of 
Iran seems non-profitable, the development of “peaceful use of Atomic energy” is Iran’s 
sovereign rights under the NPT regime.   
 
Although the MEK’s allegation and CNN report was a good opportunity for the US to 
build its momentum to push Iran, due to the preparation of the war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the Bush administration could not afford to utilize its resources to execute 
a measure to coerce Iran. Thus, the US attempted to indirectly influence Iran’s nuclear 
programme by offering a lucrative economic package to Russia in exchange for halting 
construction of the nuclear reactor in Bushehr and other nuclear cooperation with 
Tehran. However, as Yuri Bespalko, a spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy 
Ministry stated “Americans are being rather sly when they offer this kind of swap... It’s 
better to have a bird in the hand than two in the bush”, Russia rejected the proposal. 326 
 
Despite US allegations and sabotage on Iran’s nuclear programme, Iran continued to show 
its ‘Sense of Urgency’ on the nuclear programme and development under the NPT regime. 
On 9 February 2003, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami declared that Iran had 
discovered and extracted indigenous uranium in the Yazd area. He also stated, “It is our 
legitimate right to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful aims....We are ready to accept IAEA 
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inspectors to check our nuclear activities in order to reveal the lies told by others.” 327  On 10 
February 2003, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, director of the AEOI, stated that Iran was not 
interested in nuclear arms production but sought to acquire nuclear know-how to generate 
electricity to meet its energy demands. As he put it, “the AEOI started its activities by 
drilling special wells in Arkedan of Yazd…. With the completion of the Isfahan factory in 
the near future, we hope to complete the fuel cycle and indigenously produce fuel for our 
plants.” Iran disclosed its will to secure a full-fledged nuclear programme.328  
 
On 10 March 2003, the standoff of the US and Iran entered a new phase when the 
director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, announced an IAEA inspection on the 
Natanz nuclear facility of 22 February 2003. As ElBaradei stated, Iran’s enrichment 
facility was “very sophisticated” which is in need of “full transparent” and “sign the 
additional protocol”,329 the US who had expressed their discontentment of the IAEA 
inspection immediately coerced Iran to accept the IAEA additional protocol.  
During the Preparatory Commission for the NPT Review Conference on April 28 to 9 
May 2003, US Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf accused Iran of cheating on its 
obligation under the NPT, stating that Iran has an “alarming, clandestine programme” 
and “is going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international 
inspections in North Korea and Iraq.”330 The IAEA March report played an important 
role in consolidating France, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to 
support the US argument on Iran to accept the IAEA additional protocol.   
 
It was based on the view that if Iran’s objective was the peaceful use of nuclear 
programme, it would be much safer and more productive to precede its nuclear 
programme with IAEA cooperation under the additional protocol. However, Iran had a 
plausible reason to be reluctant in accepting the additional protocol. Since Iran had 
suffered from US sabotage on its legitimate nuclear programme under the IAEA 
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Safeguards Agreement, signing the additional protocol would make it almost impossible 
for Iran to precede its nuclear development.  
 
However, Iran had to comply with US coercion to a certain degree since the US 
succeeded the international support on its coercive diplomacy. Moreover, as the Bush 
administration had displayed its ‘Sense of Urgency’ and ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ on 
the Iran nuclear programme through the Iraq war, Iran did not have many options to 
choose from after witnessing the fall of Baghdad and was in danger of becoming the 
next possible target.  
 
According to Tim Guldimann, then Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Iran sent a forward 
looking negotiation agenda to the US on 1 May 2003. In the disclosed document by 
Guldimann, the Khatami administration suggested full transparency on its nuclear 
programme including the 93+2 additional protocol and full cooperation and the 
exchange of all the information on the war on terrorism as the agenda of the negotiation. 
However, as Mousavian’s interview with Tim Guldimann revealed, the Bush 
administration was in firm stance that Iranian nuclear dismantlement is the precondition 
for the further negotiation. Thus, US denounced Tim Guldimann and Switzerland for 
passing the memorandum of Iran nuclear negotiation. 331  If Iran’s offer was a fact, as 
Tim Guldimann claimed, it was the golden opportunity to implement a more intensified 
supervision on Iran’s nuclear programme. However, the Bush administration, after 
experiencing a victory in the wars with Iraq and Afghanistan, seemed disinterested in 
negotiating for the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme, but aimed to negotiate 
the nuclear dismantlement of Iran as a precondition.   
 
Although the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice denied having received Tim 
Guldimann’s memorandum, Congressman Robert Ney, Trita Parsi, and former senior 
National Security Council official Flynt Leverett and Gary Sick confirmed the Iranian 
high official had said subsequently that the deal was from the supreme leader. On 9 
December 2013, John Kerry also admitted to Tim Guldimann’s memorandum and 
criticized the Bush administration. He was the first senior US official who stated the 
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proposal was real. 332 
 
On 6 June 2003, the IAEA released the first IAEA Board Statement on the Iran nuclear 
programme based on its inspection in February 2003. In the statement, the IAEA 
criticized five points that Iran had failed to clarify regarding its nuclear programme and 
requested Iran’s approval of the IAEA’s additional protocol to restore its credibility on 
the nuclear programme. The five points were that they had: 1) failed to declare the 
import of natural uranium in 1991, 2) failed to declare the use of the imported uranium 
and related nuclear activities, 3) failed to declare the facility which had received, stored 
and reprocessed such materials, 4) failed to provide timely updated design information 
on the nuclear facility including the Tehran research reactor, and 5) failed to provide the 
information about the nuclear facility in Isfahan and Arak. However, since Iran had not 
signed the IAEA additional protocol, the five points which had been criticized by the 
IAEA were not in violation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Thus, the IAEA Board 
Statement could not declare that Iran had violated the NPT. 333 
Although the IAEA did not stipulate that Iran had breached the IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement, the IAEA Board Statement which cast doubt on Iran’s nuclear programme 
worked against the ‘strategic environment’ of Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy. According 
to ElBaradei, all the member states except Cuba requested Iran to be more transparent and to 
build confidence with the international community at the IAEA Board of Governors 
meeting in June 2003. Immediately, the US grouped a hard-line bloc with the United 
Kingdom, Austria and Canada to denounce Iran’s unreported nuclear activities as ‘proof of 
Tehran’s intention to produce nuclear weapons’ and demanded Iran to unconditionally 
accept the additional protocol and suspend the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility.334  
 
Nevertheless the unyielding stance of the US, all the attempt to suppress Iran nuclear 
programme without IAEA confirmation of Iran’s breach on NPT lacks in justification. It 
gave space for Iran to play their diplomatic game. On 18 June 2003, Iran’s ambassador 
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to the IAEA, Ali Salehi, stated that Iran would not allow the IAEA more intrusive 
inspections but would consider the matter if the IAEA stops using the “language of 
force.”335 Iran disclosed it would not sign the unconditional IAEA additional protocol 
and continued its development on the nuclear programme. On 2 July 2003, Gholam 
Reza Aghazadeh, the Chief of AEOI stated, “Beside Bushehr, we intend to build several 
more nuclear power stations with the overall power capacity of 6,000 megawatts, and 
we are offering Russia a chance to take up this opportunity.” 336 
 
On 7 July 2003, the Bush administration imposed economic sanctions on six private 
companies for selling WMD technology to Iran. The sanction included a ban on trading 
with and receiving assistance from the US, which would remain for two years. The six 
companies were: Taian Foreign Trade General Corporation of China, Zibo Chemical 
Equipment Plant of China, Liyang Yunlong Chemical Equipment Group Company of 
China, China North Industries Corporation, China Precision Machinery Import/Export 
Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation. 337 
Before the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on September 2003, the Bush 
administration decided to coerce Iran by pressuring the IAEA and the international 
community. During an interview with the Associated Press, then Undersecretary of State 
for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, John Bolton stated, “One has to 
wonder whether international regime that finds opposition in the form of states party to 
the agreement are ever going to work,” 338  and requested the firm action of the 
international community against Iran by emphasizing the ‘Path of Action’ that the Bush 
administration had taken in the Iraq war to eliminate the threat of WMD.  
 
As the US successfully displayed ‘Strength of Motivation’ and ‘Sense of Urgency’ on 
Iran nuclear programme by possible unilateral intervention on Iran after the end of Iraq 
War, Iran had to send a positive sign of accepting the IAEA additional protocol. 
Although it was not required by the IAEA Safeguards Agreement that Iran had signed, 
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Iran even approved of the environment sampling on its nuclear facility. 339 
 
Despite Iran’s participation and support on the IAEA inspection, the resolution which was 
adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on September 2003 was too harsh and 
demanding of Iran. As director of AEOI Gholamreza Aqazedah stated “It seems that the 
resolution has been engineered in such a manner to guarantee its non-implementation…it 
should, to promote the effectiveness of the safeguards and non-proliferation regime”, the 
requirement level of the IAEA resolution was impossible for Iran to implement.  
The IAEA September resolution adjured Iran to immediately accept the additional 
protocol, suspend all enrichment related nuclear activities and the full declaration of 
imported nuclear material in the past. According to the resolution, Iran had to complete 
the report within 50 days, in which the deadline was 31 October 2003, and guarantee 
unlimited access, inspection to and sampling for the IAEA. 
 
As explains in the figure < Figure 4-6>, the adoption of the IAEA resolution on 13 
September 2003 could be considered a partial success of the US coercive diplomacy. 
The Bush administration successfully carried the momentum of victory in the Iraq war 
to intensify the ‘Sense of Urgency’, ‘Strength of Motivation’ and ‘Asymmetry of 
Motivation’ to coerce Iran. Moreover, it also gained ‘Adequate Domestic and 
International Support’ through the IAEA Board statement, which had led to the 
resolution.  However, the excessive US demand which was based on lack of clear 
evidence soon paid its price.  
 
<Figure 4-6> The Success of the US Coercion and IAEA resolution September 2003 
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 2) The Instant Bounce Back of Iran: the Tehran Agreement and IAEA Resolution of 
November 2003   
 
The IAEA resolution of September 2003 was highly intrusive and offensive to Iran who 
had been observed the previous IAEA Safeguards Agreement. On 19 September 2003, 
Khatami once again denied nuclear armament but also announced its continuous 
development of the nuclear programme.340  
 
On the same day of Khatami’s statement, the voice of the hardliners in Tehran was also 
disclosed. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Guardian Council of Iran, stated that 
Iran should consider leaving the NPT after international pressures on its nuclear 
programme. On 21 September 2003, Jannati again urged Iran’s withdrawal from the 
NPT by stating, “What is wrong with considering this treaty on nuclear energy and 
pulling out of it? North Korea withdrew.” 341  
 
The unreasonable and unrealistic demands of the IAEA’s September resolution caused 
the formation of diverse opinion groups within Iran. According to Hossein Mousavian, 
they could be categorized into six groups, each seeking a different approach:  1) The 
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confrontational approach, 2) The nuclear rights approach, 3) The grand bargaining 
approach, 4) The eastern bloc approach, 5) The conciliatory approach, and 6) The 
pragmatic approach.342 However, regardless of the inclination whether it be reformist, 
pragmatist, hardliner, etc., the IAEA September resolution itself was a big challenge to 
Iran’s dignity.  Ironically, the US coercion created the strong domestic support to bolster 
the Iran counter coercive diplomacy.  
 
At a glance, it seemed the IAEA September resolution was a success of the US coercive 
diplomacy. However, as Thomas Schelling defined one of the conditions for successful 
coercion as being, “The coercer has to guarantee that the current surrender will not lead 
to more requests to the opponent”, the character of the resolution degraded and limited 
the US coercive diplomacy in a long term.  
 
In Iran’s domestic politics, the policy option of the reformist who could strengthen 
diplomatic relations with the US shrank as public opposition grew against the US and 
the international community. A large scale demonstration took place, chanting for the 
withdrawal of the NPT against the accusation on Iran which was based on the IAEA 
additional protocol that Iran had yet to sign. The ‘strength of motivation’ of Iran’s 
counter coercive diplomacy was enhanced accordingly.  
 
The weakly justified US coercion also degraded the international support and 
consolidation of not only Russia and China, but also with the regional allies of the US. 
On 30 September 2003, Egypt and Saudi Arabia criticized the IAEA of being pro-Israel 
in their dealings with Iran by singling them out and therefore causing a serious threat to 
the stability of the entire region. Then Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-
Faisal, claimed at a UN General Assembly, “What surprises us is that at a time when the 
IAEA is intensifying its efforts and monitoring NPT member countries, we see that it 
continues to ignore the rejection of Israel in not joining the treaty.” 343  
 
The Khatami administration’s counter strategy against the US and the IAEA resolution 
was to secure Iran’s nuclear rights, stop Iran’s nuclear programme from being referred to 
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the UNSC, defame anti-Iran US accusation to degrade the international consolidation on 
Iran nuclear programme and lastly, to engage with the international community for the 
support on Iran.  On 6 October 2003, Kamal Kharrazi stated, “We will not allow anyone to 
deprive us of our right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and in particular our 
right to enrich fuel for our power stations.” However, he confirmed Iran’s commitment to 
the NPT and reassured that they would cooperate with IAEA inspection. 344 
 
On 16 October 2003, the director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, visited Iran to avert 
an escalation of the crisis over the IAEA resolution’s October deadline. The meeting 
between Rouhani and ElBaradei took place at the Sa’dabad palace on October 17, 2003. 
During the meeting, Iran and IAEA clarified the ‘suspension of Iranian nuclear activities’ 
as ceasing the introduction of gas into the nuclear centrifuge.345 As Mossavian argued, the 
suspension could be seen as a much more moderated interpretation of the September 
resolution. Since the gas introduction to the centrifuge was not a serious impairment to 
Iran’s nuclear programme, it opened up the possibility for an Iran nuclear agreement.  
 
On 18 October 2003, Iran began negotiations with Mohamed ElBaradei over the signing 
of an additional protocol, which would allow inspectors open access to all of Iran’s 
suspected nuclear facilities.346 On 19 October 2003, soon after negotiations with the 
IAEA, the foreign ministers of EU3 – the United Kingdom, France and Germany - flew 
to Iran to discuss the implementation of the IAEA September resolution. On 21 October 
2003, Iran conceded to the demands of the IAEA after talks with EU3 and confirmed the 
signing of the Additional Protocol, which would approve of open and unannounced 
IAEA inspections, as per the ‘Tehran agreement.’ Iran also agreed to suspend all 
“uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities,” which was the suspension of gas 
introduction to the nuclear centrifuge. 347  
 
The Teheran agreement was the success of Iran counter coercive diplomacy. By 
appropriately observing the NPT and IAEA inspection, Iran secured its enrichment 
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programme and justification of its counter coercive diplomacy against the US. 
Moreover, it prevented the Iran nuclear dossier to be referred to UNSC and even 
consolidated the international support for Iran nuclear programme.   
 
On 12 November 2003, the IAEA released the report that no evidence of a covert 
nuclear weapon programme had been found in Iran. However, it expressed concerns 
regarding its production of plutonium, which was often associated with bomb-making. 
Although the IAEA did not define its discoveries as Iran’s violation of the NPT, there 
was a discrepancy between the result of the IAEA inspection and the previous denial of 
Iran.348 A trace of enriched uranium was found at the pilot enrichment facility, Kalaye 
Electric Company, and at the Natanz nuclear facility. These facts could be used as 
unfavourable evidence against Iran. Indeed, on the day of the IAEA report release, US 
Undersecretary of State John Bolton evaluated the IAEA’s report on Iran as “impossible 
to believe” and argued the detection of enrichment trace underscored the US stance that 
“the massive and covert Iranian efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities make 
sense only as part of a nuclear weapons programme.” 349 However, on 13 November 
2003, former director of the IAEA Hans Blix questioned the U.S’ claim that Iran was 
engaged in developing nuclear weapons by saying there was no “direct evidence.” He 
also added that Iran’s civilian reactors were not a worry. 350  
 
As it was shown that the US secretary of the state Colin Powell had failed to persuade 
the 25 EU states, including its future members, to declare Iran’s nuclear programme as 
having violated the NPT,351 the results of the IAEA inspection were insufficient to be 
referred as an agenda at the UNSC. The undeclared enriched uranium, which was 
detected at the Kalaye electric company, was confirmed to be a small amount of 1.2 
percent enriched uranium-235. Moreover, the 35 percent uranium enrichment trace that 
was found at the Natanz nuclear facility was due to the contaminated nuclear 
components from Ukraine. The IAEA’s November 2003 report stated it found “no 
evidence” from the previous undeclared nuclear activities of Iran that could relate it to a 
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nuclear weapons programme. 
 
The IAEA November resolution, which was adopted on 26 November 2003, was far 
different from the IAEA September resolution. The US who had intended to refer Iran’s 
nuclear programme at the UNSC by accusing Iran’s noncompliance with the NPT regime, 
was weakened. At the 2004 November IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the member 
states acknowledged Iran’s voluntary suspension on its nuclear enrichment programme 
and the phrase that stipulated Iran’s non-compliance of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement 
was lifted in its statement.  The contention is briefly explained in <Figure 4-7>. 
 
Although the November resolution adopted Paragraph 8’s so-called ‘triggering 
mechanism,’ which could directly refer Iran’s nuclear programme at the UNSC in case 
of Iran’s violation, it could be considered as a failure or a setback of the US coercive 
diplomacy, which aimed to utilize the IAEA resolution to build up measures to 
dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme. Again, the objective of US coercive diplomacy 
which surpasses the NPT –no enrichment- could not derive the dismantlement of Iran 
nuclear programme or the decrement of its capability.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 4-7> The Success of Iran’s Counter Coercion and the IAEA November 
Resolution 2003 
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3) The Continued Contention and the Paris Agreement of November 2004 
 
On 18 December 2003, Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s representative to the IAEA, signed the 
93+2 Additional Protocol over Iran’s nuclear programme. As the US Secretary of State, 
Colin Powell, disclosed the possibility of direct talks with Iran on 30 December 2003, it 
seemed issues of Iran nuclear programme would reach an agreement. However, when 
new technical problems and disclosures occurred during Iran’s implementation of the 
IAEA resolution, contention continued between the US and Iran.    
 
In a comprehensive document submitted to the IAEA on 23 October 2003, Iran only admitted 
its possession of a P-1 nuclear centrifuge. However, after Muammar Gaddafi announced his 
commitment to disclose and dismantle all WMD programs in Libya on 19 December 2003, 
the US acquired information that Iran had the blue print for a P-2 type nuclear centrifuge.  The 
P-2 centrifuge relied on stronger maraging-steel rotors, which would improve speed, hence 
yielding a higher Separating Work Unit. The speed of the P-2 centrifuge could reach 90,000 
RPM, which was about 50 percent higher than that of P-1 design centrifuge. 
  
On 28 January 2004, Iran admitted to the purchase of the P-2 centrifuge design in 1995 from 
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the A.Q khan network. Since Iran’s omission of purchasing the P-2 centrifuge blueprint and its 
research in the October’s declaration was perceived as a deliberate concealment by the EU3, it 
created an unfavourable environment for Iran. For EU3, the revelation of the P-2 centrifuge, 
which was not mentioned in the October declaration, could be considered as ample evidence 
of Iran’s ill intentions. However, in legal terms, Iran’s purchase of the P-2 centrifuge design 
was also difficult to be dealt with as a violation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.  
 
As it was stated in the IAEA Board of Governors resolution on February 2004, when Iran’s 
October report was submitted to the IAEA, Iran had not yet signed the IAEA Additional 
Protocol and the objectives of the October report was to clarify Iran’s past observance on its 
previous IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Thus, although Iran’s concealment on the purchase of 
the P-2 centrifuge was a clear breach under the IAEA Additional Protocol, technically it was not 
a violation of the NPT regime for Iran who did not yet signed or ratified the additional protocol.   
 
If the US continuously accuse Iran’s past nuclear activities, which it was not bound to observe 
under previous IAEA Safeguards Agreements, as a reason for referring to the UNSC or more 
severe coercion, it directly contradicted Thomas Schelling’s condition on the success of 
coercive diplomacy where he stated, “The coercer has to guarantee that the current surrender 
will not lead to more requests to the opponent.” However, despite the continuous execution of 
coercive diplomacy, US ignored this basic logic of compellence.  
 
On January 2004, when Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, led by Hassan Rouhani, visited 
Vienna to discuss the further implementation of Iran’s Additional Protocol, another 
problem that had not been reported in the Iran’s October declaration was raised: the 
detection of polonium. 352 Since polonium is a highly radioactive neutron that could be 
applied to implosion-type designed nuclear weapons as the initiator for the explosion, it 
strengthened US claims on Iran’s nuclear armament. However, again, the agreed 
Safeguards Agreement that Iran signed in 1974 did not indicate the need for polonium 
and bismuth radiation to be reported to the IAEA. Moreover, the Tehran Research 
Reactor, where the radiation was detected, had been under the supervision of the IAEA 
for the past thirty years.  
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Despite the plausible reason for Iran to challenge the accusation, new detections of 
Iranian nuclear activities which were inconsistent with its October 2003 declaration was 
not beneficial to Iran. The ‘concept of suspension’ of Iran’s nuclear programme had 
intensified to cease production and assembly of centrifuges, which included the 
construction of nuclear facilities. 353  The US obstinately cornered Iran to dismantle its 
nuclear programme. However, even George Tenet, the director of CIA admitted, the US 
had no “concrete proof,” or any “actionable information” on Iran’s nuclear weapon 
programme. 354 
 
US coercion without hard evidence could only cause severe damage on its legitimacy of 
coercion. The degraded justification of the coercive diplomacy had a negative impact on 
‘Adequate Domestic and International Support,’ which inversely reduced the 
incompliant cost of Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy.  Indeed, the lack of evidence later 
weighed in Iran’s favour to reach the Paris Agreement.  
 
However, whether the request was reasonable or not, in the face of strong US allegation 
on Iran’s nuclear weapon programme, Iran needed to find a technical solution to assure 
IAEA and the members of the IAEA Board of Governors that there was no nuclear 
weapon programme to neutralize the US coercive diplomacy. 355   Therefore, Iran 
decided to accept an extended suspension on its nuclear programme and IAEA 
inspection, which would grant technical and legal justification to the Iran nuclear 
programme.   
 
On 23 February 2004, in order to avoid the collapse of the negotiation, EU3 and Iranian 
officials met in Brussels and signed an agreement. Through the Brussels Agreement, Iran 
approved the intensified definition of suspension on its nuclear programme and agreed to 
cease the manufacturing of parts and assembly of centrifuges. In return, EU3 promised to 
support normalizing the Iran-IAEA nuclear cooperation for peaceful atomic use and close 
the Iran nuclear dossier at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in June 2004.     
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The US immediately opposed the Brussels Agreement. The US argued if the Iranian 
nuclear case was closed at the scheduled IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 
2004, Iran would give up the ‘voluntary suspension’ and obtain nuclear armament.  As 
Ken Brill, US ambassador to the IAEA stated on 26 February 2004, “Iran’s nuclear 
programme clearly geared to the development of nuclear weapons”, The US pressured 
the IAEA to refer Iran to the UN Security Council through the Paragraph 8 at the 
coming March 2004 IAEA Board of Governors meeting.356 However, again it was hasty 
coercion of the US which lacks in justification and consolidation of support from the 
international community.  
 
The suspension of Iran nuclear enrichment facility and ratification of 93+ 2 additional 
protocol could effectively curb the Iran nuclear programme. Since Iran has to report any 
nuclear development to IAEA as soon as it plans to do so, the Brussels Agreement could 
bring effective control on Iran nuclear development. However, due to the excessive 
objective of the US coercive diplomacy on prompt CVID of Iran nuclear programme, 
the US had lost the opportunity.  
 
On 13 March 2004, after five days of discussion, the IAEA Board of Governors issued a 
resolution that denied the Brussels Agreement of closing Iran’s nuclear dossier at the 
June 2004 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. All the Brussels Agreement was deferred 
to the result of the IAEA inspection and the issue of polonium, P-2 centrifuge, and trace 
of HEU, which had already been dealt with in Brussels Agreement. Moreover, all the 
issues were to be reopened in the following IAEA meetings.357  
 
Since the US was against the Brussels Agreement, the deferment could be considered as 
a success of the US coercion. However, it clearly contradicts conditions which favour 
the success the coercive diplomacy. If the coercee recognizes the crisis or the 
circumstance of conflict as zero-sum, coercee is highly likely to counter react. 
  
Although the head of AEOI Gholamreza Aghazadeh announced its suspension of all 
nuclear enrichment activities and construction, he also stated Iran’s plan to set up a 
                                                                
356 “US Again Accuses Iran of Hiding Nuclear Programme,” Middle East Online, February 26, 2004 
357  IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
GOV/2004/21, IAEA, 2004. 
162 
  
uranium conversion plant near Isfahan to send a clear message that the peaceful use of 
nuclear programme would not be abandoned. 358  It was to build the ‘strength of 
motivation’ of Iran counter coercive diplomacy that securing the full-fledge nuclear 
programme is its objective.   
 
On 18 June 2004, after four days of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, a resolution 
to settle Iran’s nuclear dossier at the following IAEA meeting in Brussels was released. 
However, the resolution was far from the Brussels Agreement of February 2004. 
Although it appreciated Iran’s efforts to observe the declaration under Articles 2 and 3 of 
its Additional Protocol, it also requested Iran to extend nuclear suspension and continue 
implementing the Additional Protocol for the reassurance of the international 
community to close Iran’s nuclear dossier.359  
 
In the framework of coercive diplomacy, the coercer has to guarantee that the current 
surrender will not lead to more requests to the opponent.  However, the IAEA resolution 
was inconsistent with the Brussels Agreement which guaranteed the lifted of Iran 
nuclear programme from the IAEA agenda for the compliance of Iran on suspending its 
nuclear enrichment programme. 
 
The IAEA Resolution of June 2004, which denied the closure of Iran’s nuclear dossier, 
initiated a crisis. Iran’s domestic situation was heightened by condemning Khatami’s 
conciliatory policy. His opposition group started to call for the withdrawal of the NPT 
and IAEA Safeguards Agreement. In order to secure the ‘strength of motivation’ and its 
inducement of counter coercive diplomacy,  Khatami sent a letter to the IAEA and EU3 
about its plan to resume reassembling the centrifuge within a week after the IAEA June 
2004 resolution. Iran also decided to convert 37 tonnes of yellowcake to uranium 
hexafluoride gas to counter coerce the US and the IAEA member states. 
 
The US immediately denounced Iran’s re-initiation of the centrifuge plan. Many high 
officials in the Bush administration such as Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld 
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disclosed the possibility of a military strike on Iran by stating that they were, “testing all 
possible ways.” However, the US could not risk Iranian retaliation on a fragile Iraq.360 
The coercive diplomacy is effective when they could establish the absolute escalation 
dominance and demand a justifiable request to the coercee with both coercive and 
compensative inducements. However, the US failed to meet the criteria.  
 
Without any means to induce Iran to the compliance, the US could not stop the re-
initiation of Iran nuclear programme. Iran gradually turns the screw to increase the 
tension by announcing its plan to produce 40 tons uranium hexafluoride. On 15 October 
2004, Senior G8 representatives met in Washington to discuss Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Through the G8 meeting, the EU3 agreed on a comprehensive plan, the so-
called “way out,” to offer to Iran: The total suspension of Iran’s enrichment and 
reprocessing activities for a clear verification of the IAEA inspection → Replace heavy 
water reactors to light water reactors → The provision of ‘objective guarantees’ that Iran 
would not divert materials that could be used as a nuclear weapon. In return, EU3 would 
recognize Iran’s right of peaceful use of atomic energy → do not support the referral of 
Iran’s nuclear case to UNSC and initiate negotiations to normalize relations with Iran.  
 
However, Iran rejected EU3’s ‘way out’ offer as it did not specify Iran’s suspension 
period and the provision of ‘objective guarantees’ could be misused to stop Iran’s 
nuclear programme. Rather to comply with the coercion and demands of the US and the 
international community, Iran decided to counter coerce them through implementing its 
Uranium enrichment which is permissible under IAEA and NPT regime.361  
The US allegation of Iran’s nuclear violation and its change definition of ‘nuclear 
suspension’ gave more room for Iran to implement its counter coercive diplomacy. Thus, 
Iran successfully widened the gap between the US and the EU3 who had different views 
on Iran enrichment programme.   
 
On 5 November 2004, after a yearlong shaky relation and the blink of negotiation 
collapse, the EU3 and Iran gathered in Paris to ease tensions before the November 2004 
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IAEA Board of Governors meeting. 362   As the result, as <Figure 4-8> shows, the 
contention that had sparked after the revelation of P-2 centrifuge was lead to Paris 
agreement which was more favourable to Iran.  
 
<Figure 4-8> The Success of Iran’s Counter Coercion and the Paris Agreement 
 
 
 
 
4) The Stalemate of the Paris Agreement and the End of the First Term of the Bush 
Administration 
 
The Paris Agreement was quite a success for Iran. Firstly, it was an agreement that 
displayed the possible support of the international community on Iran’s nuclear 
enrichment programme. Second, the agreement acknowledged the suspension of Iran’s 
nuclear programme as a ‘voluntary and temporary confidence-building measure’. Lastly, 
as stated in the Paris Agreement, ‘The E3/EU recognizes Iran’s rights under the NPT 
exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination,’ 
and judging Iran’s nuclear programme on the basis of past activities was opposed in the 
agreement. 363   
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After the Paris Agreement, Iran actively disclosed its aim of counter coercive diplomacy 
that Iran’s nuclear programme was not to be dealt with as an issue of the international 
community and the IAEA. Iran set its ‘objective guarantee’ as nuclear cooperation with 
the IAEA to settle its full-fledged nuclear programme, whereas the US continually 
claimed Iran to be a treacherous opponent with an ample amount of energy resources 
who did not need a nuclear enrichment and programme. On January 2005, Iran agreed to 
allow IAEA inspectors to visit the secret military site of Parchin, which had been denied 
until then. 364 However, although Iran displayed its compliance to the IAEA request, Iran 
clarified its will to secure its full-fledge nuclear programme. 365 
 
Moreover, Iran aimed to establish direct linkage with its nuclear programme and other 
agendas to strengthen the diplomatic ties with EU and international community to 
increase the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy.  On 17 January 2005, Iran 
presented a package deal of 33 articles to build a political and security relationship with 
EU3 at the meeting in Geneva. Through its package deal, Iran offered their full 
cooperation with the EU on combating terrorism, the elimination of WMD and the 
adoption of measures to prevent an unauthorized access to its nuclear capabilities and 
enrichment technology by any individual, group or state. In return, Iran requested the 
acceptance of a full-fledged nuclear programme, including uranium enrichment.  
 
However, the EU3 rejected Iran’s offer since they wanted no enrichment related 
activities of Iran as the ‘objective guarantee’ of non-diversion. By witnessing the gap 
between the EU and Iran, US Vice-President Dick Cheney noted that Iran was, “right at 
the top” of the Bush administration’s ‘trouble spot’ list and raised the possible pre-
emptive strike of Israel on Iran.366 However, as the situation in Iraq exacerbated, another 
US military intervention or military conflict seems distant from reality.367 Thus, the US 
coercion was not forbidding enough to make the Iran to believe the cost of incompliance 
will be large or reliable. Moreover, the aberrant US coercive diplomacy of pure coercion 
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which lacked justification, compensative inducement and dialogue was losing its 
momentum on Iran nuclear programme.  
 
Iran shrewdly seized the opportunity to execute its counter coercive diplomacy to 
increase its diplomatic measure against US coercion. While implementing the agreed 
accord of the Paris Agreement, 368 Iran reached out to consolidate support from the 
international community. On 1 February 2005, director of AEOI Aghazadeh met the 
foreign ministers of Portugal and Belgium and flew to Japan on 9 February 2005 to 
discuss Iran’s nuclear programme with the Prime Minister of Japan, Junichirō Koizumi. 
On 13 February 2005, Hassan Rouhani, then chief nuclear negotiator, embarked on a 
diplomatic tour to Algeria, Tunis, Russia, Germany and France to request their 
cooperation on Iran’s nuclear issue.  
 
Since Iran successfully strengthen its counter coercive diplomacy under the NPT regime and 
initiate its nuclear enrichment programme, the US can no longer ignore Iran. As the 
complaints increased from EU3 that non-participation of the US was preventing the resolution 
of Iran’s nuclear programme, the Bush administration had to abandon its Iran nuclear policy 
and form the P5+1 to sit with Iran to negotiate the Iran nuclear programme.  
 
During the first term of presidency, the Bush administration set the CVID of Iran’s 
nuclear programme as a precondition to coerce Iran without a diologue.  However, as 
Iran counter coerced the US by observing the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, expand its 
diplomatic relation and increase its missile capability, the Bush administration did not 
have many options except the sustaining its economic sanctions and escalation 
dominance to pressure Iran.  
 
The ‘pure coercion’ of the Bush administration was based on an overly optimistic view 
of US power that directly challenged the theory of coercive diplomacy, which was to 
maximize the complaints of the adversary with the ‘stick and carrot.’ Indeed, due to the 
US coercive diplomacy, Iran fell behind with its schedule for the nuclear development. 
However, Iran’s nuclear capability was secured and progressed through its counter 
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coercive diplomacy by building the justification of its nuclear development and signing 
the international agreements on its nuclear programme.  
 
The perception of ‘Iran’s nuclear suspension’ also shifted favourably to Iran from legally 
binding obligation to a ‘voluntary and confident building measure of Iran’ for further 
nuclear development. Moreover, as it succeeded the advancement of missile technology, 
Iran achieved a substantial level of nuclear deterrence. The Shahab 3 missile, which was 
successfully developed during the Clinton administration, became much more accurate 
and stabilized after several test fires during the first term of the Bush administration. The 
maximum effective range of Shahab 3 increased from 1,300km to 2,000km. 369 
Moreover, on May 2005, Iran achieved a technological breakthrough of developing 
ICBM by launching two staged rockets with solid fuel missile motors. 370 
 
Although the US slowed down Iran’s nuclear programme and succeeded in the 
suspension of Iran’s enrichment programme, the increased level of Iran’s nuclear 
deterrence and nuclear capability was a clear failure of the US coercive diplomacy. 
Moreover, the weakly justified unilateral coercive diplomacy led the advent of a more 
hard-line right wing regime in Iran, the Ahmadinejad administration. In 2005, in the 
Iranian presidential election, the conservative Ahmadinejad was elected by obtaining 62 
percent of the total votes. As Condoleezza Rice later disclosed in an interview with the 
al-Arabiya a few months before the Iranian presidential election in 2005, she argued that 
a total shift of Iran’s policy is necessary for Bush administration, the Bush’s coercive 
diplomacy was more of a failure since it neither decreased Iran’s nuclear deterrence nor 
created an Iranian regime and international consolidation favourable to the US. 
 
 
4.4.3 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy between 
Bush and Ahmadinejad 
 
4.4.3.1 ‘Transformational Diplomacy’ of the Second Bush Administration  
 
On 2 September 2004, in a speech accepting the Republican Party’s presidential 
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nomination, George W. Bush told the US national television audience that his end term 
would focus on spread of democracy.  On 5 November 2004, in his first press 
conference after the victory of the presidential election, Bush stressed his re-election as 
a political ‘mandate’ of US citizens by stating, “I earned capital in this campaign, 
political capital, and now I intend to spend it”. Bush made it clear that his second term 
would continue its neoconservative’s approach to pursue US hegemony and military 
dominance. As explained in <Table 4-1> below, the dramatic shift of Bush’s policy 
stance after 9/11 continued through his second term.  
 
<Table 4-1 >The Shift of the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy after 9/11> 
Character Realism 
9/11 
 
Neoconservative 
International Order The US centric balance of Power Unipolar System 
Foreign Policy Maximization of National Interest excluding the Value 
Offensive Proliferation of the 
Value 
Method 
Balance of Power,     Military 
Superiority, Selective 
American Unilateralism 
Promotion of Democracy, 
Military Dominance, American 
Unilateralism 
Military 
Intervention 
Selective Intervention with 
Deterrence 
Offensive, Value driven 
Intervention (Humanitarian, 
Democratization, etc.) 
 
 
However, the international and domestic political environment of Bush’s second term 
changed greatly from his first one. In a public opinion poll after 9/11, 73 percent of US 
citizens agreed that the US should execute affirmative intervention in international 
affairs, and there was public consensus on ‘US internationalism’ in dealing with its 
national security and counter terrorism. However, as the situation in Iraq was 
exacerbated, the support on Bush’s neoconservative approach shrank not only with the 
Democratic Party supporters but also within the Republican Party. As Henry R. Nau 
argued, the conservative scholar group disclosed its concern that if the factional rift 
continued among the neocons, realists and nationalists of the conservatives, it would 
cause a surrender of power to the Democratic Party.371 
 
From an international relation perspective, the Bush administration had difficulty sustaining 
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its unilateral policy as it did during Bush’s first term. The ally nations’ domestic general 
opinions had increased to demand the withdrawal of their military forces from Iraq and anti-
Americanism rapidly grew within the Middle East after the two wars in the region. 
Moreover, since the regional unrest of the Middle East contradicted EU’s national interest, 
as witnessed by the fact that EU3 had preceded its own negotiation with Iran during the first 
term, the Bush administration had to simultaneously execute its policy by coercing Iran and 
persuading not only China and Russia, but also the EU.  However, despite difficulties, the 
Bush administration released policy reviews; 2006 QDR, 2006 NSS that the second term of 
his presidency would continue its coercive diplomacy on ‘rogue states’ through the 
‘Transformational Diplomacy’.372  
 
Although the second term of the Bush administration displayed its ‘Strength of 
Motivation’ on Iran’s nuclear programme with its policy reviews, as long as Iran 
observed the regulations of the NPT regime and claimed its rights to the peaceful use of 
atomic energy, the measures that the US could utilize was insufficient to coerce nuclear 
dismantlement of Iran. Thus, the Bush administration claimed that article IV of the NPT 
would only be guaranteed to the states that fully complied with the IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement, including the Additional Protocol and NPT regulation to pressure Iran. 
Since Iran has not been fully inspected by the IAEA for the 93+2 Additional Protocol, 
the US claimed to refer the Iran nuclear dossier to the UNSC to obtain a platform to 
strengthen its coercive diplomacy. Moreover, as the Bush administration evaluated the 
failure of Iran’s nuclear dismantlement was due to failed ‘consolidation of International 
support’, the Bush administration implemented the multilateral framework of P5+1 to 
execute its coercive measure.    
 
4.4.3.2 The Advent of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Administration: Repercussions 
of a Weakly Justified Bush’s Coercive Diplomacy 
 
 
On 24 June 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the presidential candidate of the conservative 
Abdagran party was elected as the president of Iran by winning 61.69 percent of the 
total votes. Combining that to the victory of the conservative party in Iranian general 
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election securing 156 seats out of a total of 290 on 7 May 2004, it become clear that 
Iran’s policies, including nuclear negotiations, would shift to more hardliner than the 
Khatami administration. On the same day of Ahmadinejad’s election, the senior nuclear 
negotiator for the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Hossein Mousavian, 
announced that 95 percent of Iranians supported the government’s nuclear programme 
and Iran is determined to continue its nuclear development. 373   
 
Confident that the Iranian politics was dominated by conservatives, the Ahmadinejad 
administration reinitiated its nuclear enrichment by discarding the nuclear deal with 
EU3. During his presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad had had criticized Khatami’s 
nuclear diplomacy. He denounced the two years of Khatami’s nuclear negotiation (2003-
2005) as having exchanged ‘a pearl for a lollipop’. He believed Iran had achieved 
nothing by suspending the nuclear enrichment programme and by agreeing to sign the 
IAEA Additional Protocol. Moreover, he defined nuclear enrichment as Iran’s sovereign 
right, which should not be up for negotiation. 374  Ahmadinejad disclosed his willingness 
to take on US sanctions and persecution. 375 As the result, Iran’s nuclear negotiator 
Rouhani and his team were replaced by conservative right wing Ali Larijani and Iran 
nuclear negotiations underwent substantial changes.   
 
As Ray Takeyh and Hussein Mousavian argued, the beliefs of the ‘new right 
conservatives’ based on Iran’s unique geopolitical status in the Middle East and its 
inevitability of becoming a regional hegemon made the Ahmadinejad administration 
more audacious in its diplomatic decisions.376 Moreover, as the situation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan became exacerbated, the new Iranian regime evaluated that the US would 
have to negotiate with Iran, who could play a critical role in stabilizing the situation in 
both countries.  
 
1) The Collapse of Iran Nuclear Negotiation and the Re-Initiation UEP 
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As the unreasonable coercive diplomacy, which lacked justification, compensative 
inducement, and dialogue continued in Bush’s 2nd term, Iran reinitiate the nuclear 
conversion programme even under the rule of a reformist Khatami who himself suspend 
its nuclear enrichment programme.  
 
On 29 June 2005, Bush issued executive order 13382 to freeze all the US assets related 
with AEOI to prevent other countries from engaging in business with AEOI. 377 It was 
US counter measure on Paris agreement. As the Bush administration continued its 
coercive diplomacy of ‘pure coercion’, Iran decided to respond. On 18 July 2005, Iran’s 
chief nuclear negotiator Rouhani sent a proposal to EU3 for the commencement of 
operations at the Isfahan UCF at a low level capacity.378  On 1 August 2005, the Khatami 
administration sent a letter to the IAEA to inform them of the re-initiation of the nuclear 
conversion programme, which had been suspended for more than two years.  It meant the 
collapse of a diologue channel with the reformist group in Iran who has been struggled to 
negotiate its nuclear programme with reason.   
 
When Khatami declared the re-opening of the Isfahan conversion facility, the EU3 
immediately sent a letter to ElBaradei arguing Iran had seriously damaged the 2004 
November IAEA resolution and the Paris Agreement. However, Iran was adamant about 
their decision. Iran counter coerced EU3 for the compliance on agreeing to Iran’s 
uranium enrichment by stating it would suspend restarting the nuclear enrichment if the 
EU3 submitted draft proposals by 7 August 2005. 379  
 
On 5 August 2005, compelled by Iran, the EU3 presented a proposal that it would fully 
cooperate with the nuclear development for Iran’s indefinite suspension of the 
enrichment programme and abandon the Arak heavy water reactor. On the day EU3’s 
proposal was offered, the senior nuclear negotiator for Iran’s Supreme National Security 
Council, Hossein Mousavian, announced that Iran would reject the European Union’s 
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package of trade and technology incentives because it required Tehran to abandon all the 
nuclear fuel technology. 380 Again, Iran displayed its ‘strength of motivation’ on its 
objective of counter coercive diplomacy; the full-fledged nuclear programme.  
 
The Ahmadinejad administration, which inaugurated its term on 7 August 2005, also 
clarified its rejection of the EU3 proposal and decided to executed the ‘gradual turning 
of the screw’ to push the compliance of the US and the EU3 to approve Iran’s full-fledge 
nuclear programme. On 8 August 2005, Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of the AEOI, 
announced the Isfahan uranium conversion facility had resumed nuclear activities.381 
 
On 9 August 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors meeting was held to discuss Iran’s 
nuclear programme. However, like the US, the IAEA board members had no specific 
measures to stop Iran who had not clearly violated NPT regulation. Thus, the IAEA 
Board of Governors meeting decided to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme after the 
results of the IAEA comprehensive report on 3 September 2005.382 
 
On 10 September 2005, ElBaradei announced the IAEA inspection of Iran in 2004 
November and the re-initiation of Iran enrichment conversion facility in Isfahan at the IAEA 
Board of Governors meeting. The report stated that a trace of HEU, which brought 
suspicion on Iran’s nuclear programme, was cleared from accusations that it had been 
created outside of Iran. However, it drew concerns about the P-2 centrifuge programme and 
the trace of LEU contamination could not be determined at this time. 383 As the IAEA report 
pointed out several issues on the Iran nuclear programme, the US and France claimed the 
IAEA report was sufficient enough to take Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC.  
 
On 19 September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors meeting was held in Vienna. 
After a weeklong meeting, the resolution was ratified that Iran’s nuclear programme 
would be ‘notified to the UNSC’ if Iran failed to take corrective measures for its full 
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verification to the IAEA. 384 The resolution of the 2005 September IAEA Board of 
Governors meeting accused Iran of breaching the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which 
constituted a noncompliance in the context of the IAEA Article XII, Paragraph C. 385 
However, the IAEA resolution which stipulates possible application of Article XII, 
Paragraph C was immoderate since IAEA inspection did not find any new evidence to 
verify Iran’s noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement. The coercion base on weak 
evidence could not consolidate the multilateral coercion let alone inducing behavioural 
change of Iran. 
 
As ElBaradei later stated “The eventual referral…was primarily an attempt to induce the 
Security Council to stop Iran’s enrichment programme, using Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter”, 386 the resolution was based more on the will of the US coercive diplomacy to 
stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment not an actual finding of the IAEA inspection. It could be 
also referred to the statement of Adam Ereli, US State Department deputy spokesman on 
21 September 2005 during the IAEA Board of Governors meeting that the US would not 
withdraw its threat to refer Iran to the UNSC, with their claim that, “Our goal is to build 
the broadest possible consensus...it is a question of not if, but when.” 387 
 
The Bush administration attempted to use Iran’s declaration of reopening the uranium 
enrichment programme as leverage to push the IAEA for referring the Iranian nuclear 
dossier to the UNSC.  However, again the US accusation without any clear evidence of 
violation only created space for Iran’s counter coercion.  
 
Nevertheless the US succeeded in referring Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC, it 
appeared to be a difficult task to ratify the UNSC Resolution on Iran. On 22 September 
2005, during the IAEA Governor meeting, Chinese Ambassador Wu Hailong of the 
permanent mission to Vienna stated the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved through 
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the IAEA and continued dialogue. 388 On 15 October 2005, the Foreign Minister of 
Russia Sergei Lavrov stated that Iran has the right to enrich uranium and Moscow does 
not support sending the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme to the UN Security 
Council. 389 Moreover, the Western allies of the US, France and Germany expressed the 
possible nuclear cooperation with Iran.  
 
As a part of the counter coercive diplomacy, Iran took measures to consolidate 
international support by building justification of their nuclear programme. Iran complied 
with the IAEA demand and provided detail information on P1, P2 centrifuges. 390 On 3 
November 2005, Iran approved UN nuclear inspectors to access Parchin military 
complex which IAEA had suspected it to be a nuclear weapons development sites.391   
 
As Iran counter coerced the US coercive diplomacy, the situation progressed differently 
from the US’ aim of CVID on Iran nuclear programme. On 10 November 2005, Russia 
purportedly offered a compromise that would allow Iran to continue with their uranium 
conversion at the Isfahan facility. Unnamed officials added that the US and EU also 
proposed a deal in which enrichment would be performed in Russia and the conversion 
of uranium into uranium hexafluoride gas would be done in Iran. 392 Although US 
secretary of the state Condoleezza Rice denied US participation in the EU proposal by 
stating, “There is no US-European proposal to the Iranians,” 393 on 13 November 2005, 
the director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, expressed support for the EU proposal, 
calling on Iran to move its uranium enrichment programme to Russia. 394  
 
However, Iran firmly proclaimed its sovereign rights on uranium enrichment in its 
territory. Although the EU and Russian proposal approved the conversion process of 
uranium yellowcake into UF6 at the Isfahan facility, Iran rejected its offer since the 
proposal would permanently suspend Iran’s reprocess of nuclear fuel programme in 
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Natanz and increase Iranian nuclear dependence on Russia.  
 
On 18 November 2005, Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani confirmed the 
conversion process of uranium started at the Isfahan nuclear facility. 395 Once again, the 
Bush administration had to back down its stance on Iran. On 18 November 2005, 
without any coercive inducement to implement, the US approved the proposal that 
allowed Iranian enrichment programme through the joint venture between Iran and 
Russia. 396  
 
On 21 December 2005, Iran and EU3 met in Vienna to negotiate Iran’s nuclear 
programme for the first time after the breakdown of the talks on August 2005 with Iran’s 
initiation of the uranium conversion process.  During the negotiation Iran implement its 
counter coercion to pressure EU3 to acknowledge Full-fledge nuclear programme of 
Iran. On 3 January 2006, Deputy of AEOI Mohammad Saeedi disclosed that Iran had 
resumed nuclear fuel research. However, he clarified the resumption of nuclear fuel 
research did not mean the actual resumption of the enrichment process.397  
 
A day after Iran’s announcement, the US Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on 
two Iranian companies, Novin Energy Company and Mesbah Energy Company, for their 
support of the proliferation of WMD in connection to the AEOI. The decision was taken 
pursuant to Executive Order 13382. However, the economic sanction could not compel 
Iran to stop its enrichment process. On 10 January 2006, Iran broke open internationally 
monitored seals on at least three of its nuclear facilities, clearing the path for the 
resumption of nuclear fuel research under the supervision of the IAEA. Seals were 
removed at the Natanz enrichment facility and at two related storage and testing 
locations known as Pars Trash, near Isfahan, and Farayand Technique. It was a bold 
action of Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy since it had a high risk of Iran to be referred 
to the UNSC.  
 
Iran’s re-initiation of their nuclear conversion facility was not a violation of the NPT 
                                                                
395“Iran Confirms Processing New Batch of Uranium”, Reuters, Nov 18, 2005. 
396“Bush Backs Putin Initiative on Iran,” BBC, Nov 18, 2005. 
397“Iran announces further resumption of atomic work”, Reuters, Jan 3, 2006. 
176 
  
Safeguards Agreement. However, it was a clear denial of Iran on IAEA’s demands that 
to suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities for the nuclear 
negotiation. The US promptly utilized Iran’s re-opening of the Isfahan facility as the 
momentum to gather the consolidation of global powers and the UNSC on Iran’s nuclear 
programme. On 22 January 2006, representatives of China, Russia, the United States 
and EU3, which later formed P5+1, announced a statement requiring IAEA to report 
Iran’s nuclear dossier to UNSC on 31 January 2006.  The <Figure 4-9> displays how the 
contention leads to re-initiation of Iran UEP.  
 
<Figure 4-9> The Contention which leads to the re-initiation of Iran UEP  
 
 
 
Notwithstanding failure of its strategy and policy in 1st term, the Bush administration 
sustained the coercive diplomacy of pure coercion. Since the US clearly demanded the 
Iran’s behavioural change of suspending the nuclear programme, therefore not 
deterrence strategy, it not only failed to implement the efficient inducements but also 
degraded its coercive diplomacy by using weak evidences as the base of its coercion. As 
the US isolate it-self by not talking to Iran as the punishment, Iran achieved its objective 
of counter coercive diplomacy by preserving its nuclear capability and minimize the 
repercussion of international community on re-initiation of nuclear enrichment 
programme. 
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2) A Divided Parallel Negotiation and UNSC Resolution 1696 and 1737  
 
On 31 January 2006, the P5+1reached an agreement to report Iran’s nuclear dossier to 
the UNSC in a meeting in London. However, as China and Russia opposed using 
sanctions or threats of sanctions to solve Iran’s nuclear programme, they decided to 
‘report’ Iran’s nuclear case to the UNSC.398 
 
As agreed in the first P5+1 meeting, on 4 February 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors 
emergency meeting put Iran’s nuclear issue to a vote to decide whether to report Iran to 
the UN Security Council. The IAEA statement called on Iran “to heed the clear 
message” of the international community and urged Iran to suspend its uranium 
enrichment and processing activities, cooperate fully with the IAEA, and resume 
diplomatic negotiations. Iran was given until the following IAEA Board of Governors 
meeting on 6 March 2006 to come clean on its nuclear activities. 399 
 
However, with the situation of an international consolidation against Iran, the Ahmadinejad 
administration decided to increase its level of the ‘gradual turning of the screw’ of counter 
coercive diplomacy. On 13 February 2006, Iran began to inject UF6 gas into a limited 
number of centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear conversion facility. In order to raise the tension 
and display strength of motivation, Iran also announced possible seizure of additional 
protocol that was on voluntary temporal implementation since 2003.400 
 
The provocation of the Ahmadinejad administration was due to the discrepancy on the 
perception of the nuclear fuel cycle. Iran thought of its conversion process under IAEA 
supervision as a legitimate R&D activity which could run parallel to its nuclear 
suspension, whereas the US considered any activities related to enrichment as 
unacceptable. As ElBaradei state “It hardly seemed likely that the Security Council 
would take action against Iran given that most of Tehran’s ‘noncompliance’ had been 
corrected over the previous two years, and its small enrichment operation was after all 
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legal”,401  operating a small R&D enrichment cascade at the pilot plant Natanz was a 
‘calculated risk’ by Iran who wanted ground breaking start to secure its full-fledge 
nuclear programme.  
 
The coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration was simple. As Condoleezza Rice 
stated during her talk with ElBaradei, “Iran is not North Korea…Iran does not want to 
be isolated. It will buckle under pressure”, 402  the US wanted to coerce absolute 
surrender of Iran not even allowing one centrifuge. When Condoleezza Rice sabotaged 
the Iran-Russia proposal of controlled enrichment programme on 5 March 2006 after the 
meeting with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov,403 the US aim of CVID and no 
enrichment on Iran nuclear programme had revealed once again.  
 
On 29 March 2006, after 20 days of negotiation, the first UNSC Presidential Statement on Iran’s 
nuclear programme was released. The presidential statement noted with serious concern on Iran’s 
nuclear programme, including Iran’s decision to resume enrichment-related activities, research and 
development, and to suspend cooperation with the IAEA. Thus, it requested a report from the 
Director-General of the IAEA within 30 days on the process of Iranian compliance which will be 
requested by the IAEA Board of governor meeting. 404  
 
Although Iran’s nuclear dossier was dealt with in the UNSC for the first time, the 
Ahmadinejad administration decided not to comply with its request but to intensify its 
counter coercion by further turning the screw. Iran’s objective was clear from the 
beginning, approve of full-fledge nuclear programme which is guaranteed in NPT. On 
11 April 2006, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of the AEOI presented a 27 minute 
report on Iran’s nuclear programme that Iran had succeeded in enriching 3.5 percent 
uranium. He further added that the achievement was a big leap since it technically 
allowed the enrichment process at an industrial scale in Iran. He also disclosed Iran’s 
plan to build a 3,000 centrifuge complex by March 2007. 405  
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As the deadline of the UNSC on the IAEA’s Iran nuclear report approached, on 25 April 
2006, Ali Larijani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator further displayed ‘Sense of Urgency’ 
and ‘Strength of Motivation’ Iran counter coercive diplomacy on securing the Iran 
nuclear programme by adding, “If you take harsh measures, we will hide this 
programme. Then you cannot solve the nuclear issue.” 406 
 
On 2 May 2006, a P5+1 meeting was held in Paris to draft its resolution on Iran’s 
nuclear programme. The US once again displayed its firm stance of coercive diplomacy 
on Iran’s nuclear programme. Under Secretary of State Nicholas R. Burns stated, “the 
Security Council has no option but to proceed under Chapter 7” and argued if the UNSC 
failed to do so, the US would form a coalition of countries to impose independent 
sanctions on Iran. 407 However, since Iran played its counter coercive diplomacy with in 
the NPT, the US could not go any further in implementing coercive measures. As China 
and Russia argued, the UNSC initiative to punish Iran with lack of legitimacy would 
only escalate the crisis. Even an ally of the US, the German chancellor Angela Merkel, 
called on Bush to start direct talks with Iran.408   
 
Although the Bush administration wanted to consolidate multilateral coercion to create 
‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ over Iran’s ‘Strength of Motivation’ of protecting the full 
fledge nuclear programme to derive compliance of Iran’s nuclear dismantlement, the US 
had no efficient inducement to do so. Thus, On 15 May 2006, the EU and the US offered 
a proposal that support Iran to obtain the most advanced civilian nuclear technology if 
Iran completely suspended its uranium enrichment.409  
 
It was big policy change of the US who had been pertinacious with its pure coercion and 
prerequisite for the dismantlement of Iran enrichment programme for any further 
negotiation. However, since the package deal could execute more severe sanctions and 
coercion in case the engagement failed, it could be referred to as a ‘Hawk Engagement’ 
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of coercive diplomacy, which applied to North Korea.  
 
 
It was first coercive diplomacy of Bush administration which observed the theory of 
compellence with its logic. The EU3 had also disclosed sixteen punitive inducements for 
the noncompliance of Iran. However, since the proposal set the suspension of Iran’s 
enrichment programme as a precondition, it was not a change of the US’ zero 
enrichment.410 Shortly after the US’ approval of the package deal, President Bush made 
a ‘tacit ultimatum’ for the prompt response of Iran, by saying “We’ve given the Iranians 
a limited period of time you know, weeks, not months.”411  
 
On 2 June 2006, P5+1 agreed to provide incentives to induce Iran to abandon its 
uranium enrichment. The package deal was a two-track proposal with incentives and 
penalties based on Iran’s response. According to ElBaradei, it was a much more 
‘generous’ proposal compared to previous ones. However, although P5+1 offered the 
provision of nuclear technology, it repeated the request for the suspension of Iran’s 
enrichment as a prerequisite for negotiations. Iran was given about 40 days to confirm to 
the atomic offer before the G8 Summit in mid-July. 412 On 12 June 2006, Iran’s Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Assefi stated that Iran would take “as long as 
necessary” to reply to the P5+1 package deal and claimed they would confirm before 
August 22, 2006.  
 
Although the US maintained the precondition for further Iran nuclear negotiation, providing 
the reasonable inducement enhanced its coercive diplomacy which was not the case for bush 
administration’s pure coercion. As Bush administration executed its coercive diplomacy as 
the theory, multilateral coercion was consolidated.413 On 12 July 2006, P5+1 agreed to refer 
Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council to suspend all the enrichment activities of 
Iran. It was a quite a success of the US administration since Russia and China, who had 
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been reluctant to refer Iran’s case to the UNSC, supported the US’ demand.  
 
On 31 July 2006, the UNSC passed Resolution 1696, demanding Iran suspend its 
uranium enrichment activities by 31 August 2006. Under Article 41 of Chapter VII in 
the UN Charter, Iran had to face possible economic, politic sanctions, and even the 
military intervention. Despite the situation of Iran’s nuclear dossier been referred to the 
UNSC, and the possible imposing of a UN sanction, on 21 August 2006, Iran’s supreme 
leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made a televised announcement that turned down UNSC 
Resolution 1696.414 Moreover, Iran denied access to the IAEA inspectors to the main 
nuclear facility in Natanz. 415  
 
Although Iran decided to deny the UNSC resolution 1696, it was keen on its counter 
coercive diplomacy to create rift among P5+1. On 22 August 2006, Iran formally 
submitted a written response to the P5+1 proposal that Iran is comprehensively in 
content with the proposal and willing to make a diologue over the request. However, 
Iran questioned the ambiguities of P5+1’s offer on Iran’s enrichment programme and 
insisted on its continuous development. Since the suspension of Iran’s uranium 
enrichment was a key request of the P5+1 proposal, it was considered a rejection but 
surely, Iran had shaken the solidarity in P5+1 by showing possible negotiation on the 
P5+1 proposal.416   
 
On 31 August 2006, Mohamed ElBaradei released an IAEA report as requested by the 
UNSC Resolution 1696. Although the IAEA admitted Iran had provided access to Iran’s 
nuclear material and facility, the report appraised that Iran had ignored the UN Security 
Council resolution that demanded suspension of all enrichment related activities.417 
 
UNSC Resolution 1696 could be considered a success of the US coercive diplomacy 
since it had officially announced Iran’s nuclear programme as a security threat of the 
international community, built a platform for further coercion if Iran failed to comply 
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with the UNSC Resolution and coerced the implementation of the IAEA Additional 
Protocol, which Iran had yet to ratify. However, Resolution 1696 was like a house of 
cards since it excessively applied IAEA Article XII, Paragraph C to refer Iran’s nuclear 
dossier to the UNSC without clear evidence of the IAEA on Iran’s nuclear 
programme. 418 Thus, it had difficulty further consolidating the ‘international support’ on 
the implementation of coercive inducements to Iran.  
 
On 15 September 2006, French President Jacques Chirac stated referring Iran to the UN 
Security Council was not the best way to resolve the crisis. He argued the best way 
forward for Iran’s nuclear programme would be a negotiation without any preconditions, 
and suggested a dialogue between Iran and the P5+1. 419 On 20 September 2006, Jacques 
Chirac proposed a P5+1 dialogue with Iran to George W. Bush at the UN General 
Assembly in New York. Again with lack of any possible inducement against Iran, the 
president Bush agreed to put on hold a push for UNSC sanctions, giving EU3 more time 
to persuade Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and resume negotiations over its 
nuclear programme. 420  
 
On 6 October 2006, the P5+1 gathered in London to discuss the level of punitive actions 
over Iran’s nuclear programme. The US and United Kingdom favoured immediate 
punitive sanctions whereas Russia and China refused to implement coercive 
measures. 421  On 11 October 2006, P5+1 failed to reach a decision over Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Although the general agreement was that the Security Council must take 
some action against Iran, disagreement persisted over specific measures that should be 
part of the resolution. While the US insisted on a total ban on nuclear and missile 
technology sales, Russia and China favoured softer measures.   
 
Admittedly, the China and Russia who soft balances the US was a disadvantage in 
strategic environment of coercive diplomacy. However, although the excessive US 
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demand without ‘smoking gun’ evidence was the main contributor which created the rift 
of consolidation for multilateral coercion or at least utilized by the both countries as an 
excuse, the US was not willing to make the adjustment on its demand to create more 
strengthened coercion.   
 
According to ElBaradei, the sanction insisted by the US was ‘far too harsh’ and illogical; 
“travel bans on Iranian officials”, “freezing Iran’s foreign assets”, and “suspending or 
restricting the IAEA’s technical assistance”. It was more of a cornering Iran into 
accelerating its enrichment programme and to withdraw from the NPT rather than 
induce Iran to the compliance.  On 23 October 2006, this fear became a reality. When it 
appeared that the approval of P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear enrichment is zero to none, Iran 
launched a second cascade of 164 centrifuges at its pilot fuel enrichment plant.422 The 
contention model of <Figure 4-10> shows how it leads to the escalation of crisis and 
UNSC resolution 1737. 
 
<Figure 4-10> The Contention which Leads to the 1st UNSC 1737 Sanction 
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On 25 October 2006, as It appeared that a sanction insisted by the US would make the 
situation worse, EU3 circulated its own draft resolution which approved of, to a certain 
degree, Iran’s nuclear development. On 23 December 2006, in a unanimous vote, UNSC 
Resolution 1737 was ratified. However, the sanction was much more moderate 
compared to the US’ request of a total ban on Iran. The UN sanction ban on supplying 
Iran with nuclear-related technology and materials and a freezing of the assets of 
specific individuals and companies who had supported Iran’s enrichment programme.  
 
3) Squandered Opportunity by the US Coercive Diplomacy and the End of the Bush 
Administration   
 
UN Resolution 1737 requested the IAEA to submit a report verifying Iran’s ‘full and 
sustained’ suspension on uranium enrichment and the construction of a heavy water 
reactor in Arak within a 60 days’ time period. However, on 19 January 2007, Iranian 
government spokesman Gholam-Hossein Elham announced a nuclear enrichment plan 
that aimed to install 3,000 centrifuges at the Natanz conversion facility by the end of the 
Iranian year which was a direct denial of UNSC Resolution 1737. 423 
 
On 22 February 2007, the IAEA submitted Iran’s report to the UNSC. The report 
concluded that Iran had accelerated its uranium enrichment activities, continued 
construction of a heavy water reactor, transported nine tonnes of gaseous feedstock to 
the main facility in Natanz and planned the expansion of centrifuge installations to 3,000 
centrifuges. 
 
Based on the IAEA report, the UNSC unanimously ratified Resolution 1747. The 
Resolution enhanced key sanctions of Resolution 1737 with an extended amendment. It 
expanded the blacklist of individuals and companies to be banned due to its direct 
association and provision of support on Iran’s nuclear activities. It also expanded the list 
of items prohibited for export to or import from Iran. Once again, Resolution 1747 gave 
Iran an ultimatum of 60 days to suspend their nuclear programme.  
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However, despite the series of UNSC Resolutions, on 10 April 2007, Iran announced it 
had achieved uranium enrichment with 3,000 centrifuges.  The coercive diplomacy of 
Bush administration was creating the escalation of crisis not the escalation of pressure to 
induce Iran nuclear dismantlement. As ElBaradei later distressingly recalled in his 
memoir as “One year earlier the build-up of Iran’s enrichment programme could have 
been halted at thirty to forty centrifuges”, the ‘pure coercion’ of Bush’s coercive 
diplomacy rather increases Iran nuclear capability. 424  On 15 May 2007, ElBaradei 
announced Iran has accumulated ample knowledge of nuclear enrichment and possibly 
construct 8,000 centrifuges before year end.425  
 
On 24 May 2007, the IAEA submitted Iran report to the UNSC, which concluded that Iran 
had defied the implementation of Resolution 1747. However, the IAEA admitted Iran’s 
cooperation with the agency by providing required nuclear material accountancy reports in 
connection to the declared nuclear material and facilities.426  Although a weakly justified US 
coercive diplomacy succeeded in referring Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC, it again 
created weakly justified UNSC resolutions which excessively applied Article 41, Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter that turned out to be no avail to induce the dismantlement of Iran 
enrichment programme.  
 
In order to cut the escalation of crisis, ElBaradei requested US to make dialogue with Iran. 
Based on the evaluation that Iran could only achieve its nuclear weapon capability by 2010 at 
its maximum level, which is an impossible task for Iran, he asserted that there was ample 
amount of time to solve Iran’s nuclear programme through dialogue and negotiations. He 
proposed a so-called ‘double suspension,’ in which Iran and UNSC simultaneously freeze its 
enrichment programme and resolution to initiate negotiation. 427 
 
With the situation being at a stalemate, there were five ways in which Iran’s nuclear 
issue could be settled: 1) Iran would voluntarily surrender its nuclear programme, 2) 
military intervention or an air strike to demolish Iran’s nuclear facility, 3) engage Iran 
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for the temporal suspension of the nuclear programme while building a more concrete 
measure of the IAEA to control and supervise Iran’s nuclear programme, 4) maintain the 
stalemate and increase coercive inducements to derive Iran’s nuclear dismantlement, and 
5) the US acknowledges Iran’s full-fledge nuclear programme. Since the possibilities of 
Iran’s surrender and the US’ approval of Iran’s nuclear programme were slim to none, 
there were three options for the P5+1. However, as Iran successfully increased its 
knowledge and capabilities of the nuclear programme and deterrence through the 
sanctions, the engagement to suspend Iran’s nuclear programme and negotiate for Iran’s 
nuclear settlement was the most rational method.  
 
However, the US policy stance of ‘pure coercion’ was sustained. On 15 May 2007, as 
Under Secretary of State for Policy, Nicholas R. Burns, revealed in an interview with the 
New York Times, the US maintained ‘no enrichment’ and its coercive diplomacy to 
implement more severe coercive measures to derive Iran’s compliance. 428 On 23 May 
2007, US Ambassador to IAEA, Greg Schulte pressured IAEA by stating, “Americans 
could treat the IAEA budget like that of the Universal Postal Union and reduces its 
mandate”. He also requested ElBaradei to stop circulating the proposal of reinitiating the 
Iranian nuclear negotiation which is dividing the international community and 
undermining the Security Council and the IAEA Board.429 
 
As the US coercive diplomacy suffered from lack of evidence, the strategic environment 
becomes more favourable to Iran. Thus,  Iran who had disclosed its willingness to 
consider freezing the enrichment activities at the R&D level before UNSC 1747, 
enhanced its counter coercive diplomacy of limiting enrich uranium beyond five percent.  
Through the three UNSC Resolutions, Iran successfully expanded its enrichment 
operations and nuclear capabilities rather than complying with the resolutions. While 
allowing IAEA inspections, Iran increased its nuclear capacities within the permissible 
levels of the IAEA and NPT regime. On 14 July 2007, Iran approved an IAEA 
inspection for the Arak nuclear facility and simultaneously announced its Arak research 
reactor would make isotopes for medical and other peaceful uses, replacing an older 
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1970s light water reactor in Tehran. 430  Iran’s declaration of creating isotopes for 
medical use meant the possible increase of its enrichment level to 20 percent. 
As the gap between the US and Iran showed no signs of narrowing, the IAEA and chief 
Iran nuclear negotiator Larijani attempted to focus on other issues to build cooperation 
upon a common interest. On 27 August 2007, Iran and the IAEA made a three month 
plan to conclude Iran’s nuclear issues that had been under IAEA investigation for four 
years. Iran agreed to resolve the suspicion on its past experiments of plutonium which 
include documents that was acquired from Abdul Qadeer Khan. 431 As ElBaradei later 
reiterated, it could be a comprehensive plan to derive a solution to Iran’s nuclear 
dossier.432 However, the Bush administration who had set its Iranian nuclear policy as 
intensifying the coercive diplomacy with the UNSC Resolution did not take any action 
towards the IAEA and Iran’s plan. Adversely, the US criticized the IAEA by arguing the 
plan only weakened the chance of prodding China and Russia into imposing further 
sanctions. 433  
Although the US displayed ‘strong motivation’ for its coercive diplomacy on Iran’s 
nuclear programme, since the IAEA had not found any undeclared facilities nor any 
weaponization activities in Iran, the US’ ‘pure coercion’ without a negotiation started to 
lose its international support. P5+1 could not make any progress since Russia and China 
denied their support on another set of Iranian sanctions. On 14 September 2007, as 
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated “We would advocate a peaceful resolution 
of the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation”, China urged the IAEA and Iran to 
initiate a new round of negotiations. 434 On 17 October 2007, in a speech at the meeting 
of the five Caspian littoral states, the president Vladimir Putin asserted its support on 
Iran’s nuclear programme. 435  
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However, Bush administration did not back down its policy stance. On 26 October 2007, 
the US announced a tougher sanction against three of Iran’s largest state-owned banks: 
Bank Melli, Bank Mellat and Bank Saderat. The sanction was designed to increase 
pressure on the Iranian government by cutting it off from financial institutions around 
the world. The sanction was also imposed on key branches of Iran’s military: the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and Quds force, nine Iranian companies, and five Iranian 
officials. 436  
Indeed, the Bush administration well-sustained its framework of coercive diplomacy. 
However, the continuous coercion without a clear violation of Iran’s nuclear programme 
created an unfavourable international strategic environment for the US. To make the 
situation worse, the US National Intelligence Estimate Report was released that Iran had 
halted its nuclear weapons programme since 2003 which directly contradicted the Bush 
accusation on Iran. 437  
Iran cleverly took the advantage of the situation. On 18 December 2007, Russia 
delivered the first of eight fuel shipments to the power plant in Bushehr and by January 
25, 2008, Iran received a sixth batch of nuclear fuel from Russia. On 9 February 2008, 
Iran’s Ambassador to Russia, Gholamreza Ansari, announced the construction of a 360-
megawatt plant is under way at Darkhovin. Moreover, as it was revealed by ElBaradei’s 
visit to Iran on January 2008, the state of art nuclear lab was on the operation with the 
numbers of prototypes P-2 centrifuge in the pilot enrichment facility at Natanz. 438 By 
countering the US coercion Iran made the advancement in its nuclear capability.  
 
On 22 February 2008, a new IAEA report was released after the January inspection 
which both the US and Iran claimed that the report reinforced their own argument. From 
Iran’s perspective, the accusations regarding the low-and high-enriched uranium traces 
detected at various locations in Iran had finally closed as Iran was able to successfully 
explain its polonium experiments, activities at the Gchine mine, and the procurement 
activities of Physics Research Centre. It was accepted by the IAEA as a valid 
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explanation. 439  Whereas, for the US, as the alleged weaponization studies was yet 
clarified, the US argued the IAEA report revealed Iran’s ill intention on nuclear 
armament. However, as ElBaradei stated the US allegation as “No one knew if any of 
this was real… the US said only that their source had gotten it from a third party and 
that there was reason to believe this person was now dead”440, US evidence against on 
Iran nuclear weapon programme was flimsy.441 
 
As the IAEA report again failed to discover Iran’s violation or to declare Iran’s 
fulfilment of the UNSC Resolution, it seemed the stalemate of P5+1 would continue. 
Thus, IAEA director ElBaradei and France proposed a double-suspension to initiate the 
nuclear negotiation. The plan was that Iran and UNSC simultaneously suspend its 
enrichment activities and sanctions. IAEA set three principles for the proposal: 1) 
acknowledge Iran’s nuclear rights including the enrichment and suspension of Iran 
enrichment as a temporary measure for an agreement, 2) full cooperation of Iran with 
IAEA verification for the establishment of nuclear transparency, and 3) commitment of 
the US and Iran for the full normalization of the military, economy and politics. 
However, as the US was sceptic of the word ‘normalization’ and Iran’s right to 
enrichment,   the proposal of double-suspension could not break the impasse.  
 
However, the Bush administration was adamant to keep ‘no enrichment’ and suspension 
of Iran’s nuclear programme as a precondition for negotiations. Rather than negotiate 
with Iran for the nuclear dismantlement, the US urged IAEA and ElBaradei to support 
UNSC resolution on Iran nuclear dismantlement. Awkwardly, it contradicted the US’ 
criticism on IAEA being ‘politics’. However, the IAEA could not make any statements 
that favoured the UNSC sanction since it could not find any evidence accusing Iran of 
violating the NPT.   
 
On 3 March 2008, two days before the IAEA Board of governor meeting to discuss 
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ElBaradei’s proposal on Iran, the Bush administration pressured the UN Security 
Council to ratify a third round of economic sanctions against Iran for its failure to 
suspend enrichment work per UNSC Resolution 1803. The sanctions banned dual-use 
goods from being traded with Iran. UNSC Resolution 1803 was similar to the sanction 
imposed on Iraq during the first Gulf war, which approved land, air and maritime 
inspection of shipments suspected of carrying any banned items.  
 
However, any severe coercive inducement that derived by weakly justified US coercive 
diplomacy could not consolidate the actual implementation of multilateral coercion. It 
neither could isolate the Iran nor create the image of possible military intervention or a 
war which are the important context valuables of coercive diplomacy theory.  Moreover, 
it failed to make Iran to believe the cost of incompliance will be large. 
 
On 9 April 2008, during a visit to Natanz, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced the 
plan of installing 6,000 IR-2, P-2 centrifuges and the uranium enrichment process of four 
percent U-235. 442 It was a clear counter coercive diplomacy to put pressure on the US and EU 
for their abandonment of ‘no enrichment’. 
 
Against the Iran provocation, the US could not execute its coercive diplomacy except 
imposing the new sanctions. On 11 June 2008, President Bush and EU leaders embraced 
new financial sanctions which targeted Iranian banks, unless Iran fully disclosed its 
covert nuclear weapons activities and allowed the IAEA for a full verification. 443 
However, Bush’s accusation was a bit tricky since the NIE report declared Iran’s nuclear 
weapon programme, if there had ever been one, had stopped since 2003. 444 
 
On 8 August 2008, the EU raised its trade sanctions against Iran. The new sanctions 
went slightly beyond the scope of the UN sanctions and were designed to deny public 
loans or export credits to companies trading with Iran. European governments also 
agreed to monitor banks dealing with Bank Saderat and would increase inspections of 
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ships and airplanes traveling to Iran. On 12 August 2008, the US Department of the 
Treasury designated five entities: the Nuclear Research Centre for Agriculture and 
Medicine, the Isfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, Jabber Ibn Hayan, 
Safety Equipment Procurement Company and Joza Industrial Company, for their 
attempts to Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
Unfortunately, the increased economic sanction which lacks its justification could not 
stop Iran from its nuclear development but a dead end. On 30 August 2008, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Ali Reza Sheikh Attar announced Iran’s nuclear enrichment of 4,000 
centrifuges and its plan to install an additional 3,000 at Natanz facility. 445  On 16 
September 2008, the IAEA had to announced the “dead end” since Iran who had been 
gradually reducing its cooperation with IAEA after UNSC Resolution 1803, finally 
stopped its cooperation of providing information on ‘possible military dimension’446;1) 
the conversion of uranium dioxide to UF4, or ‘green salt’, 2) development and testing of 
high voltage detonators, a possible nuclear explosive device,  3) design of a nose cone 
for Shahab 3 Missile, which could be used as the nuclear delivery system.  
 
On 28 September 2008, as the June P5+1 proposal failed to reach an agreement or to 
consolidate international support on the US coercive diplomacy, UNSC Resolution 1835 
was ratified without imposing a new sanction on Iran. As the <Figure 4-11> displays, 
the second term of the Bush administration ended in failure to dismantle Iran’s nuclear 
programme or decreased the nuclear capability of Iran.  
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<Figure 4-11> The Continued Contention and Escalation of the Crisis 
 
 
 
 
Despite his failure during his first term, the second Bush administration again set its 
objective of Iran’s nuclear policy as ‘no enrichment’ and implemented an aberrant 
coercive diplomacy without negotiation to subdue Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment 
programme as a precondition. Admittedly, after analysing it needs international 
consolidation for efficient coercion, the 2nd term of Bush administration established  the 
P5+1, to put multilateral coercion on Iran’s nuclear programme. However, without clear 
evidence of Iran’s violation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and securing its 
justification for the coercive diplomacy, the US failed to raise the level of coercive 
inducement to bring the behavioural change of Iran. Although the Bush administration 
displayed its strength of motivation and sense of urgency to succeed in referring Iran’s 
nuclear dossier to UNSC and ratified a series of UNSC Resolutions: 1696, 1737, 1747, 
1803 and 1835, it failed to derive a consensus to put a tougher sanction on Iran. The 
excessive strategy of pure coercion had no bargaining power to induce not only Iran but 
also other participants of P5+1 to support the US coercive diplomacy. 
 
Nevertheless ElBaradei claimed the approach of providing a ‘face saving’ measure for 
establishing more concrete IAEA supervision on Iran was a much more logical and 
rational method to prevent the increment of Iran’s nuclear capability. The Bush 
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administration sustained the coercive diplomacy without negotiation and dialogue. 
Moreover, the US went even further to threaten IAEA to support its implementation of 
severe measures and neglected the IAEA report while consolidating international sanctions 
on Iran.  
 
The US displayed ‘Strength of Motivation’ of the coercive diplomacy by pushing UNSC 
and IAEA to support its Iranian nuclear policy. However, the Bush administration was 
lacking in evidence and failed to consolidate the international support that had created a 
room for the Ahmadinejad administration to play its own counter coercive diplomacy. Iran 
strengthened its diplomatic ties with not only Russia and China but the EU countries to 
make them more engaged with Iran to increase the enforcement cost of the US coercion. 
Moreover, according to the situation that had built up, Iran willingly accepted an IAEA 
inspection and cooperated with the international community to reduce its incompliant costs, 
which would be imposed on Iran for the noncompliance of US’ coercive diplomacy. Iran 
also successfully utilized its provocation within the limit of the IAEA regulation to induce 
the participation of the international community on the Iran nuclear programme.   
 
Through its counter coercive diplomacy, Iran did not only keep its nuclear programme 
but also succeeded in increasing its nuclear capability. The Ahmadinejad administration 
had built a nuclear centrifuge up to 6,000 at Natanz facility which was only several 
hundred when the second term of the Bush administration was began in 2006.  
 
During its two terms of presidency, the Bush administration wanted to dismantle Iran’s 
nuclear programme through its coercive diplomacy. However, as the former US 
ambassador to UN  John Bolton claimed, the US was the ‘true loser’ of Iran’s nuclear 
negotiations, and although the Bush administration succeed in forming P5+1 and 
referred Iran’s nuclear dossier to UNSC, it failed to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme 
and managed only to exacerbate the case by allowing Iran’s increment of nuclear 
capability.  Although Bush administration was confidence on nuclear dismantlement of 
Iran through the victory of Afghan and Iraq War and the nuclear dismantlement of 
Libya, the US compellence strategy that was distant from the theory only create chances 
for Iran. Therefore, the US could not utilize its asymmetry of power to induce Iran to 
abandon its nuclear programme let alone containing Iran. 
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4.5 Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Obama Administration and   
      Counter Coercive Diplomacy of Iran 
 
4.5.1 Background 
 
 4.5.1.1 The Subprime Mortgage Economic Crisis and Obama’s ‘Smart Diplomacy’ 
 
In 2009, the first policy priority of the newly elected Obama administration was the 
management of the US economic crisis. The collapse of the subprime mortgage, which 
broke out in August 2007, hit the US economy hard and reached the point of ‘credit 
crunch’ across the global financial market. Thus, as 62 percent of the voters of the US 
presidential election answered, the economic issue was the most important political 
agenda in the CNN exit poll, the environment of the US’ domestic politics was focused 
on the economic issue.  
 
The Obama administration could not afford implementing more severe coercive 
inducements on Iran’s nuclear programme without the support of the international 
community. It was clearly revealed in Obama’s policy review on May 2010 in the 
National Security Strategy report. By stating it would ‘build its power at home and 
shape it abroad’, the US decided to firstly gain its strength and assets before projecting it 
into a global issue. The NSS admitted it was not possible for one country to prevent the 
global security threats of terrorism and its network, along with nuclear proliferation, 
cyber space attacks, climate change, etc. Thus, it argued for the need of ‘comprehensive 
engagement’ by the alliance and the international community.447 In order to get the 
cooperation of ‘comprehensive engagement’ to function, the US emphasized the ‘whole-
of-government approach’, which would utilize military, diplomacy, and development aid 
and humanitarian assistance, provision of security, international institutions and the 
alliance. In short, it was the US’ declaration of executing a ‘smart diplomacy’.   
 
During his presidential campaign, Obama denounced Bush’s ‘War in Iraq’ and argued 
the terrorists that had attacked the World Trade Centre in 2001 had no connections to 
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Iraq.  Thus, if he were elected president, he overtly claimed that he would withdraw two 
brigades a month to evacuate the US Forces in Iraq and complete redeployment within 
16 months by the summer of 2010. He asserted the evacuated US Forces would have to 
be placed in Afghanistan, the breeding ground of Al Qaida.  
 
Since change in the US’ foreign policy on Iraq and Afghanistan needed much Iranian 
support to achieve success, there was the hope of eased tension and dialogue over Iran’s 
nuclear programme. Although Obama insisted the tougher sanctions could be 
implemented on Iran and the US military superiority in Middle East would be sustained, 
as he stated, “The notion that somehow not talking to countries is punishment to 
them…is ridiculous”, Obama revealed his Iranian policy would be more of an 
aggressive, principled and direct high-level diplomacy. This change of US’ approach 
was based on Obama’s plan to put more emphasis on ‘soft power’, believing that the 
provision of opportunity, such as education, medical assistance, and various 
humanitarian aid, would benefit the national interest of US instead of solely 
implementing the ‘hard power’ as done by the Bush administration.  
 
Coupled with a fundamental change in US posture, Obama’s nuclear policy started to 
show its true colours. The US nonproliferation policy started to materialize, starting with 
the famous ‘Nuclear Free World’ in Prague on 5 April 2009. In the speech, the Obama 
administration divided its nuclear policy into three parts: non-proliferation, 
disarmament, and the peaceful use of atomic energy. 448 
 
Like as the US conventional nonproliferation strategy, Obama asserted the US would solve 
the nuclear issue based on the international institution and regime. Using more aggressive 
tactic than his predecessor, Obama declared he would double its allocation and support the 
establishment of the International Nuclear Fuel Bank in order to strengthen the IAEA and 
NPT regime to directly pressure Iran and North Korea on their nuclear programme. 
Moreover, Obama also declared the continuation of implementing Bush’s PSI, and bolster 
the system with the institutionalization of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, to counter proliferate the nuclear development of Iran and North Korea.   
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The ‘Nuclear Free World’ speech in Prague was later documented as an official policy 
with the release of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The 2010 NPR review dealt with 
five agendas as the aim of the US’ nuclear strategy. 449  The Obama administration 
focused its nuclear policy as nonproliferation through the cooperation with the 
international community for a ‘nuclear free world’, whereas the Bush administration 
declared war on terrorism and focused on counter-proliferation. While Bush put an 
emphasis on building more efficient US military power to demolish nuclear 
proliferation, terrorist groups and the ‘axis of evil’, the Obama administration put more 
weight on the dismantlement of the nuclear weapon programme than the expansion of 
war against the terrorist group and regime.  
 
However, it did not mean that the Obama administration had abandoned its coercive 
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme which had been imposed since Clinton 
administration. The ‘New Triad’ system of the Bush administration, which was 
mentioned in the 2002 NPR and later constructed to build absolute military superiority 
under any provocation, was sustained by the Obama administration. Moreover, the 
‘negative security assurance’ of Iran that the US could execute nuclear strikes against 
any type of Iranian aggression was valid through the first term of the Obama 
administration. That is, although the nuclear policy of Obama on Iran indeed meant the 
change of ‘pure coercion’ of the Bush administration, it was not the abandonment the 
framework of the US coercive diplomacy. It was more of the utilizing of the US’ ‘smart 
power’ on Iran. With its absolute military strength of ‘escalation dominance’, the Obama 
administration wanted to impose its soft power of the US to consolidate international 
support to derive the compliance of Iran on its nuclear dismantlement.   
 
 
4.5.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy between 
Obama and Ahmadinejad 
 
4.5.2.1 Obama’s ‘Try and See’ Coercive Diplomacy and Iranian Presidential 
Election 
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Although the Obama administration announced the change of its approach on Iran’s 
nuclear programme, Gregory Schulte, a supporter of Bush’s ‘pure coercion’, remained in 
place as US ambassador to the IAEA until June 2009. As ElBaradei stated in his memoir 
“I was eager to engage anew with Washington on Iran… There were no calls for a 
Washington briefing, no attempts to build on what the IAEA had learned” 450 , the 
rhetoric and the stance of Obama’s engagement on Iran seemed slightly different than 
what people had first had perceived it to be. As Obama had stated at the AIPAC on June 
2008, “Israel’s Security is sacrosanct. It is non–negotiable,” and ElBaradei’s memoir of 
the US’ concern over the possibility of Iran’s request on the dismantlement of Israel’s 
nuclear weapons programme in early 2009, the direct talks and dialogue by Obama 
already had set the limit. 
 
On 11 January 2009, at the ABC news programme This Week, president-elected Barack 
Obama stated, “Iran is going to be one of our biggest challenges,” and clearly displayed his 
concern that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology might trigger the arms race in the Middle 
East. 451 He also reiterated, “It is very important for us to make sure we are using all the tools 
of US power, including diplomacy, in our relationship with Iran”. The nuance of the rhetoric 
had changed so that other coercive inducements were still on the table. 
 
The Obama administration aimed to approve Iran’s nuclear programme as a real global 
security threat and dealing with it as an important international agenda would be the key 
to resolution. Thus, the declaration of Obama’s direct talks and dialogues on Iran could 
be perceived as a dual mean. That was, if talk of authenticity failed to draw a resolution, 
Iran could be accused of having no intention of cooperating, which then would be easy 
for the US to execute its coercive diplomacy by consolidating international support. The 
Obama administration wanted to secure the consensus of the international community at 
the US’ side and through its consolidation, wanted to implement the multilateral 
coercion of the IAEA, UNSC and P5+1 according to Iran’s response. Thus, the US took 
a step further and announced the participation of P5+1 negotiation with Iran as a “full 
participant,” which the Bush administration had refused to do unless Iran ceased its 
uranium enrichment programme.  
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The audacious approach by the Obama administration to initiate diplomatic talks with 
Iran was not based on blind optimism but the enhancing its ground work for the coercive 
diplomacy. It became clear when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revealed the plan at 
the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the US would impose a “crippling 
sanction” if diplomatic efforts failed 452  On 18 May 2009, after a summit with Israel 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Obama stated, “It is not in (Iran’s) 
interest to pursue a nuclear weapon and...they should change course,” and urged Iran to 
demonstrate a procedure to stop the nuclear programme by the end of 2009. He added, 
“We’re not going to have talks forever”.453 
 
Obama’s stance was the ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy with the persuasive 
inducement to observe the development of the situation. However, Iran was not 
insensible to the US stance. Thus, when Obama sent the Nowruz message to Iran on 
March 20, Supreme Leader Khamenei responded there would be no change in relations 
between the two countries unless the US brought an end to the US hostility policy to 
bring “real change.”454  
 
The persuasive inducements such as inviting Iran as the full member of P5+1 and 
displaying good gesture could not decrease ‘strength motivation’ of Iran’s counter 
coercive diplomacy on achieving full-fledge nuclear programme. Thus, Iran who had 
decreased the uranium enrichment production in response to Obama good gesture,455 
decided to gradually turn the screw to indicate its ‘strength motivation’ on its 
enrichment programme. 
 
On 9 April 20, on the following day of being offered to be a full participant to the P5+1, 
the head of AEOI Gholamreza Aghazadeh reported that Iran had increased its centrifuge 
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count to 7,000.456 Iran counter coerced the US to initiate the nuclear negotiation by 
displaying the Iran enrichment programme is about to cross the threshold. As later 
verified by IAEA report, Iran successfully increased its centrifuge of 7,200 centrifuges 
with 1,339 kg enriched uranium.457   
 
In early May of 2009, President Obama sent a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei to show his 
willingness for direct talks to engage with Iran nuclear programme. However, as there was 
Iranian presidential election in June, no other action was followed. As some experts argued, 
the US’ gestures towards the talks could work positively to pressure Iranian citizen to vote 
for a reformist candidate who was more favourable to the US. However, the Iranian nuclear 
issue was not that simple. Besides the argument that weather the decision of Iran nuclear 
programme could be changed by the presidential leadership, all the president candidates, 
including reformist Mir-Hossein Mousavi was adamant about pursuing Iran’s right for the 
nuclear programme due to the failure of Bush’s pure coercion.458 The Obama administration 
was not in a situation that could create a substantial change in Iran if there is no change in 
US coercive diplomacy that aimed ‘no enrichment’. 
   
4.5.2.2 The Success of US Coercive Diplomacy or Push for 20 Percent Uranium 
Enrichment of Iran? 
 
1) The Successful US coercion: Revelation of the Fordow Nuclear facility 
 
The result and the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian presidential election became a snag in 
Obama’s attempts for a dialogue with Iran. When the suspicion on fraud election initiated 
the ‘Green Movement’, the Obama administration decided not to push for nuclear 
dialogue or the subject matter that related with the election until the domestic 
disturbance of Iran was stabilized.459 Thus, the US sustained its ‘Try and See’ coercive 
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diplomacy until the Iranian proposal of the package deal was offered to P5+1 on September 
2009.  
 
Despite the domestic unrest and international criticism on Iran’s handling of the anti-
government protest, Ahmadinejad gradually formed his second administration. The director 
of the AEOI, Gholamreza Aghazadeh was replaced with the ambassador to the IAEA, Ali 
Akbar Salehi, who had a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. The appointment of Salehi who was considered a logical and soft spoken 
person was perceived by the West as a positive sign for nuclear negotiations. 460 However, as 
a competent nuclear scientist, Ali Akbar Salehi knew Iran nuclear enrichment programme is 
not a breach of NPT regime. On July 2009, Salehi stated “legal and technical discussions 
about Iran’s nuclear case have finished... and there is no room left to keep this case open,” 
and demanded US to cease hostility towards Iran for the resolution.461  
 
With its policy objective of no enrichment on Iran nuclear programme, the ‘Try and See’ 
coercive diplomacy of Obama which utilized the direct talk and diologue could not 
create ‘sense of urgency’ and ‘asymmetry of motivation’ of coercion to derive the 
behavioural change of Iran. In this environment, Obama could only implement the same 
inducements as his predecessor. On 2 August 2008, the secretary of the State Clinton 
warned the possible economic sanction on petroleum product if Iran does not pledge to 
join nuclear negotiation talks before the September UN general assembly. 462    
 
Iran refuted the September deadline but approved the IAEA inspection as its counter 
coercive diplomacy to decrease the possible multilateral coercion and its incompliant 
cost. On 24 August 2009, Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the heavy water reactor 
under construction at Arak to avoid isolation from the international community. 
Moreover, Iran displayed a gesture of goodwill to the international community by 
allowing the increased IAEA supervision on Natanz uranium enrichment facility. 463 
 
Despite the tone downed rhetoric and will to diologue, the 1st term of Obama 
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administration continued the policy of his predecessor. The ‘zero enrichment’ which had 
been degrading the US coercive diplomacy was also the red-line of Obama 
administration and continued to request Iran to provide alleged nuclear weapon 
programme to the IAEA which had been another obstacle for further negotiations. 464  
However, as IAEA revealed in the report, the unidentified information which were 
mainly provided by the US and the Israel to accuse Iran was ‘serious concerns’ but all 
the allegations were ‘baseless’ and that the data have been ‘fabricated’. 465 With the 
impaired justification, the US coercive diplomacy could not consolidate the international 
support to build the strong coercion to pressure Iran.    
 
As Iran’s cooperation seemed highly unlikely and the ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy 
of ‘no enrichment' started to crumble, the Obama administration change its coercive 
diplomacy to the ‘gradual turning the screw’. On 3 September 2009, the US held high-
level government officials meeting of the P5+1 and issued a joint statement calling on Iran 
to formally accept the nuclear talks within weeks for the fast opening of nuclear 
negotiation. As a response, on 9 September 2009, Iran submitted its amended package 
deal to P5+1 through the UN which was the amended package proposal of P5+1 in April 
2009.466 Since Iran successfully buys time through offering proposal, on 21 September 
2009, the US executed its coercive diplomacy by disclosing its intelligence information 
on the covert Iran nuclear facility in Fordow. The revelation of Fordow facility was to 
increase tension and consolidate the multilateral coercion on Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
As CIA director Leon Panetta stated in the interview with Time magazine, the US had 
already been aware of the Fordow facility since 2006. 467 That is, the US revealed matters 
regarding the Fordow facility just before the P5+1 nuclear meeting and opened a 
discussion of the issue at the 2009 September UN general assembly. This was a high 
level diplomacy to increase tension and consolidate multilateral coercion on Iranian 
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sanctions. Whether this appraisal was true or not, it worked positively for US coercive 
diplomacy. On 24 September 2009, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev agreed to 
impose sanctions against Iran. 468 
 
The construction of Fordow facility itself does not form a violation of NPT since Iran 
had not yet ratified the 97 additional protocols.469 Moreover, the construction of Fordow 
facility believed to be initiated in 2006 when the Iran’s voluntary temporal 
implementation of additional protocol was on and off due to the conflict between Iran 
and P5+1. Iran refuted that the Fordow facility was built as a backup facility in 2006 
when the possibility of a military strike by the US and Israel on Iran’s nuclear facility 
was heightened. 470  However, the existence of a covert nuclear facility was a big 
disadvantage for Iran not only in the following P5+1 nuclear negotiation but the 
justification of its counter coercive diplomacy.  
 
With the unfavourable strategic environment which was successfully created by the US, 
Iran had to accommodate most of the requests from P5+1. On 1 October 2009, Iran 
accepted the request to deliver 1200kg of 1600kg low enrichment uranium, which was a 
major portion of its enriched uranium reserves, to the third country in exchange for 
Tehran’s nuclear reactor fuel. Many Iranian nuclear experts, whether they are reformist, 
conservative, or pragmatist, opposed the deal since it would lose Iran’s bargaining 
power and leverage in future nuclear negotiations. However, Iran did not have other 
option. It was first success of Obama’s coercive diplomacy.  
 
If the asymmetry of motivation is created it is likely that the behavioural change of the 
agent could be induced. When the strength of motivation of the two conflicts, the 
asymmetry is created base on the interest. In Iranian nuclear programme case, the US 
and Iran both had a balanced motivations on the nuclear enrichment programme, the US 
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wanted no enrichment whereas the Iran wanted its full-fledge nuclear programme to be 
approved. However, when the covert Fordow facility revealed, the balance of ‘strength 
of motivation’ had changed. First, China and Russia who soft balances the US and 
supportive on Iran shifted its position to impose sanction on Iran. Second, the 
justification for US coercive diplomacy to use military inducement had increased. On 
the contrary, for Iran, the stockpiled enriched Uranium can be abandoned if Iran could 
keep its nuclear enrichment programme. Thus, Iran decided to forfeit the majority of low 
enriched Uranium for the fuel exchange. It was clear evidence on how the secured 
justification of coercive diplomacy and limiting its objective could bring the behavioural 
change of Iran. If the US decided to use the momentum to argue the total dismantlement 
of Iran enrichment programme which is vital interest of Iran, Iran’s behavioural change 
probably would have failed. It was soon proved during the nuclear fuel swap deal.  
 
2) The Nuclear Energy Swap Deal or Push for Iran’s 20 percent nuclear Enrichment ? 
 
From 19-21 October 2009, talks between P5+1 and Iran were held in Vienna to conclude 
the deal of supplying Iran with nuclear fuel in exchange for its LEU. IAEA Director 
General Mohammed ElBaradei circulated a draft agreement that reportedly envisaged 
the shipment of Iran’s low-enriched uranium to Russia for further enrichment and then 
to France to produce fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. This was schemed as a dual 
structure to magnify the IAEA’s control on the nuclear fuel provision for Iran. However, 
Iran was not happy with the draft agreement. Since the nuclear deal already included 
Iran’s loss of its bargaining power by giving out its massive amount of nuclear material 
outside their territory for the fuel exchange, the extra process to obtain the nuclear fuel 
through France made Iran feel as if they were giving up too much of their rights. 
According to the P5+1 and IAEA plan, the process could take up to a year or more for 
Iran to acquire nuclear fuel.  
 
As the situation progressed disadvantageously for its vital interest of protecting the full-
fledge nuclear programme, Iran tried to create rift for the break through.  On 29 October 
2009, Iran counter-proposed an alternative that the exchange of Iran LEU and France 
nuclear fuel would occur simultaneously in Iran’s territory or that the two sides would 
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carry out the swap in smaller batches. 471 It was Iran’s counter coercive diplomacy to 
provide persuasive inducement. However, as P5+1 adhered to the original plan and 
demanded Iran to comply, on 18 November 2009, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr 
Mottaki announced that Iran would not ship its low-enriched uranium out of the country.  
 
As the negotiation collapsed, the US, along with P5+1, decided to raise its level of 
coercion on Iran. On 20 November 2009, P5+1 met in Brussels to discuss the next steps 
after Iran rejected a nuclear fuel deal. Iran responded to impose counter coercion to 
display its ‘Strength of Motivation’ and the deterrence power to increase the 
enforcement cost of the possible US military intervention. Thus, Iran executed a massive 
military exercise to protect its nuclear facilities against any potential attacks which 
covered approximately one-third of Iran territory 472  and declared the production of 
twenty percent enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor. 
 
However, as unjustified US coercive diplomacy had been self-degraded by losing the 
multilateral support and coercion, the unjustified counter coercive diplomacy of Iran 
was in favour to the US. The IAEA, who had been discreetly dealing with Iran’s nuclear 
programme, made a bold move. On 27 November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors 
adopted a resolution urging Iran to comply with the UNSC resolutions that demanded 
the suspension of enrichment activities, including the construction at the Fordow.  Since 
Iran utilized IAEA report and inspection as the efficient tool for decreasing its 
incompliant cost for counter coercive diplomacy, it was a loss for Iran. As being in the 
cornered, on 2 December 2009, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared the 
production of twenty percent enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor.   
 
The US started the ‘gradual turning the screw’ to pressure Iran after the inauguration of 
Ahmadinejad’s second term. By speculating the covert Fordow underground nuclear 
facility, Obama successfully won the consolidation of the international community on 
Iran’s nuclear programme. As it is explained in <Figure 4-12>, it was considerable 
success of US coercive diplomacy regarding nuclear negotiation. However, as it again 
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pursue the objective of swift implementation of ‘no enrichment’ by enhancing the 
nuclear fuel control, it failed to close the deal and made Iran declared the 20 percent 
nuclear enrichment. 
 
<Figure 4-12> The Contention which Leads to initiate 2009 Nuclear fuel Swap Deal  
 
 
 
It was once again proved when the US enhanced the justification of coercive diplomacy 
with hard evidence and reasonable policy objective-in this case reducing Iran enriched 
Uranium stockpile and the fuel control not the ‘Zero enrichment’- the US succeeded to 
consolidate the multilateral coercion. As the US induced Iran to energy swap deal rather 
than demanding the dismantlement of its nuclear programme, the face-saving and 
reasonable request, Iran had to comply with the US coercion.  
 
 
4.5.2.3 Escalation of Contention and the UNSC Resolution 1929 
 
The collapse of the negotiation had adverse effects on Iran on the global strategic 
environment over its nuclear programme. On 16 February 2010, the US, France and 
Russia sent a letter to the IAEA Director General expressing regret over Iran’s 
unwillingness to agree to the TRR fuel swap arrangement. The letter reiterated the need 
for implementing the IAEA proposal and reaffirmed their full support. The request from 
the three countries including Russia to the IAEA was not beneficial to Iran. Moreover, 
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as WikiLeaks disclosed in a confidential US document that the newly elected ‘Yukiya 
Amano was solidly in the US court on every key strategic decision’, the new leadership 
of the IAEA was not favourable for Iran.473 
 
On 18 February 2010, the first IAEA report from the new leadership of Yukiya Amano 
on Iran’s nuclear programme was released to the IAEA Board of Governors meeting. As 
Hossein Mousavian argued, Amano’s IAEA report was evaluated as more ‘harsh’ and 
inclined to the West compared to previous IAEA reports of ElBaradei as its director. 474 
The alleged possible military dimensions of Iran, which the IAEA questioned the related 
information during ElBaradei’s rule, were become ‘credible’ evidence that IAEA should 
inspect.475  
 
Iran immediately sent a letter to denounce the IAEA report as being biased and claimed 
all the declared material in Iran was supervised by the IAEA and accounted for. On 22 
February 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of AEOI, announced that Iran would continue 
with its plan to build ten more enrichment sites and identified twenty sites for the new 
facilities. 476 It was to display its ‘strength of motivation’ of counter coercive diplomacy 
and increase the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy on Iran nuclear 
programme. Howecer, the 2010 February IAEA report provided a favourable strategic 
environment to implement its coercive diplomacy. The EU was reportedly drafting new 
sanctions that would target Iran’s energy and financial sectors which was the first time 
that the EU considered the coercive measures targeting the entire Iranian economy 
including Iran Central Bank.477   
 
Since the possibility of an agreement seemed remote and the additional coercion to be 
implemented, Iran decided to increase its nuclear capability to counter coerce the US to 
the negotiation. As president Ahmadinejad declared the production of twenty percent 
enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor, on 12 February 2010, Iran succeeded 
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in producing twenty percent enriched uranium and achieved the ability to enrich more 
than the LEU. 478 The twenty percent Uranium enrichment was the border line of NPT 
regime. Thus, it was deliberate threat to send the message that the possibility nuclear 
deal on limiting Iran’s full fledge nuclear programme at a certain level, 3 to 5 percent, is 
about to close. On 19 April 2010, Iran released a statement that it would start the 
construction of new enrichment plants. The director of the AEOI, Akbar Salehi, stated 
that Iran would start the construction of two enrichment sites by March 2011. Iran did 
not inform the IAEA of the location and designs of the new sites, claiming it did not 
need to do so until six months before the nuclear materials were introduced to the 
facility. 479 It clearly displayed Iran’s perception on the Additional Protocol that it was 
not yet signed and ratified to limit Iran’s nuclear activity.   
 
As contention between the US and Iran continued, the Obama administration utilized 
other persuasive inducement to induce Iran. On 27 April 2010, when Brazil offered to 
act as a mediator between Iran and the US to prevent a further round of sanctions against 
Iran, the US gave a green light. Therefore, Brazil’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim 
suggested a proposal to work with Turkey to formulate an agreement which was more 
acceptable to both sides. 480 On 17 May 2010, Iran, Brazil and Turkey signed a joint 
declaration, the ‘Tehran Declaration’, on Iran’s exchange of low-enriched uranium for 
fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. The terms of the agreement were practically 
identical to the failed October 2009 proposal. The only difference was that Turkey was 
to be the location for the fuel swap.  
 
When the ‘strength of motivation’ of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy between 
the US and Iran again become parallel, the Turkey and Brazil found the middle ground 
to make a compromise deal; for the US, massive reduction of Iran enriched uranium and 
implementation of enhanced control over Iran nuclear fuel, and for Iran, place the 
energy swap location near Iran to kept certain degree of energy independence.  
However, the US who successfully consolidated the multilateral coercion and support 
decided to turn down the Teheran agreement and increased its coercion. It was the clear 
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evidence that the US became adamant with its policy objective of ‘no enrichment’. 
 
On 19 May 2010, after consultations with Russia, China and other major powers, the 
Obama administration submitted a draft U.N. Security Council Resolution that would 
tighten sanctions against Iran. Hillary Clinton called the fuel swap deal of Turkey and 
Brazil was a “transparent ploy” on Iran’s part to avoid new sanctions. 481 However, 
considering the fact that the US supported the talks and that the proposal was quite 
similar to the IAEA and P5+1 proposal of September 2009, allegations that the ‘Tehran 
declaration’ was a decoy of Iran was illogical.   
 
On 9 June 2010, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1929. UNSC Resolution 
1929 imposed a fourth round of sanctions against Iran, including tighter financial 
measures and an expanded arms embargo. Resolution 1929 demanded Iran to, “suspend 
all enrichment related and reprocessing activities as well as work on all heavy water 
related activities,” and requested the IAEA to report Iran’s implementation of the UNSC 
Resolution within 60 days.  
 
<Figure 4-13> The Contention which Leads to the UNSC Resolution 1929 
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As shown in <Figure 4-13>, by utilizing US coercion, Iran succeeded in producing 
twenty percent enriched uranium which boasted its nuclear capability and the bargaining 
power in nuclear negotiation. However, it also lost a certain degree of support from 
Russia and China on Iran, which allowed them to participate on ratifying UNSC 
Resolution 1929.  
 
The UNSC Resolution 1929 was a meaningful success for the Obama administration. 
Unlike the Bush administration, the Obama administration displayed its willingness to 
talk with Iran and provided a meaningful compensative inducement, such as a nuclear 
fuel swap that recognizes certain level of Iran nuclear enrichment, to magnify 
international support.  
 
Although the participation of Russia and China on UNSC Resolution 1929 could be devaluated 
as their attempt to secure the energy trade with Iran, the justified US coercive diplomacy which 
pushed them to the fourth round of the Iranian sanction could be considered a success. However, 
as the US displayed its coercive diplomacy of ‘no enrichment’ on turning down the Teheran 
agreement, it left Iran counter coercive diplomacy to avail.   
 
4.5.2.4 The End of Obama’s First Term and Iran’s Enhanced Nuclear Capability 
 1) The Coercive Diplomacy of ‘No Enrichment’ and the Dead End  
As UNSC Resolution 1929 was ratified, the US prepared to execute its coercive 
diplomacy with intensified economic sanctions. On 1 July 2010, Obama signed a joint 
bill that could sanction any person who provided Iran with goods, services, technology 
or information with a market value over $1 million or any agent – meaning individual, 
organization or institution – that made an investment of over $20 million in Iran’s 
petroleum industry. 482  This was the tool with which the US administration would 
gradually turn the screw on Iran’s capacity to finance its nuclear programme and deepen 
its isolation. 
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However, increased coercion with economic sanctions was not able to create an 
asymmetry of motivation regarding uranium enrichment as it was a vital interest for 
Iran. The P5+1 fuel swap proposal, which designated Russia and France as suppliers of 
nuclear fuel to Iran, meant a possible delay of the energy swap of more than a year. This 
meant a permanent effect on the Iranian nuclear programme, reducing Iran’s nuclear 
capability more than occurred when Khatami suspended the enrichment programme for 
more than 2 years during his presidency. Thus, without a compromise and without Iran 
having the bargaining power of a fully fledged nuclear programme, the p5+1 deal 
demanded by the US was too excessive for Iran to accept.  
 
In order to create the an ‘asymmetry of motivation’ that could coerce Iran into dismantling 
its enrichment programme, the Obama administration needed clear evidence of Iran’s 
violation or near-violation of the NPT, such as construction of the Fordow facility or a 
‘global strategic environment’ such as 9/11, to justify its coercion and consolidate 
multilateral support. However, revelation of the construction of the Fordow covert facility 
site, which had not yet initiated operations, was insufficient to create an ‘asymmetry of 
motivation’ which could lead to ‘zero enrichment’ by Iran. Therefore, the US either needed 
to compromise the objective of its coercive diplomacy by aiming lower, such as at a nuclear 
energy swap deal, or else negotiate with Iran with other inducements. However, the US 
refused to do either of these things and instead increased its economic sanctions. As a result, 
the contention between coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy continued, which only 
bought the time for Iran to develop its nuclear capability.  
 
On 11 July 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the AEOI, announced it had produced 20 
kilograms of twenty-percent-enriched uranium and that it was initiating the production 
of its own fuel plates.483 This research on plate-type fuel may have been a cause of grave 
apprehension for the international community since plate-type fuel process creates a 
neutron flux, a material which is essentially used to study nuclear weapons. The 
progress of Iranian nuclear development was clear evidence that Obama’s coercive 
diplomacy was failing to create an ‘image of war,’ isolate Iran, consolidate international 
support to induce an Iranian behavioural change or decrease its nuclear capability. 
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Conversely, as Iran recovered enough bargaining power in the absence of negotiations, it 
started to degrade the US coercive diplomacy by displaying its nuclear capability and 
will to engage in nuclear negotiations. On 26 September 2010, Ahmadinejad stated that 
Iran would end higher level uranium enrichment if the world powers would send nuclear 
fuel for its research reactor. Soon, Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki requested a nuclear 
dialogue with the P5+1 within the framework of the ‘Tehran Declaration.’484  
 
On 20 October 2010, the head of the AEOI, Ali Akbar Salehi, announced that they had 
stockpiled 30 kg of twenty-percent-enriched uranium U-235. Since the amount was 
nearly double the 17 kg of June 2010, Iran had again successfully increased its 
bargaining power in nuclear negotiations. Again, on 5 December 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi 
declared Iran self-sufficient in the production of yellowcake, a uranium concentrate 
powder. The first batch of domestically produced yellowcake was shipped from the 
Gchine mine to the uranium conversion facility in Isfahan under the supervision of the 
IAEA.485 Since Iran was continuing to enhance its nuclear capability under the NPT 
treaty, the Obama administration had no other option than to initiate negotiations.  
 
There were three possible methods that the US could employ in its coercive diplomacy 
against Iran’s uranium enrichment: 1) escalate the possibility of military conflict to force 
dismantlement; 2) consolidate critical multilateral sanctions and the isolation of Iran 
through the UN; or 3) put US unilateral sanctions on Iran and any third party that had 
transactions with Iran. However, apart from unilateral sanctions, it was a difficult task to 
employ these methods with its weakly justified coercive diplomacy. Despite the US’s 
escalation dominance on Iran, with its struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan the US could 
not implement an ‘image of war’ by escalating military tension. It simply could not 
make a possible military intervention seem credible. Moreover, Iran’s missile and 
military deterrence could cause casualties, which made it even more difficult for the US 
to utilize a limited military option. If it escalated into a war, it would be a failure of the 
coercive diplomacy. Above all, as long as Iran developed its nuclear programme under 
the NPT, there was not much space in which to execute coercion.    
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On 6 December 2010, the nuclear talks between the P5+1 and Iran, which had ceased 
for over a year, were finally resumed in Geneva. However, the US, which aimed at ‘zero 
enrichment’ by Iran, could not offer more than the previous P5+1 nuclear energy swap 
deal,486 which led to an impasse in the negotiations. The Obama administration, which 
had inaugurated its term promising ‘direct talk and dialogue,’ came closer and closer to 
following the trajectory of Bush’s ‘pure coercion’ diplomacy. 
  
2) Back to Pure Coercion? An Absence of Negotiation with Increased Sanctions 
 
Since a satisfactory resolution of the Iranian nuclear negotiation seemed remote due to 
the differences over uranium enrichment, the Obama administration notably shifted the 
main focus of the US’s foreign diplomacy from Iran’s nuclear programme to the issue of 
democracy and human rights abuses in Iran. Thus, the US became increasingly 
outspoken on the Arab uprising, on issues of democracy, and on how change was needed 
in the Middle East. After years of failure to reach a resolution on Iran’s nuclear programme, 
the Obama administration reassessed that the nuclear talks only bought time and momentum 
for Iran’s nuclear development. Thus, the US decided to swing its Iranian nuclear policy 
from direct talks and negotiation to patiently squeezing compliance by Iran. On 23 May 
2011, the Obama administration enacted Executive Order 13574 to sanction seven foreign 
companies involved in supplying Iran with refined oil. It also blacklisted sixteen firms and 
individuals involved in Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes.487 
 
On 13 July 2011, in order to break the impasse in the Iranian nuclear negotiation, 
Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov proposed a phased plan to restart the talks 
between Iran and the P5+1.488 The Russians proposed the following steps: 1) Iran would 
limit enrichment activity to the Natanz nuclear facility, suspend the instalment of any 
additional centrifuges, and halt the production of advanced centrifuges. In return, the 
P5+1 would suspend the financial sanctions and ship inspections which were imposed 
according to UNSC Resolution 1929; 2) Iran would agree to provide centrifuge and 
nuclear facility design information to the IAEA under Code 3.1, cap its enrichment level 
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at five percent, and allow greater IAEA monitoring of its centrifuges. In return, the P5+1 
would suspend the UN sanctions except those related to nuclear supplier groups and 
gradually lift the unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran; 3) Iran would implement the 
Additional Protocol. In return, the P5+1 would suspend all UN sanctions in a phased 
manner according to the level of Iranian implementation of the Additional Protocol; and 
4) Iran would suspend all enrichment-related activities for three months. In return, the 
P5+1 would lift all sanctions and begin to implement the group’s proposed incentives.  
 
However, the US, which had changed its political stance from ‘strategic patience’ to 
coercive diplomacy, planned to gradually increase its coercion until Iran showed 
integrity in the nuclear negotiations. 489  Moreover, as the most severe economic 
sanctions on Iran were in the process of being set up by the US and the EU,490 the 
Obama administration did not need to jump into the negotiations.  
 
The Russian proposal was a realistic package deal which could cap Iran’s nuclear 
enrichment at 5% and implement the Additional Protocol as the final resolution of Iran’s 
nuclear programme. The IAEA would have increased surveillance and control over 
Iran’s nuclear programme. However, on 30 September 2011, the US State Department 
spokeswoman Victoria Nuland stated “Ahmadinejad makes a lot of empty promises… 
from our perspective at the moment, this looks like a diversion from the real issue,”491 
and so the US rejected the Russian proposal. 
 
Although, Iran’s largest trading partner, the EU, decided to increase its sanctions to 
induce a behavioural change by Iran, the US had to compromise and negotiate to 
implement effective coercion of Iran within the strategic environment that included the 
soft balance of China and Russia in the region. Hillary Clinton has stated that “The 
biggest consumers of Iranian oil, and the hardest to convince to turn off the spigot, were 
in Asia. China and India, in particular, depended on Iranian oil to meet their rapidly 
expanding energy needs. The advanced economies of South Korea and Japan were also 
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highly dependent on imported oil from Iran.”492 Thus, Iran was able to counter the 
coercive measures and decrease the cost of not complying with the US and EU coercive 
diplomacy.493  
 
On 8 November 2011, the IAEA released a new report on Iran that damaged Iran’s 
stance on its nuclear programme. For the first time, the IAEA report assembled the 
available evidence into one general overview that strengthened the allegation that Iran 
had continued with its nuclear weaponization since 2003. However, the IAEA 
accusation against Iran, which began with the phrase ‘the Agency has information from 
more than 10 Member States,’ was mainly based on US intelligence information, the 
credibility of which had been criticized in a previous IAEA report. Therefore, it faced 
strong resistance from Russia, China and the bloc of developing countries. Russia 
immediately announced its refusal to implement any sanctions against Iran. Its deputy 
foreign minister, Gennady Gatilov, rejected the US approach, arguing that further 
sanctions would only degrade the nuclear non-proliferation regime.494 The members of 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also released a statement denouncing the IAEA 
report, stating that it had “departed from the standard verification language.” Even India, 
which had been supportive of the US, took the side of the NAM.495 A statement from 
China was the most critical. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, stated 
“sanctions cannot fundamentally resolve the case. We hope the IAEA will be fair and 
objective and actively committed to clarifying the salient issues through cooperation 
with Iran.” 496  Again, US coercion based on a lack of evidence only increased the 
enforcement cost of coercive diplomacy. 
 
The US had successfully created momentum for its coercive diplomacy by revealing the 
Fordow facility and thus inducing Iran to engage in negotiation over a nuclear fuel swap. 
However, the success of its coercive diplomacy was limited because it aimed at ‘no 
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enrichment’ rather than the reasonable objective of limiting Iranian nuclear enrichment.  
 
By utilizing the favourable strategic environment that had been created, the US had the 
opportunity to force Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol and both control nuclear fuel 
and put a 5% cap on the Iranian nuclear enrichment programme. However, it missed the 
opportunity and fell back on its conventional pure coercion aiming at no enrichment, 
which had continually failed to produce an ‘asymmetry of motivation’ to induce 
behavioural change by Iran.  
  
Despite criticism from the international community of the neutrality of the IAEA report, 
on 21 November 2011 the Obama administration enacted Executive Order 13590, which 
targeted the Central Bank of Iran and the oil sector. In what Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton called “a significant ratcheting up of pressure on Iran,” a list of companies 
involved in supporting Iran’s nuclear programme and in the production and sale of 
petrochemicals were targeted to induce them to cease business with Iran.497 It was the 
strongest economic sanction that the Obama administration could enact. The EU also 
decided to impose an oil embargo and freeze the European assets of Iran’s central bank 
on 1 July 2012 as part of the US-led Iran sanction campaign. Since the EU was the 
recipient of 20 percent of Iran’s oil sales, this was a staggering blow to Iran’s 
economy.498  
 
Coercive diplomacy aims to achieve a diplomatic solution by creating an artificial 
environment which favours the coercer. The coercer has to create an ‘asymmetry of 
motivation’ by threatening an image of war, consolidating multilateral support and 
isolating the coercee with inducements based on an asymmetry of power. However, the 
US coercive diplomacy aiming at ‘no enrichment’ failed to create an ‘asymmetry of 
motivation.’ Although the EU joined the severe economic sanctions against Iran, a fully 
fledged nuclear programme was a vital interest for Iran that could not be abandoned. As 
shown, this had become clear on many occasions during the long years of the contention 
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process. Moreover, in the globalised neoliberal economic environment Iran could always 
find substitute trading partners to minimize the impact of sanctions as long as it 
succeeded in exerting its counter-coercive diplomacy under the NPT treaty.499 Thus, 
although its GDP growth plummeted by 6.6 % in 2012 after the sanctions were imposed, 
in 2013 it recovered, increasing by 4%, and then reached its 2011 growth rate of 
4.3%.500        
 
As the US coercive diplomacy only escalated the tension without any sign of 
rapprochement, concerns about the possibility of a military conflict arose among the 
international community. The US Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, strongly believed 
there was a high possibility of Israel carrying out a pre-emptive strike in April, May or 
June.501 However, since Iran successfully enhanced its counter-coercive diplomacy by 
increasing the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy, by protecting the nuclear 
site, securing justification for its nuclear development under the NPT, consolidating 
international and domestic support, and securing the ‘motivation of strength’ of its 
nuclear programme, no state could implement inducements other than economic 
sanctions.  
 
Therefore, on 14 April 2012 the US again had to approve nuclear talks with Iran. In 
Istanbul, the P5+1 and Iran decided to adopt a step-by-step process with reciprocal 
actions in order to move towards a long-term solution. This was a setback for the 
chances of the US coercive diplomacy aimed at ‘zero enrichment’ being effective in any 
short period of time. Moreover, as Iran succeeded in developing its 20 percent nuclear 
enrichment programme and using it as a bargaining chip, it became tougher to reach an 
agreement on a nuclear deal.  
 
Unfortunately, by the end of July 2012 the only inducement left to Obama in the nuclear 
negotiation was economic sanctions. After the end of the Istanbul nuclear talks, on 13 
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July 2012 Obama imposed another economic sanction with Executive Order 13382. 
Companies and banks linked to the proliferation of nuclear and missile programmes 
were added to the US sanction list. In response, Iran doubled its production at the 
Fordow enrichment facility and succeeded in adding 43 kilograms of 20-percent-
enriched uranium to its stockpile.502 Moreover, as an IAEA report revealed, it continued 
to upgrade its nuclear facilities and construct a heavy water reactor. On 13 December 
2012, with the US Treasury and State Department imposing new sanctions on seven 
Iranian companies and five individuals under Executive Order 13382 as a last measure, 
the first term of the Obama administration ended without the dismantlement of Iran’s 
nuclear programme or a decrease in its nuclear capability.  
 
<Figure 4-14> The Contention and the End of Obama’s 1st Term 
 
 
 
 
The foreign policy of the Obama administration during its first term was a combination of 
‘liberalism,’ which emphasized American values, and ‘realism,’ which stressed the national 
interest. During its first three years, the Obama administration held an ideal vision of justice, 
peace and security to build common ground in the international community. However, once 
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it faced the realpolitik of international relations, the US set its stance as ‘progressive where 
possible but pragmatist when necessary.’ Therefore, some US foreign policy experts 
denounced the Obama administration for doing ‘damage control’ without having a grand 
strategy in its foreign diplomacy.503 Obama’s non-proliferation policy on Iran’s nuclear 
programme was not an exception. 
 
While the Obama administration argued that the US was open for ‘direct talks and dialogue’ 
with Iran, when it came to nuclear negotiations Obama took a similar approach to his 
predecessors. The US continually imposed unilateral and multilateral sanctions while 
sustaining its ‘escalation dominance’ against Iran and keeping all military options on the 
table. Iran was continually excluded from a ‘negative security assurance’ regarding US 
nuclear weapons. However, the Obama administration showed its rationality by 
implementing substantial persuasive inducements in its coercive diplomacy. Unlike Bush’s 
‘pure coercion’ and ‘no enrichment,’ it recognized a limited level of Iran’s nuclear right to 
enrich. Interestingly, when the US recognized Iran’s enrichment programme, there was 
progress in the nuclear negotiation.  
 
However, tarnishing its declaration of a desire for a ‘Nuclear Free World,’ the Obama 
administration also denied Iran’s nuclear right to produce LEU, which was approved by 
the NPT regime. Admittedly, it was important to calculate Iran’s intentions and the 
future possibility of its enrichment technology being used for nuclear armament. 
However, the US stance of limiting Iran’s nuclear enrichment to below five percent, 
which was beyond the NPT regime, became a weak point in its coercive diplomacy. 
Therefore, the Obama administration could not achieve compliance by Iran in nuclear 
dismantlement and revealed the limits of its effective coercion.   
 
During its first term, the Obama administration had succeeded in consolidating international 
support to impose more severe and efficient economic sanctions on Iran than its predecessor 
had. The unprecedented economic sanctions on Iran’s finance and oil industry hit its 
economy hard and sent its real GDP growth plummeting to -10% in 2012. The 
administration also successfully sustained its military superiority to prevent any provocation 
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by Iran while it was increasing the coercive measures. From the perspective of executing 
coercive diplomacy, Obama indeed made a substantial achievement. However, when it 
comes to evaluating whether Obama’s coercive diplomacy was a success or a failure in 
terms of Iran’s nuclear dismantlement, the outcome is negative.  
 
A gallop poll in 2013 revealed that 63 percent of Iranian citizens were in favour of 
continuing Iran’s nuclear programme even if it meant long-lasting economic repercussions 
on their daily lives. The poll also showed that only 10  percent of Iranian citizens blamed the 
Iranian government for their economic suffering whereas 53 percent blamed the US and 
Israel, which created a more favourable environment for Iran’s counter-coercive 
diplomacy.504 Moreover, the fact that Iran’s nuclear capability had increased and seemed to 
be continuing its development clearly showed that the US coercive diplomacy, which did 
not have a strong justification and made excessive demands on Iran’s nuclear programme, 
would have difficulty in achieving nuclear dismantlement. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The Clinton, Bush and Obama US administrations all stated that their nuclear policy aim for 
Iran was the dismantlement of its nuclear programme. Whether these administrations were 
fully aware of the concept of coercive diplomacy or not, and despite the differences in 
leadership, rhetoric and the composition of the cabinets, all three US administrations decided 
to enact a policy strategy of compellence to change Iran’s nuclear policy rather than to contain 
it. Their implementation of coercive diplomacy is clearly revealed in their series of policy 
reviews: the Quadrennial Defence Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, the Ballistic Missile 
Defence Review Report and the National Security Strategy reports.  
 
In order to achieve the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme, all three US 
administrations commonly utilized economic sanctions and the possibility of restoring 
diplomatic ties, economic aid and investment to induce a behavioural change by Iran: 
the abandonment of its nuclear programme. Moreover, by sustaining absolute military 
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superiority and escalation dominance against Iran, the US kept Iran in a closed and 
isolated environment, which is an important context variable for the success of coercive 
diplomacy. To sum up, the framework of coercive diplomacy was naturally applied to 
Iran’s nuclear programme after the US became the hegemonic state in a unipolar system 
after the Cold War, which created the necessary favourable environment for it to extend 
its influence. 
 
As shown in this chapter, the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme and the advance of 
its nuclear capability were the results of the contention between US coercive diplomacy 
and Iran’s counter-coercive diplomacy. Since there was no chance that Iran would 
voluntarily abandon its nuclear programme of its own free will, as the majority of 
experts and US decision-makers argued, coercion was the necessary US nuclear policy 
towards Iran. However, Iran also consistently displayed its ‘strength of motivation’ in its 
counter-coercive diplomacy to sustain its sovereign right to peacefully use atomic 
energy. Especially after witnessing the fall of Gadhafi in Libya, who had fully restored 
diplomatic and economic ties with the US by abandoning his nuclear programme, the 
already scarce possibility of spontaneous Iranian nuclear dismantlement diminished to 
none. Moreover, as long as Iran maintained the legitimate status of its nuclear 
programme under the IAEA and NPT regimes, the US coercive diplomacy lacked 
justification and evidence and so was clearly limited in its ability to implement proper 
inducements to achieve compliance by Iran.  
 
Understanding this difficulty, the majority of experts argued that coercive diplomacy 
was not a prime choice for the US in its dealings with Iran’s nuclear programme. 
However, no one denied that coercive diplomacy was the ‘lesser evil’ policy choice 
among all the other alternatives, since the opportunity cost of appeasement or a war on 
Iran’s nuclear programme went beyond rationality. Thus, to successfully achieve non-
proliferation by Iran, the US needed to face the Iranian nuclear issue squarely, form 
proper inducements and objectives, and fully understand the theory of coercive 
diplomacy, which became the fixed constant in US policy on Iran’s nuclear programme. 
However, as has been shown, from Clinton to Obama’s first term all three US 
administrations failed to do this.  
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Decision-makers should consider the mutuality of coercion when implementing coercive 
diplomacy. Since no unilateral coercion operates in the real world, the coercee’s counter-
coercive diplomacy has to be considered in order to accurately assess effective 
inducements to achieve diplomatic bargaining. To reach the objective of US coercive 
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme – dismantlement – the US needed to reduce its 
enforcement cost by consolidating policy support and creating common ground with 
Russia and China, which are soft balances of US hegemony in the Middle East. This was 
and still is not an easy task, since Iran also executes its counter-coercive diplomacy to 
do the exact opposite by decreasing the non-compliance cost created by US coercive 
diplomacy.   
 
In this sense, although it made many mistakes because of its lack of understanding of 
coercive diplomacy, the Bush administration, which formed the multilateral P5+1 
structure, created a meaningful framework within which to work towards Iranian non-
proliferation. Although a bilateral negotiation would have had a greater chance of 
achieving direct communication and consent between Iran and the US, the strategic 
environment, which was intertwined with the different interests in Iran’s nuclear 
programme of neighbouring agents, was equally important and it influenced the policies 
of both the US and Iran. Therefore, including this valuable within the framework of 
coercive diplomacy was the right way for the US to ‘consolidate international support.’ 
Whether the results were satisfactory or not, the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme was 
dealt with through a process of contention between coercive and counter-coercive 
diplomacy between Iran and the US within the strategic environment of the P5+1 
multilateral structure. 
 
The US non-proliferation policy on Iran within the P5+1 structure did not and could not 
aim to be type C coercive diplomacy – persuading the opponent to make changes in its 
government or regime. The consensus among the P5+1 was that regime change in 
dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme was impossible. This was revealed in a series of 
UNSC resolutions. Although the UNSC resolutions referred to Article 41 of Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, which includes possible military intervention, not only China and 
Russia but the EU 3 also opposed implementing any type of military measure. 
Therefore, within the multilateral framework, the viable options for US coercive 
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diplomacy were types A or B: persuading the opponent to stop short of the goal or to 
undo the action. As shown in this chapter, the US had to consolidate the support of the 
P5+1 to impose effective punitive measures and successful inducement of Iran was only 
achieved when the US secured their consent. Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic and 
political effort to resolve a crisis. The role of military action is to build credibility and to 
show the coercer’s will to mobilize a larger force if necessary as a diplomatic threat. 
Thus, if the use of total force or the use of military force escalates into a war, it is a 
failure of coercive diplomacy.   
 
Compared to a total war, which could instantly devastate the adversary and make the 
regime change, coercive diplomacy, which can only implement economic sanctions, 
limited warfare and economic investment, cannot achieve a dramatic shift in the coercee. 
As in all other diplomatic and foreign policies, tangible success comes as a result of 
accumulated effort by the participants. It needs prudent trust-building among the partners 
throughout the negotiation process until it reaches agreement. However, none of the three 
administrations from Clinton to Obama’s first term succeeded in doing this.  
 
Depending on the circumstances and the progress of the nuclear negotiation, the US 
often used type A coercive diplomacy, aiming to suspend Iran’s nuclear programme, but 
the ultimate goal was type B: the dismantlement of its nuclear programme. Admittedly, 
due to its successful counter-coercive diplomacy, Iran acquired a nuclear enrichment 
capability. However, from Clinton to Obama’s first term, the US did not approve of 
Iran’s fully fledged nuclear programme including 20% LEU, which was totally 
legitimate under the IAEA and NPT regimes.  
 
The fact that the US coercive diplomacy did not have valid justification was in itself a 
big disadvantage for the US in its effort to achieve Iran’s nuclear dismantlement. As 
seen in this chapter, multilateral coercive diplomacy is like a double-edged sword. If the 
multilateral participants can reach a consensus and agree to impose an inducement as 
coercive diplomacy, the coalition of coercion can maximise the non-compliance cost to 
the coercee to achieve a behavioural change. However, ‘Bellum omnium contra omnes’ 
and the anarchy in international relations and politics makes creating a coalition of 
coercion not an easy task. In the case of Iran’s nuclear programme, consolidating a 
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binding consensus among the P5+1 to create efficient inducements needed extra effort. 
Since Russia and China softly balanced the US and publicly displayed their reluctance to 
impose a certain level of coercion on Iran, the US had to come up with an explicit 
reason to justify the coercion. As seen in this chapter, the US administration failed to do 
this. By denying the international regime and the treaty that approved LEU development 
as a sovereign right of states, the US degraded its justification for coercive diplomacy on 
Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
This created room for Iran to enact its counter-coercive diplomacy by advancing its 
missile technology and nuclear capabilities, which increased the enforcement cost to the 
US. In 2006, when Russia made a proposal allowing Iran to operate a small R&D 
programme of thirty to forty nuclear centrifuges under IAEA supervision, and Ali 
Larijani, then Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, sent a 
positive signal that he would accept the offer, the US was adamant against the 
compromise and rejected it. The US supported its refusal by arguing that the United 
Kingdom had built its nuclear weapons programme using the knowledge gained from 
running only sixteen centrifuges. However, when Obama’s first term ended in 2012, the 
number of centrifuges in Iran was 10,414. 
 
The US administrations dealt with the Iranian nuclear programme within the framework 
of coercive diplomacy. This set a behavioural change by Iran – nuclear dismantlement – 
as the objective of coercion and entailed various inducements to achieve compliance by 
Iran. To enhance the effectiveness of the inducements, the US created the P5+1 
multilateral framework as a coalition of coercion and sustained its military dominance 
over Iran to secure escalation dominance. However, the US administrations showed a 
lack of understanding of the theory of compellence and coercive diplomacy when 
employing the actual policy on the ground. Iran was not a passive agent sitting still and 
reacting according to the inputs of US policy. Regardless of the asymmetry of power, 
Iran had resources with which to execute counter-coercion to change US behaviour and 
coercion during the contention of the crisis.  
 
Coercive diplomacy is often misunderstood because it is a tactic of ‘influence of arms.’ 
However, it is still diplomacy: ‘forceful persuasion,’ a bargaining procedure that aims for 
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compliance by an adversary with an agreement. By setting dismantlement of Iran’s 
nuclear programme as the objective of its coercive diplomacy, the US provided a 
favourable environment for Iran to execute counter-coercive diplomacy. As a result, from 
the Clinton administration to Obama’s first term, the US neither succeeded in persuading 
Iran to dismantle its nuclear programme nor to decrease its nuclear capability.  
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5. An Analysis of Diplomatic Contention between the US and North 
Korea on Nuclear Nonproliferation after the Cold War 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union who provided a nuclear umbrella and the 
assurance of national security, it was no secret that North Korea utilizes its nuclear 
capability and development as a tool to bargain compensation and military deterrence. 
North Korea has pursued a nonaggression treaty with US and normalization of the 
diplomatic relation for its regime security through its nuclear negotiation. Under this 
basic fact, there are diverse opinions among scholars whether North Korea’s nuclear 
programme can be resolved. It can be divided into three groups that believe it is 
possible, it is not possible, or it depends on how the environment is formed for the 
nuclear dismantlement. 
 
The group that believes in the possibility of the nuclear dismantlement of the North 
Korea asserts if North Korea’s security dilemma is settled, such as by allowing them to 
be incorporated in an international system, North Korea’s nuclear programme will be 
resolved. According to Roland Bleiker, to label a particular country as a rogue state and 
considering it as not negotiable is inappropriate and irrational. He argued the 
representation of North Korea as a rogue state degrades the understanding of its nuclear 
programme and the possibility of the resolution. Through an analysis of the first and 
second North Korean nuclear crisis, he pointed out there was escalation of tension 
whenever the North Korean regime was been threatened. He emphasized the North 
Korean security dilemma under US nuclear threat as the key for a resolution. By 
implementing the proper assurance and inducements, he argued the dismantlement of 
the North Korean nuclear programme is possible.505 
 
 Lee Sang Hyun proposed the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programme 
which was applied to the Ukraine. He argued one should provide compensative 
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inducements such as economic aid and an assurance of regime security for North Korea 
to force them to accept the Ukraine Nonproliferation model. Since there is mistrust 
between North Korea and the US, Lee asserted the necessity of an international 
agreement on the North Korean regime security as well as an institutional plan of the 
economic development to provide North Korea could join the international 
community.506    
 
The other group of experts argues the nonproliferation of North Korea is not possible no 
matter how much punitive or compensative inducements are to be provided. Selig S. 
Harrison believes even if the US negotiate with North Korea, assuring them of their 
regime’s security, along with diplomatic normalization and economic compensation, 
none of these would be sufficient for bringing an end to the North Korean nuclear 
programme. Since the North Korean regime is sustained by its ‘military first’ policy and 
nationalist military elite group, which needs the nuclear programme as a crucial element 
in sustaining their strength, he argued it will only be dismantled when all of North 
Korean security threat is gone or the regime itself is toppled.507 
 
Kang Won Sik also evaluated the North Korean nuclear programme as non-negotiable 
agenda. Since he believes there is scant possibility of the North Korean regime to trust the 
US’ assurance of national security, it is more of a ‘chicken game’ that who would first 
abandon its own diplomatic objectives, not an agenda that could be solved through trust 
building process of negotiation.508 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye both believed 
North Korea will never change their position on nuclear development and it is highly 
likely to be solved as that of Ukraine model only after the unification of the two 
Koreas.509 
 
Lastly, there is a group that sees the resolution of the North Korean nuclear programme 
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is dependent on the strategic environment and inducements that creates the momentum. 
This group of scholars focuses on the opportunistic decisions of North Korea. They 
refuse to have a fixed concept on the North Korean nuclear programme and instead, 
focus on North Korea’s decisions which are influenced by international coercion and 
compensation. This group of scholars argues the North Korea does not have a 
categorical goal in achieving nuclear weapons.  
 
According to Lee Jong Seok, the assumption that North Korea attempted to acquire 
nuclear weapons from the very beginning of their nuclear development cannot explain the 
fact that their nuclear test and possession of nuclear weapons capability occurred during 
the Bush administration and not the Clinton administration. However, he also asserted the 
argument of North Korean nuclear programme was only to maximize its ability to coerce 
compensation cannot explain the circumstance of the actual execution of the nuclear test. 
Therefore, Lee Jong Seok argues one should build an analysis based on the opportunistic 
decisions of North Korea: if the compensation is sufficient, North Korea will abandon its 
nuclear programme but if the international solidarity on North Korea’s nuclear programme 
is weak, North Korea will attempt to weaponize their nuclear programme. 510 
 
Kim Keun Sik stated that the assumption of North Korea will keep their nuclear 
weapons to sustain the regime security is too risky and irrational behaviour. He argued 
the reason why the North continues to keep their nuclear programme is because if they 
succeed, it could be used as a nuclear deterrence and if not, it could still be used as a 
bargaining chip.511 Thus, if the environment of proper coercion is set, he asserts North 
Korea will change its nuclear strategy.  
 
Graham Allison, who argued the Cuban missile crisis to be an example of successful 
coercive diplomacy, emphasizes the strong punitive inducement and giving a clear 
ultimatum would bring favourable conditions to solving Iran and North Korea’s nuclear 
programme. He asserted an unwillingness to wage war could offset the North Korean 
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opportunistic decision making environment and dismantle their nuclear programme.512   
The analysis on US foreign policy for resolving the North Korean nuclear programme 
among scholars could also be divided into three groups that support Appeasement, 
Engagement or the Regime Change policy. The group that suggests the appeasement 
policy on the North Korean nuclear programme asserts it would be more helpful in 
dismantling the North Korean nuclear programme if the US allowed North Korea to 
possess its nuclear weapons or if they normalized their relations with North Korea.    
 
According to Gregory J. Moore, a favourable environment has to be set first to derive 
the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme. He suggested normalization 
between U.S, and North Korea and institutionalizing the six-party talks as a multilateral 
security cooperation regime would bring the behavioural change of the North Korea.513 
 
Bennett Ramberg expressed his concern that the North Korean nuclear weapons being 
used in reality. He asserted that accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons and managing 
North Korea as a nuclear state would be much safer. Since the lack of information on 
North Korean nuclear weapon would result in intelligence failure that could lead in to a 
war, he argued confidence building predicated on the acceptance of a nuclear Pyongyang 
is much better policy choice.514 
 
However, the appeasement approach of the US towards the North Korean nuclear programme is 
highly unlikely. Historically, North Korea’s nuclear programme was unpardonable for any US 
administrations. Moreover, it contradicts the US nonproliferation policy that controls nuclear 
proliferation by the NPT and IAEA. The North Korean programme was largely focused on by 
all US administrations and the US intent to deal with the issue was once again officially 
announced at Obama’s ‘nuclear-free world’ speech in Prague. Therefore, neither the US 
appeasement policy on the nuclear programme of North Korea nor accepting the North Korean 
nuclear weapon is likely to happen.515 
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The most extreme method, which is the regime change policy, literally suggests resolving 
the North Korea’s nuclear programme by changing the leadership in the country. Since 
there is no chance for North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme, they argue there is 
no need to evaluate and consider persuasive inducements. Moreover, they do not see the 
‘compensative’ inducement is necessary in the case of North Korea.  
 
Max Boot stated the critical threat to US is the development of WMD by rogue states and 
sharing them with terrorist groups. Thus, in order to secure US national security, he 
suggested a regime change is necessary policy measure in dealing Iran and North 
Korea. 516 
 
Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh evaluated that the diplomatic agreement would never 
come across in solving the North Korean nuclear programme and estimated that the 
North Korean regime would not abandon its nuclear capability. However, since military 
intervention is very difficult in the case of North Korea, they insisted on provoking a 
bottom-up regime change and promoting democracy within North Korea by planting the 
plot information.517   
 
Mark Fitzpatrick argues the North Korean regime needs to keep its nuclear capability 
and strength for their survival. As he evaluated the survival of the North Korean regime 
and its nuclear programme as one, Fitzpatrick insisted the US should pressure North 
Korea on the possibility of an overthrow. Moreover, since the North Korean regime 
would not forfeit its nuclear programme, he argued the US should implement a more 
severe sanction to North Korea.518 
 
However, the regime change policy is not feasible in being implemented since 
neighbouring countries such as China and South Korea do not want and are not willing 
to tolerate any turmoil in the region. Also, the contradictions of national interest within 
East Asia, security of Japan and South Korea, hinder the US in executing such a policy 
towards North Korea’s nuclear programme. Moreover, with the fact that the US 
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administration officially announced they had no intention of pushing North Korea for a 
regime change, the possibility of implementing a regime change policy is low.     
A majority of scholars who study diplomacy regarding North Korea’s nuclear 
programme support the engagement policy. They argue the necessity of utilizing 
diplomatic normalization and the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula as an 
engagement frame and implementing the stick and carrot, the coercive diplomacy, in 
dealing with the North Korean nuclear programme. They believe it is, relatively, the path 
of least resistance. 
 
According to David Kang, the economic reform action of North Korea in 2002 indicates 
its intention to change. He assumed North Korea is fully aware of the inevitability of 
economic reform and opening the markets. Based on this hypothesis, Kang argued North 
Korea’s nuclear programme would be resolved if the US negotiate with the 
nonaggression treaty, diplomatic normalization and the peace treaty.519   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the US’ engagement policy on Iran and North Korea’s 
nuclear programme is not a simple policy that only provides positive inducements. It 
goes along with the containment and compellence on the nuclear programme of Iran and 
North Korea. However, as being temporary used during the engagement policy, the 
purpose of the containment is not just for the containment itself as it was for the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War.  
 
Scott Snyder and Charles Freedman argued the containment to be the easiest, most 
efficient and practical way in managing North Korea’s nuclear programme without 
causing any escalation. However, they also clarified it as an interim policy since the 
containment itself would not lead to the dismantlement of the nuclear programme. 520 
The containment that used in engagement policy on nuclear programme of Iran and 
North Korea is ultimately to coerce them to comply with the dismantlement of their 
nuclear programme. Thus, the engagement policy that the majority of scholars insist is 
actually ‘coercive diplomacy’ that occasionally utilize the containment as a method of 
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‘wait and see’ under the coercion frame.  
 
Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochiziki emphasized the concept of ‘grand bargaining’, 
which includes all possible measures such as diplomatic normalization, nonaggression and a 
peace treaty. They insist ‘grand bargaining’ is necessary in solving all intertwined North 
Korean problems: drugs, counterfeiting US dollars, human rights issues, missiles, the 
nuclear programme, etc. However, although they insist one shot solution than the 
negotiation process of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy between the US and North 
Korea, O’Hanlon and Mochiziki emphasized the importance of  US government to sustain 
its coercive diplomacy to induce North Korea to accept the grand bargaining offer.521 
 
According to Michell B. Reiss, the US coercive diplomacy has to be executed directly 
against the regime since North Korea puts its regime security as their first priority. 
Michell argued gradual coercion by imposing sanctions or cutting the economic, energy 
aid and food aid along with persuasive inducement, providing normalization, and an 
assurance of the regime’s security will lead to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear 
programme.522 
 
Chae Gyu Cheol insisted that North Korea should be coerced to accept the Ukraine 
model by implementing the engagement policy combined with coercive diplomacy. As 
the means of coercion, Chae argued the reinforcement of the US force in South Korea; 
performing the Team Spirit joint military exercise, enhance capability of pre-emptive 
strike and even the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.523  
 
Richard N. Haass also suggested the combination of engagement and containment when 
dealing with the North Korean nuclear programme. Admittedly, he pointed out in the 
shortcomings of this approach; the possibility of buying time for North Korea to develop 
nuclear capability and the possibility of North Korea continuing their nuclear 
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programme even if the agreement is reached. However, Haass added the proven fact that 
the ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’, economic sanction and politic inducements were more effective 
than containment in bringing change to the Soviet Union during Cold War. Therefore, 
even if there is the possibility of failure, Haass insists the engagement with coercive 
diplomacy dealing with North Korea’s nuclear programme.524 
 
Leon V. Sigal criticized the containment policy cannot be a possible solution to the 
North Korean nuclear programme. Using ‘pure coercion,’ a failure on the part of the 
Bush administration that led to North Korea’s nuclear armament rather than 
dismantlement, as an example, Leon V. Sigal argued the give and take diplomacy is the 
best policy option for the US.525 
 
For a more hard liner engagement policy, the hawk engagement policy by Victor Cha is 
a typical one. As Victor Cha evaluated the possibility of North Korea abandoning its 
nuclear programme as being slim to none, he argued the freezing of the North Korean 
nuclear programme should be a precondition to any negotiation. He insisted 
compensative inducement, should only be provided as a package deal and provided only 
after North Korea announces its dismantlement of the nuclear programme. In hawk 
engagement, inducement itself means to draw a consensus of coercion among the 
participants of 6 party talks. That is, if the engagement fails to get North Korea to 
comply, a more severe sanction and coercion will be implemented to coerce nuclear 
dismantlement Of North Korea.526  
 
Colin Duke analysed the US and North Korea negotiations to be a failure. He believed 
North Korea’s main goal in negotiation is to squeeze out the maximum amount of 
compensation from the US, rather than reaching a nuclear agreement. Therefore, Duke 
shares the idea of hawk engagement as being an engagement policy that should be 
utilized as an initial step to severe sanctions and coercion in case the negotiation fails.527 
Nicholas Eberstadt criticized the Bush administration, which formed the 2.13 Agreement 
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with North Korea and insisted more severe sanction with a more heightened 
Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI.528 
Since North Korea is like a black box, it is not possible to fully understand either their 
intention towards nuclear strategy or the proper US policy in resolving it. Therefore, as 
shown above, there are various opinions among scholars in dealing with the issue. 
However, since it is the most effective bargaining chip in drawing out compensation and 
regime security, and as witnessed during the first and second nuclear crisis on how 
North Korea conducts their strategy in keeping their nuclear ability and furthering their 
nuclear development, the analysis on North Korea of pursuing the nuclear ability is 
highly credible.  
 
During the contention process of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy North Korea 
demanded an absolute assurance of regime security whereas the US demanded the 
Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement. However, as witnessed in Gadhafi of 
Libya, due to the nature of the self-help environment, absolute assurance of the North 
Korean regime is impossible. Therefore, whether slowing down North Korea’s nuclear 
development or completely dismantling it, the US has to implement a coercive 
diplomacy to achieve its aim. In reality, the US administration has been dealing with the 
North Korean nuclear programme with the engagement policy, which utilizes coercive 
and persuasive inducement.  
 
In chapter 5, the US coercive diplomacy, which was implemented on North Korea’s 
nuclear programme after the Cold War, will be examined. Analysing the contention 
between the US’ coercive diplomacy post-Cold War and North Korea’s counter coercive 
diplomacy on its nuclear programme, this chapter aims to analyse how the US’ coercive 
diplomacy failed short of reaching its objective. 
 
5.2 An Analysis of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy on the Nuclear 
Programme of North Korea 
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5.2.1 The US Coercive Diplomacy on the Nuclear Programme of North Korea 
 
The objective of the US coercive diplomacy on North Korea is the complete 
dismantlement of its nuclear programme. In order to achieve its goal, the US 
administration sets the type of coercive diplomacy during the process of contention of 
the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy: type A – persuading the opponent to stop 
short of the goal, type B – persuading the opponent to undo the action and type C – 
persuading the opponent to make changes in the government or regime. 
 
Each goal differs from the other. In the case of North Korea’s nuclear programme, type 
A is to seize or freeze North Korea’s nuclear programme. That is, the objective of the 
type A coercive diplomacy is to seize the current capability of the North Korean nuclear 
programme and its capability. Type B is the complete dismantlement of the North 
Korean nuclear programme. It means more than a seizing or freezing of the current 
nuclear programme and its capability. It includes the dismantlement of the ‘past nuclear 
capability,’ which aims for the complete dismantlement of the entire accumulated North 
Korean nuclear programme and its capability. The goal of type C, the complete 
dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme through a regime change, goes 
even further to achieve the assurance of the ‘future North Korean nuclear programme’ 
by eliminating the North Korean regime, which is hostile to the US.  
 
Although the final goal of the US coercive diplomacy is the complete dismantlement of 
the North Korean nuclear programme, the type of coercive diplomacy is changeable 
according to the process of contention between the coercive and counter coercive 
diplomacy. Therefore, as the contention proceeds, the US changes the inducements, the 
level of coercive diplomacy and what to demand from North Korea depending on the 
environment in each phase of the contention. Thus, the US indicates the ‘Strength of 
Motivation,’ which influences the North Korean counter coercive diplomacy and its 
‘strength of motivation’. As Alexander George explained in ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’, 
the side employing coercion is more likely achieve success if they are more motivated 
than their opponents by what is at stake, and this is the basic determining factor behind 
the success of coercive diplomacy.  
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5.2.1.1 Favourable Conditions for the US Coercive Diplomacy on the Nuclear 
Programme of North Korea 
 
Through a number of case studies, Alexander George elaborated Thomas Schelling’s 
five required conditions for the success of coercion and defined the eight conditions that 
favour the success of coercive diplomacy: Clarity of objective, Strength of Motivation, 
Asymmetry of Motivation, Sense of Urgency, Strong Leadership, Adequate Domestic 
and International Support, Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation, and Clarity 
Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis. 
 
In the case of the US coercive diplomacy on the North Korean nuclear programme, the 
‘Clarity of Objective’ is clear, which is the dismantlement of its nuclear programme. 
However, methods on achieving dismantlement varies in implementing the coercive 
diplomacy: 1) Freeze the North Korean nuclear programme → Dismantlement, 2) 
Freeze the North Korean nuclear programme → Decrease North Korea’s Nuclear 
capability → Dismantlement, 3) Dismantlement through grand bargaining 4) 
Dismantlement through the regime change. Since the choice of which method to 
implement is determined by the contention between the coercive and counter coercive 
diplomacy, there is room for the ‘Clarity of Objective’ to be damaged. For example, 
suppose the US changes the type of coercive diplomacy from type A to type C during 
the contention of the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy. The discrepancies of the 
objective, the freezing of the North Korean nuclear programme and the North Korean 
regime change degrades the ‘Clarity of Objective’. Moreover, if the US coercive 
diplomacy fails to send a clear signal of what they are demanding from North Korea, it 
could be referred as an absence of ‘Clarity of Objective.’ 
 
The ‘Strength of Motivation’ indicates the willingness of how much and how far the US 
would accept the enforcement cost of the coercive diplomacy. It also displays the 
integrity of the US’ demands on North Korea in each phase of its coercive diplomacy. 
‘Asymmetry of Motivation’ means the asymmetry of the ‘strength of motivation’ 
between the US’ coercive diplomacy and the counter coercive diplomacy of North 
Korea. It is the imbalance between the eagerness of the US in achieving the coercive 
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diplomacy and that of North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy. If there is an 
imbalance between the two occurs, ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’, the possibility of a 
successful coercive or counter coercive diplomacy is highly likely to achieve. Therefore, 
by utilizing the inducements, the ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’, the US degrades and minimizes the 
‘Strength of Motivation’ of North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy whereas North 
Korea implements its inducements of the counter coercive diplomacy to reduce the 
‘Strength of Motivation’ of the US coercive diplomacy. The contention between these 
two have an impact on adjusting the ‘Sense of Urgency’; if the US is in a great sense of 
urgency to achieve its coercive diplomacy, it is more likely to generate an atmosphere 
that will make North Korea more amenable for compliance. 
 
The North Korean regime has long been astute and well-managed to survive the 
sanctions and coercions of the US and the outside world. Therefore, in order to 
implement an efficient coercive diplomacy on North Korea, a ‘Strong Leadership’ is 
needed for a successful US coercive diplomacy. Moreover, ‘Strong Leadership’ is one of 
the core elements in bringing an ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support’. 
Historically, the US tried to maximize the incompliant cost and the risk for North Korea 
by combining the solidarity and assets of China, Russia, South Korea and Japan, who all 
share the same opposition of the North Korean nuclear development. However, it has 
been proven to not be an easy task. Although, China and Russia share the need for North 
Korea to dismantle their nuclear programme, they do not want to do so through 
coercion, which would harm the national security of North Korea and its regime. 
Moreover, China and Russia, who implemented ‘Soft Balancing’ on the US foreign 
diplomacy, do not accept any US military coercion against North Korea. Thus, ‘Strong 
Leadership’ is important in minimizing this gap and the ‘Adequate Domestic and 
International Support,’ which would maximize the inducements of the coercive 
diplomacy and is crucial for the US coercive diplomacy on the North Korean nuclear 
programme. 
 
The ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ is the core task of the coercive 
diplomacy. US coercive diplomacy has to be planned ahead to maximize the incompliant 
cost of North Korean resistance. If the US coercive diplomacy succeeds in building the 
‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ of North Korea, the possibility of North 
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Korea changing its behaviour or being more compliant to the US demand would be 
maximized. The ‘Clarity of Objective’ militates in favour of building the 
‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’. For instance, if the US coercive diplomacy 
is not clear in setting its goal as a regime change or the temporary seizing of North 
Korean nuclear programme, establishing the ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ 
of North Korea will give space to implement North Korean counter coercive diplomacy.  
 
The last condition that favours coercive diplomacy is the ‘Clarity Concerning the 
Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis’. When an agreement or compromise of North 
Korean nuclear programme is made as the result of contention between the coercive and 
counter coercive diplomacy, the accurate terms of agreements have to be clarified for the 
settlement of the contention. As we witnessed in the subversion of the Geneva Agreed 
Framework, the 2.13 Agreement and 10.3 Agreement of the six-party talks and the 2.23 
Agreement of the US and North Korea, imprecise terms and articles lead to future 
conflict and collapse of the agreement.  
 
The implementation of the US coercive diplomacy on North Korean nuclear programme 
begins by stating clear objectives and demands for North Korea. After it is set, the 
measures and inducements of the US coercive diplomacy are decided accordingly. When 
the objectives and means of the coercive diplomacy are settled on, the US manages its 
coercive diplomacy within the strategic environment by considering favourable 
conditions to derive the compliance of North Korea.   
 
The US coercive diplomacy on nuclear programme of North Korea proceeds through the 
contention process of the two and as its result, it will move on to different phases. The 
ultimate goal of the US coercive diplomacy on North Korean nuclear programme is 
complete dismantlement. If the US succeeds in inducing North Korea to an agreement 
and the process of dismantlement progresses as agreed, the US coercive diplomacy 
could be evaluated as a success. However, if an agreement is just a principle which 
cannot be extended to practical implementations or if further agreement is necessary for 
dismantlement, it is a continuation of contention to the next phase between the coercive 
and counter coercive diplomacy.  
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5.2.2 North Korean Counter Coercive Diplomacy 
 
North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy against the US nonproliferation policy has 
been the perseverance of its nuclear capability and nuclear deterrence. Strategically, 
North Korea often utilizes inducement, freezing or the decrease of nuclear capability to 
coerce compensation from the US and the international community. However, the 
ultimate objectives of its counter coercive diplomacy was the joining the international 
community without losing its nuclear capability and deterrence.  
 
The will of preserving its nuclear capability, the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of North 
Korean counter coercive diplomacy, was witnessed during the negotiation of the first 
North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. In order to secure their concealed plutonium which 
was not reported to the IAEA, North Korea displayed their will to go on a war. 
Moreover, whenever the outlook of conflict escalated in the Korean peninsula or it 
appeared that the development of nuclear capability would favour the nuclear 
negotiation, North Korea executed nuclear and missile tests.  
 
North Korea has always refused the nuclear dismantlement that could be completely 
verifiable and only accepts negotiations that based on the reported amount of plutonium 
and nuclear ability submitted by North Korean authorities. Moreover, North Korea 
demands compensation for every dismantlement process through the negotiation. If 
North Korea believed the compensation was inadequate or the negotiation process was 
leading to build up the demands of complete nuclear dismantlement, North Korea 
counter coerced the US by delaying negotiations or increasing their nuclear capability. 
 
The utmost goal of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy is to join the international 
community without losing its nuclear capability. As the coercive diplomacy became the 
US nonproliferation policy against North Korean nuclear programme, freeze or decrease 
of nuclear programme after maximizing its nuclear capability became the most powerful 
tool for North Korea in achieving political and economic compensation from the US and 
the International community. That is, in order to achieve the objective of the counter 
coercive diplomacy, North Korea utilizes its efficient measures to maximize the 
enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy. 
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Since the coercive diplomacy is the ‘persuasion through its arms of influence’, it 
approves of the limited use of military force. Thus, if the coercee failed to display its 
readiness to counter-react with a military response against the coercer’s coercive 
diplomacy, a counter coercive diplomacy is not possible to exist. The coercee must 
imprint ‘image of war’ and collateral damage to the coercer to implement its counter 
coercive diplomacy.  Therefore, North Korea continuously displays its willingness to go 
on a war with the US and struggles to maximize the enforcement cost of the US coercive 
diplomacy. Moreover, a totalitarian regime like North Korea has the high possibility of 
taking the riskier choice. It does not mean that North Korean regime is irrational. 
However, compare to democratic state, its rationality could be weighing on more of 
regime security not the security of its citizen. Thus, it makes more difficult for the US to 
utilize the military action.  
 
The readiness of North Korea and its willingness to go on a war intensifies the ‘Strength 
of Motivation’ of the counter coercive diplomacy. It restrains the favourable condition of 
the ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ of the US coercion. The more North 
Korea creates the devastating ‘image of war’, the more damage would be done to the US 
coercive diplomacy for consolidating the ‘Adequate Domestic and International 
Support’. It makes countries in the Far East Asia, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan, 
whose first priority is the peace in the region, to be extra cautious in supporting the US 
coercive diplomacy. Thus, the ‘Strong Leadership’ of the US coercive diplomacy could 
also be damaged. Apart from displaying a willingness to go on a war, North Korea 
executes its nuclear tests, missile tests and threats of nuclear proliferation to third 
countries to maximize the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy. Since the US 
policy’s objective for the Far East region is stability and peace and protecting its 
regional allies, the advent of North Korean nuclear and missile that could strike Japan 
and South Korea is a substantial enforcement cost for the US coercive diplomacy. 
    
In addition, when the US implements a more severe and strict coercive diplomacy by 
applying only punitive inducements such as ‘pure coercion’ of Bush administration, 
North Korea extends their will to compromise and negotiate amongst the neighbouring 
states and legitimizes them for developing its nuclear capability since it is their only 
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option against the US Coercion. Again, the more the nuclear capability of North Korea 
increases through this vicious circle, the more of the enforcement cost for the US 
coercive diplomacy increases. The increase of North Korea’s nuclear capability by 
utilizing US coercion intensified the ‘strength of motivation’ of North Korean counter 
coercive diplomacy, whereas the ‘strength of motivation’ of the US coercive diplomacy 
is weakened. Eventually, it influences the ‘asymmetry of motivation’ to North Korea. 
 
The other implementation strategy of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy is to 
minimize the incompliant cost that will be imposed by the US. In order to reduce the 
incompliant cost, North Korea first tries to degrade the legitimacy of the US coercive 
diplomacy. The legitimacy of the US coercive diplomacy lies on the justified demands 
for the coercion. Therefore, North Korea questions and refutes the demands of the US 
coercive diplomacy to minimize its justification. For example, when the first six-party 
talks was held in 2003, US delegation James Kelly revealed their knowledge of North 
Korea’s uranium enrichment programme to coerce North Korea. Immediately, North 
Korea strongly opposed this fact and requested proof of any uranium enrichment activity 
on their part. However, the Bush administration failed to produce evidence on North 
Korea’s enrichment programme except for the testimony of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a 
famous Pakistani nuclear scientist and a metallurgical engineer, and this restrained the 
other participants of the six-party talks from providing their expertise to support the US 
coercive diplomacy. 
 
North Korea criticizes the demands of the US coercive diplomacy as being unilateral, 
imbalanced and unjust. Moreover, by expressing their will to negotiate and compromise, 
North Korea degrades the justification of the US coercive diplomacy. During the second 
North Korean nuclear crisis, the US coerced North Korea by demanding the 
dismantlement of its nuclear programme as a precondition for any further negotiations. 
However, North Korea counter coerced the US coercive diplomacy by accusing it of 
being unjust and proposed their own resolution, the dismantlement of North Korea’s 
nuclear programme through the establishment of a non-aggression treaty. In the end, 
North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy eventually won the support of Russia and 
China, who wanted a ‘Soft Balance’ against the US in Far East Asia, which made it 
more difficult for the US coercive diplomacy to utilize severe inducements. According 
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to Alexander George, the ‘Strength of Motivation’ is not influenced by the justification 
of a cause but the balance of interest. That is, any attempt from North Korea that 
degrades America’s coercive diplomacy has its limit on influencing the ‘Strength of 
Motivation’ of the US coercive diplomacy. However, as mentioned above, it is valid in 
non-proliferation of North Korea since it gave a room for Russia and China to play their 
game against the US coercive diplomacy.  
 
In order to minimize the incompliant cost for North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy, 
apart from degrading the legitimacy of America’s coercive diplomacy, North Korea also 
strengthens its diplomatic asset by intensifying its alliance with friendly countries. 
Through strengthened relations, North Korea restrains its allies from participating in 
America’s coercive diplomacy. Moreover, depending on the circumstances, North Korea 
accepts the demands of neighbouring countries including Japan and South Korea, to 
create diplomatic differences among the participants of America’s coercive diplomacy, 
which also would minimize the incompliant cost for North Korea. The following 
<Figure 5-1> shows the clear picture of how the US coercive diplomacy and counter 
coercive diplomacy of North Korea are competed. 
 
<Figure 5-1> The Coercive & Counter-Coercive Contention Model 
of US & North Korea 
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Contention between America’s coercive diplomacy and North Korea’s counter coercive 
diplomacy is still currently underway. Thus, evaluating the success and failure of 
America’s coercive diplomacy on North Korea’s nuclear programme is a difficult task. 
Moreover, since it is an on-going and sensitive issue, there are limits on accessing 
relevant references that are crucial for an accurate analysis. 
As the contention is still in process, even if North Korea succeeds in its Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile test and in possessing several nuclear warheads, it cannot be used to 
determine the ultimate success of North’s counter coercive diplomacy. This is due to the 
fact that North Korea is under a more severe sanction according to the UN Security 
Council resolution and the objective of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy, 
which aims for normalization with the US and joining the international community, has 
become more difficult. Moreover, with there still being a possibility of North Korea 
abandoning its nuclear programme, this allows the assessment of the US coercive 
diplomacy to be even more difficult. Likewise, America’s coercive diplomacy on North 
Korea’s nuclear programme, which is apparently failing to achieve fruitful results, 
cannot be judged as an ultimate failure. This is due to the fact that even if America’s 
coercive diplomacy failed to coerce North Korea at a certain phase, if it could be 
evaluated as a partial success in reducing North Korea’s nuclear capability and 
programme or a success in drawing the support from among the neighbouring states, it 
cannot be determined a total failure.     
 
However, similar to chapter four, if the analysis of the US coercive diplomacy on the 
Iranian nuclear programme and the counter coercive diplomacy of Iran after the Cold 
War could set a certain time period, the evaluation of the US coercive diplomacy as 
either a success or failure would not be difficult. Therefore, in this chapter, the 
contention between America’s coercive diplomacy and North Korea’s counter coercive 
diplomacy during the three US administrations - Clinton, Bush and Obama - will be 
examined.  
 
5.3 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Clinton Administration and the 
Counter Coercive Diplomacy of North Korea 
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5.3.1 Background 
 
The nuclear development of North Korea was initiated in early the 1950s at the 
beginning of the Cold War. However, it neither caused tension nor was it considered a 
threat in the international community. Although the boundaries of nuclear technology 
between peaceful existence and military measures are unclear, the level of North 
Korea’s nuclear ability was just experimental and did not even have a means of delivery. 
Moreover, due to the existence of the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella, nuclear weapon 
development was not North Korea’s top priority. 
 
By the late 1970s, the US Intelligence Agency started to closely observe North Korea’s 
nuclear programme and its development. However, it focused on finding the reasons 
why North Korea was delaying the Safeguards Agreement and not on North Korea’s 
nuclear development and capability. 529 According to the 1983 CIA secret report, the US 
accessed North Korean nuclear weapon capability to be very low since there was no 
reliable information to believe that North Korea had a nuclear armament facility or 
nuclear materials. Moreover, for the delivery of nuclear weapon, the MIG 23 Aircraft 
was the only option for North Korea. 530  
 
In 1986, when North Korea activated the nuclear reactor that could produce weapon-
grade plutonium, the US did not seem to be particularly concerned. In the Cold War 
system, the US administrations trusted China and Soviet Union to a certain degree that 
they would prevent the nuclear armament of North Korea. 531 However, by 1988, the 
CIA began to question North Korea’s new nuclear reactor and in 1989, the CIA report 
revealed its concern on a rapid increase of nuclear activity from North Korea.532 In 
1991, during a visit to China, Reginald Bartholomew, the Under Secretary of State for 
International Security Affairs, expressed concerns that North Korean nuclear programme 
might possess a sufficient amount of plutonium for nuclear weapons by the mid-1990s 
and urged China to pressure North Korea to comply with the IAEA Safeguard 
                                                                
529 CIA, “North Korea: Delaying for Nuclear Weapon Development” 1986;  Robert Wampler, North Korea 
and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified US Record, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 
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531 Ibid, US Department of State, “US Department of State Briefing Paper”, 1985. 
532 Ibid, CIA, “ NORTH KOREA: Nuclear Program of Proliferation Concern”,1989. 
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Agreement.533 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the communist bloc in the early 1990s 
spurred the concerns on North Korean nuclear programme. It meant not only the loss of 
political and military protection for North Korea but also the dissipation of the Soviet 
Union’s deterrence on North Korean nuclear programme. Moreover, as North Korea 
failed to normalize relations with its Cold War adversaries, the diplomatic isolation of 
North Korea made Kim Il-Sung regime felt more vulnerable to survive. It was clearly 
revealed during the 1st high level meeting between South and North Korea on September 
1990. North Korea argued that if the existence of the tri-system - China, the Soviet 
Union and North Korea - was threatened, North Korea had no other option but to 
possess a nuclear weapon. 534  
 
Despite the abrupt change in international system, there seemed to be a way of solving 
North Korean nuclear programme in the early period of the post-Cold War. As the US 
president George Bush declared the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons that had 
been deployed all around the world, the nuclear warheads in South Korea were also 
withdrawn. In accordance to this action, the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on 
December 1991 and Inter-Korean Denuclearization Pact on December 31, 1991 were 
agreed. Although these were the agreements between North and South Korea, the US 
pressured North Korea to include not only the prohibition of plutonium reprocessing but 
also the enrichment of uranium.535 The US responded by cancelling the 1992 US- South 
Korea team spirit joint military exercise which had been held annually since 1976 and a 
direct talk between the U.S and North Korea was held on January 22, 1992.  
 
However, things started to change after the outbreak of the first Gulf War in 1991. 
Through the war, Iraq’s nuclear programme was revealed to be far more advanced and 
progressed than estimated, shocking the US and the international community. This 
caused a huge concern in regards to North Korean nuclear programme, causing the 
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IAEA and US to take a more hardliner stance towards the programme.    
 
Until 1991, IAEA inspections were limited to the nuclear facility and materials that were 
voluntarily reported by member states of the NPT. However, when Operation Desert 
Storm revealed information that Iraq, an NPT member state, had developed a nuclear 
weapon programme - the ‘crash program’ 536  - at a secret facility near the IAEA 
inspection site, the IAEA was accused of incompetence. Thus, IAEA changed its 
inspection to use any information provided by other member states of the NPT and 
perform a special inspection on any suspicious sites at any time. With its changed 
regulation, the IAEA could acquire confidential information from the member states’ 
Intelligence Agency and images from their Intelligence satellite.   
 
As North Korea was believed to have a similar nuclear facility as Iraq with their nuclear 
reactor, uranium enrichment programme and high explosive test site537, it soon became 
IAEA’s first target who wanted to put their new capabilities and regulstions to the test. On 
May 4, 1992, North Korea’s first nuclear report was submitted to the IAEA. According to 
the report, the IAEA initiated six inspections from May 1992 to January 1993.  
 
5.3.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy in  
the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
 
On January 1993, the IAEA requested a special inspection on two waste storage sites in 
Yongbyon that were discovered during the previous six inspections. It was an 
exceptional case since the IAEA had been inspecting the facilities where the NPT 
member state voluntarily provided. North Korea denied the IAEA’s request by asserting 
the two sites were military facilities, which was not under the remittance of the IAEA. 
North Korea denounced the request of the IAEA, saying that it was a criminal act by 
America in an attempt to disarm North Korea by utilizing the IAEA.538 
 
As the conflict between the IAEA and North Korea was not resolved, the Clinton 
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administration executed the team spirit military exercise on March 8, 1993 to pressure North 
Korea to comply with the IAEA’s request. (It was cancelled in 1992 for a rapprochement) The 
counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea was also initiated. North Korea thereupon 
announced a quasi-state of war and chose to withdraw from the NPT at the seventh session of 
the ninth Central People’s Committee on March 12, 1993. The deadline for North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the NPT was set to June 12, 1993, as the withdrawal from the NPT only 
becomes effective 90 days after the declaration. It worked as the ultimatum of North Korea’s 
counter coercive diplomacy since the US had to respond before that 90 days’ time line. On 29 
May 1993, North Korea tested the Rodong Missile which had a range of over 1000 km to 
pressure Clinton administration by showing its detternce power over South Korea and Japan.  
 
On April 5, 1993, to increase the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy, North Korea 
suggested direct talks with the US to solve the problem. The North Korean gesture 
successfully gathered international support.  On April 8, 1993, the Foreign Minister of China 
announced their position to support North Korea, adding that it was not clear whether North 
Korea possessed nuclear weapons. China urged the dialogue between the U.S and North 
Korea by arguing it would be a more efficient method in solving the problem.  
 
The direct talk with the US was the core objective of North Korea counter coercion at 
the height of the escalation in 1993.539 However, as shown in <Figure 5-2>,  the Clinton 
administration had to comply to North Korea request and initiate a high-level talks with 
North since the impact of North Korea’s withdrawal would influence the upcoming NPT 
review and the extension conference in 1995.  
 
During the first contention between the US and North Korea, the ‘asymmetry of 
motivation’ was slanted to North Korea. For the US, the negative impact of North 
Korean withdrawal of NPT to the extension conference was not a minor problem. 
Moreover, as given the direct talk to negotiate with North Korea for the full list IAEA 
inspection, it was not necessary for the US to raise the contention. Especially, since 
China and the regional ally, South Korea, wanted the high-level talks with the North, the 
‘strength of motivation’ of US coercive diplomacy could not be stronger than the 
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counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea.  
 
 
 
 
<Figure 5-2> The Contention of US-North Korea and the 1st Bilateral Talks of 1993 
 
 
 
 
During the first (June 2-11, 1993) and second round (July 14-19, 1993) of the high-level 
talks, the Clinton administration changed its stance to type A coercive diplomacy and 
provided many inducements; promises of continuous talks, the assurance of security and 
provision of a light water nuclear reactor which guarantees nuclear programme with less 
proliferation concern to North Korea. The hawkish analysts in Washington criticized the 
Clinton administration for being too weak against North Korea.540 However, as a result, 
when US congressman Gary Ackerman visited North Korea in October 1993, North 
Korea suggested a package deal that if the US ceased the team spirit exercises and 
nuclear threats against the North, then the North would accept the IAEA inspections 
before the third round of direct talks.541 In addition, during the direct talks, if the US 
agreed to provide a light water reactor and normalized relations with the North, North 
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Korea would agree with several other requests of the US.  
 
This package deal caused much debate in the Clinton administration since there was the 
possibility that North Korea was getting all the benefits without giving anything in 
return. However, implementation of type A coercive diplomacy was much rational 
policy choice for the US. The North Korean nuclear capability was not the level of grave 
threat in 1993 542  than risking the collapse of 1995 NPT review and extension 
conference. North Korea does not yet have the technology to minimize its nuclear 
warhead or the efficient nuclear explosive device. The US estimated if the nuclear 
deterrence of North Korea remains at a symbolic level, the overwhelming military 
superiority of the US is efficient enough to manage North Korean nuclear programme 
until it could achieve type C coercive diplomacy, the nonproliferation through regime 
change which was estimated within 10 years.543  
 
On June 11, 1993, a day before the designated date for North Korean withdrawal, the joint 
statement was announced and North Korea remained in NPT. However, no progress was 
made since North Korea and the IAEA could not reach an agreement about the level of the 
nuclear inspection. North Korea was very anxious about its exposure of full past nuclear 
activity. Since no one could estimate how the past nuclear activity would be used against 
North Korea,544 -it could trigger the total submission of North Korea- accepting the full 
IAEA inspection was the irrational choice for North Korean regime. The full exposure of 
nuclear capability meant North Korea’s loss of most efficient negotiation power in 
international community and the last bastion of possible nuclear deterrence which could be 
used as the last resort. For North Korea, these were the vital interests for its national 
security. However, there were discrepancies among the US, IAEA and the regional allies. 
While the US stance was more open to accept type A coercive diplomacy, the IAEA, Japan 
and South Korea wanted to verify past nuclear activity of North Korea for the complete 
dismantlement. Thus, the US coercive diplomacy had to set its ‘clarity of objective’ –
nuclear dismantlement or nuclear freeze-more prudently to create the ‘asymmetry 
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motivation’ for the behavioural change of North Korea.  
 
As the compensative inducement of the Clinton administration seemed to reach its limit, 
the Clinton administration began to prepare its coercive inducements. While providing 
the compensative inducements in the early stages of North Korea nuclear crisis, it 
sought to enhance the US escalation dominance over any provocation of North Korea; 
dispatching patriot antimissile batteries, expediting the delivery of Apache helicopters 
and Bradley armed vehicles, stationing an aircraft carrier and sending air and ground 
reinforcement.545 The Clinton administration also planned to implement an economic 
sanction and urged the UN Security Council, especially China, to set a resolution.546 
 
On January 25, in order to coerce North Korea to agree on an IAEA inspection, the Clinton 
administration disclosed their plan to deploy a patriot missile, one of the measures to 
reinforce the United States Force in Korea.547 Moreover, on January 31, the 1994 team spirit 
exercise was announced to be resumed if North Korea does not accept the IAEA inspection. 
North Korea reacted immediately by stating ‘the US is responsible for the all tragic outcome 
created by its treachery’. However, without any other options to legitimize its resistance, 
North Korea had to comply with the US demand and accept the IAEA Inspection.  The 
<Figure 5-3> shows the US coercive diplomacy that leads the compliance of North Korea. 
On February 15, North Korea agreed to an IAEA Inspection. The US secured the 
justification of coercive diplomacy by accepting North Korean demand for the talk and 
completed the following negotiation. Thus, when North Korea delayed the agreed joint 
statement of implementing the IAEA inspection, the US promptly redeployed its military to 
escalate the tension and ‘image of war’.  Lastly, by announcing the possible ‘team spirit’ 
military exercise, the US successfully coerced North Korea to accept IAEA inspection.   
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<Figure 5-3> The Contention of US - North Korea and the IAEA Inspection 
 
 
 
 
However, with the two sides making opposing claims, there was a clash between North 
Korea and the IAEA. The IAEA announced North Korea agreed to the inspection in its 
entirety, whereas North Korea claimed IAEA inspection is limited “exclusively to access 
North Korea’s commitment for safeguards agreement” 548 The conflict escalated and 
began to get serious after the IAEA ordered the withdrawal of inspectors from North 
Korea on March 15, 1994.   
 
The IAEA announced that they had been unable to verify through inspections whether 
North Korea exchanged the nuclear materials to nuclear weapons. On March 19, during 
the working-level talks for the exchange of envoys between North and South Korea, 
South Korea urged the North to approve of an IAEA inspection and threatened the North 
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with the possibility of imposing sanctions. Park Young Sun, North Korean delegation, 
responded, “We are ready to respond with an eye for an eye and war for war. Seoul is 
not far away from here. If a war breaks out, Seoul will become a sea of fire.”549 
 
When the bilateral talks began with the US in 1993, North Korea realized the US was more 
flexible on the verification issue of its past nuclear activity. Thus, North Korea actively 
implemented its counter coercive diplomacy to degrade the cooperation among the US, 
IAEA and South Korea. North Korea carried out diologue with the US with forward looking 
manner while dismissed the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission meeting and 
the IAEA’s demand of full list inspection.550 North Korea wanted to simplify the negotiation 
channel as bilateral talk with the US and secure its nuclear capability through diplomatic 
bargaining and escalation of the tension, so called the brinkmanship. 
 
However, the Clinton administration was prepared to secure escalation dominance on the 
crisis of North Korea. It was revealed on March 23, when Lee Byung Tae, the Minister of 
the National Defence of Korea revealed classified information on ‘Operational Plan 5027’ 
at the National Assembly Defence Committee. According to Lee, the combined forces of 
the ‘Operational Plan 5027’ of the US and the Republic of Korea already included 
retaliation to deter North Korean provocation. Thus, if the North caused any provocation, 
the combined forces would execute military action, which could be elevated to a unified 
military operation depending on the level of provocation from the North.”551 On April 
1994, US patriot antimissile batteries, Apache helicopters, tanks and advanced radar 
tracking control systems, arrived in South Korea. Additionally, the Clinton administration 
decided to mobilize support for sanctions in the UN Security Council. 
 
On April 19, 1994, North Korea notified the IAEA that they would be extracting spent 
fuel from the 5MW reactor to the IAEA. On May 8, opposition from the IAEA 
notwithstanding, North Korea proceeded with the extraction without the approval and 
supervision of the IAEA. It was the bold action of North Korea to eradicate the possibility 
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of verification on past nuclear activity. The North Korea clear displayed its ‘strength of 
motivation’ of counter coercive diplomacy that the nuclear freeze was the red-line.  
 
On May 18, 1994, the US Secretary of Defence, William Perry, held a military operation 
meeting at the Pentagon to execute a military strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facility in 
North Korea. The US immediately considered the military strike on North Korean 
nuclear cite. However, since the US evaluated the nuclear freeze would lead to the 
dismantlement, the ‘sense of urgency’ to implement violent coercive inducement could 
not be formed. Moreover, as the thoroughly simulated war scenarios showed that the 
results would end with tragedy, the Clinton administration decided to take diplomatic 
measures and with gradually increasing the coercion.552    
 
From May 17-24, the IAEA dispatched inspectors to Yongbyon for an additional inspection 
on their radiochemical laboratory and to confirm the extraction of spent fuel from the 5MW 
reactor. However, their request for a sample was denied and the majority of the related 
documents were found to be unreadable.553 On June 2, the IAEA announced its inability to 
verify the North’s past nuclear activity since all the spent fuel rod had been extracted.  
 
The US Department of State made a special announcement to cancel the third round 
talks with North Korea and the declared sanctions against North Korea would soon be 
discussed. On June 3, Kang Seok Ju, a North Korean delegate, denounced the US and 
would consider the sanction as a declaration of war. On June 13, North Korea withdrew 
from the IAEA and the tension reached its peak on the brink of war.  
 
However, US did not abandon its intention to talk with North Korea while economic 
sanctions and military coercion were being prepared. On June 15, 1994, former 
president Jimmy Carter was sent to North Korea to make a final attempt to talk. On that 
same day, the US was circulating a sanction draft on North Korea that was to be 
submitted at the UN Security Council. Moreover, in case of a veto from China, who had 
been unfavourable against the sanctions on North Korea, the US had already planned to 
form a coalition with South Korea and Japan to impose an autonomous sanction. 
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Fortunately, the talks between Jimmy Carter and Kim Il-Sung were successful. During 
the dialogue, Kim Il-Sung insisted North Korea wanted to build a nuclear energy 
programme but not nuclear armament. Thus, if US cooperated with them by providing a 
light water reactor, North Korea claimed they would dismantle their graphite-moderated 
reactor, re-join the NPT and hold a summit meeting with South Korea. Carter’s visit to 
North Korea proved to be a great deterrent in resolving the first North Korean nuclear 
crisis, which might have resulted in war. 
 
<Figure 5-4> The Contention of US - North Korea and the Geneva Agreed Framework 
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<Figure 5-5> The Chronicles of US-North Korea Contention to Geneva Agreed Framework 
 
 
 
The summit meeting between North and South Korea floundered due to the sudden 
death of Kim Il-Sung on July 8, 1994. However, as it progressed shown in <Figure 5-4> 
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and <Figure 5-5>, the third round talks of the US and North Korea was held in Geneva 
and as a result, on August 12, 1994, they reached an agreement to open a liaison office.  
 
Throughout the meeting, North Korea revealed its objective of the counter coercive 
diplomacy, the compensation for freezing its nuclear programme and the provision of 
security assurance from the US. On September 24, 1994, North Korean delegation 
representative and Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk Ju, announced North Korea would 
only freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and nuclear programme if the US guaranteed 
to provide the North with a light water reactor. Moreover, if the US deployed their 
aircraft carriers according to the rumours at the time, Kang Suk Ju threatened the US 
that all bilateral talks would be nullified.  
 
Although there was the possibility of North Korea possessing several nuclear warheads, 
the Clinton administration estimated North Korean nuclear capability could be managed 
and solved if the programme was frozen. Thus, the US preceded with type A coercive 
diplomacy and finally, on October 21, 1994, the first North Korean nuclear crisis ended 
by adapting the Geneva Agreed Framework.   
 
5.3.2.1 Results of the Contention: Geneva Agreed Framework 
 
The 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework was an actual treaty that included mandatory 
clauses to create binding forces on both sides.  The Geneva Agreed Framework consists 
of four articles; 1) cooperate to replace North Korean graphite-moderated reactors and 
related facilities with a light water reactor power plant, 2) normalize political and 
economic relations, 3) cooperate for peace and security in a nuclear free Korean 
peninsula 4) have North Korea remain in the NPT and strengthen the NPT regime.554 
 
The opinions among scholars diverge on the Geneva Agreed Framework. The group of 
scholars who see it as positive asserts the Geneva Agreed Framework opens North 
Korea to special inspections that make it possible to resolve North Korea’s ‘past nuclear 
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capability’. Moreover, they evaluated the Geneva Agreed Framework as having 
strengthened the NPT regime since it froze the nuclear programme of North Korea, 
guaranteed IAEA inspections on any future North Korean nuclear activities and made 
possible the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme. 555   
Oppositely, the group of scholars who view it negatively insists the Geneva Agreed 
Framework is a bad precedent that provided a light water reactor and alternative energy 
to an outlaw state, which only inspired other states to do the same. They evaluated the 
Geneva agreed framework is nothing more than the US submitting to nuclear threats 
from North Korea and paying the ransom to support their ill intentions.556 
 
The determining factor among scholars evaluating the US coercive diplomacy on 1st 
North Korean nuclear crisis as either a success or a failure is how they see the role of 
Jimmy Carter. Those who evaluated Carter’s visit as an external factor that happened by 
chance claim that the US coercive diplomacy was a failure, whereas the other side that 
sees it as a persuasive inducement of America’s coercive diplomacy see it as a success.  
 
According to William Drennan, since Carter’s visit to North Korea was not planned and 
military conflict between the US and North Korea was inevitable without this accidental 
visit, he argues the US coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration was a 
failure.557 However, the coercive diplomacy of the Clinton administration during the 
process of the first North Korea nuclear crisis was considerable success since the 
dramatic resolution of Carter’s visit is due to the successful implementation of the 
coercive diplomacy that created favourable conditions such as the ‘Asymmetry of 
Motivation’, ‘Sense of Urgency’ and ‘Unacceptability of Threatened Escalation’ and the 
‘Image of War’ on North Korea  During the interview with Se-Hyun Cheung, the former 
minister of unification of Republic of Korea, he revealed the Clinton administration 
demanded the Kim Young Sam government to accept the Carter’s offer of ‘at the spot’ 
negotiation with Kim Il-Sung indicates the intention of Clinton to send Jimmy Carter as 
special envoy.558   
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As mentioned above, indeed the clauses of the Geneva Agreed Framework includes the 
objective of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy, compensation for freezing its 
nuclear programme, political and economic normalization and secured the deterrence of 
the US military threat. However, it was the part of the US strategy that to freezes North 
Korean nuclear programmes and dismantles it later. Many of the US generals and 
experts in the political circle at Washington believed the collapse of North Korea was 
near.559  Since it takes more than 10 years to build a light water reactor, the Clinton 
administration believed it would be a sufficient time for North Korea to collapse or at 
least squeeze them to abandon their nuclear programme during the process.560 Moreover, 
the US also achieved a platform and process to derive the dismantlement of North 
Korean nuclear programme.  
 
However, the Geneva agreement lacks favourable conditions for the success of the 
coercive diplomacy, ‘Clarity Concerning the Precise Terms of Settlement of the Crisis’. 
As it stated that ‘when a significant portion of the light water reactor is completed, but 
before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPKR, North Korea will come into full 
compliance with its safeguard Agreement with the IAEA’, the third clause article 4 of 
Geneva agreed framework was full of ambiguity and discrepancies. North Korea 
claimed that the IAEA inspection was limited to verifying the freezing of its nuclear 
programme, whereas the US insisted that the inspection also included verifying the 
accumulated North Korean nuclear capability prior to that point. Moreover, since the 
definition of the ‘significant portion of the LWR project’ was ambiguous, it could not 
seal the agreement to end the nuclear contention. The process to the Geneva agreed 
framework was considerable success of US coercive diplomacy. However, the Geneva 
agreed framework itself was a considerable failure since it already created future crisis 
as the beginning.  
  
 
5.3.3 The Missile Negotiations and the Increased Deterrence of North Korea 
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After signing the Geneva Agreed Framework, the US attempted to prohibit North 
Korea’s missile development and the exportation of its technology to limit North Korean 
nuclear capability. Throughout the two terms of the Clinton administration, six rounds 
of missile talks were held between the US and North Korea to curb North Korea’s 
missile development: first round: April 20-21, 1996, second round: June 11-13, 1997, 
third round: October 1-2, 1998, fourth round: March 29-30, 1999, fifth round: July 10-12, 
2000, sixth round: November 1-3, 2000 
 
The missile development of North Korea was not merely a regional security problem. 
As North Korean missile system proved its capability of strike on all of South Korea and 
much of Japan, it could initiate the arms race in North East Asia in any time. Moreover, 
the possibility of North Korean chemical and biological weapons to be loaded as the war 
head was grave threat to the US’ crucial allies of the region. The proliferation of missile 
technology was another critical issue. Although it was seized in 1994, Israel was already 
on the negotiation with North Korea to stop the missile exportation to Middle Eastern 
countries by 1992. 561  It was global security threat on the proliferation of WMD. 
Moreover, it was one of the critical measures which North Korean utilizes to increase 
the enforcement cost of the US coercive diplomacy.  Therefore, the US wanted to coerce 
North Korea to join the Missile Technology Control Regime to limit North Korean 
missile development and its exportation. 
 
The US utilized possible ease of sanction and remove of North Korea from state 
sponsors of terrorism to induce North Korea to join MTCR. North Korea refuted the US 
by arguing the missile development, production and deployment as the right of self-
defence and dismissed the offer. However, after the successful launch of Intermediate-
range ballistic missile, North Korea separated the issue and announced the possible 
negotiation on arms embargo to the third party. It was the clear statement of North 
Korea that its objective of counter coercive diplomacy would be the securement of 
missile deterrence and the acquiring the compensation.  
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The first and second round of the missile talks ended without reaching an agreement. 
However, as mentioned, it started to heat up from the third round of the talks after North 
Korea test-fired the Taepo Dong 1 missile on August 31, 1998. It was the calculated 
counter coercive diplomacy of North Korea to induce the US to make an offer of more 
compensation by displaying its increased missile capability. Before North Korea tested 
the Taepo Dong 1 missile, the US estimated North Korea was developing a two-stage 
rocket missile. However, Taepo Dong 1 was designed as a three-stage rocket, which 
could be used as a space launch vehicle. That is, contrary to the estimations of the CIA, 
the Taepo Dong 1 project of North Korea meant the development of the Inter-
continental Ballistic Missile.562 
 
According to Joseph S. Bermudez, if the 3-stage Taepo Dong missile is real 3 stage 
space launch vehicle as North Korea claims, it could deliver a 200kg warhead into the 
middle of the US and if the warhead was 100kg, it would reach Washington D.C. 
Moreover, if the larger North Korean Missile, Taepo Dong 2, was designed as a three-
stage rocket, he asserted that it could deliver 700-1000kg warheads with a maximum 
range of 6700km.563 CIA intelligence officer Robert D. Walpole’s assertion was the 
same as that of Joseph S. Bermudez’s. According to Walpole, the original two-stage 
Taepo Dong 1 could deliver several hundred kg warheads up to a 2000km distance. 
However, if it was designed as a three-stage rocket missile, its maximum range would 
reach up to 5500km and if North Korea was able to miniaturize the warhead, the 
maximum range of the missile would increase accordingly.564  
 
The Taepo Dong 1 test in 1998, which displayed North Korea’s missile capability, was a 
shock to the US since it meant North Korea had a considerable amount of deterrence on 
the US coercive diplomacy. The level of North Korean missile technology and the 
danger of it being exported were enough to draw concerns of the US. Although, the 
missile capability of North Korea was not enough that they could confront the US, the 
level of its missile development was sufficient enough to deter the allies of the US, 
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namely South Korea and Japan. Therefore, with their ability to strike South Korea and 
Japan, North Korea achieved an indirect deterrence on the US and the US coercive 
diplomacy.  
 
The third round of US-North Korea missile talks was held in New York a month later on 
October 1-2, 1998. After North Korea’s missile test, it was more of the U.S sending 
North Korea a warning rather than a negotiation. The US requested North Korea to 
terminate the missile test and its missile exportation in exchange for easing economic 
sanctions. However, North Korea denied the offer since easing sanctions was already 
included in the Geneva Agreed Framework.   
 
The fourth round of talks was held in Pyongyang on March 29-30, 1999. The agenda of 
the talks was focused on the exportation of North Korean missile and North Korea 
joining the Missile Technology Control Regime. Again, the talks ended without coming 
to any agreement. According to Robert Einhorn, the Assistant Secretary of State, who 
was the US representative at the fourth round of talks, ‘North Korea requested 
compensation should they cease to export missiles and was subsequently denied’.565 
 
The difference between the US and North Korea was clearly revealed at the fifth round 
of bilateral missile talks in Kuala Lumpur on July 2000. Jang Chang Sun, North Korean 
representative and the American Affairs director of North Korean Foreign ministry, held 
a press conference that ‘North Korea requested corresponding compensation for any 
restraint on North Korean missile programme, which is a matter of its sovereignty’. 
According to his statement, North Korea demanded 10 billion US dollars for not 
exporting North Korean missiles or technology to a third party. Moreover, he stated 
missile development and placement within North Korea was not negotiable.  
 
The sixth round of missile talks was held in Kuala Lumpur on November 1-3, 2000. The 
agenda and focus of the talks switched to negotiations on North Korean space rocket, 
since the stalemate on the missile development of North Korea was too difficult to solve 
at the time. The US offered to launch North Korean satellite excluding the participation 
of North Korean experts and in return, they requested North Korea stop developing 
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missiles that exceeded the maximum range of 1500km. However, North Korea 
postulated its right to the presence of their own experts and the right of developing a 
space launch vehicle, ultimately denying the demands of the US. 
The US engaged the negotiation to coerce North Korea to join MTCR and abandon it 
missile technology of 300km maximum range. Although the US sustained its escalation 
dominance on any provocation of North Korea, the circumstances were not favourable 
to the US to induce the behavioural change of North Korea. As Geneva agreed 
framework already being agreed, the US could not escalate tension to implement the 
‘image of war’. Moreover, since the missile development and capability was vital 
interest that related to the regime security of North Korea, the US inducement of calling 
off the sanction, technical aid on space launch vehicle and delisting the state sponsor on 
terrorism cannot create the ‘asymmetry of motivation’ to the US which would favour the 
coercive diplomacy to bring behavioural change of North Korea. During the Clinton 
administration, North Korea achieved its missile capability which becomes efficient 
means to increase the enforcement cost against the US coercive diplomacy. 
 
5.4 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Bush Administration and the 
Counter Coercive Diplomacy of North Korea 
 
5.4.1 Background  
 
After Bush’s inauguration on January 21, 2001, the Bush administration adopted a more 
hard-line stance on North Korea compared to previous the Clinton administration. The 
Bush administration concluded the Geneva Agreed Framework to be a failure and 
revealed its aversion towards North Korean regime and Kim Jong-Il. 
 
Robert Joseph, the NSC Senior Director for Non-Proliferation for the first term of the Bush 
administration, postulated the Geneva Agreed Framework to be an appeasement policy that 
provided a lifeline for North Korean regime. Therefore, he believed the Geneva Agreed 
Framework needed to be abolished and such similar agreements prevented in the future.566 
John Bolton, who was appointed as the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
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International Security, was also determined that the Geneva Agreed Framework was exploited 
by North Korea.567  
 
Soon after the start of his term, the Bush administration suspended all the negotiations 
with North Korea and formed a committee on March 12, 2001 to reappraise North 
Korean policy. As a result, the comprehensive policy review was derived on June 6, 
2001 which recommended continuous talks with North Korea. However, Bush 
administration was concerned about the possible North Korean manipulation of Geneva 
Agreed Framework for nuclear armament. According to Victor Cha, the Bush 
administration was convinced in determining North Korean regime as ‘evil’ through 
North Korea policy review.568 Thus, As Bush stated on the completion of North Korean 
policy review, the US included the renegotiation of the Geneva Agreed Framework as 
the agenda of the bilateral talk. 
 
The renegotiation of the agreed Geneva Agreed Framework was the critical deterioration 
in the theory of coercive diplomacy. If the coercee thinks that there will be another 
request or demand after complying, the motivation to agree is declined. Moreover, it 
was the renegotiation to an agreement which was finalized 7 years ago. The excessive 
demand of the US later becomes the obstacle to consolidate international support and 
multilateral coercion that provide North Korea to implement its counter coercive 
diplomacy.  
 
On September 30, 2001, the US Department of Defence submitted the QDR report to 
Congress. The report was to prevent threats against the security defence of the US 
Mainland, the prevention of the asymmetry weapon threat and the establishment of the 
US strategy based on its asymmetry weapon capability. The QDR aimed to deter and 
prevent any threats or challenges to the US’ national interest. In addition, if the 
deterrence failed, it approved pre-emptive use of all the US’ military options to prevent 
further challenges. The QDR was bolstered by the Nuclear Posture Review, which was 
announced in January 2002. The NPR stated seven countries that could be attacked by 
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US nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear states, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria 
were included along with the nuclear weapon states, Russia and China.569 
 
On January 29, 2002, President Bush delivered the State of Union address, which 
labelled North Korea, Iran and Iraq as the ‘Axis of evil’. Moreover, on September 2002, 
the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which allows a pre-
emptive strike on rogue states and adversaries, was announced. Although it stated ‘the 
United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should 
nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression’, the Bush administration did not 
strictly distinguish the concepts between the pre-emptive and preventive strike to create 
a favourable environment in implementing its unilateral coercive diplomacy.570 It also 
denied distinguishing terrorists and the state that sponsored terrorism and stated that the 
US would not hesitate to act alone to exercise its right to self-defence. 
 
At the 1st US-North Korea bilateral talks of its term, the Bush administration revealed 
the existence of North Korean HEU programme and announced no further 
implementation for Geneva agreed frame work unless North Korea accepts the IAEA 
special inspection to come clean with the US accusation. However, the execution of 
coercive diplomacy without clear evidence on North Korean violation and existence of 
HEU programme seriously damages its justification. Moreover, the US had agreed in the 
article 3, provision 1 of Geneva agreed framework as ‘will provide formal assurances 
threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US’. Thus, the weakly justified US coercive 
diplomacy not only failed to derive multilateral coercion to induce North Korean nuclear 
dismantlement but lead to the 2nd North Korean nuclear crisis.  
 
5.4.1.1 The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
 
On June 6, 2001, the Bush administration announced the preconditions for the dialogue 
with North Korea. However, bilateral talks did not commence since North Korea 
rejected the preconditions, the dismantlement of its nuclear programme. The stalemate 
lasted about a year since the US announced a series of hard-line policy review reports on 
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North Korea after 9/11. The request of renegotiation is the one of the condition which 
degrades the coercive diplomacy; the coercer has to guarantee that the current surrender 
will not lead to more requests to the opponent. However, Bush administration 
inaugurated its presidency by demanding more requests which were already agreed.  
 
On October 3, 2002, US delegations led by James Kelly visited North Korea to initiate 
the first bilateral talks of the Bush administration. However, there was friction from the 
onset of the negotiation. On the first day of the talks, James Kelly asserted the existence 
of North Korean HEU programme and demanded its dismantlement as a precondition 
for any further negotiations. The negotiation partner, Kang Suk Ju, the first Vice 
Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, criticized the absurdity of the US’ 
accusations on uranium enrichment by comparing it to their prior wrongful suspicions of 
the Kumchang-ri and urged them to focus on the normalization agenda of the US and 
North Korea. 
 
On the second day of the talks, James Kelly re-questioned North Korea on their HEU 
programme. As Kang Suk Ju replied “with the current relationship of the US and North 
Korea, we cannot discuss the matter like gentlemen. If we disarm ourselves we will 
become like the Taliban, beaten to death….What is wrong with us having our own 
uranium enrichment programme? We are entitled to possess our own UEP, and we are 
bound to produce more powerful weapons than that”, it was considered a confession to 
the existence of North Korean HEU programme. 571 
 
On October 16, 2002, the Bush administration revealed this statement that North Korea 
admitted the UEP programme which violates the Geneva Agreed Framework.572 Thus, 
the Bush administration demanded the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear 
programme as a precondition to any further negotiation. North Korea refused to comply 
with the US’ demands and responded with its counter coercive diplomacy that leads to 
the second North Korean nuclear crisis. 
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If North Korea had truly developed a clandestine HEU nuclear programme as accused by 
the US, it meant not only the violation of the Geneva Agreed Framework but also the 1992 
Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, NPT and the IAEA 
Safeguard agreement as a whole. That is, if North Korean violation was true, the US had 
acquired the high position to implement the coercive diplomacy on North Korea. As 
Alexander George stated, if the coercee clearly violates international regulations and law, it 
favours the coercer to implement the ‘defensive form’ of the coercive diplomacy and easily 
achieve ‘adequate domestic and international support’. However, the accusation of the Bush 
administration against North Korea was far-fetched.  
 
The Bush administration failed to produce any evidence of North Korean uranium 
enrichment programme other than the confession of Abdul Qadeer Khan. 573  Based on 
Khan’s confession, the US intelligence agency wrote a report that assumed North Korea had 
duplicated tens of thousands of nuclear centrifuges from Khan’s 20 centrifuges to establish 
its UEP.574 Although Joseph DeTrani, the mission manager for North Korea from the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence analysed actual existence of the UEP was at a mid-
confidence level’,575 the Bush administration was confident about North Korea’s intention 
to acquire the UEP. However, they did not have any clear evidence of the actual existence of 
North Korea’s UEP.   
 
Since the LEU is the sovereign rights of a state for the peaceful use of Atomic energy, if 
North Korean development was bound to LEU level and the nuclear fuel was yet to be 
injected to the nuclear centrifuges, the construction of nuclear facility itself was not the 
clear breach of the IAEA agreement. The lack of firm evidence and not distinguishing 
between HEU and LEU, which is permissible within the NPT regime, would degrade the 
future US foreign policy on North Korea. Unfortunately, it soon revealed in reality. 
 
The coercive diplomacy is highly context-dependent. Thus, ‘Type of provocation’, a 
clear attempt of violation of North Korea helps the US obtaining international and 
domestic support. It helps to cut off North Korea’s international backing or protection 
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from its allies. Contrary, the weakly justified US coercive diplomacy cannot create 
domestic and international support to implement efficient coercion to North Korea. 
Moreover, it is easily counter plotted by coercee to decrease the incompliant cost from the 
coercion that would only make the coercer difficult to induce the behavioural change of the 
Coercee.  The Bush’s consistent implementation of coercive diplomacy which lacked in its 
justification increasingly damaged US coercive diplomacy. As it made the efficient 
inducement on North Korea to diminish, it also affected the coercive diplomacy of Obama 
administration. 
 
According to Michael F. Mazzar, it was a great opportunity for hardliners of the Bush 
administration to kill the Geneva Agreed Framework and implement a new US coercive 
diplomacy on North Korean nuclear programme. Therefore, he evaluated the revelation 
of North Korean UEP by James Kelly at the bilateral talks was a sign that the hardliners 
won the initiative of North Korean policy within the Bush administration.576 According 
to Glenn Kessler, the hardliners of the Bush administration was resolved to nullify the 
Geneva Agreed Framework since the US could no longer delay providing light water 
reactor supplies to North Korea. 577 
 
North Korea refused to neither deny nor confirm the accusations of the US that North 
Korea had the UEP. On October 25, 2002, the Korean Central News Agency explained 
the statement of Kang Suk Ju as “North Korea has made it very clear to the special 
envoy of the US President that North Korea is entitled to possess not only nuclear 
weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty 
and right to existence from the ever growing nuclear threat by the US”. However, it 
declined to verify the existence of the UEP.578  
 
If the US intended to execute type B or tacit type C coercive diplomacy on North Korea 
and denies the negotiation and diologue, it creates more favourable environment for 
North Korea to implement its counter coercive diplomacy. It is because North Korea is 
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easy to counter plot the US coercion with displaying its ‘sense of urgency’ with 
belligerence to advent it’s nuclear and missile development. Therefore, it is rational 
choice of North Korea to increase the tension when facing the weakly justified US 
coercive diplomacy for maximization of its interest.  
Thus, when the US delegation led by James Kelly revealed North Korea UEP and 
requested the dismantlement of its UEP as the precondition for any further negotiations, 
North Korea decided to respond with their counter coercive diplomacy. The North 
Korean foreign ministry stated, “if the US recognizes the sovereignty of North Korea, 
supports North Korean economic development and signs the nonaggression pact, which 
includes the nuclear strike, North Korea is then ready to resolve any US security 
concerns caused by North Korea.”579 
 
 
5.4.2 The Contention of the Coercive and Counter Coercive Diplomacy in the 
Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
 
5.4.2.1 US’ ‘Try and See’ Coercive Diplomacy and North Korea’s Denial 
 
When the second North Korean nuclear crisis began on October 2002, the policy’s 
priority of the Bush administration was on Iraq. 580  Since North Korean nuclear 
programme was pushed back on the Bush administration’s priority list, the US 
implemented a ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy on North Korea and monitored the 
situation closely. After the controversial bilateral talks with North Korea, the Bush 
administration emphasized the necessity of policy change on North Korea and set the 
dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme as a precondition for any further 
negotiation.  
 
On November 7, 2002, President Bush stated the US would implement diplomatic 
coercion to North Korea with its neighbouring states: China, South Korea, Japan and 
Russia. 581  However, diplomatic coercion was the initial strategy of the coercive 
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diplomacy. On the same day of President Bush’s press conference, the Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell stated “all comprehensive measures must be put on the table to 
induce North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program.”582 
 
As North Korea denied accepting the US’ request of the dismantlement of its nuclear 
programme, the Bush administration decided to go a little further to coerce North Korea 
with the ‘Gradual Turning of the Screw’. The US immediately abrogated the Geneva 
Agreed Framework and ceased the energy provision that had been guaranteed in the 
agreement. On November 14, 2002, through the KEDO executive Board meeting, the 
decision to cut off the annual provision of heavy fuel oil to North Korea from December 
2002 was made, if North Korea did not dismantle its UEP. Again, since the US firstly 
violated the implementation of Geneva agreed framework, it degraded the justification 
of the US coercive diplomacy.   
 
5.4.2.2 The Collapse of the Geneva Agreed Framework and the US’s ‘Gradual 
Turning of the Screw’ 
                          
North Korea immediately denounced the US for violating the Geneva Agreed 
Framework. The Foreign Ministry of North Korea announced “the only clause of the 
treaty that had been kept by the US has now been finally breached”. 583  
 
Although North Korea is accused of making empty promises and the strategy of 
‘brinkmanship’, there were elements that US’s breach of the agreement; 1) North Korea 
would freeze their graphite-moderated reactor and related facilities on the condition that 
the US would provide a light water reactor before the end of 2003. However, the light 
water reactor had not yet been provided. 2) Although the Geneva Agreed Framework 
guaranteed the security assurance from the nuclear weapons of the US, the policy 
reviews of the US included North Korea as a possible target of its nuclear arms. 3) The 
inspection on North Korean nuclear facility and programme was agreed to be performed 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63868. 
582 George Gedda, “Powell: N. Korea Danger to Neighbors”, Associated Press, Nov 8, 2002. 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2002/Powell-N-Korea-Danger-to-
Neighbors/id1dce0b5fff73742dece4a9ba8fa59f18 
583 Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang, November 21, 2002.  
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after the light water reactor project was fully completed. However, the US unilaterally 
demanded North Korea to accept extra inspection before the provision of light water 
reactor by accusing North Korea had violated the Geneva agreed Framework. 
 
Since the concern of North Korean nuclear armament is caused by the security threat of 
the US, North Korea counter demand non-aggression treaty of US for its nuclear 
dismantlement. It was an efficient strategy of North Korea since a rejection of US would 
damage the coercive diplomacy in consolidating international support.  
 
As witnessed from the unwillingness of North Korea to comply with the coercive 
diplomacy, the Bush administration executed a more violent coercive measure to North 
Korea, seizing a North Korean vessel. On December 9, 2002, a multilateral force led by 
a US executed naval operation, ‘Task force 150,’ captured vessel Sosan with the excuse 
that it had not hoisted a national flag. Through inspection of the Sosan vessel, 15 scud 
missiles heading to Yemen were found. However, as Ari Fleischer, a spokesman of the 
White House, admitted, the US has no right to confiscate the cargo of a foreign state in 
international waters. Thus, the US had to release the vessel.  
 
The seizure of Sosan vessel had an impact on both the US and North Korea. It was the 
point where North Korea stopped relying only on diplomatic negotiations and initiated 
its aggressive counter coercive diplomacy. 584  Since the legitimacy of US coercive 
diplomacy was weak on capturing the Sosan Vessel, it gave a room for North Korea to 
reinforce its counter coercive diplomacy against the US coercion.  
 
North Korea did not officially lift its freeze of the nuclear programme when the Bush 
administration decided to stop its energy supply as agreed on in the Geneva Agreed 
Framework. It seems North Korea wanted to solve the dispute in a diplomatic diologue 
and restore relations with the US. However, after the seizure of the Sosan vessel, North 
Korea decided to execute its counter coercive diplomacy. On December 12, 2002, one 
day after the release of Sosan, North Korea sent a letter to the IAEA and stated they 
would reactivate the nuclear programme, which they had frozen since 1994.  
                                                                
584 Jofi Joseph, “The proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?” Arms Control 
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On December 21, 2002, North Korea unsealed the 5MW nuclear reactors in Yongbyon, and 
then unsealed the spent fuel storage of 8,000 spent fuel rods that could be reprocessed to 
extract plutonium on December 22, 2002. On December 23, 2002, North Korea unsealed 
their nuclear reprocess facility, the Yongbyon radiochemistry laboratory.  
 
On January 10, 2003, North Korea once again withdrew from the NPT. Although North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the NPT meant the possibility of nuclear armament without any restraint, 
North Korea explained that their nuclear programme would only be limited to peaceful use and 
to produce electricity.585 It was strategy of North Korea to lower its incompliant cost of the US 
coercive diplomacy that would be imposed after the withdrawal of NPT. The <Figure 5-6> 
explains how the contention leads to the 2nd North Korea nuclear crisis.  
 
The covert missile exportation of North Korea to Yemen was ethically reprehensible in 
international community. However, since North Korea is not the member of MTRC, it was 
not the violation of any legal binding law. The illegitimate seizure of a Ship in international 
water could be considered as the declaration of a war in any sovereign state. The unjustified 
US coercive diplomacy was a great opportunity for North Korea to counter coerce. Thus, it 
swiftly declared the withdrawal of NPT, extracted the spent fuel from the nuclear reactor 
and unsealed its reprocessing facility without creating the discontent of international 
community and successfully enhanced its capability of counter coercive diplomacy.      
 
<Figure 5-6> The Collapse of Geneva Agreed Framework and 
 the 2nd North Korea Nuclear Crisis 
                                                                
585 Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang, Jan 10, 2003.  
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5.4.2.3 The Multilateral Coercive Diplomacy on North Korean Nuclear Programme 
 
The objective of Bush’s coercive diplomacy was the prompt Complete Verifiable 
Irreversible Dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme. Therefore, the US set 
the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme as a precondition and sustained 
it to coerce North Korea. However, North Korea refused the demands of the US and 
decided to counter coerce by withdrawing from the NPT. Thus, in order to be more 
efficient in their coercion, the Bush administration decided to implement a multilateral 
frame on North Korean nuclear programme.  
 
There were various opinions on whether the bilateral or multilateral frame would work 
better for North Korea.586 However, the Bush administration wanted to put North Korea 
in a multilateral frame since it evaluated the bilateral talks of the Clinton administration 
as a mistake that ended with the Geneva Agreed Framework. The Bush administration 
saw the bilateral environment as limiting the measures and assets of the US in coercing 
North Korea. In an interview with ABC News on March 10, 2003, Condoleezza Rice, 
the US National Security Advisor stated “We have to bring the weight of the 
                                                                
586 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three president and the Crisis of American Superpower, Basic 
Books, New York, 2008, p.103.; Henry A. Kissinger, “U.S. shouldn't again fall for bilateral negotiations 
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Kyungnam University Press, 2004, pp.59-60.;  Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story 
of How North Korea Got the Bomb, Brookings Institution Press, 2007, pp. 163-168. 
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international community, in a multilateral fashion…so that North Koreans know that 
there is no way out… will bring maximum pressure on North Korea to actually this time 
not just freeze its weapons of mass destruction but begin to dismantle them”, She 
dismissed the suggestion of direct bilateral talks.587  
 
The objective of North Korean counter strategy on the coercive diplomacy of the Bush 
administration was the same as that of the Clinton administration, to receive 
compensation for decrement or freeze of its nuclear capability and receiving security 
assurance from the US. Thus, North Korea pursued the bilateral talks, which would be 
more convenient to be guaranteed the security assurance and the compensation from the 
US. As North Korea asserted “since the concern of North Korean nuclear development 
is due to the hostile policy of the US, there is no reason to discuss North Korean nuclear 
program with any other state except the US as they hold the key to a resolution”, 588 
North Korea did not want to be placed in a multilateral environment which would 
increase the incompliant cost for its counter coercive diplomacy.  
 
After North Korea declared it would unfreeze the nuclear programme on December 22, 2002, 
the Bush administration executed more severe inducements to pressure North Korea to accept 
the multilateral negotiation. On March 2, 2003, the US Air Force’s reconnaissance aircraft, the 
R-135 Cobra Ball, deliberately flew over North Korea Air Defence Zone which might have 
initiated the armed conflict.589 On March 5, 2003, the US revealed the reinforcement of 24 
aircraft bombers, B-52 and B-1 at Guam’s US Airbase and explained its objective to support a 
pre-emptive strike if necessary on North Korean nuclear facilities. 590  To back up Bush’s 
statement, the redeployed bombers executed a tactical nuclear strike exercise at the Anderson 
Airbase.591 On March 5, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld, the Minister of National Defence, revealed 
the redeployment plan of the USFK from out of North Korean artillery range. This was 
announced without prior consultation with South Korea. The redeployment plan could be 
                                                                
587 Condoleezza Rice, Interview with the ABC, Mar 10, 2003. 
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considered as the abandonment of the ‘human trip wire’ and a pre-step towards a pre-emptive 
strike on North Korea.  
 
North Korea was highly threatened by the US coercive diplomacy. North Korean leader 
Kim Jong-Il did not attend the annual Supreme People’s Assembly for the first time in 
six years592 and organized a council of war for 40 days at a military bunker. Kim Jong-Il 
cancelled all his activities from February to April 2003.  
  
The Bush administration did not only implement the coercive inducement but also 
utilized the persuasive inducement to maximize its coercive diplomacy. Although North 
Korea neglected the US’ offer and demanded a legal binding nonaggression treaty,593 
Bush’s presidential letter, which guarantees the security of North Korean regime, was 
delivered to degrade the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of North Korean counter coercive 
diplomacy. 
 
Regardless of implementing the unjustified and weakly justified coercions that degraded 
the US coercive diplomacy, Bush administration successfully escalated the tension to 
display its ‘sense of urgency’, ‘image of war’ and credibility of coercion. However, it 
was not sufficient to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme which 
would be the most critical bargaining chip to compete with soon to be escalated US 
coercion. Admittedly, the US coercive diplomacy successfully implemented the ‘image 
of war’ not only to Kim Jung-Il but also the neighbouring states to participate in North 
Korean nonproliferation. However, as North Korea ministry of defence stated ‘will 
retaliate against military action with military action and war with war’,594 it also induced 
North Korea to strengthen its motivation for counter coercive diplomacy to prepare the 
war game and reinitiate its nuclear programme.   
 
 5.4.2.4 The Shift of the Strategic Environment: The End of the Iraq War and the 
Establishment of the Multilateral Frame 
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The stalemate between the US and North Korea continued since neither one of them 
backed down and claimed a different frame of negotiation, multilateral for the US and 
bilateral negotiations for North Korea. However, the swift victory of the US in the Iraq 
war brought a favourable strategic environment for the US.  
 
North Korea appealed to the international community not to support or realign with US 
military action and insisted the bilateral talks would be the solution without any armed 
conflict. Russia and China also emphasized the necessity of direct talks and urged the 
US to accept bilateral negotiations with North Korea. However, the possibility of 
bilateral talks diminished as the US achieved swift victory in the Iraq war.  
 
The outbreak of the Iraq war displayed the willingness and capability of US military 
action that enhance ‘the strength of motivation ‘of coercive diplomacy. By witnessing 
the US’ preparation and execution of the Iraq war, China who insisted the fulfilment of 
the Geneva Agreed Framework and direct bilateral talks was seriously concerned North 
Korean nuclear programme would be the next target. China did not want an escalation of 
tension or an armed conflict in Korean peninsula, which would be a great harm to its 
national interest. Thus, China changed its stance and put an effort to arrange multilateral 
negotiations regarding North Korean nuclear programme. 
 
The policy change of China could be referred to as a success of the US coercive 
diplomacy. The Bush administration displayed ‘Asymmetry of Motivation’, ‘Sense of 
Urgency’ and ‘Strong Leadership’ on North Korean nuclear programme by releasing a 
consistent policy review and implementing it to an action. On March 8, 2003, Qian 
Qichen, the Vice Premier of the State Council, visited North Korea to demand a 
multilateral five-party talk. When North Korea rejected the request during the meeting, 
Qian Qichen amended the request to a three-party talks.  
The acceptance of multilateral talks was disadvantage on North Korea. However, 
attaining the bilateral talks with the US was not a vital interest of North Korea which 
could risk the possibility of military intervention or strike from the US military who had 
just gain their confidence from the victory in Iraq. Moreover, the three party talks that 
includes long-standing ally, China, was not far different from bilateral talks. In this 
circumstance, North Korea’s ‘motivation of strength’ of securing the bilateral talks 
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cannot be stronger than that of the US’s on multilateral talks. As it is indicated in 
<Figure 5-7>, <Figure 5-8>, the US successfully increased its coercion to induce North 
Korea to accept the multilateral talks.595 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 5-7> The Success of U.S and the Three Party Talks of 2003 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 5-8> The Chronicle of Contention to Three Party Talks of 2003 
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5.4.2.5 Three-Party Talks: Absence of Negotiation  
 
On April 23, 2003, the three-party talks was held in Beijing. However, As Colin Powell 
stipulated the three-party talks as “a way of bringing three countries in a multilateral 
setting”,596 there were differences in the negotiation posture of the US and North Korea. 
The US regarded the three-party talks was a pre-meeting for further expanded 
multilateral talks, whereas North Korea wanted to derive a substantial agreement 
through the negotiation. Thus, when North Korea presented a package deal of a four 
phase process, the so-called ‘bold resolution’, the US ignored the proposal and repeated 
its demand for dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme.  
 
Due to the irreconcilable differences, the tension was high between the US and North 
Korea. On the second day of the talks, North Korea’s chief delegation, Lee Keun, 
announced North Korea would not participate in the plenary session if the US refused 
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the bilateral meeting. As the US responded that there will be no bilateral negotiation, the 
three-party talks ended a day earlier than its schedule. Although it ended without 
deriving an agreement, both sides agreed to meet again. 
 
As Larry A. Niksch evaluated that the US’ strategy at the three-party talks was more 
towards to regime change or diplomatic surrender of North Korea,597 the three-party 
talks was far from a negotiation. It was rather a theatre where US displayed its strong 
will towards North Korean nuclear dismantlement and the ‘Strength of Motivation’ of its 
coercive diplomacy. Since North Korea realized the US has no intention of negotiation but 
to utilize the extended multilateral talks as an efficient tool for the US coercive diplomacy, it 
rejected the US demands of the multilateral negotiation and requested the bilateral talks.598   
 
Despite North Korea’s demands for a bilateral negotiation, the US ignored and increased its 
implementation of coercive diplomacy. On May 5, 2003, the Bush administration declared 
the possibility of a pre-emptive strike on North Korea.599 The US’s ‘strength of motivation’ 
was again confirmed on May 12, 2003, when Bush refused the demand of Roh Moo Hyun, 
then President of South Korea, to rule out the military strike option on North Korea.600 On 
May 31, 2003, the Bush administration disclosed the USFK reinforcement plan of 11 billion 
dollars, which was 80% of the annual 2003 South Korean national defence budget. It was a 
clear step of US coercive diplomacy to secure its escalation dominance against North Korea.  
 
Moreover, the US mobilized multilateral support for its global nonproliferation project 
to coerce North Korea. On June 1, 2003, the US requested the participation of PSI at the 
G8 summit meeting in Evian, France and organized the first PSI meeting in Spain on 
June 12, 2003. As Condoleezza Rice stated, the degree of PSI intervention cannot be 
predicted, and the PSI could be the trigger to a military action or a war. It was an 
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efficient coercion on North Korea who had experience the seizure of Sosan vessel.  
Indeed, North Korea considered the PSI, ‘a declaration of war’, a serious threat to its 
national security.601 
 
By utilizing the momentum and the fear of WMD which was created after the 9/11, the 
Bush administration wanted to swiftly eliminate North Korean nuclear threat. Thus, the 
US set the dismantlement of nuclear programme, which was the objective of coercive 
diplomacy, as the prerequisite for any further negotiation and executed its coercion to 
derive the behavioural change of North Korea. However, this approach was far 
disconnected with the theory of compellence and the coercive diplomacy.  
 
The successful coercion is created when target objectives are induced by the bargain of 
force or forceful persuasion. That is, both coercer and coercee must be persuaded that 
negotiating will bring more benefits than each pursuing their own interest by force. 
Thus, when North Korea is convinced that the dismantling its nuclear programme is 
more beneficial through the bargaining of punitive and compensative inducement, it will 
change its behaviour and abandon the nuclear programme. However, the Bush 
administration executed aberrant coercive diplomacy which omitted the negotiation 
process.  
 
The Bush’s aberrant coercive diplomacy, which already lacked in justification from 
excessive nullification of Geneva agreement frame, had massive adverse effect to create 
the multilateral coercion in six party talks which was the main implementation body of 
North Korean nonproliferation.   
 
As it is shown in <Figure 5-9>, On July 31, 2003, North Korea announced the 
acceptance of extended multilateral talks. In a first glance, as North Korea had been 
seeking bilateral talks and subsequent compensation and security assurance, it could be 
considered as failure on the part of North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy. 
Admittedly, North Korea submitted to the US coercive diplomacy and accepted its 
demands for multilateral talks without any clause of indemnity.  
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However, in the long term, North Korea successfully increased its nuclear capability by 
utilizing the US coercion as its diplomatic asset. When the Bush administration executed the 
aberrant coercive diplomacy that lacks in evidence and absence of persuasion, North Korea 
not only successfully defended its objective of preserving the nuclear capability but also 
increase its nuclear deterrence. On April 18, 2003, before the three-party talks, North Korea 
declared the extraction of 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor without 
any restraints from the international community. On July 8, 2003, North Korea achieved 
advanced nuclear deterrence and capability by finalizing the plutonium reprocessing that 
could make nuclear bomb. Moreover, by counterplotting the US coercion, North Korea 
reasons its nuclear deterrence as a means of self-defence so that Russia and China could 
support the ‘denuclearization of Korean peninsula’ not the dismantlement of North Korean 
nuclear programme.  The US coercive diplomacy did induced North Korea to the 6 party 
talks. However, it was a ‘Pyrrhic victory’ which exacerbated the henceforth implementation 
of US coercive diplomacy by increasing nuclear deterrence of North Korea.  
 
 
 
<Figure 5-9> The US Coercive Diplomacy and the Six Party Talks 
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5.4.2.6 The Six-Party Talks: The New Dynamics of the Contention 
 
1) First - Third Round of the Six-Party Talks 
 
The Bush administration wanted to derive prompt Complete Verifiable Irreversible 
Dismantlement from North Korean nuclear programme through the six-party talks. 
Therefore, the US wanted to derive a full agreement with North Korea instead of a 
phased manner agreement such as the Geneva Agreed Framework. It was a rational 
choice of the Bush administration as they believed North Korea deliberately stalled for 
time and enjoyed compensation through the Geneva Agreed Framework to develop their 
nuclear capability. However, it was impossible for North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
programme and capability within such a short period of time without any compensation. 
There is no regime that would give up the means of deterrence and bargain when facing 
an adversary with great asymmetry of power.  
 
On August 27, 2003, the first round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing. During the 
first round of the talks, the US denied to sign the non-aggression treaty with North 
Korea and requested the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme as a 
precondition for any further negotiation. The Bush administration made it clear the 
political and economic compensation would only be provided when North Korean 
completes its nuclear dismantlement.  Moreover, the US revealed that the full diplomatic 
normalization was only possible after the additional agreements are made on the issues 
of missiles, conventional weapon, forgery of US dollars, drug trafficking and human 
rights. Thus, even if North Korea dismantlement its nuclear programme, there were 
many other agenda which has to be sealed before the full normalization. It directly 
contradict the simple logic of coercive diplomacy; ‘The conviction that there will be no 
further demands after compliance’. If the adversary thinks that there will be another 
request or demand after complying, the motivation to agree will decline.  
 
During the first round of the six-party talks, the other participants South Korea and 
Japan supported the US by claiming the CVID on North Korean nuclear programme 
whereas China and Russia focused on the nonproliferation of the Korean peninsula to 
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alleviate the possible coercion which might be imposed on North Korea. Due to the 
differences, the first round of talks failed to reach an agreement or a joint statement. On 
August 29, 2003 the 1st round of six party talks ended with the chairman’s summary that 
the participants agreed to organize another six-party talks for a peaceful resolution. 
 
As the ‘denuclization of Korean peninsula’ and the necessity of North Korean security 
assurance being discussed as the agenda of six party talks, North Korea was convinced 
that its counter coercive diplomacy had decreased the incompliant cost. Thus, North 
Korea immediately rebuffed the continuous talks and condemned the US’ refusal to meet 
‘action with action’ negotiation and its request of nuclear dismantlement as a 
precondition. 602  Moreover, North Korea extended its counter coercive diplomacy to 
maximize the perseverance of its nuclear capability and possible compensation through 
strengthen its diplomatic tie with China.    
 
On October 30, 2003, Wu Bangguo, the Chairman of the Community Party Committee 
Politburo Standing Committee, visited North Korea to talk about North Korea’s 
participation in the six-party talks. During their meeting, Kim Jong-Il disclosed the 
possibility of resuming the six-party talks if the six-party talks proceeded to negotiate a 
package deal on the basis of reciprocal method which the US refuses. On December 
2003, after the meetings with Wang Yi, the deputy Ministry of Chinese Foreign Affairs, 
both agree to implement reciprocal method in second round of the six-party talks. North 
Korea succeeded to degrade the US coercive diplomacy by damaging the possible 
multilateral coercion before the 2nd round of six party talks.  
 
The second round of the six-party talks began on February 25, 2004 in Beijing. The US 
was convinced of North Korean HEU programme and urged North Korea to officially 
abolish the nuclear programme for further negotiation. North Korea responded that there 
was no UEP and it would be only possible to discuss about the HEU programme if the 
US could bring forth evidence about North Korean HEU.603 As the second round of the 
six-party talks ended without any agreement other than to hold another round of six-
party talks in the near future, even South Korea and Japan, who had been supporting the 
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US, requested a change of the US for a reasonable agreement. 604 The aberrant US 
coercive diplomacy that set its objective as a prerequisite for further negotiation was 
already losing its ground.  
  
On June 23-26, 2004, the third round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing. Both 
North Korea and the US maintained its stances but there were changes in the US on how 
to implement the dismantlement. The US stepped back from their demand of 
dismantlement as a precondition, and offered North Korea a two-phase dismantlement 
process. However, the two-phase dismantle process of the US was not a big change from 
the previous ‘dismantlement as the precondition’. Basically, the Bush administration 
demanded North Korea had to initiate the first action. That is, if North Korea executed 
the dismantlement process, the US would provide economic and energy aid. After North 
Korea completed the CVID of the nuclear programme, the US would assure North 
Korea’s regime security and would initiate the diplomatic normalization process. The 
only difference between the two-phase process and the previous policy was the supply 
of energy aid as a compensation for North Korea’s good behaviour after the completion 
of the first phase.  
 
On June 28, 2004, North Korea positively assessed the change of the US policy through 
its propaganda Rodong newspaper; “The freezing of North Korean nuclear programme 
must be accompanied by proper compensation… The terms of the nuclear freeze is 
solely dependent on US compensation… The US should provide 200 million KW 
energy aid apart from the assurance of regime security and the lifting up the 
sanctions” 605  As similar to the first North Korea nuclear crisis in 1994, when the 
negotiation began, North Korea utilized its nuclear programme and its capability to deter 
US coercion and counter coerce the US for the compensation. 
 
However, any sense of rapprochement that had been created by the US’ two-phase 
process of dismantlement at the third round of the six-party talks soon began to collapse 
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when James Kelly stated the goal of the US is the CVID of North Korean nuclear 
programme at the senate hearing on July 15, 2004. As the US displays its ‘strength of 
motivation’ of coercive diplomacy by executing the joint PSI military exercises with 
Japan, North Korea immediately condemned the ‘duplicity’ of the US and announced its 
refusal of joining the 4th round of six-party talks on August 23, 2004. 
 
If the US is pursing the type B: nuclear dismantlement, or type C: nuclear 
dismantlement through regime change as the variant of its coercive diplomacy, it 
directly collides with the vital interest, preserving nuclear capability and security 
assurance, of North Korea. In order to overcome the resistance of North Korea, who 
would attempt to keep its vital interest, and achieve the objectives of coercive 
diplomacy, the US has to either implement forceful persuasion on North Korea or coerce 
North Korea to submission without engaging a war. Specially, if the Bush administration 
aims the prompt CVID of North Korean nuclear programme as it claimed during the six-
party talks, it needs to create tremendous ‘asymmetry of motivation’ over North Korean 
counter coercive diplomacy in a short period time. However, the Bush administration 
that prerequisite the CVID for further negotiation cannot create such kind of ‘asymmetry 
of motivation’.  
If it is not a simple problem that could be resolved only with a force, the persuasion 
through various types of inducements is inevitable to create the ‘asymmetry of 
motivation’. The Bush administration did not acknowledge this basic logic of 
compellence and coercive diplomacy theory. Thus, it simply decided to implement more 
coercion by utilizing the multilateral framework of six-party talks on North Korea. 
However, the six-party talks is not a convenient universal tool box for the US. It is a 
multilateral security cooperation that based upon the principles of joint application, 
reciprocity and invisibility of welfare. 606 Thus, the aberrant US coercive diplomacy 
which perquisite CVID of North Korean nuclear programme for the further negotiation 
made the absence of negotiation and reciprocity in six party talks that hindered the 
consolidation of multilateral coercion to derive the behavioural change of North Korea. 
 
The US wanted to maximize the assets of the participants of six party talks to implement 
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a more severe coercive diplomacy on North Korea. However, with the absence of 
evidence on North Korean HEU programme, multilateral coercion could not be 
consolidated. Since the US failed to provide any evidence other than the confession of 
A.Q. Khan, half of the participants in the six-party talks, China, Russia and South 
Korea, expressed doubt on North Korean HEU Programme.607  
 
On the contrary, during the first to third round of the six-party talks, North Korea actively 
executed its counter strategy to minimize the incompliant cost which would be created by 
the US coercive diplomacy. First, North Korea claimed the necessity of security assurance 
to prevent US military intervention and in return, guaranteed the freezing of its nuclear 
programme. By addressing the reasonable offer, North Korea restrained not only its allies, 
Russia and China, but also South Korea from supporting the US coercive diplomacy. On the 
basis of the non-aggression treaty and the freezing of the nuclear programme, North Korea 
requested a reciprocal action process in reaching dismantlement. Second, North Korea 
degraded the legitimacy of the US coercive diplomacy by demanding proof of the existence 
of North Korean HEU programme. By damaging the legitimacy of the US’ demands on 
North Korean nuclear dismantlement as the precondition, North Korea prevented the other 
participants of the six-party talks to support and form a multilateral coercion.  
 
The US coercive diplomacy during the 1st to 3rd round of six-party talks was a total failure. 
Since the US coercive diplomacy set the nuclear dismantlement as precondition for any 
further negotiation, the US could neither create, consolidate nor bargain for ‘asymmetry 
motivation’ to derive behavioural change of North Korea. Moreover, as the US repeatedly 
argued the CVID as the precondition for any further negotiation, it could not bring up the 
issues on 8,000 spend fuel rod extraction, nuclear fuel reprocessing process and 
accumulated weapon grade plutonium which took place right before the six-party talks. 
The enhancement of North Korean nuclear capability soon returned as another extraction 
of spent nuclear fuel rod and the 1st North Korean nuclear test.  
 
                                                                
607 Larry Niksch, The Six Party Talks: Guess Who’s in the Catbird Seat and Six Party Talks, Round Two, 
PACNET #9 AND 9A, CSIS, Feb 23 , 2004.  
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2) The 2nd term of Bush Administration and the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks 
  
The impasse of the six-party talks and nuclear negotiation came to a stop when President 
Bush was re-elected. ‘end tyranny to promote democracy’ became the US’ new foreign 
policy and North Korea was labelled as the ‘outpost of tyranny’. The Bush 
administration displayed its ‘strong leadership’ and planned to execute a more severe 
coercive diplomacy on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programme. However, the 
US who had failed to derive Type B coercive diplomacy did not have efficient means to 
change North Korean regime for its nuclear dismantlement. Moreover, the Bush’s 
doctrine of ‘end tyranny to promote democracy’ rather strengthened the ‘peace 
treaty ’claim of North Korea during the six-party talks.  
 
Since the aberrant US coercive diplomacy of ‘CVID as precondition’ failed to consolidate 
the multilateral coercion in the first three rounds six-party talks, there were no inducements 
but the US unilateral military escalation and economic sanction to implement on North 
Korea. Although US had succeeded the behavioural change of North Korea to accept the 
1994 Geneva agreed framework through its unilateral military escalation, it could be settled 
since the US had changed its objective of coercive diplomacy from the nuclear 
dismantlement to nuclear freeze of North Korea. The last minute bargaining brought the end 
of the escalation and induced North Korea to freeze their nuclear programme.  
In case of Bush’s aberrant coercive diplomacy that aims prompt CVID of North Korean 
nuclear programme, it was impossible task to create ‘asymmetry of motivation’ to 
induce North Korea to comply with the US demand. Due to the many limitations; 
increased North Korean nuclear capability and its deterrence power, the aftermath of a 
possible war in Korean peninsula and the possible casualty of US military personnel, it 
was an excessive risk choice for the US to unilaterally implement the ‘unacceptability of 
threatened escalation’ to create ‘asymmetry of motivation’ against North Korean counter 
coercive diplomacy. In order to achieve the prompt CVID of North Korea, the 
multilateral coercion and support was a necessity. However, although the six-party talks 
was formed, the Bush administration sustained the aberrant coercive diplomacy of no 
negotiation and failed to consolidate the multilateral coercion to induce North Korea.   
 
When the credibility US unilateral military action was eroded as the situation in Iraq 
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became worse in 2005, North Korea who had been successfully implemented its counter 
coercive diplomacy initiated its counter coercion. On February 10, 2005, North Korea 
changed its strategic ambiguity of ‘neither confirm nor deny’ and announced its nuclear 
armament and declared an indefinite postponement of the six-party talks until the US 
abandoned its hostile policy on North Korea. On March 31, 2005, North Korea asserted 
their change of agenda and the character of the six-party talks by claiming itself as a 
nuclear state. It claimed the six-party talks should be shifted as an arms reduction talks 
since North Korean nuclear programme could no longer be solved by the give and take 
process, compensation and nuclear freeze. 
 
The verbal provocation of nuclear armament and refusal of nuclear negotiation were the 
good reasons for the US to engage and implement the coercion. However, as North Korea 
justifies the cause with absence of its security assurance, China and Russia displayed their 
concerns on nuclear armament but assent to its cause. It was clear evidence that North 
Korea was building higher ground by degrading the multilateral cooperation on the US 
coercive diplomacy. Thus, as convinced that the US unilateral military action or the 
multilateral coercion from the six-party talks was highly unlikely, on April 7, 2005, North 
Korea once again extracted the spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon 5MW reactor to enhance 
its nuclear capability. The US responded that North Korean extraction of spent fuel would 
be officially discussed at the UN Security Council. However, as China and Russia refuses, 
it even failed to release the Presidential Statements.  
 
Without any efficient inducements left for Bush’s ‘pure coercion’, the only measure the 
US coercive diplomacy could implement is securing the escalation dominance on North 
Korean provocation. Indeed, the US successfully sustained its military superiority of 
instil fear on North Korea but the escalation dominance is the back drop of coercive 
diplomacy not the efficient inducement to derive the behavioural change of North Korea. 
Therefore, the US had to accept North Korean demand. On May 13, 2005, the Bush 
administration sent Joseph DeTrani, and James Foster as special envoys to meet with 
North Korea’s representatives at the United Nations. Through the meeting, the US 
confirmed North Korea as a sovereign state and disclosed it had no intention of military 
intervention. Moreover, the US revealed the acceptance of bilateral talks if North Korea 
resumed the six-party talks. On May 16, 2005, a vice-minister level talk between North 
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and South Korea was held after the10 months of impasse and agreement of 20 thousand 
tons of food aid from South Korea was made. On June 17, 2005, Kim Jung-Il disclosed 
to Chung Dong-Young, the minister of South Korea’s Unification department, that North 
Korea would re-join the six-party talks. The North Korea successfully achieved its 
enhancement of nuclear capability and the compensation through its counter coercive 
diplomacy. As the <Figure 5-10> indicates, the Bush had to accept North Korean 
request to resume the six party talks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 5-10> The Failure of US Coercive Diplomacy and the 4th round of six-party talks 
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The fourth round of six-party talks was held as a two-phase process at Beijing; the first 
phase was from July 26 to August 7, 2005 and the second phase from September 13-19, 
2005. From the beginning, North Korea and the US revealed its differences. North 
Korea insisted its rights to the peaceful use of atomic energy which included the UEP 
whereas the US insisted a CVID on the entire North Korean nuclear programme. The 
first phase of the fourth round of six-party talks had to call a recess due to the core 
differences on the delimitation of the dismantlement.  
 
During the recess, on August 12, 2005, Kim Kye Gwan, the first Vice Minister of North 
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disclosed its will to secure a peaceful use of atomic 
energy and demanded the supply of light water reactor as the key to a resolution. It 
became clear that North Korean objective of the counter coercive diplomacy on the 
following second phase of the talks would be the compensation of the light water reactor 
and the approval of a certain degree of nuclear capability. 
 
On September 13, 2005, the second phase of the fourth round of the six-party talks was 
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held and the two agendas mentioned by Kim Kye Gwan became the core issue of the 
negotiation. Although the US wanted a CVID on the entire North Korean nuclear 
programme, the US could not persist on full dismantlement since it violated the peaceful 
use of atomic energy recognized by the NPT. Therefore, the US had to accept the 
mediated offer of China allowing North Korea the peaceful use of atomic energy and 
supply of a light water reactor. On September 19, 2005, the six-party talks finally 
reached a joint statement. Again, it was facile victory of North Korea. The <Figure 5-
11> clarifies how the contention of US and North Korea lead to the agreement. 
 
<Figure 5-11> The Contention of US & North Korea and the 9.19 Joint Statement 
 
 
 
The supply of the light water reactor delivered to North was a symbolic recognition of the 
US acceptance on North Korea’s peaceful use of atomic energy. This could be considered a 
failure of the Bush administration’s coercive diplomacy, which demanded the 
dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme as a precondition. Moreover, the 9.19 
joint statement, which recognized the peaceful use of atomic energy and the provision of the 
light water reactor, is very much similar to that of the Geneva Agreed Framework from 
1994. That is, giving a though that the 2nd nuclear crisis initiated by the accusation of US on 
fallacy of Geneva agreed framework, it was coming back to square one.  
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The negotiation process that derived 9.19 joint statement indicates the problems of 
Bush’s aberrant coercive diplomacy which was absence in negotiation and bargaining. 
Although coercive diplomacy utilizes the force and violence as its means, it is still a 
diplomatic strategy. However, the Bush administration set its policy objective, CVID of 
North Korean nuclear programme, as the precondition for any further diplomatic 
negotiation. Thus, as there was not much ground to bargain or negotiate, the US become 
more isolated while North Korea implement its counter coercive diplomacy to expand 
its leverage. Admittedly, the US coercive diplomacy was the main driver which 
successfully formed the six-party talks that could create multilateral coercion to induce 
nuclear dismantlement of North Korea. However, the six-party talks does not mean the 
automatic multilateral coercion. Since the US decided to join the multilateral diologue, it 
had to actively implement its inducements to create the asymmetry motivation over 
North Korea to consolidate multilateral coercion on North Korean nuclear 
dismantlement. However, the weakly justified US coercive diplomacy that omitted the 
diplomatic negotiation and bargaining process cannot bring the result that US aimed.  
 
Although the US signed the 9.19 joint statement, the US statements at the closing 
plenary revealed the unchanged objective of Bush’s coercive diplomacy which directly 
contradicted the joint agreement. Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State, made 
a statement at the closing plenary of the fourth round of the six-party talks, which 
demanded the CVID on North Korean nuclear programme. He postulated the 
‘appropriate time’ for the provision of light water reactor would be after the complete 
dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programme. 608  Moreover, Christopher Hill 
stated that diplomatic normalization with North Korea is only possible after North Korea 
took the proper measures on various issues: human rights, the missile programmes, the 
sponsor of terrorism and etc.  The irony soon created the crisis.  
 
  3) Sanction on Banco Delta Asia and the Defamed US Coercive Diplomacy 
 
As the 4th round of six-party talks progressed to the US disadvantage, the Bush 
                                                                
608 Christopher Hill, North Korea - US Statement, US Department of State, Sept 19, 2005. http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53499.htm 
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administration took a step to build unilateral coercive measures that could implement the 
efficient coercion on North Korea.  
 
On September 15, 2005, while the fourth round of the six-party talks was in procession, 
the US Department of the Treasury designated the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao as 
the institution of primary money laundering. BDA was suspected of being a willing 
pawn for the corrupt financial activities of North Korea such as by distributing 
counterfeit dollars and laundering drug money. However, the sanction on BDA degraded 
the justification of US coercive diplomacy on North Korea. The evidence against BDA 
was not strong enough to hold up, let alone prove the involvement of North Korean 
government. The list of North Korean allegations accused by US treasury Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network were missing basic factual data such as dates, sums of 
money involved and names of individuals or North Korean entities involved to confirm 
criminality. 609   
 
Despite the credibility of evidences, according to Section 311 of the U.S Patriot Act, the 
BDA was about to be prohibited from all financial transactions with approximately 
5,000 banks and financial institutes of the US. On September 16, 2005, as 1/3 of the 
bank assets amounting to 133 million dollars were withdrawn from the BDA on one day, 
the Monetary Authority of Macao had to get involved and freeze North Korean account 
of 25 million dollars in BDA to stabilize the imbalance. As North Korean spokesman of 
foreign ministry strongly denounced, “Vicious act to suffocate whole system of North 
Korea”, it brought economic contraction since foreign banks refuses the financial 
transaction with North Korea.  
 
The US Department of the Treasury claimed the execution of Section 311 of the Patriot 
Act had nothing to do with the nuclear negotiation with North Korea and the six-party 
talks. However, as Stuart A. Levey, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence disclosed, “Our financial authorities complement other 
national security instruments, providing policymakers with a range of options for 
isolating and pressuring hostile regimes, terrorists, and proliferators of weapons of mass 
                                                                
609 John McGlynn, “Financial Sanctions and North Korea: In Search of the Evidence of Currency 
Counterfeiting and Money Laundering”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 5, No. 7, 2007, pp. 1-39. 
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destruction”, the BDA sanction was to coerce North Korea.610  
 
Moreover, US started to make the human rights issue to put leverage on North Korea. 
On August 2005, the Bush administration appointed Jay Lefkowitz as the human rights 
envoy to North Korea. The position was created on October 4, 2004, after the US House 
of Representatives passed North Korean Human Rights Act. It had been vacant for 10 
months since the Department of States expressed its concern that the appointment might 
provoke North Korea. However, in order to utilize North Korea human rights envoy as 
another means of coercion, the Bush administration appointed Jay Lefkowitz before the 
beginning of the second phase of the fourth round of the six-party talks to pressure 
North Korea. 
  
The implementation of unilateral coercion is the US sovereign right of foreign policy 
which is not violation of international law. Moreover, at a first glance, the extra US 
sanctions on BDA and the credible threat of possible sanctions on North Korean human 
rights issue seemed an efficient measure to derive the behavioural change of North 
Korea. However, it seriously degraded the US coercive diplomacy on North Korean 
nuclear proliferation in the prospect of the compellence and coercive diplomacy theory.  
 
Firstly, the overly various agendas and coercion of the US on North Korea damaged the 
‘clarity of objectives’ of coercive diplomacy.611 The ‘clarity of objectives’ helps the 
coercee to distinguish the possible loss if the coercee denies or accept the coercer’s 
demand. For instance, in a contention of the coercive and counter coercive diplomacy on 
North Korean nuclear dismantlement, the US has to convince North Korea that it is 
beneficial to accept the nuclear dismantlement offer than pursuing nuclear programme 
by resistance. However, the unilateral US coercion that aimed the omnidirectional 
pressure on North Korea cannot create forceful persuasion to convince them that the 
compliance is more beneficial. 
 
                                                                
610 Stuart A. Levey , Testimony before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, US 
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611 Alexander L. George, “Findings and Conclusions,” The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Boulder; 
Westview Press, p. 280 
293 
  
Second, the accusation of North Korean money laundering and human rights issue is 
another agenda which could be the reason for the continuous US coercive diplomacy 
even after the nuclear deal is settled. It directly contradicts basic logic of compellence 
theory for success of coercion; ‘the coercer has to guarantee that the current surrender 
will not lead to more requests to the opponent.’612 If North Korea is convinced that there 
will be other forms of coercive diplomacy to face after abandoning its most efficient 
tool, nuclear capability, North Korea would resist keeping its nuclear programme base.  
However, the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration during the fourth round of 
the six-party talks seriously degraded this core element for success and sent a wrong 
signal to North Korea.  
 
Since the 9.19 joint statement declared to solve North Korean nuclear programme ‘in a 
peaceful manner’ by ‘respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together’, the US 
unilateral sanction was the act of deviation from 9.19 joint statement. As Daniel Byman 
and Mattew Waxman stated, “true effects of coercive strategy lie in the altered - in some 
cases, hardened – policy preferences or decision making calculi of the actors 
involved”,613 the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration hardened the policy 
preference of North Korea by giving the justification of its counter coercive diplomacy. 
On October 24, 2005, the spokesman of North Korean ministry of Foreign affairs 
announced a statement that North Korea would join the fifth round of the six-party talks 
to criticize the US policy and to hold the US responsible for the outcome.   
  
4) The First Phase of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks and the First Nuclear Test 
 
On November 9, 2005, the fifth round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing. As 
previously announced, North Korea condemned the US’ duplicity in implementing the 
sanctions during the negotiation. Kim Kye Gwan, the chief delegate of North Korea, 
protested that it would defer any nuclear dismantlement until the US lifted up the measures 
applied to the BDA. The US responded the implementation of the Patriot Act Section 311 on 
the BDA is in regards to money counterfeiting and laundering, a completely separate matter 
                                                                
612 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 69. 
613 Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate”, International 
Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2000, p.14.  
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from North Korean nuclear dismantlement. Due to differences, the first phase of the fifth 
round of the six-party talks ended without any further negotiations.  
 
By witnessing the US had no intention to implement 9.19 joint statement, North Korea 
started to display its will to strengthen military deterrence including nuclear armament 
unless the US abandoned its ‘squeezing hostile policy.’ On December 3, 2005, North 
Korea denounced the US, accusing its policy as a regime change by labelling North 
Korea as drug traffickers and currency counterfeiters.614  On May 2006, Michael Green, 
the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, and James Kelly, 
the Assistant Secretary of State, disclosed the US had no intention of North Korean 
regime change at the first Seoul-Washington Forum. They described the US policy as a 
‘regime transformation,’ which aims to change the attitude of North Korea, not the 
regime itself. However, a series of policy reviews, which were released for the second 
term of the Bush administration, could be highly interpreted as a regime change. On 
February 6, 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report was released, stating the 
possible pre-emptive strikes including the use of nuclear weapons on North Korea. On 
March 16, 2006, in the second national security strategy of the United States, which 
clearly stated the objectives as being ‘promoting democracy’ and ‘ending the tyranny,’ 
North Korea was named at the very top as the target.615   
 
Although the US agreed to sign 9.19 Joint Statement, it simultaneously implemented the 
previous coercive diplomacy that prerequisite the prompt CVID of North Korean 
nuclear programme for further negotiation. However, as examined through the chapter, 
successful negotiation on nuclear disarmament of North Korea involved compensation 
in security and economic benefits in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons 
capabilities. Without bargaining there would be no other solution but the type C coercive 
diplomacy; the nonproliferation through regime change. Since there was no participant 
of six-party talks who were willing to take the security risk and support a policy 
explicitly aiming for regime change, the US coercive diplomacy which aimed to 
consolidate the multilateral coercion and prompt CVID of North Korea without 
bargaining was at variance to induce North Korea for nuclear dismantlement.  
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The North Korea, who had been successfully implemented their counter coercive 
diplomacy by countering the aberrant US coercion since 2nd nuclear crisis, could not 
make the diplomatic bargaining as the US implement more aberrant coercive diplomacy 
of  in between type B and Type C or tacit type C. Thus, although it would damage the 
justification of counter coercive diplomacy, North Korea decided to execute more bold 
action to display its strength of motivation and increase its deterrence power.  
 
On July 5, 2006, North Korea launched ICBM Taepodong 2 to display its will and ability to 
counter strike against the US coercion. It was the end of North Korean self-moratorium on 
the missile test, which had come to a halt since 1998. After the Taepodong 2 Missile 
provocation, the US circulated a UN Security Council resolution on North Korean Missile 
programme. Due to its clear evidence, unlike the previous resolutions on North Korea, 
China and Russia agreed to support it. On July 15, 2006, the UNSC Resolution 1695 was 
adopted to urge the UN member states not to provide the material, technology and economic 
support that could be misused on North Korean missile development. It also urged an 
unconditional immediate return of North Korea to the six-party talks.616 However, China 
and Russia did not take any measures to cut economic links with North Korea. The aberrant 
US coercive diplomacy hindered to consolidate international support even in the face of 
North Korea’s clear missile provocation.617  
 
For North Korea, the launch of ICBM Taepodong 2 was half failure. It successfully 
displayed its ability of military deterrence, ‘strength of motivation’ of counter coercive 
diplomacy and confirmed the support of China and Russia to show the US that their 
aberrant coercive diplomacy would worsen the case. However, it decrease its 
justification of counter coercive diplomacy, failed to change the US tacit type C coercive 
diplomacy,  and no longer freely postpone the 6-party talks to avoid the US aberrant 
coercion since the UNSC resolution 1695 was adopted.    
 
As it was revealed in the launch of ICBM Taepodong 2, the US aimed to create regime 
                                                                
616  United Nation, United Nation Security Council Resolution 1695, Jul 15, 2006. 
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transformation or credible threat of regime change in North Korea to coerce them for re-
joining the six-party talks. 618  Moreover, by utilizing US unilateral coercion and the 
multilateral coercion of six-party talks, the US wanted to induce North Korea to abandon its 
nuclear programme. It indicates the US had sustained the aberrant coercive diplomacy that 
prerequisite for CVID of nuclear programme to further negotiation even after it signed 9.19 
agreements.619 When UNSC resolution 1695 was adopted, there was opportunity for the US 
to engage in six-party talks to consolidate the reasonable multilateral coercion to pressure 
North Korea and derive more advantageous bargaining within the 9.19 agreement. 
Moreover, it could create better environment to pressure multilateral coercion since the US 
has the legitimacy to demand the China and Russia to join the multilateral coercion if the 
reasonable offer could be made to North Korea. However, as Bush administration sustained 
its aberrant coercive diplomacy. The US not only failed to dismantle North Korean nuclear 
programme but also push North Korea to the nuclear test.      
 
When North Korea gradually escalated the tension by announcing the nuclear 
armament, 620 nullity of the armistice agreement at the Panmunjom621 and threatened the 
US with possible military action,622 the US sustained its unilateral coercive diplomacy 
that gradually turn the screw to squeeze North Korea with BDA related sanction. 623   
 
On October 3, 2006, North Korea answered the US coercive diplomacy by announcing 
its plan of the nuclear test. North Korea stated the nuclear test would be executed safely 
and North Korean nuclear warhead would never be first used nor proliferated. 624 On 
October 9, 2006, North Korea informed the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang that the 
nuclear test was about to be executed. At 10:36 a.m., North Korea executed the first 
nuclear test. It was the display of nuclear capability by a state accused of being the axis 
of evil. The failure of US coercive diplomacy lead to the first nuclear test of North 
Korea is briefly explained in the <Figure 5-12> below.   
                                                                
618  Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb, 
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<Figure 5-12> The ‘Melt down’ of US Coercion and the First Nuclear Test of North Korea 
 
 
 
5) The Second Phase of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks and the 2.13 Agreement 
 
As the contention of coercive and counter coercive diplomacy progressed 
disadvantageous for the US, the Bush administration attempted enhanced its aberrant 
coercive diplomacy by implementing more excessive coercion that are based on weak 
evidences and much deviated from the theory of compellence and coercive diplomacy. 
As the result, it failed to create efficient multilateral coercion even the phase of North 
Korean ICBM missile launch and the 1st nuclear test.  
 
This was witnessed when the UNSC resolution 1719 was being adopted. On October 16, 
2006, the Bush administration sent Condoleezza Rice to diplomatic visits to the member states 
of the six-party talks to consolidate strong multilateral coercion on North Korea based on the 
UNSC resolution 1719. However, even after North Korean nuclear test, the three member 
states of the six-party talks, China, Russia and South Korea, were against the tougher level of 
coercion that might cause the loss of control of North Korea. Thus, there were limits to the 
Bush administration to implement more severe measures for its coercive diplomacy.  
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In the phase of North Korean nuclear test, the most efficient and strong variants of the US 
coercive diplomacy was the ‘Ultimatum’. However, due to the successfully constructed counter 
coercive diplomacy of North Korea; massive prospected casualty, the uncertainty of Chinese 
and Russian response and the North Korean military deterrence on allies of the US,625 it was 
impossible to execute the ‘Ultimatum’. Moreover, as North Korea counter coerced by disclosing 
its will to resume the six-party talks, the Bush administration had no other alternatives than to 
negotiate with North Korea for the dismantlement. The <Figure 5-13> shows how the 
contention occurred between the first and second phase of fifth round of six party talks.  
 
<Figure 5-13> The Chronicle of Contention between First and Second Phase of Six Party Talks  
 
On October 31, 2006, the confidential three-party talks of the US, China and North 
Korea was held in Beijing. The three-party talks was revealed on the same day when 
China announced the agreement of the three parties to resume the fifth round of the six-
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party talks. It was a compliance of US to North Korea’s demand of bilateral talks. As, 
Christopher Hill, disclosed the possibility of removing the BDA sanction, the second 
phase of the fifth Round of the six-party talks was agreed to be held in Beijing on 
December 18, 2006.626 
 
The objective of Bush’s coercive diplomacy was the prompt CVID of North Korean 
nuclear programme. Thus, to implement the swift coercive inducements, the US 
executed the coercion based on weak evidences. The more US being obsessed with 
prompt resolution on North Korean nuclear programme the more it created hasty 
decision that hindered the consolidation of multilateral coercion on North Korea. As 
examined, the US coercive diplomacy that lacked in justification and ‘clarity of 
objective’ only buy the time for North Korea for its nuclear advancement and building 
its justification for the cause. Thus, even after the 1st North Korean nuclear test that 
Bush had stated it as ‘grave threat’ and not to be ‘ignored longer’,627 the US had no 
other efficient measure but to give in to the demands of North Korea.  
 
As the level of North Korean capability on nuclear proliferation increases to a nuclear 
explosive device, the US had to accept the bilateral talks to negotiate with North Korea. 
Thus, the US shift its coercive diplomacy of CVID as the precondition to a phased process 
which was more time consuming  and had to reciprocate with more compensation to 
dismantle North Korean nuclear programme. 
 
On January 16, 2007, the US-North Korea bilateral talks was held in Berlin. The US 
indicated the bilateral talks as the preliminary meeting for the six-party talks. However, 
the fact that lift of the BDA sanction was deeply discussed by the two states could not be 
denied.628 During the talks, Kim Kye Gwan, the head of the North Korean delegation 
demanded the provision of heavy fuel oil as compensation for freezing the North Korean 
nuclear programme. The US counterpart, Christopher Hill, agreed to offer the supply of 
heavy fuel oil if North Korea froze the nuclear facility within 60 days.  
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On February 8, 2007, the third phase of the fifth round of six-party talks was held in 
Berlin and finally reached the 2.13 Agreement. The 2.13 Agreement was the initial action 
for the implementation of the 9. 19 joint statement. According to the 2.13 Agreement, the 
five working groups, Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Normalization of North 
Korea and US Relations, Normalization of North Korea and Japan, Economy and Energy 
Cooperation and Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism were agreed to be formed 
within 30 days to implement the 9.19 joint statement.  
 
The 2.13 Agreement was based on the ‘action for action’ approach with two phase 
processes. That is, the moment North Korea froze all its nuclear facility and approved the 
IAEA to inspect and verify this within 60 days, bilateral talks between North Korea-US and 
North Korea-Japan would simultaneously be held for diplomatic normalization. Moreover, 
the participants of the six-party talks provided the 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. Second, 
after being verified that the North Korean nuclear freeze is fully executed, North Korea 
would initiate nuclear disablement. In return, 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil would be 
provided to North Korea in compensation and the US would initiate the negotiation of the 
peace treaty of the Korean peninsula. Apart from the two phase process, the US Department 
of State agreed to lift the BDA sanction within 30 days after the 2.13 Agreement. 
 
The 2.13 Agreement is very similar to the Geneva Agreed Framework. Both are phased 
processes in that the US provides compensation according to the progress of the North 
Korean nuclear freeze or disablement. However, compare to 1994 Geneva agreed 
framework, the 2.13 Agreement was the tentative agreement that North Korea could 
regenerate the nuclear reactor whenever they pleased. The Geneva Agreed Framework was 
the ‘all or nothing’ package agreement which could control the whole process of the North 
Korean nuclear programme. 629 It was a quite a setback from the previous agreement except 
for the fact that the 2.13 agreement was agreed in Multilateral framework that had more 
binding power.  Moreover, the North Korean nuclear programme and capability has vastly 
improved after the Geneva Agreed Framework was collapsed in 1st term of Bush 
                                                                
629  Kenneth C. Quinones, “Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed?”, North Korean 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, Oct 10, 2007, p.24-26. 
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administration.630 
 
 Through the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration, North Korea acquired 
enough plutonium to produce 8-10 nuclear warheads. Moreover, the UEP, which 
triggered the second nuclear crisis, was not even discussed in the 2.13 Agreement. The 
<Figure 5-14> indicates the clear picture of how the 2.13 agreement was made through 
the contention and how North Korea secured the Geneva greed framework level of 
compensation with enhanced nuclear capability. Again the coercive diplomacy of the US 
revealed its failure as it gave in to the demand of North Korea only enhancing their 
nuclear capability.  
 
 
<Figure 5-14> The Contention of US & North Korea and the 1st Bilateral Talks 
 
 
 
 
6) The Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks and the Collapse of 10.3 Agreement 
 
On June 19, 2007, as the North Korean frozen fund at the BDA was finally transferred, 
the dismantlement process had begun. On June 26, 2007, Olli Heinonen, the deputy 
director general of the IAEA, visited North Korea to discuss the freezing of the North 
Korean nuclear programme. The five nuclear facilities were agreed to be closed down; 
                                                                
630 Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, St. Martin’s Griffin, 2009, pp. 
326-328. 
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the Yongbyon 5MWe reactor and the 50MWe reactor which was under construction, the 
Taechon 200MWe reactor, the reprocessing radiochemistry laboratory and the nuclear 
fuel rod manufacturing facility. On July 14, 2007, the IAEA sent 10 inspectors to North 
Korea to inspect and verify the freeze of the North Korean nuclear programme. The 
IAEA inspectors installed surveillance cameras at the sealed North Korean nuclear 
facilities. Ironically, it was first success of Bush administration to curb the North Korean 
nuclear programme after North Korean withdrawal of NPT in 2003. Yongbyon 5mw 
reactor was the one that extracted the plutonium for the 1st nuclear test.  
 
On September 27, 2007, the second phase of the sixth round of the six-party talks was 
held in Beijing. As a result, the 10.3 Agreement, which is the second phase action for 
implementing the 9.19 joint statement, was announced. It was also the ‘action for action’ 
agreement that North Korea disable its nuclear facilities for the provision of heavy fuel 
oil and diplomatic normalization with the US and Japan. 
 
After the nuclear test of North Korea, the US changed its policy objective of North 
Korean nuclear programme to phased manner dismantlement from prompt CVID. As the 
context of the contention between US and North Korea had changed to the subject of 
nuclear freeze, North Korea could not hold its ‘strength of motivation’ to resist the 
demand of the US and six-party talks. As the multilateral support for US nuclear freeze 
demand on North Korea was consolidated, ‘asymmetry of motivation’ on nuclear freeze 
becomes slanted to the US. Thus, North Korea could no longer resist negotiating its 
disablement process of nuclear weapon capability. Moreover, the US displayed its 
‘clarity of object’ which had not the case during Bush administration. According to the 
agreement which was made with in the six party talks, the US prudently implements its 
coercive inducement to North Korea.  
 
The changed US policy stance and coercive diplomacy kept its stability and composure   
in the unexpected crisis. On September 6, 2007, the North Korean cooperation on the 
Syrian nuclear programme was disclosed by the Israel air strike on the Syrian nuclear 
reactor. 631 If the North was helping the Syrian nuclear programme as accused, North 
                                                                
631 David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, “Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analyst Say”, New York 
Times, Oct 14, 2007, A1.  
303 
  
Korea was not only pursuing nuclear weapons but also spreading its nuclear programme. 
Moreover, it was suspected that North Korea was not providing ‘complete and correct 
declaration’ of all its nuclear programmes as agreed in the 10.3 Agreement. However, 
without the clear evidences on North Korean involvement on Syrian nuclear facility, the 
US did not implement any substantial coercion on North Korea outside the six-party 
talks agreement which would only exacerbate the case. Thus, the US deferred the 
process of lifting North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which was 
also the part of the 10.3 Agreement for diplomatic normalization.  
 
When the implementation of the 10.3 Agreement became late, the US and North Korea 
held two bilateral meetings on February 19, 2008 in Beijing and March 13, 2008 in 
Geneva for the ‘complete and correct’ declaration of the North Korean nuclear 
programme. It was an active engagement of US to forcefully persuade the North Korea 
which was absence in previous coercive diplomacy of Bush administration.  
 
The US urged North Korea to provide a full declaration of all its nuclear activities, 
including the details on an alleged secret uranium enrichment programme and suspected 
nuclear technology transfers to Syria. However, North Korea denied all the suspicion 
and announced it would not provide a full declaration unless the US fulfilled its 
agreement. The two bilateral meetings ended without any results and no progress could 
be made as agreed in the 10.3 Agreement. 
 
On April 8, 2008, North Korea and the US had another bilateral meeting in Singapore. 
The key difference between North Korea and the US was the declaration of suspicion 
that North Korea pursued the UEP and provisions of its nuclear technology to a third 
party, in particular Syria. North Korea did not want to admit to the suspicion at all 
whereas the US wanted at least leaves an official record, ‘a bill of particulars’, on the 
suspicion of North Korea proliferation. 632  That is, North Korea declare the correct 
amount of plutonium through an official ‘complete and correct’ declaration and the US 
would fill in a ‘confidential minute’ on suspicions of providing nuclear technology to 
Syria and the development of the UEP, which North Korea ‘acknowledge’ to but does 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/washington/14weapons.html?pagewanted=alland_r=0 
632 Song Shutao, “US, North Korea nuclear envoys begin talks”, Xinhua, Mar 14, 2008. 
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not officially challenge. 633 
 
Fortunately, the change of US stance made the tentative agreement to continue the North 
Korean disablement process as agreed in the 10.3 Agreement. However, as Mitchell 
Reiss, the former State Department Director for Policy Planning stated, “We did not give 
North Korea a draft protocol for the declaration. We gave them a four-page paper on 
verification principles which is different from an operational protocol…it ended up the 
Bush administration had misled the public”, the agreed format of the disablement 
process was not the verification protocol of North Korean disablement process. 634  
 
The Bush administration evaluated the most threatening and dangerous components of 
the North Korean nuclear programme were its capability of producing plutonium and the 
current amount it possessed. Thus, the US believed that if the disablement process 
continued and restrained the plutonium-based North Korean nuclear programme, other 
subordinate threats such as the UEP and proliferation issues would be eventually 
resolved.  
 
It was an evidence of US coercive diplomacy that focuses ‘clarity of objective’ to induce the 
behavioural change of North Korea. The US attempt was to access the exact threat level of 
North Korean nuclear programme and dismantle the target according to the priority. 
However, it was also another testament that revealed the previous coercive diplomacy of 
Bush administration was built on the weak foundation. The 2nd North Korean nuclear crisis 
was initiated by the US allegation on North Korean HEU programme. Therefore, if the US 
agreed to change ‘the format’ of the ‘complete and correct declaration’ as to verify the North 
Korean plutonium programme, it contradicts all the US coercive diplomacy which built its 
reason accusing the North Korean HEU programme.   
 
On May 9, 2008, North Korea submitted 18,000 pages of documents to the US about the 
nuclear activities from 1990 to 2008.635  North Korea stated 26 kg of plutonium had been 
                                                                
633 Winston Lord and Leslie H. Gelb, Yielding To N. Korea Too Often, Washington Post, April 26, 2008. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/25/AR2008042503007.html  
634 Byun Chang Sup, “The document which is hand in to North Korea was not the verification protocol”, 
buk-e numgin gun hack euijung seo ga anieutda, Radio Free Asia, Jul 31, 2007. 
http://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_us_nuke-07312008173559.html 
635 Helene Cooper, “North Korea Gives US Files on Plutonium Efforts”, New York Times, May 8, 2008. 
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extracted for nuclear weapons and another 7-8 kg of un-extracted plutonium had been 
stored. However, there were discrepancies with the US’s estimated data of 40-50 kg of 
plutonium. Since the North Korean UEP and proliferation activities were excluded in the North 
Korean declaration, the participants of six-party talks, especially the US, South Korea and Japan, 
wanted a strict verification protocol on plutonium programme of North Korea.  
 
As the US shifted to more efficient and authentic coercive diplomacy, it made the some 
progress that induced North Korea to the nuclear disablement process. However, as the 
North Korea increased its nuclear capability to a bomb level, the North Korean counter 
coercive diplomacy of North Korea became another level for the US to deal with. 
 
On August 14, 2008, when the US delayed de-listing North Korea from the state 
sponsors of terrorism due to the disagreement in the verification protocol, North Korea 
decided to counter coerce the US by ceasing the nuclear disablement process. North 
Korea unsealed the nuclear reprocessing facility and denied the access of IAEA 
inspectors to the site. Moreover, North Korea announced it would reinitiate plutonium 
reprocessing before the end of September. The Bush administration, which was at the 
end of its term, had no other choice but to negotiate. 
 
On October 1, 2008, two states gathered in Pyongyang to negotiate the measures to 
confirm the verification protocol. After three days of the bilateral meeting, the US 
announced that scientific procedures including sampling and forensic inspection were 
agreed on to verify the North Korean nuclear disablement process. However, North 
Korea claimed they had never agreed to the sampling in the verification protocol. 636     
 
On October 11, 2008, the US announced that North Korea was no longer in the list of 
state sponsors of terrorism. Before the announcement, Japan and South Korea requested 
the US to be more prudent in delisting North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism 
since there was no written document of verification protocol. Unfortunately, their worst 
fears were confirmed when North Korea made a statement that “the verification process 
should be limited to the site visit, reported documents verification and interview with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/asia/09diplo.html?_r=0 
636 Jung Jin Lee, “Will the ‘sampling’ of North Korea nuclear program possible?, Bukhack Siryo Chachi 
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North Korean nuclear technician”.  
 
Although the Bush administration that had been enforcing the aberrant version of 
coercive diplomacy made the substantial change after the 1st nuclear test, it was late and 
incapable to derive behavioural change of North Korea with its limited inducements that 
the US had created in a short period time. Although the multilateral support on the US 
had enlarged to freeze the North Korean nuclear programme, it did not have enough 
time to build momentum and justification of multilateral coercion through negotiation.   
 
The denial of sampling could be considered as a proof that North Korea wished to 
maintain ambiguity on their nuclear capability. The sampling of spent fuel rod, nuclear 
waste from the reprocessing facility, and the environmental radioactive sample from the 
nuclear reactor, could be analysed to find the amount of plutonium production, the 
number of reprocessing activities, the period of nuclear reactor operation, the term of 
reprocessing and the quality of the extracted plutonium. Moreover, the state of art 
sampling technology could detect nano or pico levels of nuclear material, which could 
find the covert nuclear facilities and the North Korean UEP. North Korea argued the 
sampling inspection would only be confirmed after the second phase of 10.3 agreements 
is fully implemented.637 
 
In the 10.3 Agreement, North Korea agreed to a complete and correct declaration of its 
entire nuclear programme. However, the North Korean declaration which was submitted 
to the six-party talks, only included the amount of North Korean plutonium. The number 
of nuclear warheads, the nuclear explosive devices, manufactures facilities of nuclear 
weapons and UEP were not in the declaration. Therefore, the US and other participants 
of the six-party talks requested a strict verification protocol with a sampling method 
which would cover the loopholes. On December 8-11, 2008, the 6 party chief delegation 
meeting was held at Beijing. However, it failed to make a consensus on the verification 
protocol since North Korea denied the sampling method. The six-party talks once again 
came to an end without the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme. 
 
                                                                
637 “The sampling inspection is only possible after the fulfillment of 10.3 agreement”, Dong-A Daily, Nov 
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When the sixth round of the six-party talks came to an end, North Korea decided to 
strengthen its counter coercive diplomacy. In order to strengthen the ‘asymmetry of 
motivation’, on January 17, 2009, North Korea intensified the tension in Korean 
peninsula by nullifying all the peace agreements that had been set in place to ease 
diplomatic and military confrontation.638 The nullification of the Northern Limit Line in 
the West Sea was not an empty threat, later resulting in the sinking of the Cheonan 
Vessel and bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. However, as shown during the tentative 
2.13 Agreement and the subsequent 10.3 Agreement, the US did not possess the coercive 
inducement that could be used as an effective tool to increase North Korea’s 
apprehension. Thus, after the 2.13 Agreement was signed, the Bush administration had 
to execute the coercive diplomacy of ‘Try and See’ by delaying and cutting the 
compensative inducement. As the <Figure 5-15> indicates, without any efficient means 
of coercion, the coercive diplomacy of Bush administration leads to the collapse of 10.3 
agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 5-15> The Contention Model and the Collapse of 10.3 Agreement 
 
                                                                
638 Korean Central News Agency, Jan 17, 2009. 
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The coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration, which had been initiated due to the 
suspicion on the North Korean HEU programme in 2002, had failed to achieve the 
CVID of the North Korean nuclear programme.  
 
As witnessed in the first and second North Korea nuclear crisis, the ‘strength of 
motivation’ and the ‘sense of urgency’ of the North Korean counter coercive diplomacy 
were also equivalent to balance the US coercive diplomacy. Moreover, through China 
and Russia, who were ‘soft balancing’ against the US within the region, North Korea 
adequately neutralized the US coercion and successfully increased its nuclear deterrence 
and capabilities. 
 
Besides the well-schemed North Korean counter coercive diplomacy, there were 
shortages on the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration, which degraded the 
success of the North Korean nuclear dismantlement. The coercive diplomacy of the 
Bush administration was based on suspicions of the North Korean HEU programme. By 
criticizing the North Korean HEU programme, the US urged North Korea to dismantle 
its nuclear programme within the multilateral frame of the six-party talks as the 
precondition for any further negotiation.  
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As the Bush administration was adamant that persuasive and compensative inducements 
such as diplomatic normalization, energy aids, lift of sanction and etc. would be the 
result of the North Korean nuclear dismantlement, the US could not execute the coercive 
diplomacy to induce North Korea to dismantle or decrease the nuclear programme.  
Without any other mean but force to create the ‘asymmetry of motivation’, the US could 
not derive the nuclear dismantlement which is vital interest of North Korea for regime 
survival and the efficient bargaining chip.  That is, the Bush administration had planned 
to utilize ‘pure coercion’ which opposed to negotiations to obtain their objective of type 
B: dismantling North Korea’s nuclear programme. However, according to Alexander 
George and his theory of the ‘defensive use’ of coercive diplomacy, the ‘offensive use’ 
of Bush’s coercive diplomacy based on the suspicion of North Korean HEU programme 
could not achieve an ‘Adequate Domestic and International Support’ and ‘Strong 
leadership,’ which are the key elements to achieve the compliance of the coercee.  
 
In his second term, due to the unsuccessful result of its coercive diplomacy, the Bush 
administration initiated the negotiation with North Korea and ironically, achieved the 
diplomatic success of the 9.19 Agreement. However, after the 9.19 Agreement, the Bush 
administration once again pursued pure coercion to pressure North Korea to accept the 
US’ demands. The Bush administration failed to understand the process of ‘forceful 
persuasion’ and executed the more aggressive coercive diplomacy with absence of 
negotiation. As it created a more favourable environment for the North Korean counter 
coercive diplomacy, the North Korea successfully tested its 1st nuclear test and achieve 
the nuclear warheads. 
 
 
5.5 An Analysis of the Coercive Diplomacy of the Obama Administration and the 
Counter Coercive Diplomacy of North Korea 
 
5.5.1 Background  
 
During the presidential campaign, Obama set forth that ‘direct diplomacy’ and ‘direct 
dialogue’ would be applied to North Korea to solve the nuclear proliferation. On July 
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23, 2007, at the CNN first Democratic primary debate, Obama disclosed his will to meet 
with the leaders of the ‘rogue’ states such as North Korea, Iran, Cuba and Venezuela, 
without preconditions. On May 17, 2008, at the press meeting in South Dakota, 
presidential candidate Obama criticized that cutting the dialogue only made North Korea 
turn towards nuclear armament. However, he evaluated the six-party talks of the Bush 
administration as ‘not perfect but made some valuable progress such as the 9.19 and 
2.13 Joint Statement’. Obama displayed his will to solve the problem with its 
adversaries through dialogue and diplomacy rather than only implementing the policy of 
containment and coercion.  
 
After his inauguration on January 2009, the Obama administration insisted the necessity 
of international support to solve the North Korean nuclear programme and announced a 
direct and aggressive diplomacy would be executed to deal with the matter. However, 
although dialogue and diplomacy were emphasized, the frame of the US coercive 
diplomacy, which is based on its military superiority and economic sanction, was 
sustained. The foreign policy of the Obama administration sought to keep a balance 
between the ‘hard power’ based on Bush’s policy and the ‘liberal internationalism’ of 
democrats, which emphasises more on ‘soft power’.  
 
The ‘balanced strategy’ of the Obama administration was well described in the US 
national defence policy. Roberts M. Gates, the secretary of National Defence, claimed 
‘balanced strategy’ would do three things. First, it would try to prevail in current conflicts 
and prepare for other contingencies. Second, it would institutionalize capabilities such as 
counterinsurgencies and foreign military assistance and maintain the United States’ 
existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces, and 
lastly, retain those cultural traits that have made the US Armed Forces successful while 
shedding things that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.639 As it was seen in 
the national defence policy, the changed policy of the US did not mean it would abandon 
its basic frame of the coercive diplomacy.   
Like as his predecessors, the Obama administration also aimed the CVID of the North 
Korean nuclear programme. Thus, when North Korea executed a series of provocations 
                                                                
639 Robert M. Gate, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age”, Foreign affairs, 
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and its counter coercive diplomacy, the US decided to put off its ‘ready for diologue’ 
engagement strategy with North Korea. Based on its military superiority and the 
escalation dominance, the Obama administration decided to utilize economic and 
diplomatic sanction to coerce North Korea until it changed its stance.  
 
Facing the series of North Korean provocations which coincided with the inauguration, 
the ‘dialogue and diplomacy’ of the Obama administration on North Korea was amended 
to ‘benign neglect,’ or ‘strategic patience’. The ‘strategic patience’ was aimed not to 
compensate North Korea for its bad behaviour. Moreover, it was set to achieve initiatives 
in future negotiations with North Korea, which included the six-party talks for CVID on 
the North Korean nuclear programme. 
 
The ‘strategic patience’ of the Obama administration was the US coercive diplomacy to 
coerce North Korea to change its position through the ‘Try and See’ with economic 
sanction. It was based on US military strength, which guarantees ‘escalation dominance’ 
at any North Korean provocation.  
 
 
5.5.2 Well Schemed North Korean Counter Coercive Diplomacy and the 2nd 
Nuclear Test  
 
When the sixth round of the six-party talks broke down on December 11, 2008, North 
Korea decided to implement its counter coercive diplomacy to achieve its nuclear 
advancement by taking advantage of temporal power vacuum in the US government 
transition period.  Moreover, North Korea aimed to display its ‘strength of motivation’ 
and the ‘sense of urgency’ to newly inaugurated Obama administration to enhance its 
counter coercive diplomacy for the future contention.   
 
 On January 17, 2009, North Korea nullified all the peace agreements that had been 
made with South Korea to ease diplomatic and military tension. On February 24, 2009, 
North Korea announced the launch of Kwangmyeonsung-2, the space launch vehicle 
which could be used as the ICBM. The newly inaugurated Obama administration 
immediately responded with the ‘key resolve’ annual joint military exercise on February 
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27, 2009.  The North Korea, who had been waiting for the most effective time to cause a 
provocation, launched the Kwangmyeonsung-2 on April 5, 2009, the same day Obama 
announced the nuclear free world doctrine at Prague. The launch of ICBM capable space 
rocket that could deliver the nuclear warhead was a direct challenge on Obama’s nuclear 
free world statement.  
 
On April 14, 2009, the Obama administration responded by circulating its own 
resolution at the UNSC to punish the launch of North Korean ICBM capable rocket. 
However, as China and Russia exercised its veto power, only the presidential statement 
urging article 8 of the Resolution 1718 was adopted. As witnessing the weak 
consolidation of international support on US coercive diplomacy, North Korea 
immediately announced the pulling out of the six-party talks and nullifying all the 
agreements which had been made through the multilateral negotiation. On April 25, 
2009, North Korea declared the reprocessing process of the spent fuel rod at the 
Yongbyon Nuclear facility. On April 29, 2009, North Korea continued its provocation by 
announcing its ICBM test, nuclear test and the production of fuel in the light water 
reactor, which indicates uranium enrichment. 640  On May 25, 2009, North Korea 
executed the second nuclear test at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, Kilju County.  
 
Since the series of North Korean provocations and the 2nd nuclear test were executed 
smoothly within 4 months of time, it was considered as well-schemed counter coercive 
diplomacy of North Korea.641 The Obama administration that had just initiated its term 
could not do much to stop the ‘blitzkrieg’ style of North Korean counter coercion with 
failed diplomatic legacy of Bush on North Korean nuclear programme.  
 
Although the framework of US coercive diplomacy on North Korea was maintained through 
legislative regulation, executive orders and the presence of US military forces, the Obama 
administration did not have any proper inducement to coerce the North Korea to stop the 
provocation since Bush administration had failed to build efficient means or strategic 
environment for the US coercive diplomacy as examined.   
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bukhaneui 2cha hack silhum baegeoungkwa daebuk jeonrayk kwaje, Current Issue and Policies, No. 158, 
2009. pp. 1-4. 
313 
  
 
Therefore, when North Korea executed its series of counter coercive diplomacy in the beginning 
of the Obama administration, the US only could execute the ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy 
with nonviolent inducement and sustain its ‘escalation dominance’ against the North Korean 
threats. The <Figure 5-16> explains the contention between Obama administration and North 
Korea which was lead to the 2nd nuclear test of North Korea. 
 
<Figure 5-16> The Contention that Leads to the Second Nuclear Test 
 
 
 
 
5.5.3 The Strategic Patience and the Continued Crisis 
 
With the clear NPT violation of North Korea, the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted the UN Resolution 1874 on June 12, 2009. As Condoleezza Rice stated “a very 
robust, tough regime with teeth that will bite in North Korea”, the UNSC Resolution 
1874 was much more severe to that of Resolution 1718 which was adopted after the first 
North Korean 1st nuclear test in 2006. It included the rights to sequestrate and dispose 
the North Korean freight related to WMD. Moreover, Resolution 1874 expanded its 
rights to prevent the provision of all arms and related materials, as well as to financial 
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transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance. 642  North Korea 
immediately denounced the UN Resolution 1874 and disclosed its plan to weaponize all 
the extracted plutonium and the initiation of uranium enrichment.  
 
As North Korean provocation continued, the Obama administration shifted its policy 
from ‘diplomacy and dialogue’ to ‘strategic patient’ in order to distance themselves from 
North Korea’s counter coercive diplomacy. Since the US regarded the North Korean 
nuclear programme is a time consuming issue, the Obama administration decided to 
implement ‘try and see’ of coercive diplomacy to coerce the CVID of the North Korean 
nuclear programme through PSI and economic sections. Moreover, in order to maximize 
its coercive diplomacy, persuasive inducements were also provided to North Korea.  
 
On June 11, 2009, Stephen W. Bosworth, the US Special Representative for North Korea 
Policy, implied the possibility of bilateral talks at the senate hearing if North Korea 
abided by its international obligation. On July 17, 2009, during the visit to South Korea, 
Kurt M. Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
disclosed the provision of the comprehensive package deal if North Korea took 
irreversible and sincere measures to abandon its nuclear programme. On July 20, 2009, 
Hilary Clinton, the Minister of the State Department, revealed in an interview with the 
ABC News that the comprehensive package deal would include diplomatic 
normalization, a permanent peace treaty, and financial and food aid. On July 23, 2009, at 
the ASEAN Regional security Forum, Hilary Clinton again stated the provision of 
comprehensive package deal if North Korea could adhere to the 9.19 agreement.  
 
In return, on August 18, 2009, Kim Jong-Il disclosed his will to solve the problem 
through dialogue and compromise at the bilateral meeting with China. Kim Jong-Il 
stated that he would resume any type of talks to solve the North Korean nuclear 
programme. However, in order to maximize its counter coercive diplomacy, -induce the 
US to the negotiation and increase of its bargaining power- North Korea sent a letter to 
the chair of the UN Security Council on September 4, 2009, that the plutonium 
reprocessing was about to be finished and the extracted plutonium would be weaponized 
                                                                
642 UN Security Council, Resolution 1874, UN Department of Public Information, New York, Jun 12, 
2009. 
315 
  
accordingly.  
 
As the real contention process initiated between the North Korea and the US after the 2nd 
nuclear test, the Obama administration responded with ‘strategic patient’ by 
strengthening its escalation dominance and sending its envoy to North Korea for a 
diologue. On October 30, 2009, Walter L. Sharp, the ROK-US Combined Forces 
Commander, announced the military agreement of the US and South Korea that include 
of Operation Plan 5029, which is to eradicate North Korea’s WMD, would be conducted 
by the US command. While enhancing the war readiness and escalation dominance 
against North Korea, the US sent Stephen W. Bosworth as an envoy to Pyongyang for 
the bilateral talks. 643 
 
On December 10, 2009, Stephen W. Bosworth wrote a report about his visit to North 
Korea and identified the necessity of the six-party talks and the importance of 
implementing the 9.19 Joint Statement. However, as Stephen W. Bosworth evaluated the 
time for the talks is not ripe after the bilateral meetings with North Korea, 644 the Obama 
administration decided to continue its ‘strategic patience’ with economic sanction and 
military deterrence until North Korea displays its integrity on nuclear dismantlement.  
On January 27, 2010, President Obama announced in the State of the Union Address that 
North Korea would only face more severe sanctions and isolation unless they displayed 
a true change in position.  
 
As the US continued with its ‘strategic patient’ and ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy, 
North Korea utilized its diplomatic channel to induce the US to engage in the 
negotiation. On February 8, 2010, Kim Jong-Il disclosed his will on the non-
proliferation of the Korean peninsula and urged action from the six parties to resolve the 
problem at the meeting with Wang Jiarui, director of the International Department of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. However, As Philip J. Crowley, 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs responded, “North Korea is saying the 
right things, that the six-party process should resume…but the right words must be 
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followed by action. Words by themselves are not sufficient” 645, the US was firm to 
maintain its ‘strategic patience’. 
 
When North Korea realized that the counter coercive diplomacy through their artillery 
exercises and diplomatic statements were not working, they decided to maximize 
provocation to escalate tension in the Korean peninsula. On March 26, 2010, North 
Korea attacked the South Korean PCC-722 Cheonan naval vessel. The battleship went 
down in an explosion, killing 46 sailors. As it is shown in <Figure 5-17>, again the 
contention escalated to another crisis and conflict not the resolution. 
 
<Figure 5-17> The Contention which Leads to the Sinking of PCC-722 and Continued Conflict 
 
 
 
In the prospect of compellence theory, Obama had more logical stance compare to Bush 
administration that neglected the importance of negotiation and bargaining process in 
coercive diplomacy.  Even in the series of North Korean provocation, Obama handle the 
issue calmly by securing escalation dominance in Korean peninsula with ‘try and see’ 
coercive diplomacy. However, as the policy stance of ‘strategic patient’ with ‘try and 
see’ coercive diplomacy continued, it had weaken ‘sense of urgency’ of the US coercive 
diplomacy on North Korean nuclear programme and conversely, strengthen ‘asymmetry 
                                                                
645 US Department of State, Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs P.J. Crowley, Feb 9, 
2010. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/02/136594.htm 
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of motivation’ for North Korean counter coercion which created the room for advent of 
its nuclear capability .  
 
Admittedly, due to the failed coercive diplomacy of Bush administration, Obama 
inherited no efficient inducement to coerce the North Korea in the early period of its 
presidency. Moreover, as global economic crisis and the post management of war in Iraq 
being on the top US policy priority, the coercive diplomacy of Obama administration on 
North Korea had its limit. However, despite these unavoidable limitations, in the 
perspective of coercive diplomacy and compellence theory, the continued strategic 
patience and ‘try and see’ coercive diplomacy of Obama was no different from that of 
Bush’s ‘pure coercion’  in latter period of  its term with no efficient inducements.  
 
 
5.5.4 The ‘Gradual Turning the Screw’, Death of Kim Jung-Il and the 2.29 Agreement 
  
   
By witnessing the bold provocation of North Korea, the Obama slowly shift its ‘try and 
see’ coercive diplomacy to a ‘gradual turning the screw’. The Obama administration 
confronted the North Korean elevated provocation by executing the proper escalation of 
the coercive inducement. On April 6, 2010, the US announced the Nuclear Posture 
Review, which excluded North Korea from ‘negative security assurance’. The US 
pressured North Korea by not adopting the ‘No First Use’ of the US nuclear arms on 
North Korea. On June 26, 2010, the scheduled transfer of the South Korean wartime 
operational control in 2012 was postponed to 2015.  It meant automatic engagement of 
US force would continue until 2015 if a war breaks out in Korean peninsula.  
 
On July 20, 2010, joint statements were made by the US and South Korea that the US 
would provide sufficient military deterrence to South Korea including the nuclear 
umbrella, missile defence, and sustaining the USFK level to its maximum.646 Moreover, 
on July 25, 2010, US executed the largest scale of the tri-service joint military exercise 
‘invincible spirit’ against North Korea to display substantial US military presence in 
Korean peninsula. It was a massive military exercise that even sparked strong opposition 
                                                                
646 R.O.K Ministry of National Defense, “Joint Statement: The US- South Korea Minister of National 
Defense”, ‘Han-Mi kookbang gangkwan Gongdong Seoungmyeong’, Ministry of National Defense Press 
Office, Seoul, Jul 20, 2010. 
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from China. The nuclear aircraft carrier USS George Washington, Aegis destroyers USS 
McCampbell, USS John McCain, nuclear submarine USS Buffalo, USS Houston and 
200 aircrafts including a F-22 were deployed to South Korea for the joint military 
exercise.647 On August 5, 2010, the US–South Korea joint maritime military exercise 
was executed in the West Sea to confront the North Korean NLL provocation.648 On 
August 16, 2010, the US–South Korea joint military exercise ‘Ulgi Freedom Guardian’ 
was executed to exercise the smooth transition of wartime operation control to display 
the war readiness of US forces. Along with the enhanced escalation dominance, on 
August 30, 2010, Obama issued executive order 13551 to strengthen its economic 
sanction against North Korea.  
 
Although it seemed belated, the Obama administration precisely increased its coercion 
according to the level of North Korean provocation. The US plan was to secure its 
strategic ‘patience’ and coerce the North Korea to six-party talks for the dismantlement. 
As the Obama administration seemed adamant and capable of keep its ‘strategic 
patience’ strategy, North Korea decided to counter coerce the US by revealing its 
advanced nuclear capabilities to induce the behavioural change of the US.  
 
On November 9, 2010, North Korea invited Professor John Lewis and Professor 
Siegfried S. Hecker to disclose the North Korean uranium enrichment facility in 
Yongbyon. After the four day visit, Siegfried S. Hecker was astonished at the state-of-
the-art-facilities of North Korea. He evaluated that North Korea had an 8,000 kg-
SWU/yr capacity that could produce up to two tonnes of LEU or, if the cascades were 
reconfigured, up to 40 kg of nuclear weapon grade HEU.649 As North Korea convinced 
that the US was shocked by its uranium Enrichment capability, it also displayed its 
military deterrence for the possible military strike from the US. On November 23, 2010, 
North Korea carried out artillery fire on Yeonpyeong Island to display its ‘asymmetry of 
motivation’; in other words, the willingness to wage war if the Yongbyon nuclear 
                                                                
647 R.O.K the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The US- South Korea Joint Military Combat Readiness Training”, 
‘Han Mi Yonhap Dongmang Haesang mit Koongjeoung Jeototaese Hoonryeon’, R.O.K the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Press Office, Seoul, Jul 20, 2010. 
648 R.O.K the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The US-South Korea Joint Maritime War Game in West Sea” , R.O.K 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Press Office, Seoul, Aug 4, 2010. 
649 Siegfried S. Hecker, “North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex: A Report by Siegfried S. Hecker”, 
CISAC, Nov 20, 2010. 
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facilities were under attack.  
 
The disclosed North Korean uranium capability was not something that negligible with 
‘strategic patience’. If the North Korea succeeded to acquire the HEU programme, it 
directly damages the US non-proliferation policy of ‘nuclear free world’. Thus, on 
January 19, 2011, the US set out the necessity of North Korean commitment to the 9.19 
joint statement and urged the early resuming of the six-party talks at the summit meeting 
with China. 650 
 
Although the Obama administration declared the resuming of the six party talks by 
breaking its strategic patience, it did not mean the abandonment of the US coercive 
diplomacy. On February 28, 2011, The US-South Korea joint military exercise ‘Key 
Resolve’ was executed with the participation of the aircraft carrier USS George 
Washington to secure the escalation dominance of US on North Nora. And On April 18, 
2011, the Obama enacted the Executive Order 13570, which prohibited the importing of 
all North Korean products. However, since the behavioural change of the US was 
induced by the revelation of advent nuclear technology of North Korea, it could be 
considered the success of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy.  
 
From its inauguration, the Obama administration had the limit in implementing the non-
proliferation policy on North Korea. As Mike Chinoy once described as the total 
‘meltdown’, the 8 years of aberrant coercive diplomacy of the Bush administrations had 
seriously damaged the efficient coercive inducements and the momentum of six party 
talks. Moreover, the series of well schemed North Korean counter coercion that occurred 
in the first 4 months of the presidency had entrapped the Obama administration from 
implementing the nuclear negotiation with North Korea. Despite these unavoidable 
shortages, the Obama’s nonproliferation policy on North Korea had unfairly criticized as 
‘mere damage control’ or ‘the result of the inept grand strategy’.651 However, even the 
inevitable disadvantages to be accounted for the accurate assessment of Obama’s policy, 
Obama administration made a clear mistake in the perspective of compellence and 
                                                                
650 The White House, “US - China Joint Statement”, the White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
Washington D.C., Jan 19, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-
statement 
651 Daniel W. Drezner, Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4, Jul/Aug 
2011, pp. 57-68.  
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coercive diplomacy theory in dealing with nuclear programme of North Korea. 
 
Admittedly, the coercive diplomacy has the variant which intentionally maintain the 
status of quo with its coercee so called ‘Try and See’ approach. Thus, in the situation 
that lacked efficient coercive inducements and the absence of momentum in six-party 
talks, Obama administration implemented the ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy between 
the period of the 2nd North Korean nuclear test and the revelation of North Korean UEP 
facility.  
 
However, nevertheless the US successfully secured its escalation dominance on North 
Korea to maintain the framework of coercive diplomacy, the Obama administration had 
failed to implement ‘Try and See’ coercive diplomacy as the real policy. Indeed, Obama 
administration verbally guaranteed package deal that include diplomatic normalization, 
a permanent peace treaty, and financial and food aid to North Korea. However, since 
Obama administration maintained the ‘no enrichment’ programme on North Korea that 
clearly surpasses the NPT regulation as the perquisite for the negotiation, any further 
negotiation and bargaining process of coercive diplomacy could not take place like as 
Bush administration.  
 
As the result, Obama administration failed to curb the nuclear development of North 
Korea. Thus, the time was on North Korean side. During the impasse of the six party 
talks, the North Korea successfully increased its Uranium enrichment capability that 
enhanced its tool for the counter coercion. As the counter demands of North Korea 
become tougher with growing bargaining power, it became more difficult for the US to 
dismantle North Korean nuclear programme.  
 
As agreed in US-China summit meeting, the process of resuming the six-party talks was 
set as ‘constructive inter-Korean dialogue’ → ‘the six-party talks’. 652 However, the 
inter-Korean dialogue could not reach an agreement since the two had core differences 
on the sinking of the Cheonan naval vessel and the Schelling of Yeonpyeong Island. 
Thus,  on February 8, 2011, the US offered the new process of ‘Bilateral talks of inter–
Korean Chief delegate to the six-party talks’ → ‘the US-North Korea bilateral talks’ → 
                                                                
652 Ibid.  
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‘the six-party talks’ for the early resumption of the six-party talks. It indicates how 
shocked the US was by the North Korean nuclear advancement.  As true effects of 
coercive strategy lie in the altered policy preferences or decision making calculi of the 
actors involved, the changed stance of Obama administration could be considered as 
success of North Korean counter coercive diplomacy.  
 
On July 28, 2011, bilateral talks between the US and North Korea were held in New 
York. The US demanded the cease of nuclear testing and uranium enrichment, the return 
of the IAEA inspectors and the cease of military provocation as the precondition for the 
resumption of the six-party talks. North Korea confronted the US’ request by urging 
provision of food aid, lifting the imposed sanction, the initiation of a peace treaty and 
diplomatic normalization as the precondition. Moreover, the North Korea announced the 
launch of three stage space rocket to counter coerce the US. On October 24, 2011, the 
second round of the U.S- North Korea bilateral talks failed to reach an agreement.  
 
The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il on December 17, 2011 cut off all 
diplomatic dialogue until the third round of the US-North Korea bilateral talks began on 
February 23, 2012 in Beijing. Through the third round of bilateral talks, on February 29, 
2012, North Korea agreed the temporal freeze of its UEP, missile test and nuclear test 
for 240,000 tons of food aid.653 However, the 2.29 Agreement was rather derived by the 
necessity of domestic politics of North Korea that needed to consolidate its political 
power for newly succeeded leader Kim Jong-Eun and the intentions of both US and 
North Korea who wanted to sustain the momentum of the negotiation. 654 Thus, the 
substantial consensus on the issue and exact term were not clarified in the agreement. 
For instance North Korea agreed not to conduct long range missile test but did not 
specify the space launch vehicle was included in that category. The failed clarity of 
precise terms leads to the failure of the 2.29 agreement. It was soon proved by the well 
planned launch of Kwangmyeonsong-3 which took place six weeks after the agreement.  
 
As it briefly explained in <Figure 5-18> and how it progressed in <Figure 5-19>, both 
                                                                
653Victoria Nuland,”Press Statement: US-DPRK Bilateral Discussions”, the US Department of State, 
Washington D.C., Feb 29, 2012. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184869.htm 
654 Hak Soon Paik, the relationship between North Korea and the US during the 1st term of Obama, 
Obama geongbu sigi bukmi kwangaye ,Seoul: the Sejong Institute Press, 2012, pp. 56-58. 
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the US and North Korea had implemented their coercive and counter coercive 
diplomacy. However, as the Obama administrations took the coercive diplomacy of his 
predecessor, no enrichment and nuclear dismantlement as perquisite for further 
negotiation, the US could not deter, decrease or dismantle the nuclear programme of 
North Korea. Thus, as being pressured by the losing the golden time for nuclear 
dismantlement, the US signed the rather sloppy 2.29 agreement with North Korea who 
came to negotiation table by the unexpected death of Kim Jong-Il and abrupt leadership 
change.  
 
<Figure 5-18> The Contention of US & North Korea and the 2.29 Agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 5-19> The Chronicles of Contention between the US and North Korea in the 
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1st  Term of Obama Administration 
 
 
5.5.5 The Increase of North Korean Nuclear Deterrence, Kwangmyeonsong-3 
 
324 
  
On March 7, 2012, the US-North Korea food aid talks were held in Beijing. On March 
12, 2012, Ri Yong Ho, the North Korean vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced the 
return of IAEA inspectors to North Korea in the near future. The expectation on the 
resumption of the six-party talks grew as the follow-up action of the 2.29 Agreement 
continued. However, the mood of rapprochement collapsed when North Korea 
announced the launch of Kwangmyeonsong-3 satellite on March 16, 2012. It was 
obvious that North Korea wanted to increase its capability of counter coercive 
diplomacy through ICBM technology. North Korea claimed it as their right to launch 
satellites for peaceful use whereas the US considered the North Korean satellite launch 
as a violation of not only the UN obligation but of the 2.29 agreement. On April 13, 
2012. Despite the opposition of the US, North Korea launched the Kwangmyeonsong-3 
Rocket at the Tongchang-dong Missile and Space Launch Facility. The launch was a 
failure as the rocket exploded 90 seconds between the separation of the first and second 
stage.655  
 
Although the North Korean attempt to improve its military deterrence had failed, the 
Obama administration swiftly took steps to coerce North Korea. On April 16, 2012, the 
UN Security Council adopted the presidential statement which ‘strongly condemned’ the 
launch of the North Korean ‘space launch vehicle’. 656 On April 17, 2012, Mark Toner, 
the deputy spokesperson of the State Department, announced the suspension of the 2.29 
Agreement, which guaranteed 240,000 tons of food aid to North Korea. On April 26-27, 
2012, the first Korea-US Integrated Defence Dialogue (KIDD) was held in Washington 
D.C. in order to counter react against North Korean provocation. During the dialogue, 
the US and South Korea agreed on a collaborative research project to develop the 
counter strategy scenario against North Korean nuclear weapons and WMD.657 On May 
2, 2012, three North Korean entities, Amroggang Development Banking Corporation, 
Green Pine Associated Corporation and Korea Heungjin Trading Company were added 
                                                                
655 Han Jong Chan, “R.O.K Ministry of National Defense Brefeing:North Korean Rocket launch seems as a 
failure”, ‘Kukbangbu Briefing Missiel Balsa Silpae Handeot’, Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, Apr 13, 2012.  
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656 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Department of Public 
Information, Apr 16, 2012. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10610.doc.htm 
657Ministry of National Defense, “The 2012 Defense White Paper”, “2012 bangwie backseo”, Seoul, Dec 
12, 2012, pp. 276-277. 
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on the North Korean economic sanction list under UN resolution 1718. 658 
 
Apart from the UN economic sanction, the US sustained its independent sanction to 
coerce North Korea. On June 18, 2012, President Obama sent a notice to the congress 
for the continuation of the national emergency with respect to North Korea under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act of the Bush administration. It meant a 
one year extension of all the imposed US economic sanctions on North Korea. 659 
Moreover, on August 20, 2012, the Obama administration executed the annual US-South 
Korea joint military exercise in Korean, ‘Ulchi-Freedom Guardian’ as planned.  
 
However, the continuous contention without the diologue and negotiation only begot the 
rise of the tension. On October 7, 2012, when the US strengthened its North Korean 
deterrence through the agreement of extending the range of South Korean ballistic 
missiles to 800 km, North Korea legitimized its development of the missile capability 
and announced the re-launch of Kwangmyeonsong-3 on December 1, 2012. The US 
immediately warned there would be a more severe sanction on North Korea. However, 
as it is explained in <Figure 5-20> and <Figure 5-21>, on December 12, 2012, North 
Korea successfully launched the three-stage rocket, Kwangmyeonsong-3, which could 
be utilized as ICBM. It was the curtain call for the first term of Obama’s coercive 
diplomacy on non-proliferation of North Korea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
658 UN Security Council, “Security Council Committee Determines Entities, Goods Subject To Measures 
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Public Information, May 2, 2012. 
 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10633.doc.htm 
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<Figure 5-20> The Failure of US Coercion and the Launch of Kwangmyeonsong-3 
 
 
 
<Figure 5-21> The Chronicles of US - North Korea Contention and the Launch of 
Kwangmyeonsong-3 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
The non-proliferation strategy towards North Korea of all three US administrations after 
the Cold War was coercive diplomacy. However, even after long years of implementing 
its compellence strategy, the US failed to either contain or dismantle North Korea’s 
nuclear programme. Conversely, North Korea succeeded in enhancing its nuclear 
capability through its counter-nuclear strategy against US compellence. 
 
In order to achieve the policy objective of US coercive diplomacy of nuclear 
dismantlement by North Korea, the US administrations had to flexibly set appropriate 
types of coercion inducements according to the context and the strategic environment in 
particular circumstances. This is because coercion never works in a one-way direction. 
For coercive diplomacy to be successful, it needed to be understood that even though the 
asymmetry of power between the US and North Korea was overwhelming, North Korea 
also had critical tools with which to degrade the US coercion: consolidation of 
international support from its traditional allies, strengthening the justification for its 
nuclear programme and enhancing its deterrence by developing nuclear and missile 
capabilities that could strike the US allies within the region – South Korea and Japan.  
 
Without understanding the mutuality of coercion and the contention between coercive 
and counter-coercive diplomacy, the coercer cannot evaluate the ‘strength of motivation’ 
of counter-coercive diplomacy and its counter-inducement to set appropriate means and 
types of coercion. If a suitable inducement cannot be formed, no coercive diplomacy can 
achieve compliance by the coercee. Unfortunately, as seen in this chapter, the three US 
administrations from Clinton to Obama’s first term not only failed to form effective 
coercive diplomacy but also provided ammunition with which North Korean counter-
coercive diplomacy could achieve the enhancement of its nuclear capability. 
 
All three US administrations set their coercive diplomacy towards North Korea’s nuclear 
programme as type B: persuading North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programme. 
Thus, the US utilized various inducements to compel North Korea to carry out a CVID 
of its nuclear programme. Naturally, the objective of North Korean counter-coercive 
328 
  
diplomacy was to maintain its nuclear programme and even increase its capability by 
countering the US coercion. Moreover, North Korea also planned to maximize the 
compensation for a freeze of or decrease in its nuclear capability if its counter-coercive 
diplomacy was put into a defensive corner. Through the contention between the coercive 
and counter-coercive diplomacy of the US and North Korea, the result of the US non-
proliferation policy towards North Korean nuclear dismantlement was decided.  
 
The objective of all the US administrations regarding the North Korean nuclear 
programme after the Cold War was a complete and irreversible dismantlement. 
However, since this limited the state’s sovereign right to peaceful use of atomic energy, 
the US policy aim of CVID degraded its justification for coercion of North Korea from 
the start. The damage to the US’s justification for its coercive diplomacy was counter-
plotted by North Korea and resulted in increasing the enforcement cost of the coercion.  
 
As the first government to be inaugurated after the US became the unipolar hegemonic 
power, the Clinton administration wanted to utilize its unchallengeable power to engage 
with North Korea to terminate its nuclear proliferation. The Clinton administration 
decided to break away from the conventional containment policy of ‘engagement and 
enlargement’ to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat. Thus, the US extended its 
diplomatic and military strength to force CVID by North Korea. By utilizing 
international institutions – the UN and IAEA inspections – Clinton pressured North 
Korea to come clean on its nuclear armament. The US also employed economic 
sanctions and the possibility of providing economic aid while securing escalation 
dominance against any provocation by North Korea to induce it to dismantle its nuclear 
programme.   
 
When the first North Korean nuclear crisis began, the Clinton administration employed 
archetypal coercive diplomacy. It secured absolute military dominance over North Korea 
even close to the breaking point of a war. The US conducted a joint military exercise in the 
Korean peninsula and reinforced its aircraft carriers and the forces deployed in Korea to 
build a credible threat of military intervention. Moreover, it also utilized economic sanctions 
and the possibilities of an economic package deal and the provision of a light water reactor 
to induce behavioural change by North Korea if it complied with US demands.  
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The Clinton administration also displayed flexibility in implementing coercive 
diplomacy, which was never the case in the Bush and the first Obama administrations. 
By sending Jimmy Carter as a special envoy and a last resort before war, the Clinton 
administration efficiently pushed North Korea towards compliance. Moreover, by 
accurately evaluating the North Korean nuclear capability, the Clinton administration 
shifted its type B coercive diplomacy to Type A: persuading the opponent to stop short 
of its goal and succeeding in achieving the Geneva agreement framework to freeze the 
North Korean nuclear programme. This was a diplomatic success for Clinton’s coercive 
diplomacy, which accurately analysed the North Korean threat and the strategic 
environment to flexibly set its inducements and type of coercion to reduce North 
Korea’s nuclear capability.660 The Clinton administration at least kept the Yongbyon 
nuclear facility frozen during its term. Moreover, by establishing the multilateral 
cooperation of KEDO under the agreed Geneva framework, the Clinton administration 
laid the groundwork for a multilateral platform on the North Korean nuclear programme. 
 
However, as shown in this chapter, the Geneva framework was agreed without ‘precise 
terms of settlement of the crisis.’ As a result, the agreement collapsed and failed to 
dismantle the North Korean nuclear programme. Moreover, as it maintained type B 
coercive diplomacy aiming at the CVID of the North Korean nuclear programme, which 
surpassed its right established by the NPT to the peaceful use of atomic energy, the 
Clinton administration failed to coerce North Korea to ratify the 93+2 additional 
protocol and prevent North Korea from furthering its nuclear advancement.  
 
The Bush administration, which became more aggressive after the 9/11 crisis, evaluated 
the agreed Geneva framework as payment of a ransom to support North Korean ill 
intentions. Thus, after gaining confidence from its victories in Afghanistan and the Iraq 
war, the Bush administration adopted the unprecedented stance of aiming to swiftly 
dismantle North Korea’s nuclear programme. Clinton’s Geneva agreement framework 
provided for a dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme in a 10-year 
process. However, the Bush administration set North Korean nuclear dismantlement as 
the precondition for any further negotiation to conclude the North Korean nuclear 
                                                                
660 Richard L. Armitage, “A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea,” Strategic Forum, Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, No.159, 1999, pp. 1-2. 
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programme. This step was a big mistake and it damaged the US coercive diplomacy, 
which had already been degraded by demanding an excessive nuclear dismantlement by 
North Korea that went beyond its right to a peaceful use of atomic energy under the 
NPT. Thus, as seen in this chapter, it added more limitations to the US coercive 
diplomacy compared to that of the Clinton administration. Despite the ‘strength 
motivation’ and ‘strong leadership’ of Bush’s coercive diplomacy, the Bush 
administration could not consolidate proper inducements to coerce North Korea to 
abandon its nuclear programme in a short period of time as it had planned.  
 
In 2002, at the administration’s first bilateral talks with North Korea, Bush raised 
suspicion of the North Korean HEU programme by citing a lack of evidence, and he 
initiated his ‘pure coercion.’ The Bush administration sustained its aggressive form of 
coercive diplomacy even when North Korea withdrew from the NPT and re-initiated 
nuclear centrifuging. Coercive diplomacy is forceful diplomatic persuasion that utilizes 
economic and diplomatic sanctions, military threats and limited military interventions to 
cause the adversary to expect sufficient costs and risks to cause him to stop what he is 
doing. However, Bush’s ‘pure coercion’ diplomacy that truncated the ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’ 
negotiation process did not even conform to the basic principles of coercive diplomacy 
and only increased the enforcement cost of its coercion. Moreover, as witnessed on the 
occasion of the freezing of the North Korean account at the BDA after the 9.19 
agreement, the Bush administration severely harmed the basic condition for the success 
of coercive diplomacy that the coercer has to guarantee that a current surrender will not 
lead to more requests. The absurdity of Bush’s pure coercion, which lacked the basics of 
coercive diplomacy theory, was that the Bush administration could not implement any 
efficient coercion of North Korea except limited economic sanctions.  
 
Admittedly, the ‘strong leadership’ of the Bush administration created a ‘sense of 
urgency’ to establish a multilateral framework of six party talks on the North Korean 
nuclear programme. This could be seen as a success of Bush’s coercive diplomacy. 
However, by wrongfully forming the inducements of coercion and making demands on 
North Korea that surpassed the NPT, the Bush administration not only failed to 
consolidate multilateral coercion of North Korea but also strengthened its counter-
coercive diplomacy through the six party talks. 
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The ‘pure coercion’ that demanded the CVID of North Korea without negotiation 
created the space for Russia and China to strengthen the logic of exercising their veto 
power at the UNSC. Moreover, the degraded legitimacy of US coercive diplomacy also 
caused a rift among the US’s traditional allies of South Korea and Japan, which 
criticized the Bush administration. Thus, during his presidency, Bush was unable to 
prevent North Korean withdrawing from the NPT, two nuclear tests, advances in the 
North Korean uranium enrichment programme and the development of the Taepo-dong 
ICBM. This compares to the Clinton administration, which at least froze North Korean 
nuclear development.  
 
The Obama administration, which had witnessed the total failure of Bush’s ‘pure 
coercion’ declared it would solve the matter by employing reasonable negotiations, 
‘direct dialogue and diplomacy.’ However, it also maintained the demand for the CVID 
of the North Korean nuclear programme and did not approve the fully fledged nuclear 
programme which was recognized as the state’s sovereign right under the NPT. 
Therefore, the degraded US coercive diplomacy stayed the same and caused the failure 
of hopes to dismantle the North Korean nuclear programme.  
 
Moreover, although Obama declared a willingness for dialogue and direct talks with 
North Korea, the US clearly argued for the necessity of North Korea displaying integrity 
in bilateral direct talks by dismantling its uranium enrichment programme. This was no 
more than a toned-down version of Bush’s precondition for further negotiations. 
Admittedly, Obama had shown a change of rhetoric on North Korea, but it was not 
enough to restore the damaged mutual trust between the US and North Korea and bring 
about substantial change in the North Korean nuclear programme or to consolidate 
proper multilateral coercion against North Korea. Therefore, the contention between 
coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy by the US and North Korea continued.  
 
The Obama administration decided to implement a ‘strategic patience’ strategy in its 
dealings with North Korea. By gradually turning the screw with the escalation of 
economic sanctions, the Obama administration executed a series of ‘try and see’ 
coercive diplomacy moves to squeeze North Korea to the negotiation table. However, 
332 
  
this turned out to be a failure that only bought time for North Korea to advance its 
nuclear capability. As was revealed in 2010 when Siegfried S. Hecker visited the 
uranium enrichment facility in Yongbyon, North Korea succeeded in acquiring a nuclear 
enrichment capability beyond US expectations. Again, North Korea had successfully 
countered the US coercion to enhance its nuclear capability. Moreover, when North 
Korea successfully launched the Kwangmyeonsong-3, it achieved a missile capability 
that could strike at least Hawaii, Guam, Alaska and the west coast of the US.   
 
The Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations executed coercive diplomacy to resolve 
North Korean nuclear proliferation. The shift in the international political environment 
to a unipolar system also naturally formed favourable conditions for the US to 
implement its compellence strategy. However, as has been seen in this chapter, all the 
US administrations implemented inducements and policies which contradicted the 
theories of compellence and coercive diplomacy despite building these policies within 
the structural framework of coercive diplomacy. The ironic self-degrading US coercive 
diplomacy provided ample ammunition for the counter-coercive diplomacy of North 
Korea and resulted in not only failure to contain the nuclear capability of North Korea 
but also in strengthening its ability to become a nuclear state. When the first North 
Korean nuclear crisis began, North Korea had the ability to extract plutonium from a 
spent fuel rod. However, after the contention process with the coercive diplomacy of 
Clinton, Bush and Obama’s first term, North Korea was right on the threshold of 
becoming a de facto nuclear state with a uranium enrichment programme and an ICBM 
capability that could reach US territories.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
333 
  
6. Conclusion 
 
6.1 Origin of the Thesis and Main Objectives 
This study has aimed to investigate the US non-proliferation policy against Iran and 
North Korea, two countries in different regions of the world that are causing concerns 
about global nuclear proliferation. The nuclear developments in these countries have 
long histories of making advances under economic sanctions and threats of military 
intervention from the US. Although the international political environment was 
favourable for the US compellence strategy after the Cold War, the coercive diplomacy 
of US administrations did not have tangible success in disarming the two countries of 
their nuclear programmes. Instead they increased their nuclear capabilities.  
 
It is true that a nuclear deal has recently been reached in the Iranian case. However, one 
should remember the 10-year process of the 1994 agreed framework with North Korea 
and how it ended. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will take 15 years to 
complete the settlement and it seems that the framework of coercive diplomacy will be 
maintained over that period. Therefore, as this study has found, if the US fails to apply 
the right inducements as it executes its coercive diplomacy or commits the same 
mistakes which have been examined in the contention model in this study, a fruitful 
result cannot be expected to close the JCPoA as agreed. 
 
In order to achieve a ‘nuclear-free world’ as the US declares it aims to do, US decision 
makers have to understand how the strategy of compellence and the contention process 
operate in its non-proliferation policy. Since the majority of scholars and decision 
makers perceived and still perceive the strategy of compellence and coercive diplomacy 
as the lesser evil among the other alternatives for dealing with the Iranian and North 
Korean nuclear programmes, learning from past policy failures which were also based 
on coercive diplomacy will create a new possibility of reaching global non-proliferation.   
 
This research project was planned to find the discrepancies between compellence and 
coercive diplomacy theory and its actual implementation as the US non-proliferation 
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policy from the Clinton administration to the first term of Obama and how it failed to 
achieve the dismantlement of the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Thus, 
with the hypothesis that US coercive diplomacy departs from theory and that this is 
causing the failure of its non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and North Korea, the 
study has aimed to answer its research questions by applying coercive diplomacy theory 
and a comprehensive model to the actual implementation of US non-proliferation policy 
towards Iran and North Korea.   
 
6.2 The Findings and the Contributions of the Thesis 
In order to understand the US diplomatic strategy of non-proliferation after the Cold 
War, in Chapter Two this thesis first examined the international political environment, 
US foreign and security policy strategy and aims, and the four action plans it 
implemented in the post-Cold War period. By revealing the correlation between US 
post-Cold War foreign diplomacy and the pursuit of hegemony as a unipolar power, the 
chapter examined the US’s use of a compellence strategy and coercive diplomacy at the 
core of its non-proliferation and security policy. It also explained the validity of 
applying the framework of coercive diplomacy to examining the nuclear advances and 
strategies of Iran and North Korea. In addition, the chapter provided the justification for 
treating these two cases as case studies in this research. 
 
Chapter Three reviewed the literature on compellence and coercion in order to build a 
comprehensive theoretical framework, theory and model for the research. Although 
‘forceful persuasion’ is widely used in international politics, especially when it comes to 
international security and non-proliferation issues, there is no clear definition of the 
diplomacy of coercion. Since coercive diplomacy lacks conceptual clarity, many studies 
have built their own terminology rather than refining the work of others. This is evident 
from the various terms used more or less interchangeably as synonyms for coercion: 
compellence, coercive diplomacy, military coercion, coercive military strategy, 
behaviour change through sanctions paired with containment and deterrence, dual-track 
engagement, hawk engagement etc. However, building on the basis of previous work, 
the chapter elaborated a theory of coercive diplomacy and created a model with which to 
more accurately appraise US non-proliferation policy.  
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The validity of applying the model to US non-proliferation policy was also examined by 
analysing the contents of the official policy reports of successive US administrations, 
together with the validity of employing coercive diplomacy within the broader scope of 
traditional US diplomatic strategy. By comparing the stance of conventional US 
diplomatic strategy and its use of coercive diplomacy, the validity of applying the theory 
and the model developed in this research was examined.  
 
Chapter Four applied the contention model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy 
developed in Chapter Three to the US non-proliferation policy towards Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Using the comprehensive model, the study included all the independent 
variables and examined the contention between the US and Iran. The model 
incorporated the US, the EU3, the IAEA, the UN, Russia, Israel and China and 
examined how the influence of each variable was utilized by both the US and Iran as a 
means of inducement. 
 
By dividing the many years of contention between the US and Iran into short phases 
within the theoretical contention model, the chapter examined and clarified the process 
and results of each phase for both Iran and the US. Thus, the chapter uncovered the 
fallacies involved in the foreign policies and inducements in the coercive and counter-
coercive diplomacy between the US and Iran to derive a better understanding of the 
possibilities of resolving the situation. By modelling the whole contention process of the 
US’s coercive diplomacy and the counter-coercive diplomacy of Iran after the Cold War, 
the chapter examined the comprehensive dynamics of US non-proliferation contention 
with Iran and explained how its coercive diplomacy led to failure.  
 
Chapter Five used the same methodology and model applied in Chapter Four, but this 
time applied to US diplomatic coercion regarding the nuclear programme of North 
Korea. As in Chapter Four, it included all the independent variables related to non-
proliferation and North Korea. Thus, the policies of the US, South Korea, China, Russia, 
the UN and Japan towards North Korean nuclear development were examined within the 
contention model to see how these variables worked for or against non-proliferation and 
how they influenced the result in each phase of the contention process. 
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Since North Korea had already withdrawn from the IAEA, the context and the 
contention of US coercive diplomacy was more dynamic than in the Iranian case. North 
Korea’s counter-coercion during the contention process was more adamant and included 
nuclear tests and the launch of ICBM-capable rockets. However, this strong counter-
inducement against the US did not always work favourably for North Korea. Both 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five found that withdrawal from the IAEA is a double-edged 
sword. Although North Korea could freely proceed with nuclear development above the 
NPT limit to provoke the US and maximize the inducements of counter-coercive 
diplomacy, the absence of IAEA protection entailed a drop in ‘international support’ and 
the loss of justification for its counter-coercion – important conditions for the success of 
North Korean counter-coercive diplomacy. Using the comprehensive contention model, 
Chapter Five examined the reasons for the results of US non-proliferation policy 
towards North Korea in each phase of contention and how they influenced the latter’s 
nuclear strategy and led to the failure of non-proliferation.   
 
Overall, this study has clarified that US non-proliferation policy is based on a 
compellence strategy. Although the US approves of the nuclear development of certain 
countries such as India and Pakistan according to its national interests, the basic 
principle of its non-proliferation policy has clearly been revealed to be its compellence 
strategy. For this reason, this study has focused on the compellence and coercion 
literature to understand the theory of coercive diplomacy and build a comprehensive 
coercive diplomacy model to examine US strategy regarding nuclear non-proliferation.  
 
The nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea were selected as the case studies for 
this research because they resulted in archetypical US non-proliferation coercive 
diplomacy. The study has examined how US coercive diplomacy was implemented and 
what caused its failure in disarming Iran and North Korea. Using the comprehensive 
model of coercive diplomacy, it has analysed the fallacies involved in the contention 
process. Despite the various differences between the two countries, the contention model 
has displayed its high applicability to the topic of non-proliferation and the state strategy 
of compellence.  
 
The study has also revealed the dynamics of contention and how they proceeded to a 
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certain result in each phase of contention from the Clinton presidency to the first term of 
Obama. It has proposed a possible policy for more efficient US coercive diplomacy to 
bring a possible resolution in the future. Since the implementation of forceful persuasion 
in international politics is likely to continue as the foreign policy of strong states on 
various agendas, the contention model contributes to helping policy makers understand 
how to implement their coercive diplomacy when there is a clear asymmetry of power.  
 
 
6.3 The Implications of the Research for Non-Proliferation in Iran and North Korea 
 
Although the US had transitions of government three times after the Cold War, it 
sustained its compellence strategy, especially regarding the nuclear non-proliferation of 
states that could seriously damage the unipolar system of US hegemony. Despite 
differences in leadership, rhetoric and decision-making groups, all three administrations 
implemented coercive diplomacy against the nuclear programmes of Iran and North 
Korea by labelling them as rogues, ‘axis of evil’ members and ‘outposts of tyranny.’   
 
However, despite the US administrations executing compellence against the nuclear 
programmes of Iran and North Korea, it failed to understand the concepts of 
compellence and coercive diplomacy and to execute efficient coercion to achieve 
behavioural change in either country. Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic negotiation 
procedure that forcefully persuades the coercee to realize that compliance with the 
coercer’s demands is more profitable than resistance. However, with the exception of 
the coercive diplomacy that led to the 1994 Geneva agreed framework, the three US 
administrations set the CVID of Iran and North Korea as preconditions in their non-
proliferation coercive diplomacy and refused to negotiate with them to induce 
behavioural change. Although coercive diplomacy utilizes limited military intervention 
as inducements, it is not a strategy of bullying or seeking total surrender of the coercee. 
Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic strategy to artificially create a win-win agreement 
for both the coercer and the coercee. The US coercive diplomacy from Clinton to 
Obama’s first term failed to utilize inducements to negotiate the compliance of Iran and 
North Korea and thus strayed from the basic logic of coercive diplomacy theory. 
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The erratic coercive diplomacy that pervaded in the US’s attempts to achieve the CVID 
of Iran and North Korea was based on confidence in its dominant strength. The 
administrations from Clinton to Obama’s first term believed the US had the ability to 
squeeze both Iran and North Korea into nuclear disarmament, or at least contain the 
advance of their nuclear capabilities by ‘gradually turning the screw’ of coercive 
diplomacy. However, as this thesis has shown, the US coercive diplomacy neglected the 
basics of compellence theory and was countered by Iran and North Korea and resulted in 
them enhancing their nuclear capabilities.   
 
Since the nuclear development of Iran and North Korea ran counter to the national 
interests of neighbouring states, the US administrations calculated that if it displayed 
‘strong leadership’ and ‘strength of motivation’ – despite some difficulties – a 
‘consolidation of multilateral coercion’ would be formed to intensify the costs of non-
compliance to Iran and North Korea to coerce them towards nuclear dismantlement. 
However, by not engaging in negotiation to justify the support of other countries such a 
coalition of multilateral coercion could not be formed.  
 
As Chapter Four and Chapter Five showed, the US had several moments in which there 
were opportunities to induce Iran and North Korea to ratify the stricter 93+2 Additional 
Protocol and limit their nuclear enrichment to a few tens of centrifuges at the laboratory 
level. However, the US refused to negotiate anything other than the CVID of Iran and 
North Korea or anything surpassing the NPT.  
 
Coercive diplomacy might not be a sufficient condition but it was inevitably needed to 
reach the dismantlement of the nuclear programmes, or at least to degrade the nuclear 
capabilities, of Iran and North Korea. As has been shown, in the contention process of 
coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy the ‘motivation of strength’ and the ‘sense of 
urgency’ of Iran and North Korea were so high that they even considered going to war 
to keep their nuclear programmes. Of course, the wishful thinking of trusting the 
countries’ good will could not be the solution and the possibility of both countries 
abandoning their nuclear programmes or nuclear rights was slim or zero. Containment or 
appeasement could also not be alternatives as they would only buy time for their nuclear 
development. When the US took the stance of employing ‘try-and-see’ coercive 
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diplomacy, Iran and North Korea successfully increased their nuclear capabilities. The 
only times that the US succeeded in inducing Iran and North Korea to comply with its 
demands were when it offset their counter-coercive diplomacy by integrating flexible 
coercion with negotiation.     
 
The tools that North Korea and Iran used in their counter-coercive diplomacy can be put 
into two categories: 1) military deterrence, including missile capability; and 2) 
strengthening of diplomatic ties with the international community, especially with 
Russia and China, which seek a soft, or sometimes hard, balance with the US. Therefore, 
in order to offset their counter-coercive diplomacy and induce them to abandon their 
nuclear programmes, a multilateral framework of talks and negotiation is crucial. 
Although a bilateral framework is very efficient in negotiations and for the 
implementation of inducements, unilateral coercion has a low chance of achieving the 
compliance of the coercee within a strategic environment of coercive diplomacy that is 
highly influenced by the context and the environment of the subject matter. This was 
shown when the Obama administration imposed the most severe sanctions on Iran in 
2013, including on oil imports and exports. Although the sanctions hit the Iranian 
economy hard, they increased  China’s influence and leverage power over Iran by 
making China Iran’s number one export and import partner.  
 
As has been seen in this study, the consolidation of multilateral coercion is not an easy 
task. However, when the US created the momentum and legitimacy to lead the coercion 
it did make progress and induced Iran and North Korea to comply with its demands.  
Whenever it secured justification for stronger multilateral coercion, Iran and North 
Korea had to back down and suspend or decrease their nuclear capabilities.   
 
Once the multilateral framework of P5+1 and six-party talks was established, US 
coercive diplomacy towards the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran could not 
go beyond type B within the geopolitics and strategic environments of the Middle East 
and East Asia. Type C coercive diplomacy – non-proliferation through regime change in 
the two countries – was too risky for the participants with different national interests in 
Iran and North Korea. Thus, the US had to focus on building common ground with 
common interests in order to dismantle their nuclear programmes. Non-proliferation by 
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Iran and North Korea could be achieved if the US secured justification for its coercive 
diplomacy and flexibly shifted coercion back and forth between type A and type B with 
efficient inducements according to the circumstances and strategic environment.  
 
The failure of the US regarding non-proliferation by Iran and North Korea from Clinton 
to Obama’s first term was due to the inefficient policy which lacks on understanding of 
the theory of compellence and coercive diplomacy. This led to implementing inefficient 
inducements and an absence of negotiation by setting nuclear dismantlement as the 
precondition and not accepting the states’ sovereign rights to nuclear development 
which are assured under the NPT. That is, by setting the CVID of the nuclear 
programmes of North Korea and Iran as the precondition, the US attempted to achieve 
the objective of its coercive diplomacy too quickly. Therefore, it failed to build 
justification for the coercion or provide efficient inducements to compel the countries to 
abandon their nuclear programmes.  
 
In the literature on compellence and coercion theory, the optimal coercive diplomacy for 
the US to achieve non-proliferation in Iran and North Korea is as follows. First, it 
should secure justification for its coercive diplomacy against their nuclear programmes 
to consolidate the multilateral coercion from the P5+1 and the members of the six-party 
talks. Second, as a result of consolidating multilateral coercion, it should induce the two 
countries to accept the 93+2 additional protocol, which would naturally involve severe 
inspections and surveillance by the IAEA and NPT. This would trigger an immediate 
UNSC resolution if they breeched the additional protocol. Third, with the assurance of 
the IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group would aid the nuclear programmes of Iran and 
North Korea and at the same time keep tight control on their nuclear fuel to prevent 
misuse of it for nuclear arms. Although there would be the possibility of Iran and North 
Korea reneging on their decisions and restarting the development of nuclear arms, the 
risk would not be great with the nuclear fuel being managed by the NSG and facilities 
being inspected under the 93+2 additional protocol. Moreover, a clear breech of the 
NPT would bring more favourable conditions for the US to implement various 
inducements including a possible air strike. If these procedures could be achieved 
through US coercive diplomacy, it would be a ground-breaking milestone towards a 
nuclear-free world.  
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6.4 The Limits of the Study and Potential Avenues for Future Research 
 
Although both Iran and North Korea are located on the same continent of Asia, they are 
totally different countries in terms of geopolitics, culture, history, religion etc. However, 
as this study has shown, the nuclear strategies of the two countries during the contention 
process reveal many similarities, so that it has been possible to make a general policy 
proposal applicable to both. Moreover, since these two countries are archetypical states 
developing nuclear programmes despite US non-proliferation coercive diplomacy, there 
are important implications for understanding the strategy of any other state that may 
attempt to possess nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapon capability in the future. If 
research can identify the commonalities in the counter-strategies of Iran and North 
Korea against US non-proliferation policy, potential future nuclear proliferation threats 
can be dealt with efficiently to achieve stable resolutions.   
 
Future research should focus on four common features shared by Iran and North Korea 
to not only guides US coercive diplomacy against nuclear proliferation by these two 
countries but also that by other potential nuclear proliferation states that share these 
commonalities. They are as follows: 
 
(1) Patrimonial Rules and Neo-clerical Patrimonial Rules  
 
Values which differs from those of democracy. Iran and North Korea share some 
similarity in their political systems that can be defined as patrimonial rules. North Korea 
is a typical totalitarian regime with patrimonial rules and Iran could be defined as neo-
clerical with patrimonial rules. As Max Weber argued, “with the development of a 
purely personal administrative staff, especially a military force under the control of the 
chief, traditional authority tends to develop into ‘patrimonialism.’ ” Both supreme 
leaders have firm authority over their militaries. Moreover, North Korea and Iran both 
have dual structures of elected and unelected authority that protects their basic values: 
the Juche ideology and Velayat-e faqih. Maintaining Juche, which is a monotheistic 
religious-like faith in the Kim dynasty, and governance by Islamic jurists take priority 
over any other values in the respective states. Therefore, the state systems and 
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governance structures are also designed to uphold these values. Thus, Iran and North 
Korea have higher tolerance levels of coercive diplomacy in order to protect their 
regime security than democratic countries with similar deterrence capabilities. This 
means that they can sustain an ‘asymmetry of motivation’ in their strong counter-
coercive diplomacy. As seen in the case studies in this thesis, Iran and North Korea 
displayed high levels of resistance against US coercion. Certainly, a simplistic 
comparison between a garrison state with a ‘military first’ policy and the theocratic 
Islamic republic of Iran, which has many more democratic features, cannot be possible. 
However, in the contention process of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy, they 
display similarity in their nuclear strategies.     
 
(2) A Siege Mentality  
 
Both Iran and North Korea share a siege mentality resulting from long-lasting economic 
sanctions and external military threats. The demise of the Soviet Union and the loss of 
its nuclear umbrella in 1989 made North Korea feel defenceless. In 1991, North Korea’s 
net profits from trade and exports had plummeted from 2.6 billion dollars to 300 million 
dollars due to the loss of trade with the Soviet Union. Moreover, while North Korea 
failed to normalize its relations with the US and Japan, South Korea restored full 
diplomatic ties with Russia in 1990 and China in 1992. Furthermore, it successfully 
normalized diplomatic relations with ten countries from the former Soviet Union. A 
sensation of marginalization made North Korea start to realise the importance of its 
nuclear programme for regime survival.    
 
Iran has faced a number of the external threats since the 1979 Islamic revolution. These 
include the Iran-Iraq war, economic sanctions, the US 5th fleet in the Strait of Hormuz, 
surrounding US military bases, and possible air strikes by Israel. However, even though 
Iran and North Korea share the same siege mentality, their perspectives on their nuclear 
programmes are different. Unlike North Korea, Iran does not need nuclear weapons for 
regime survival. However, as Gallup discovered in a 2012 survey, 57% of Iranians 
support the nuclear programme while only 19% disagree. Furthermore, a World Public 
Opinion poll which was conducted after the controversial presidential election of 
Ahmadinejad in 2009 revealed that 90% of both the general public and supporters of the 
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reformist Mousavi supported the Iranian nuclear programme. The impact of the siege 
mentality on both countries is that the nuclear programme is not just a question of 
energy supply but one of pride and state dignity.   
 
(3) The Utilization of International Politics 
 
North Korea and Iran share another similarity in that they utilize international relations 
as a tool in their counter-coercive diplomacy. Since Iran and North Korea have been 
labelled members of the ‘axis of evil’ which opposes the US, both countries have built 
strategic relationships with Russia and China, which try to achieve soft balances with 
the US in each region. As the case studies have shown, North Korea and Iran use China 
and Russia to reduce the cost of non-compliance with US coercive diplomacy. China 
and Russia use their veto power in the UNSC and economically and technically support 
Iran and North Korea. By exploiting the balance of power in international politics, Iran 
and North Korea succeeded in increasing their nuclear capabilities.          
 
(4) Missile Development 
 
Missile development is an area in which Iran and North Korea had direct cooperation. 
Exchanges of missile technology between North Korea and Iran have been revealed in 
many government reports, news reports and studies. In 2006, Iran officially announced 
its relationship with North Korea and that it had purchased Scud missiles in the 1980s. 
Although the IRGC claims that aid from North Korea is no longer necessary due to 
advances in Iranian missile technology, Michael Elleman of IISS claims that Iran still 
imports key components of the Shahab missile from North Korea or third countries.  
Declassified US intelligence documents from the 2000s also assessed that North Korea-
Iran missile cooperation was ongoing and significant in building both countries’ ICBMs.   
 
Not only do the two countries cooperate on missile development but they both use 
missile development as a means of counter-coercive diplomacy. As shown in this thesis, 
in order to increase the enforcement cost of US coercive diplomacy, both Iran and North 
Korea developed missile capabilities. With increases in their missiles’ maximum range 
and acquisition of the ability to strike allies of the US, both countries increased their 
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deterrence capabilities to gain more leverage over the US.      
 
Regardless of the differences between them, Iran and North Korea show many 
similarities in terms of their nuclear strategies and their diplomatic contention against 
the US regarding their nuclear programmes. Examination of these commonalities in 
future research could lead to advances in US policy to solve nuclear proliferation in Iran 
and North Korea.  
 
Like all academic studies, this research also has its limits. Although its theoretical 
framework has been derived from the work of many previous scholars in order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of coercion, since the concepts of state coercive 
diplomacy and coercion come from the realism school of international relations, the 
‘contention model of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy’ used to examine state 
foreign policy in this study shares the tenets of realism. Thus, if the findings and the 
model employed in this research remain without further investigation, they cannot 
overcome the limits of the realism school.  
 
For example, although the theoretical framework and the contention model consider the 
mutuality of diplomatic coercion, they cannot explain all the decisions taken by the 
agents involved. Abandoning a fully-fledged nuclear programme in exchange for the 
rewards of diplomatic normalization, the lifting of sanctions, economic aid and the 
provision of nuclear fuel and infrastructure for the new nuclear facility could be seen as 
a rational choice for a state that maximizes its expected utility. However, as shown in 
this study, North Korea and Iran refused that offer and decided to maintain their nuclear 
programmes.  
 
The rational choice theory of realism, which cannot explain this behaviour, easily leads 
to a perception that Iran and North Korea are irrational actors, a ‘mad dog’ and a ‘mad 
mullah.’ There is therefore a tendency to consider the nuclear strategies of North Korea 
and Iran as strategies of ‘brinkmanship,’ based on the risky choice of gambling. 
However, ironically, as shown in this study, Iran and North Korea displayed their 
rationality during the contention of coercive and counter-coercive diplomacy to achieve 
their objectives. In each phase of the contention model, North Korea and Iran proved 
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that they are rational actors which shrewdly calculate risk and form their counter-
coercive diplomacy.  
 
Since the arguments of existing international relations theories such as realism, 
liberalism and idealism are based on the rational choice theory of economics, the 
rational choice to maximize profit has been naturally perceived as a precondition for 
decision makers in the policymaking process in international politics. 
 
Mainstream international relations and politics theory focuses on analysing the 
possibility of international cooperation based on profit and gains for states or for agents. 
The question of loss and its influence on international cooperation between states and 
agents is relatively easily neglected. However, if a ‘gain’ in the national interest is an 
important variable in analysing international relations and politics, vice versa loss to a 
state or an agent is also an important variable. From this perspective, prospect theory has 
important implications for the analysis of a state that decides to make a risky choice in 
the decision making process which is seen as irrational by the coercer. This is relevant to 
the nuclear politics of Iran and North Korea. 
 
Prospect theory sees rational choices by an agent as being affected by the status of the 
agent itself.661 That is, the preference of a state or an agent may change according to its 
status, domain of loss or domain of gain. Briefly, it can be explained that when an agent 
is situated in the domain of gain, in which either choice will bring a profit, an agent 
would have a tendency to avoid a risky choice. On the contrary, if an agent is positioned 
in the domain of loss, it becomes more audacious in making risky choices.     
 
It is at this point that this study and its model could expand and further develop. To 
overcome the given limitations, future research should adopt actor-specific theories 
which could be bolstered by the behavioural economics of rational choice to further 
develop coercive diplomacy theory and the contention model. 
 
 
                                                                
661  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 
Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1979, pp. 263-265. 
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